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Preface
The main topic of this volume is the central role of attributes and frames in the
representation of meaning in linguistics and the cognitive sciences. Many of the
articles are inspired by the inWuential work of Barsalou (1992) on the fundamental
role of frames in human cognition. Barsalou’s approach builds on two important
insights: (i) features or attributes are essential for the structuring of conceptual
representations and (ii) the values of attributes can themselves have attributes.
The second point leads to recursively structured attribute value structures, i. e.,
to frames. As shown by Barsalou, frames provide a more adequate format for
conceptual representations than simple feature lists. The Vrst point, on the other
hand, emphasizes the importance of functionality per se: not arbitrary many-to-
many relations but functional, i. e., many-to-one relations constitute the backbone
of conceptual organization.
The articles in this volume are organized into Vve sections according to the
particular topics they address:
I. Introduction to Concept Types and Frames
The Vrst section consists of two contributions which elaborate on the ideas out-
lined above and thereby serve as preparatory reading for the following articles,
which deal with more speciVc topics. In his paper ‘Functional Concepts and
Frames,’ Sebastian Löbner argues for the crucial role of functionality in the
construction and organization of meaning. Starting out from Partee’s rising tem-
perature puzzle, he discusses the signiVcance of individual and functional nouns
in the analysis of intensional constructions. Both noun types are characterized
by unique reference and together with sortal and relational nouns they form a
system of four basic types of nouns. This system results from the two binary
features ‘inherent uniqueness’ and ‘inherent relationality’ already assumed in
Löbner (1985, 2011). In the second part of the paper, Löbner relates functional
concepts to Barsalou’s frame model by pointing out that frames are recursive
attribute-value structures in which the attributes are functional concepts. Hence,
if frames can be assumed as the general format of concepts in human cognition,
this means, on the one hand, that categorization is handled in terms of functional
concepts and, on the other, that functional nouns represent the type of concepts
human cognition is based on.
Wiebke Petersen’s contribution ‘Representation of Concepts as Frames’ is a
reprint of a paper which was originally published in 2007. Petersen presents a Vrst
approach to the formalization of Barsalou’s key ideas on frames as the general
format of mental concepts. Her proposal also integrates the four-way system of
nominal concept types proposed by Löbner. She deVnes frames as directed graphs
with labeled nodes and arcs and demonstrates how the concept type distinction is
reWected in the structure of the frame graphs of lexical concepts. Furthermore,
Petersen provides a formal account of attributes and the connection between
functional concepts and frame attributes which abandons the artiVcial distinction
between types and attributes in type signatures.
II. Nominal Concept Types and Determination
The four papers in the second section of the volume are concerned with the con-
cepts referred to by nominal expressions and the diUerent ways the particular
kind of reference is established. In her contribution ‘Uniqueness of the DeVnite
Article,’ Ryo Oda discusses the so-called ‘conVgurational use’ of deVnite descrip-
tions such as the hospital in a sentence like In Paris, I caught the measles and I went
to the hospital to receive treatment. Oda argues that although this use at Vrst sight
seems to be problematic for the uniqueness theory of deVniteness, it indeed can
be regarded as expressing a unique role in a cognitive frame evoked by the context
and the situation of utterance. More precisely, the hospital plays a unique role in
a ‘medical care’ frame activated by the context of ‘catching the measles.’ In ad-
dition, Oda compares the conVgurational use of deVnites with deVnite associative
anaphora pointing out both parallels and diUerences.
Alexander Ziem also investigates the reference of a particular type of nominal
expression in his paper ‘Barsalou Frames and the Case of Associative Anaphora.’
He argues that traditional accounts of associative anaphora suUer from a number
of shortcomings whereas a frame approach has the potential to overcome these
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deVcits. In this regard, Ziem compares Barsalou’s cognitive frame theory and
the FrameNet enterprise as the currently most prominent approaches to frames
and discusses the shortcomings and advantages of both. He then shows how the
insights of both approaches can be combined in a proper analysis of associative
anaphora.
In their paper ‘The DeVniteness EUect and a New ClassiVcation of Possessive
Constructions,’ Yuko Kobukata and Yoshiki Mori take a close look at the way
in which possessive verbs such as English have and the noun referring to the pos-
sessum interact in determining the deVniteness of the possessum NP. The authors
argue that the deVniteness of the object NP is dependent on the possessive inter-
pretation of the construction, contrary to the established view that it results from
the (in)alienability of the possessum. By comparing diUerent readings of the pos-
sessive construction in English and Japanese, Kobukata and Mori propose a new
classiVcation of interpretations from which the deVniteness of the possessum NP
in both English and Japanese can be predicted.
Doris Gerland and Christian Horn’s article ‘Referential Properties of Nouns
across Languages’ is a reprint of a paper that appeared Vrst in 2010. Building
on Löbner’s theory of conceptual noun types, the authors present a study which
tests the assumption that diUerent noun types have a predisposition for partic-
ular determination types due to their respective referential properties. On the
basis of typologically diUerent languages Gerland and Horn show that a noun
undergoes a systematic referential modiVcation (or: type shift) if it is used with
a diUerent determination type. They furthermore introduce the notion of PEICs
(permanently established individual concepts) which explains unexpected deter-
mination patterns of certain kinds of noun types.
III. The Meaning of Adjectives, Nouns, and Verbs
The three contributions in the third section of the volume deal with the con-
ceptual properties of adjectives, nouns, and verbs. The particular questions the
authors focus on highlight characteristics of the respective lexical category, such
as the function of an adjective to serve as a modiVer or the ability of nouns to
refer to events. In his paper ‘Manner ModiVcation in Adjectives,’ Sascha Alex-
ejenko examines adjectives such as skillful in skillful surgeon which have tradi-
tionally been considered as non-intersective intensional modiVers. Alexejenko
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argues against the intensionality of these adjectives and proposes an alternative
account in which they are analyzed as manner modiVers of event arguments in-
troduced by the modiVed nouns. Alexejenko furthermore assumes that the event
argument is bound by a generic quantiVer in order to account for the fact that
adjective noun combinations of the type under discussion are usually interpreted
habitually and do not allow for nouns related to singular events as in #a skillful
inventor of an artiVcial language.
Irene Russo and Tommaso Caselli deal with the meaning of event nouns
in their contribution ‘Converging Evidences on the Eventivity of Italian Nouns.’
They propose a measure for the eventivity of deverbal and non-deverbal nouns
that relies on syntagmatic cues in corpus data such as the co-occurrence of a noun
with event-related verbs like continuare ‘to continue’ and cominciare ‘begin’ but
also takes speakers’ judgments into consideration. Russo and Caselli argue that
a measure for eventivity is useful for practical implementations as well as for
theoretical improvements and for the detection of coerced non-eventive nouns.
Brigitte Schwarze andHans Geisler present an account of the evolution of a
particular subclass of stative verbs in their article ‘Diachrony of Stative Dimen-
sional Verbs in French.’ Verbs of this type encode a single dimension and allow
for the speciVcation of a value along this dimension. For instance, the verbs peser
‘weigh’ and coûter ‘cost’ encode the dimensions weight and price, respectively,
and permit the external realization of a value for this dimension as in peser 2 kilos
‘weigh 2 kilos’ and coûter 5 euros ‘cost 5 euros.’ The authors put a particular focus
on stative dimensional verbs which evolve from verbs originally encoding sen-
sorimotor concepts like main body postures (e. g. standing) or elementary hand
actions (e. g. grasping). They investigate the historical processes which lead to
the development of these verbs paying special attention to the relation between
source concepts and the emergence of speciVc dimensional readings.
IV. Semantic Fields
The two articles in the fourth section investigate the meaning of expressions that
belong to particular lexico-semantic Velds. In her paper ‘Linguistic Realizations
of the Concept of FEAR,’ Liane Ströbel investigates the semantic Veld of fear
expressions in French. Based on a deVnition of the diUerent stages and parameters
involved in the experience of fear, Ströbel analyzes a variety of diUerent aspects
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of the linguistic realization of the concept of ‘fear.’ Her investigation covers the
semantic range of nominal fear expressions such as French peur and anxiété, the
conceptual sources of prototypical fear metaphors and metonymies as well as
verbal strategies and the reanalysis of fear lexemes as intensity markers.
Alexander Tokar presents a classiVcation of mechanisms for the formation of
metonymy-based euphemisms such as the use of boyfriend to refer to the taboo-
marked concept ‘male sexual partner in a non-marital sexual relationship.’ In
his contribution ‘Metonymic Euphemisms from a Cognitive Linguistic Point of
View,’ metonymies of this type are analyzed as the product of a limited number
of major strategies which all involve the violation of at least one of the three
cognitive principles important over less important, specific over generic and
more true over less true. Tokar also discusses the relation of metonymy-based
euphemisms to euphemisms derived by diUerent types of metaphors (conceptual
vs. one-shot metaphors).
V. Concepts in Philosophy and Psychiatry
The last section contains philosophical and psychiatric papers which discuss con-
ceptual analysis as an experimental method, analyze action-related concepts, and
explore the structure of standard classiVcatory texts in psychiatry. In his paper
‘Philosophical Conceptual Analysis,’ Michael T. Stuart examines the role of in-
tuitions in conceptual analysis. In particular, he argues for the signiVcance of
experimental interpretation as a foundation of philosophical conceptual analy-
sis. The author develops the idea that Davidson’s theory of radical interpretation,
which involves the principle of charity, can serve as a basis for philosophical
conceptual analysis. The central argument is that conceptual analysis functions
analogously to linguistic understanding in general and therefore makes use of
the same mechanisms: the use of the concept in question is interpreted on the
basis of self-interpretation to maximize the truth of the underlying beliefs while
rationality is presupposed.
The central thesis of grounded cognition is that concepts are grounded in
sensorimotor processes. In their contribution ‘Analyzing Concepts in Action-
Frames,’ Gottfried Vosgerau, Tim Seuchter and Wiebke Petersen argue for
a frame-based analysis of action-related concepts as a means for understanding
the theory of grounded cognition. They introduce frames for action-related con-
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cepts and discuss the advantages of a frame-based analysis over other methods of
analysis. It turns out that frames are Wexible enough to allow for a speciVcation
of the sensorimotor parts of a concept and to highlight abstraction mechanisms
within concepts at the same time. The analysis also oUers a way to represent
modal attributes without introducing modal operators.
In their paper ‘Applying Frame Theory to Psychiatric ClassiVcation,’ Jürgen
Zielasek and his coauthors explore the potential of frames for the description of
the three disorders schizophrenia, speciVc phobias and Parkinson’s disease. They
apply Barsalou’s frames to analyze the structure of operationalized classiVcatory
texts which oUer a rule-based method of diagnosis. Their results show that Barsa-
lou’s frame theory allows for a novel standardized approach to analyzing concepts
of psychiatric classiVcation which gives access to the internal structure of classi-
Vcation systems. The authors also discuss problems for the frame analysis that
are yet to be solved, such as the representation of temporal and causal aspects of
mental disorders.
References
Barsalou, L. W. 1992. Frames, concepts, and conceptual Velds. In A. Lehrer & E.
F. Kittay (eds.), Frames, Velds, and contrasts: New essays in semantic and lexical
organization, 21–74. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Löbner, S. 1985. DeVnites. Journal of Semantics 4. 279–326.
Löbner, S. 2011. Concept types and determination. Journal of Semantics 28. 279–
333.
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Introduction to
Concept Types and Frames

Functional Concepts and Frames
Sebastian Löbner
Abstract
The central point of this paper is the observation that attributes in Barsalou frames
are functional concepts. If Barsalou is correct in assuming that frames in his sense
constitute the universal format of human cognitive representations, the observa-
tion means that human conceptualization is entirely in terms of functional con-
cepts. This raises interest in this particular type of concept. Functional concepts
appear in natural language mainly in the form of functional nouns. This type of
noun did not get much attention in semantics. The paper therefore Vrst reviews
the notion of individual and functional nouns in formal semantics, departing from
Barbara Partee’s rising temperature puzzle. The second part turns to a general def-
inition of Barsalou frames as recursive attribute-value structures with functional
attribute and identiVes functional concepts as their basic components. It is argued
that the functional concept vocabulary is a recent development in natural language
lexica which is closely related to scientiVc evolution.
1 Introduction
It is the aim of this paper to argue that functional concepts are of fundamental
importance for semantic analysis and for cognitive theory. They are important
for semantics because they constitute a logical and grammatical type of nouns
of its own. They are important to cognitive theory because of the fundamental
role they play in categorization. Following Barsalou (1992a, 1992b), I hypothesize
that frames in Barsalou’s sense constitute the universal format of concepts in
human cognition; i. e. the universal format for the representation of arbitrary
objects and categories. Frames in the sense of Barsalou’s are recursive attribute-
value structures, similar to those used e. g. in HPSG1 and other formalisms. What
1 Head-Driven Phrase Structure Grammar, initiated by Pollard & Sag (1994).
Thomas Gamerschlag, Doris Gerland, Rainer Osswald & Wiebke Petersen
(eds.). 2015. Meaning, Frames, and Conceptual Representation. Düsseldorf:
dup.
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constitutes the connection between frames and functional concepts is the fact that
the attributes in Barsalou frames are functional concepts which assign values to
their arguments. If the hypothesis is correct, it follows that all representations of
objects and categories in human cognition are exclusively in terms of functional
concepts.
When I refer to “functional concepts”, I do not mean words, but cognitive
structures of representation, ultimately implemented in neuronal structures of
the brain. Languages may have lexical expressions for some of these functional
concepts, e. g. words such as English name, size, shape, color, meaning, head, bot-
tom, root, mother, or cholesterol level. But languages diUer widely in this respect.
In those languages that exhibit a rich vocabulary of terms for functional concepts,
many of these expressions are relatively young. It will be argued below that func-
tional concepts play a key role in scientiVc theory. The repertory of functional
concept terms in a language to a good deal reWects the stage of development of sci-
entiVc reasoning. This holds in particular for abstract functional concepts. Nouns
that carry the meaning of a functional concept will be referred to as “functional
nouns”. Functional concepts are not necessarily expressed by nouns. There are
also verbs that immediately express functional concepts, e. g. cost or weigh, cor-
responding to the functional nouns price and weight, respectively (for a survey
article see Gamerschlag 2014).
In the following, I will introduce the notion of functional concepts from a se-
mantic point of view, by recalling and analyzing Partee’s famous rising temper-
ature paradox (§ 2). The discussion of functional nouns will then be embedded
into the distinction of a system of four basic types of nouns, including in addi-
tion sortal, individual, and relational nouns (§ 3). In § 4, I will introduce Barsalou
frames, showing that they essentially are networks of functional assignments in
terms of attributes. This provides the crucial link between functional concepts
and frames. § 5 will brieWy discuss the role of frames, functional concepts, and
functional nouns in science. § 6 will formulate the conclusions of the discussion.
2 Partee’s paradox recalled
2.1 The temperature is rising
Montague (1973) cites an example of Barbara Partee’s that constitutes an apparent
paradox: The sentences in (1a) and (1b) do not entitle the inference of (1c).
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(1) (a) The temperature is rising.
(b) The temperature is ninety.
(c) Ninety is rising.
The example appears to contradict a fundamental law of predicate logic, ascribed
to Leibniz: If a predication P is true of an individual a, and a is identical with b,
then P is also true of b.
(2) Leibniz’ Law
P(a) a predication about some individual a
a = b identity of individuals a and b
P(b) the same predication about b
Partee’s example is not free of problems. It has been objected (cf. JackendoU
1979) that (1b) does not constitute an identity statement but rather is used to
express the location of the temperature value on a scale. According to Thomason
(1979), the predication in (1c) constitutes a category mistake.2 Also it may be
objected that the expression ninety does not refer to the same object in (1b) and
(1c). While these objections are justiVed from a linguistic point of view, they can
be avoided in several ways (cf. Löbner 1981, Löbner 1979:23f, Lasersohn 2005).
One way to save the argument intended by Partee is to consider examples such as
the following:
(3) (a) The US president will change.
(b) The US president is Barack Obama.
(c) Barack Obama will change.
Assume we relate these sentences to some time when Barack Obama is in oXce as
US president. Assume further that change in (3a) means ‘be replaced’3. Obviously,
(3a) and (3b) do not entail (3c) if change is taken in that meaning, which of course
is necessary if (3) is taken to represent an instance of Leibniz’ Law. In fact, it can
be argued that (3c), with that reading of change, not only does not follow from
the two premises, but in fact is semantically abnormal. A remaining problem with
2 This fact does not really show that the argument is wrong. Whether (1c) is logically possible and
does not follow from the two premises or whether the conclusion is necessarily false, or altogether
senseless – the fact remains that the entailment is invalid.
3 Single quotes are used for representing meanings and the contents of concepts.
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(3) is the fact that sentences (3a) and (3c) both have another reading with change
construed as ‘become diUerent’. With this reading of change, (3) does constitute
a valid instance of Leibniz’ Law. This problem does not arise in the German
equivalents of the three statements if change is translated as wechseln which has
the reading ‘be replaced’ but not ‘become diUerent’:
(4) (a) Der US-Präsident wird wechseln.
(b) Der US-Präsident ist Barack Obama.
(c) Barack Obama wird wechseln.
What is expressed in (4), and was intended in (1), is the following. The ref-
erent of the subject NP varies with the time of reference: there is a temporal
sequence of US presidents as there are temperatures varying in time. For the
nouns US-Präsident and temperature, there are functions from times to persons
and temperature values, respectively, which yield for every time the current ref-
erent of the noun. Note that for these nouns there is necessarily at most one
referent at every time and in a given context.4 In sentences like (5a,b), the NPs
refer just to the actual values at the given time of reference, and the predications
expressed by the respective VPs take these as their arguments.
(5) (a) The temperature is low.
(b) The US president is married.
Consequently, no paradox like that in (4) will arise with the sentences in (5);
consider the valid inference in (6).
(6) (a) The US president is married.
(b) The US president is Barack Obama.
(c) Barack Obama is married.
Crucially, the predications in (4a) and (1a) express a change in time of what
the subject refers to: the referent of der US-Präsident is replaced, as is the refer-
ent of the subject NP the temperature if the temperature rises. The Vrst premise,
therefore, is a statement of the type p(f, te) where p represents the predication
4 Uniqueness of reference here is not due to the deVnite article, but a fact inherent to the meanings of
the nouns US-Präsident and temperature. The deVnite article is redundant. See Löbner (1985) and
Löbner (2011) for the role of deVniteness marking with functional nouns.
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‘change/wechseln’ or ‘be rising’ and f represents the function from times to enti-
ties which assigns a US president, or a temperature, respectively, to every time;
te is the implicit time of reference, or evaluation time, which the statement relates
to. Roughly, (4a) says that there is a time t > te where f(t) 6= f(te); (1a) states that
f′(te) > 0, where f′ is the Vrst derivative of f with respect to t, i. e. df(t)/dt. Thus,
the content of (1a) and (4a) is a predication of the type:
(7) (a) p(f, te) where f: TIME −→ E (E some appropriate set of entities)
The second premise in (4) and (1) states that the value of f for the time of reference
te is a particular one. In (4), the second premise constitutes an identity statement,
in (1) it can at least be taken as an equivalent of an identity statement.
(7) (b) f(te) = Barack Obama
f(te) = 90°
In Leibniz’ Law, the second premise states that the argument of the predication
in the Vrst premise is identical with some object b. The two statements in (7b) are
identity statements about f(te), i. e. about theindividual that constitutes the value
of the function f for the time of reference. This, however, is not the argument
of the predication in (7a). p in (7a) has two arguments, the function f and the time
te, and the two-place predication cannot be reduced to a one-place predication
about f(te): der US-Präsident wird wechseln is not a predication that just concerns
the president of the US at time te; the analogue holds for the rising temperature
statement.
Consequently, the apparent paradox can be resolved by observing that the
second premise does not constitute a relevant identity statement for the Leibniz
entailment.
2.2 The nature of the example
Partee’s paradox is cited by Montague as an instance of an intensional subject
construction in the Vrst premise, something originally assumed not to exist (Lewis
1970). To see what an intensional construction is, let us Vrst deVne the notion of
an extensional construction. In the framework of Montague’s5, the extension
5 Montague (1973)
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of a noun is the set of its potential referents in a given context of utterance.
(Montague would talk of a possible world index instead of a context of utterance.)
For example, the extension of cow in a particular context of utterance would be
the set of all cows given in that context of utterance. The extension of US president
would be the (one and only) US president, the person in oXce, in that context. A
sentence construction is extensional with respect to a certain NP position, if the
NP can be replaced by any other NP with the same extension without changing
the truth-value of the sentence. For example, the valid entailment in (6) shows
that the sentence in (6a) (the US president is married) is extensional with respect
to the subject position: Let (6b) (the US president is Barack Obama) be true; it then
follows that the NPs the US president and Barack Obama have the same extension.
Consequently, (6c) is true because the construction NP is married is a predication
about the extension of the subject NP.
A construction is intensional, if it is not extensional. In Montague’s terminol-
ogy, the intension of an expression is a function that returns for every possible
context of utterance the extension of the expression. In the case of US president
and temperature, the intension returns the current US president and the temper-
ature, respectively, for a given context of utterance. The sentences in (1a) and
(4a) are intensional since the VP predicates about the extensions of the subject
NP at more than one time, i. e. in diUerent possible contexts of utterance. In
intensional constructions, the truth value may change, if the NP is replaced by
another NP with just the same extension. For example, if in a given context of
utterance the US president is Michelle’s husband, and the US president changes,
it does not follow that Michelle’s husband changes. Intensional constructions
represent a predication about the intension of the NP which cannot be logically
reduced to a predication about its extension (otherwise, the construction would
be extensional).
Although (1a) is clearly not extensional, Partee’s example met some opposition
as an instance of a construction with intensional subject position. Examples of
intensional (or ‘opaque’) constructions known in the historical context of the
early 1970s were sentences such as the following, with an intensional object NP:
(8) (a) Hank is seeking a unicorn.
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There are two readings to the sentence, one in which it entails (8b), and the
crucial, opaque one, in which it does not.
(8) (b) There is a unicorn that Hank is seeking.
The source of intensionality here is diUerent from the ‘rising temperature’
cases. The verb seek in its relevant reading does not express a predication about
the extension of the object NP at all. The actual extension of the object NP does
not matter. Hank may seek a unicorn even if no unicorns exist, in fact, even if
Hank does not believe in the existence of unicorns himself. The object NP renders
a description related to the intention of the seeker rather than to some object in
the world. Because of the diUerent nature of intensionality in the classical ex-
amples of the type in (8a), the rising-temperature examples were considered not
intensional proper (e. g. Dowty, Wall & Peters 1981:279-286), although the non-
extensional character manifest in the apparent failure of Leibniz’ Law was mostly
acknowledged.6
A further fundamental diUerence between the two types of intensionality con-
cerns the logical type of noun involved. The construction in (8a) is possible with
special verbs such as seek, design, imagine, expect and almost all types of nouns,
including sortal nouns, relational nouns, proper names and functional nouns (see
the next section for the distinction). The Partee example, by contrast, requires a
special type of noun for its intensional NP argument, as we will see now.
3 Types of nouns
3.1 Individual nouns and concepts
The rising-temperature, or changing-president, construction represents a predi-
cation about the changing referent of the subject NP. The meaning of the noun
must be such that it yields for every appropriate context of utterance a particu-
lar object as the unique referent. If the predication of the construction concerns
variation in time, the subject noun has to deVne a function from times to an ap-
propriate type of entities, e. g. persons or temperature values. Such nouns are of
a particular logical type. They are inherently unique. The concept they express
6 JackendoU (1979) argues for an extensional analysis of the temperature is rising; see Löbner (1981)
for a reply.
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deVnes a function that returns a unique referent to every appropriate context of
utterance.7 In former publications I therefore referred to this type of nouns as
“functional nouns”, and the corresponding type of concepts as “functional con-
cepts” (“FC1” in Löbner 1985, 1998) or “FunktionalbegriUe” in German (“FB1”
in Löbner 1979). To avoid confusion, and join established terminology, e. g. in
Janssen (1984), I will use the terms individual concept and individual noun here, as
I did in Löbner (2011). Thus temperature and US-Präsident are individual nouns,
and their meanings are individual concepts.
The subject terms of the rising-temperature or changing-president construc-
tion need not only express an individual concept that assigns referents to times.
In addition, the underlying functions must be able to return diUerent values at
diUerent times. Otherwise the predication about the temporal variation of the
value of the function would be inapplicable for logical reasons. The latter re-
quirement for the nouns in subject position is responsible for the awkwardness
of the sentences in (1c) and (4c): NPs such as ninety or Barack Obama do not have
diUerent referents at diUerent times.
The type of intensionality observed with (1a) and (4a) is also possible with
transitive verb constructions such as:
(9) (a) The coach replaced the goalkeeper.
(b) The government raised the exchange rate.
To see the diUerence between these intensional constructions and ordinary
extensional ones, consider the verb grow. If I say, for example, the sentence in
(10), I refer to a particular child now and the same child some time ago, when her
height was measured the last time.
(10) The child has grown 2 centimeters.
Contrary to predications such as wechseln in (4a), grow here requires that the
referent of the subject NP remains identical over time. It would be a joke playing
with this logical requirement if I would use (10) for a situation where the child
has been replaced by some other child which happens to be 2 cm taller than the
7 Quite generally, there will be contexts where a given inherently unique noun fails to refer; every
functional noun presupposes certain general conditions, or “appropriate context”, for successful
reference. For example, US president fails to refer if the time of reference is in the 16th century, or
husband of Amy lacks reference if Amy is not married.
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former one. The required constancy of the argument over time is what makes the
verb grow in (10) an extensional predicate term.
Not incidentally, the verb grow can also be used in the intensional construction,
similarly to rise in (1a), if the subject noun is an abstract individual noun:
(11) The gross national product grew 0.3 per cent.
The GNP is an abstract Vgure; the noun refers to whatever is the current GNP
value. If the GNP grows, the noun changes its referent. This is not true of persons,
or trees. If they grow, it is only one attribute, among many, that changes; the
growing organism remains the same organism.
The particular logical character of the constructions in (1a), (4a) and (9a,b) is
veiled by the fact that the constructions not only use the same syntax as their
extensional counterparts, but they also use the same vocabulary. First, the indi-
vidual nouns occurring here can also be used as the heads of argument terms for
extensional constructions (cf. (5a,b)); in fact they mostly are. Second, the pred-
icate terms, mostly verbs, usually have extensional uses as well, which are more
frequent, more basic and older. For example, rise can also be used extensionally as
in (12a), and wechseln as in (12b):
(12) (a) The mercury is rising.
(b) Hans wechselt auf die andere Straßenseite.
‘lit. Hans changes to the other side of the street.’
In English or German, there do not seem to be many verbs that occur exclusively
in the VP position of the rising-temperature construction. English vary and its
German equivalent variieren are among the rare examples. The existence of pairs
such as extensional the mercury is rising vs. intensional the temperature is rising,
or the extensional vs. the intensional reading of the president has changed is rather
typical.
Partee’s paradox did not have too much impact on the intensionality debate in
early formal semantics. Its importance lies in the fact that Partee came across a
linguistic construction speciVc for individual nouns. The discovery of inherently
unique nouns, and its signiVcance, was not immediately recognized. In fact,
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intensional constructions of this type were widely ignored8 and the relevance
of the subcategory of individual nouns for other constructions was not realized9.
3.2 Functional nouns and concepts
The noun temperature is used in (1) without a possessor speciVcation and given
that the example is to be interpreted out of any special context, no implicit pos-
sessor speciVcation is presupposed to be provided. In this use, temperaturemeans
‘temperature of the air’. In general, however, the notion of temperature is a re-
lational concept: temperature of some physical entity, be it a gas, a liquid or solid,
or light.10 Relational nouns like temperature – e. g. size, weight, speed, color, shape
– denote a certain conceptual dimension of some object. The object is usually
speciVed by means of a possessive construction. The whole denotes the unique
value in that dimension of the ‘possessor’ object.
Similarly, the component president of the term US president is a relational noun,
since a president, due to the underlying concept, is always the president of some-
thing, a country, some institution, society etc. In the compound US president,
the modiVer US speciVes the possessor institution. A speciVcation of a (non-
relational) possessor for some relational noun combines with the originally rela-
tional concept to form a non-relational concept – such as US_president or tem-
perature_of_the_air – which integrates the possessor concept into the relational
concept.
Nouns which are both inherently unique and relational are functional nouns.
English grammar allows for the omission of a possessor speciVcation, but if un-
speciVed the possessor has to be determined otherwise.11 There are three major
classes of functional nouns.
• Role terms for unique roles related to the possessor, where the possessor
may be a person (father), an institution (king), an event (speaker), an ob-
8 For exceptions see Janssen (1984) and Löbner (1979).
9 These other constructions include “concealed questions” (see § 1.6 below).
10 The special absolute use of the relational noun temperature is probably due to the fact that the
modern notion of temperature derived from the historical meaning ‘mixture’. The word temperature
acquired its present meaning Vrst in its application to the air (the temperature of the air was
apparently considered resulting from a mixed composition of the air).
11 There are many languages which require either an explicit possessor speciVcation or some derel-
ativizing morpheme for relational nouns. See Ortmann (to appear) for a general discussion and
examples.
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ject (inventor) etc. Examples are kinship terms for unique relatives such as
mother, father, husband, or wife (in monogamous social systems), but also
role terms for all sorts of other persons that stand in a unique relationship to
somebody (boss, best friend, landlord). Many role terms relate their referent
to an institution: terms for presidents, monarchs, and all the countless oXces
in public life.
• Terms for unique parts of the possessor play a central role in mereologies.
They include body part terms for unique body parts such as head, mouth,
stomach, or terms for parts of artefacts: handle, keyboard, mouthpiece, etc.
or physical objects in general: surface, top, tip, core etc.
• Terms for attributes (aspects, dimensions) of the possessor: terms for
scalar attributes such as size, weight, temperature, price, value, but also for
nonscalar dimensions: color, shape, meaning, name, function etc.
There are, of course, also terms for nonunique roles such as neighbor, friend,
colleague, or nonunique kinship terms: son, sister, aunt etc. Also many part-terms
denote parts that may occur more than once, for example eye, leg, bone, tooth.
These terms are all relational nouns in the narrower sense to be introduced in the
next subsection.
NPs are primarily used referentially, i. e. as argument terms of a predication, for
instance as subject or object NP. In referential use, functional and relational nouns
are in need of saturation of their open possessor argument. This constitutes what
I have called the “absoluteness constraint” on referential NPs.12 Otherwise NPs
with relational head nouns could not be interpreted in context because their ref-
erence cannot be resolved. One option of saturating the possessor argument is
by explicit speciVcation, e. g. in temperature of the air or president of the US. Al-
ternatively, the speciVcation of the possessor can, in many languages, be omitted
and left to inference from the given context.13 For example, price in (13) would
be construed as referring to the price of something which is uniquely determined
in the context:
(13) The price is rising.
12 Löbner (2011:299).
13 For further ways of dealing with an open possessor argument of functional and relational nouns
see Löbner (2011, § 5.3, § 6.2).
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If a functional noun is combined with a possessor speciVcation of the individual
concept type, the result is an individual concept.14 This follows from the fact that
functional nouns determine their referent uniquely relative to a possessor. If the
possessor itself is uniquely determined, so is the value of a functional concept for
this possessor. Thus, functional nouns may yield NPs that constitute individual
concepts. This is the case if the possessor is speciVed by means of a deVnite NP or
if an implicit unique possessor is retrieved from the context.
For this reason, it is not only individual nouns15 that enter the subject and
object positions of intensional verbs, but very often functional nouns with an
explicit or implicit unique possessor speciVcation. In fact, I assume, functional
nouns are even more frequent than individual nouns in these constructions. In
this sense, the rising-temperature construction and its transitive counterpart are
characteristic of inherently unique nouns in general, individual or functional.
(14) (a) individual noun The temperature is rising.
(b) functional noun, implicit unique possessor The price is rising.
(c) functional noun, explicit unique possessor The price of the ticket is rising.
(d) individual noun The US president will change.
(e) functional noun, implicit unique possessor The president will change.
(f) functional noun, explicit unique possessor The president of the US will change.
3.3 Sortal and relational nouns and concepts
Functional nouns are distinguished by two properties which set them apart from
ordinary common nouns: inherent uniqueness and inherent relationality. Indi-
vidual nouns are inherently unique, but not relational. Naturally, there are two
more basic types of nouns.
Relational nouns in the narrower sense are relational, but not inherently
unique. Nouns of this type include terms for potentially multiple roles such as
14 See Löbner (2011, § 4) for the compositional semantics of relational and functional nouns with
possessor speciVcations, and in particular for the “transparency property” of functional nouns
which makes them inherit the conceptual type from their possessor argument. The transparency
property is Vrst mentioned in Löbner (1998).
15 Talking of nouns rather than NPs (or DPs) here is rather sloppy, although harmless. Of course,
it is NPs (or DPs) rather than nouns that Vll the subject and object positions of the constructions
discussed. The diUerence can be neglected here, because in the examples we need to discuss, the
NPs consist of just the noun, or the noun with a possessor speciVcation, plus a deVnite article. In
the cases discussed, the nouns are inherently unique. The deVnite article is redundant under these
conditions. The whole NP then expresses the same concept as does the bare noun. (See Löbner
2011 for this account in the framework developed there.)
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brother, neighbor, friend, colleague, contemporary etc. or multiple parts of ob-
jects. There are also a large number of relational nouns derived from verbs, such
as predication, use, statement, expression and so on. Depending on the underlying
verb, deverbal relational nouns may have more than one additional argument. For
example, nominalizations from transitive verbs like discovery in discovery of X by
Y have two additional arguments.
Sortal nouns constitute the great majority of “common nouns”; they are nei-
ther inherently unique nor relational. They specify their potential referents by
means of characteristic properties. Thus they describe a sort (or category, or
kind) of objects. Since the number of objects that meet the description may hap-
pen to apply in zero, or one, or more cases, sortal nouns are not inherently unique.
Sortal nouns are very numerous; they include terms for natural kinds as well as
for classes of artefacts or any other concrete or abstract objects.
inherently unique
sortal nouns individual nouns
dog table noun water Paula pope weather
relation: – relation: –
logical type: 〈e,t〉 unary pred. term logical type: e individual term
re
la
ti
on
al relational nouns functional nouns
part brother property mother death age meaning
relation: to possessor relation: to possessor
logical type: 〈e,e,t〉 binary pred. term logical type: 〈e,e〉 unary function term
Table 1: Types of nouns
The distinction in terms of inherent uniqueness and relationality gives rise to a
system of four logical noun types (Table 1). The system is not complete as there
are types of relational and functional nouns with more than one relational argu-
ment. The type distinction corresponds to basic types distinguished in Vrst-order
predicate logic: individual nouns are of type e (individual terms), sortal nouns of
type 〈e,t〉 (one-place predicate terms), relational nouns of type 〈e,〈e,t〉〉 (two-place
predicate terms), and functional nouns of type 〈e,e〉 (one-place function terms).
As I argued in Löbner (2011:283-286), the type distinctions for nouns (in a given
lexical reading) are lexical, i. e. really inherent.
27
Sebastian Löbner
3.4 Two characteristic constructions for individual and
functional nouns
Abstract functional nouns can be considered to correspond to attributes (or con-
ceptual dimensions) of their “possessors”, in the widest sense. For a given pos-
sessor, in a given context of utterance, the functional noun denotes the actual
value that this attribute adopts. Like the “temperature of the air”, the “price of a
barrel oil”, the “size of the pupil”, the “meaning of temperature”, “your cell-phone
number” or the “speed of the rocket”, the value of such an attribute is, or may
be, variable over time and dependent on circumstances. Consequently, languages
may provide intensional constructions such as in (1a) and (9) for the description
of the variation of the attribute values.
Abstract individual and functional nouns, with a few exceptions such as terms
meaning ‘name’, ‘shape’ or ‘color’, are comparatively young in English, German,
and other European languages. Most of them are lexical innovations of the last
three centuries. The verb vocabulary for predications about such abstract things
as temperature, weight, price, stock exchange rate, voltage etc. was recruited from
extensional-verb vocabulary. This development in lexicon and grammar is re-
sponsible for the co-existence of extensional and intensional uses of the same
verbs.16 Intensional verbs of the relevant type mostly denote movements and
similar changes in their extensional uses, while their application to things like
prices and temperature is metaphorical and/or metonymical. Not before the 18th
century, the German verb steigen ‘rise’ for upward motion could be used to form a
sentence that literally expressed ‘the temperature rises’.17 Apparently the mod-
ern construction in (15c) is built on the predecessors (15a) and (15b). (15a) is
metonymical for the change of temperature indicated. Note that the mercury
columns of traditional thermometers were vertical; it was not the whole column
of mercury that rose, rather its tip. Thus, even (15a) involves a pars pro toto
metonymy. The derived way of expression in (15b) metonymically abstracts from
the mercury column, but still the subject is not the abstract notion of temperature.
The thermometer itself, however, did not move anymore. Thus, this construction
abandons the literal meaning of steigen ‘rise’.
16 For a collection of about three hundred relevant verbs see Löbner (1979:114-124).
17 Evidence is provided by the entries in Grimm’s dictionary, Grimm (1854/1984).
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(15) (a) Das Quecksilber steigt. ‘The mercury is rising.’
(b) Das Thermometer steigt. ‘The thermometer is rising.’
(c) Die Temperatur steigt. ‘The temperature is rising.’
Variability is accompanied by uncertainty. Thus a second type of construction
deals with the possibility of diUerent alternative values for a given functional
concept. The corresponding verbs include epistemic predications like know, esti-
mate, guess, determine, be interested in, remember, tell along with other verbs that
presuppose alternatives, such as choose, inWuence, control, delimit, or constrain,
predications of evaluation: appreciate, discuss, fear, or of co-variation depend on,
follow etc.
(16) (a) Do you know the price of the download?
(b) The number of victims cannot be determined yet.
(c) The price depends on the exchange rate of the British pound.
In this type of constructions, the functional NP can be replaced by an interrog-
ative clause, e. g. Do you know what the price of the download is? For this reason,
these constructions were called “concealed questions”. Concealed question con-
structions are not restricted to abstract functional nouns.
(17) (a) Bill does not know the capital of Belgium.
(b) His mother could not be determined.
Similar to the rising-temperature construction, concealed questions borrow
their syntax from ordinary predication formats, but exploit the concept type of
individual and functional concepts for a diUerent type of predication. Löbner
(1979:129-141) contains a collection of about 1000 German verbs that can enter
the concealed question or similar constructions.18
I mention these two types of constructions – the rising-temperature type and
concealed questions – because they play a crucial role in scientiVc discourse.
There are more constructions that require functional or individual concepts. One
such construction in Russian is investigated in Partee & Borschev (2012).
18 The notion of concealed question was introduced in Baker (1968); for a survey see Nathan (2006).
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4 Frames in cognition
4.1 Barsalou’s notion of frames
Among the various notions of frames and schemata deVned and used in cognitive
psychology, artiVcial intelligence, social interaction theory, and linguistics, the
frame deVnition of Barsalou (1992a, b) is the most explicit, precise, and elaborate
deVnition of this type of structure. According to Barsalou, a frame is a concept
representation that is recursively composed out of attributes of the object to be
represented, and the values of these attributes. In addition to the speciVcation of
attributes and their values, a frame may contain various kinds of constraints that
restrict the values an attribute may adopt or deVne relations between the values
of diUerent attributes.
Barsalou represents frames with directed labeled graphs. A central node rep-
resents the object, or category of objects, which the frame represents; arcs con-
nect nodes to further nodes. In Barsalou (1992a,b), the complex consisting of
the possessor of an attribute, the attribute, and the value it adopts is graphically
represented as in Figure 1:
	 
	
 
	
Figure 1: Possessor-attribute-value complex in Barsalou (1992a, 1992b)
The arc labeled “aspect” stands for “is an aspect of”. The arc labeled “type” means
“is of type”. For example, if the three nodes in Figure 1 were taken to represent
(from left to right) a tomato, the attribute color19, and its value red, the right
arc would mean that red is of the type color. The label “type” is the same for all
value-attribute connections.
Barsalou “deVne[s] an attribute as a concept that describes an aspect of at least
some category members” (Barsalou 1992b:30). Values of attributes are deVned
as “subordinate concepts of an attribute” (Barsalou 1992b:31). This view of the
relation between value and attribute focuses on a certain aspect of the relation
between an attribute and the values it adopts. For every attribute there is the
range of values which it can possibly adopt; it constitutes a space of alternatives.
19 In this article, small caps are used for attribute terms.
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Thus, an attribute-as-function essentially corresponds to the set of values it can
adopt. In the sense of Carpenter (1992), the set of all possible values forms an
ordered hierarchy of types.
The general correspondence between attributes and sets of values has been
observed, among others, by Guarino (1992). The correspondence is reWected in
a systematic ambiguity of linguistic expressions for attributes. A noun like color
can be used both as a functional noun and as a sortal noun. This ambivalence is
systematic20. An example of the functional, attribute use of the noun would be
(18a). (18b) illustrates the sortal use; the statement is of the type represented by
the central and the right nodes in Figure 1 and the “type” link between them.
(18) (a) The color of the potato is red.
(b) Red is a color.
In (18b), the subject NP red refers just to a color as such, not to a color as a color
of something. In (18a), however, color is an inherently relational noun. I consider
the functional meaning as basic, because the sortal meaning can be easily derived
from it, but not vice versa. In his deVnition of an attribute, Barsalou relates to the
functional concept variant. But when he deVnes values as subordinate concepts
of attribute, he conceives of attributes as sortal concepts for the possible values.
Complex frame elements such as in Figure 1 can be recursively connected by
unifying a value node with another possessor node (an example is given in Figure
3 below), resulting in a subordinate speciVcation of the value by another attribute
and its value. Barsalou (1992b:33) discusses recursive attribute speciVcation in
terms of direct connections from attribute nodes to attribute nodes. For example,
he remarks that the frame for ‘vacation’ may exhibit an attribute companion
which in turn has its own attributes such as age, free time, and preferred
activities. The chain vacation – companion – age is graphically represented
as in Figure 2.
This representation, however, is a simpliVcation of the relations involved. Re-
garding the example in Figure 2, companion is an aspect, or attribute of a vaca-
tion. However, age is not an attribute of the attribute (for example, the attribute
companion is not an old or young attribute), but an attribute of the value of the
attribute companion, i. e. an attribute of the companion: the companion is of a
20 In Löbner (2011:310) I called the shift from the functional reading to the sortal reading “Guarino
shift”, relating to the observation of the underlying ambivalence in Guarino (1992).
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Figure 2: Attribute chain in Barsalou (1992a, 1992b)
certain age. Disentangling the ambiguity, the state of aUairs depicted in Figure
2 would have to be represented as in Figure 3, in order to be in accordance with
Figure 1.
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Figure 3: Attribute chain of Figure 2 revised
Barsalou does not explicitly state what kind of relation between possessor and
value is established by an attribute. Obviously, diUerent possessors can have the
same value for a given attribute. The crucial question is, if an attribute may
relate more than one value to a possessor at the same time. If not, the attribute
constitutes a function. Implicitly, Barsalou appears to presuppose that attributes
are functions. This is evident from the choice of examples for attributes he cites as
well as from the fact that he talks of attributes “adopting values”. The very use of
the term valuewith respect to attributes would be inappropriate for nonfunctional
relations. Still, the possibility would remain that some node might have the same
attribute assigned to it more than once, e. g. two color attributes, representing an
assignment of more than one color value.21 Such a constellation, however, never
occurs in Barsalou’s frame examples.
It is therefore assumed (cf. Löbner 1998, Petersen 2007/2015) that the attributes
in Barsalou frames constitute functions (to be precise, partial functions) that re-
turn one value for every possessor of the relevant type. This basic assumption
allows a less complex way of graph representation, than the one depicted in Fig-
21 There are, of course, multicolored objects, such as the Union Jack. But the Union Jack does not
simply have the color red and at the same time the color blue and the color white. Rather, it consists
of parts of homogeneous color, and it is these parts to which their respective color attribute assigns
a value.
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ure 1. The basic unit of such graphs is a complex of two nodes, representing
the possessor and the value, connected by an arc that connects the former to the
latter. The arc represents the attribute as a function and is labeled accordingly.22

	

Figure 4: Possessor-attribute-value configuration revised
Unlike Barsalou’s frame graphs, this design implements the fundamental distinc-
tion between functions and objects23, or in this case, between attributes and val-
ues. Nodes represent objects. Attributes, being funtions and not objects, are not
represented by nodes.
Figure 5 displays a partial frame for a car, in the revised graph notation, with
similar attributes as the example frame in Barsalou (1992b:30).
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Figure 5: A frame for a car
The frame represents the values of the attributes by nodes not further spec-
iVed. The broken-line elements represent two types of constraints. “Structural
22 For a deeper and more formal treatment of the issues of Barsalou frames discussed here, see Pe-
tersen (2007/2015).
23 See (Frege 1891).
33
Sebastian Löbner
invariants” represent constitutive relations between (the values of) attributes: the
transmission rotates the wheels; similarly, the engine rotates the transmission,
the driver operates the engine, the engine consumes the fuel. “Attribute con-
straints” capture global dependencies between the values of attributes: the greater
the capacity of the engine, the higher its performance (as well as the consumption
of fuel and the production of CO2).24
Barsalou (1992a:§ 7) assumes that frames constitute the general format of con-
cept representation, and hence of categorization, in human cognition. Frames
can be used for modeling the structure of concepts as well as what Barsalou calls
“conceptualizations”, i. e. ad-hoc modiVcations of concepts in actual contexts.
4.2 Frames and functional concepts
The fact that attributes in Barsalou frames can be considered functions that as-
sign a value to objects of appropriate type has a very important consequence:
Attributes in Barsalou frames are functional concepts. This is of utmost impor-
tance for Barsalou’s conception of categorization: We categorize exclusively
in terms of functional concepts. Functional concepts constitute the represen-
tational “vocabulary” of categorization—where the notion “vocabulary” is meant
metaphorically. It is not to be taken in the sense that cognitive categorization is
verbal. To the contrary, it is to be expected that most of the attributes used in
human cognition did not make their way as functional nouns into the lexica of
human languages. But conversel, if a language does possess functional nouns,
it may be safely assumed that they correspond to attributes in cognitive frames.
There is no other motivation for this untypical type of nouns.
There is psychological evidence that in Vrst language acquisition children as-
sign meanings to nouns that favor concrete sortal or individual concepts, while
suppressing attribute concepts: “One way children initially constrain the mean-
ings of terms is to honor the whole object assumption and thereby assume that
a novel label is likely to refer to the whole object and not to its parts, substance or
other properties.” (Markman 1990:58f). In addition to the “whole object assump-
tion”, the “taxonomic assumption” causes children to establish labels that “refer
to objects of the same kind rather than to objects that are thematically related.”
24 There are further types of constraints (cf. Barsalou 1992a:37-40); for the present purpose it is not
necessary to go deeper into the matter here.
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(Markman 1990:59) Thus relational meanings for nouns are dispreferred. This
does not mean, of course, that children are completely unable to learn relational
or functional nouns, but the two strategies mentioned clearly establish sortal and
individual nouns and the corresponding types of categorizations as the paradigm
cases. The bias against relational and functional nouns corresponds to the fact
that the referents of relational and functional nouns, for example roles, proper-
ties, and parts of objects do not exist independently; the cognitive isolation of
such aspects requires abstraction.
4.3 General properties of frames
The Vrst thing to observe about Barsalou frames is the fact that they represent
sortal concepts. The attributes they employ are functional concepts but the whole
frame is sortal: a concept that describes what it refers to in terms of certain
properties, leaving open how many, if any, objects might satisfy this kind of
characterization. A frame might contain speciVcations that narrow down the
possible number of objects that meet them to one, but there is nothing in the
structure of a frame telling that it is meant to represent exactly one object. For
example, passports contain a perfect frame description of their respective bearers;
the attributes they make use of are chosen in order to uniquely identify the bearer,
but in principle they are still sortal frames: they might happen to describe no
person at all, or exactly one person, or more than one if there happen to be two
or more persons that meet the same description.
Given this observation, it is obvious that in addition to the frames Barsalou
describes, one needs frames for types of concepts other than sortal. For relational
and functional nouns, one needs frames with empty slots for the relational ar-
guments. For individual and functional concepts, the structure of the frame must
provide for unique reference. Still, these frames too will provide a mental descrip-
tion in terms of attributes, their values and constraints and relations correlating
the values of attributes. Petersen (2007/2015) introduces frames of slightly dif-
ferent structures for the representation of relational, individual, and functional
concepts.
One of the fundamental properties of frames is their Wexibility. Frames can be
reduced or enriched, by removing or adding attributes, or by changing the speci-
Vcation of attribute values. Attributes can be bundled into complex attributes; for
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example, the attributes length and width in a rectangle frame can be combined
into size. Conversely, attributes with complex values such as color can be split
into components. A further way of combining attributes is functional composi-
tion: the attribute eye color of a person is the composition of the attribute eye
and its subattribute color.
Frames for concrete real objects are principally incomplete. A real object, such
as a person, or a tree, can never be completely described. The human mind
chooses frames of a composition, complexity, and speciVcity that are adapted
to the needs of particular situations.
4.4 Restrictions on attributes and the embodiment of frames
If frames constitute the general format of knowledge representation in the hu-
man cognitive system, the question arises as to how this format is grounded, or
embodied.25 One general aspect is the question: What does constitute a possible
attribute in human cognition? Obviously, the set of all values which an attribute
may adopt must form a natural space: the cognitive system will not employ at-
tributes which may adopt values out of an arbitrary set of entities including, say,
colors, shapes, prices, Vngers and ancestors. Rather the set of values which a
given attribute may adopt must be composed of mutually exclusive alternatives;
colors and shapes are not mutually exclusive (they can be freely combined), but
diUerent colors are. Also, it appears reasonable to maximize those spaces, mak-
ing them encompass all alternatives rather than a subclass. The completeness
requirement can be subjected to constraints in particular frames; for example the
frame of a mouse will restrict the values of the attributes size, weight, or lifes-
pan to ranges of values possible for mice. In addition, further constraints have
been proposed. In his work on conceptual spaces, Gärdenfors (2000) argues for a
general constraint that restricts the space of possible values of an attribute in a
concept to be convex: if two values are within the attribute space, then the values
between them are, too. Gärdenfors & Wargien (2012) extend the conceptual-
spaces approach to concepts for actions and events. Jäger (2012) addresses a
similar question. He applies statistical methods to the data of the World Color
Survey26 in order to investigate constraints on the composition of the extension
25 For an extensive discussion of the psychological aspects of this issue, see Barsalou (1999).
26 The WCS collects data on the use of basic color terms for a sample of 110 unwritten languages from
an average of 24 speakers each. See Cook, Kay & Regier (2005) for details.
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of color categories. The result is largely in accordance with Gärdenfors’ convexity
conditions; there are, however, exceptions: some speakers seem to have noncon-
vex color term extensions, for example one term covering black and white, but
not the shades of grey between.
5 Frames and functional concepts in science
Frames and functional concepts play a central role in scientiVc thinking. Sciences
in general deal with particular classes of objects, e. g. physical objects, living or-
ganisms, chemical substances, languages, human subjects, works of art etc. The
objects of science are investigated in terms of their relevant attributes, where sci-
ences diUer in which attributes they address. For example, psychology, medicine,
sociology, and economics are concerned with human individuals under various
perspectives, dealing with diUerent sets of attributes of the individual.
Together, the attributes constitute the, more or less, abstract objects of a sci-
ence. For example, merely two attributes, mass and location, constitute the mass
point in physics. A chemical element is constituted by a small set of attributes,
including its atomic number. ScientiVc theorizing investigates possible values of
the attributes, possible combinations of the values of diUerent attributes, corre-
lations of values etc. These aspects are captured by diUerent types of constraint in
Barsalou’s frame theory. To give an example from linguistics, a lexeme is deVned
by a frame such as in Figure 6; general constraints would capture the correspon-
dence between phonological form and spelling of lexemes, or the dependence of
word inWection on the part of speech that a lexeme constitutes.
Attribute terms play a central role not only in scientiVc terminology, but also in
the very evolution of science. The notion of atomic number in chemistry evolved
with the theory of atomic structure, and with it today’s notion of a chemical
element. Frames can be shown to underlie the conception of scientiVc classiVca-
tions, as well as of types of processes such as chemical reactions; these underlying
frames can, in turn, be used to analyze paradigm shifts in scientiVc evolution (see
Chen & Barker 2000, Schurz & Votsis 2014).
The two typical constructions for functional nouns mentioned in § 3,4 directly
correspond to needs of scientiVc discourse. The rising-temperature construction
meets the need of being able to verbally describe changes of the values of at-
tributes and correlations between them. Concealed questions are involved in
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Figure 6: Frame for a lexeme
talk about possible values of attributes. Thus it appears plausible that abstract
functional nouns and the characteristic constructions they Vgure in emerged in
co-evolution with scientiVc theory and practice.
6 Conclusion
The discussion aimed to show that the distinction of conceptual types of nouns is
of fundamental importance for understanding not only the semantics of nouns,
but human cognition in general. Among conceptual types of nouns, functional
nouns are of particular interest. From a linguistic point of view, functional nouns
constitute a rather marginal class in grammar, as witnessed by their late emer-
gence in natural language vocabularies and, concomitantly, by the parasitic char-
acter of the constructions they are used in. In linguistic theory, too, they have
been enjoying little attention, sharing their fate of disregard with individual con-
cepts. The distinction between inherently relational and non-relational nouns
(see Table 1) is generally acknowledged. However, the fact that there are types
of nouns that are inherently unique, namely individual and functional nouns, is
rarely recognized, except for the inherent uniqueness of proper names and per-
sonal pronouns.27
27 Matushansky (2008) even denies inherent uniqueness of proper names, arguing for a sortal concept,
type 〈e,t〉, analysis.
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When Janssen titled his 1984 paper “Individual concepts are useful”, this was a
reaction to the disregard of inherently unique concepts in the development of For-
mal Semantics following Montague (1973). From the perspective of this article,
Janssen’s statement is actually an understatement. The immediate connection
between functional concepts and frames shows that functional concepts Vgure
most fundamentally in human concept formation. If Barsalou is correct in as-
suming that the basic structure of all concepts in human cognition is frames,
then functional nouns represent the type of concepts which our entire cognition
is based on. Attribute concepts, i. e. instances of functional concepts, form the
structure of the mental representations in our cognitive system: we categorize
whatever we categorize in terms of functional concepts. The relatively complex
logical type 〈e,e〉 of functional concepts is the elementary unit of concept forma-
tion, while the logically elementary type e of individuals corresponds to concepts
of unlimited complexity.
One has to assume that the mental representations of the meanings of linguis-
tic expressions are of the same structure as concepts in general. Consequently,
propositions and lexical meanings basically have the structure of frames, if Barsa-
lou is right. This observation might pave the way for a uniVed theory of decom-
position and composition that conceives of meanings as represented by frames.
Such a perspective would oUer a basis for integrating the results of formal seman-
tic research with those of cognitive psychology and neuroscience.
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Abstract
Concepts can be represented as frames, i. e., recursive attribute-value structures.
Frames assign unique values to attributes. Concepts can be classiVed into four
groups with respect to both relationality and referential uniqueness: sortal, indi-
vidual, proper relational, and functional concepts. The paper deVnes frames as
directed graphs with labeled nodes and arcs and it discusses the graph structures
of frames for sortal and relational concepts. It aims at a classiVcation of frame
graphs that reWects the given concept classiVcation. By giving a new deVnition of
type signatures, the status of attributes in frames is clariVed and the connection
between functional concepts, their sortal uses, and their associated attributes is
explained.
1 Introduction
According to Barsalou (1992), frames, understood as recursive attribute-value
structures, are used as a general format in accounting for the content of mental
concepts. The attributes in a concept frame are the general properties or dimen-
sions by which the respective concept is described (e. g., color, spokesperson,
habitat. . . )1. Their values are concrete or underspeciVed speciVcations (e. g.,
[color: red], [spokesperson: Ellen Smith], [habitat: jungle] . . . ). For exam-
ple, ball can be characterized by [shape: round], specifying its concrete shape,
and [color: color], specifying that it has a color which is not further speciVed.
The attribute values can themselves be complex frames and thus described by ad-
ditional attributes. E. g., the value jungle of the attribute habitat can be further
1 Throughout the paper we will mark types by using small, bold letters, while attributes are written
in small capitals.
Thomas Gamerschlag, Doris Gerland, Rainer Osswald & Wiebke Petersen
(eds.). 2015. Meaning, Frames, and Conceptual Representation. Düsseldorf:
dup.
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speciVed by attributes like average temperature or rain season. Frames are
thus recursive, and it is this feature that renders them Wexible enough to repre-
sent information of any desired grade of detail.
Barsalou & Hale (1993) argue that frame theory is independent with respect to
various theories of categorization such as checklist theory (cf. Katz 1972; Lyons
1977), exemplar theory (cf. Rosch & Mervis 1975; Brooks 1978), prototype the-
ory (cf. Rosch 1973, 1975; Smith & Medin 1981) or connectionist networks (cf.
McClelland & Rumelhart 1981; Shanks 1991). Frames are rather a model for the
representation of concepts and therefore establish an alternative to pure feature-
list representations. The advantage of frames over predicates of First Order Logic
is that they do not force one to stipulate a Vxed arity and that substructures can
be addressed via labeled symbols instead of ordered argument positions.
Being motivated primarily by empirical research, Barsalou’s focus in develop-
ing his frame theory was not on giving a formal theory. However, a formal theory
of frames is necessary if they are to be employed in knowledge management or
language-processing systems and it is the project of developing such a formal
theory that concerns us here. For our account of concept decomposition we will
use Barsalou’s (1992) cognitive frame theory as a starting point. We will show
how frames can be represented by labeled graphs and will establish a type system
based on them. Our aim is to develop a formal theory of frames that enables us
to describe all kinds of concepts and that is plausible as an adequate basis for a
frame-based cognitive semantics explaining both decompositional and composi-
tional phenomena in a uniVed way.
In aiming at the decomposition of concepts that are expressible by nouns, our
approach aligns with well-established graph-based knowledge representation for-
malisms that focus on situations such as frame semantics (Fillmore 1982) and on
propositions as in conceptual graph theory (Sowa 1984).
1.1 Frame-based knowledge representation
Frame structures appeared in several disciplines in the 1970s. In Cognitive Sci-
ence, their introduction led to a paradigm change (cf. Fahlmann 1977; Minsky
1975): Instead of being taken as atomic units, concepts came to be understood
as classes of highly structured entities describable in terms of recursive attribute-
value structures. Feature lists and binary features represented a preliminary stage
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in this process (cf. Chomsky & Halle 1968). The frame perspective also became
prominent in ArtiVcial Intelligence (AI) and Linguistics. One of the best-known
frame-based knowledge representation languages of AI is KL-ONE (Brachman &
Schmolze 1985), which is the predecessor of a whole family of knowledge repre-
sentation languages, the socalled description logics (cf. Donini et al. 1996; Baader
et al. 2004).
In Linguistics, frames were Vrst introduced in Fillmore’s case grammar in order
to represent verbs and the relational roles of their arguments (Fillmore 1968). This
early work laid the foundations for the development of frame semantics (Fillmore
1982). Kay (1979) introduced the idea of describing language signs with complex
frame structures and proposed frame uniVcation for their manipulation. These
frame structures are now known in Computational Linguistics (CL) as feature
structures and are heavily used in uniVcation-based grammars (cf. Shieber et al.
1983; Shieber 1986). Inspired by the work of Aït-Kaci on Ψ-terms (Aït-Kaci 1984),
type hierarchies with appropriateness conditions were introduced in CL in order
to restrict the set of admissible typed feature structures (Carpenter 1992).
Further knowledge representation structures that are related to frames are Se-
mantic Networks (cf. Quilian 1968; Helbig 2006) and Conceptual Graphs (cf. Sowa
1984, 2000).
1.2 A classiVcation of concepts
Concepts can be distinguished with respect to both their relationality and their
referential uniqueness (Löbner 1985). Sortal and individual concepts are non-
relational and thus typically have no possessor argument. Sortal concepts (e. g.,
apple) denote classical categories and have no unique referents. Individual con-
cepts (e. g., Mary), in contrast, have unique referents. Proper relational and func-
tional concepts are both relational in that their referents are given by a relation to
a possessor (e. g., brother of Tom, mother of Tom). It is characteristic of functional
concepts (e. g., mother) that they establish a right-unique mapping from posses-
sors to referents and thus are uniquely referring.2 In contrast, unique reference
is not generally implied for proper relational concepts (e. g., brother). Figure 1
shows the resulting concept classiVcation.
2 Note that throughout this paper the term functional concept is always used in the sense of describing
a concept that establishes a functional mapping. Hence, functional in this paper does not mean that
the concept denotes objects which have a special function.
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The meaning of a given concept may be shifted: E. g., the concept mother
which, in its normal use, is uniquely referring and relational (the mother of Tom)
and thus functional can be also used in contexts like Mothers like gambling or
The mothers of the constitution were wise, where it is used as a sortal or proper
relational concept, respectively. Suchmeaning shifts are always context triggered.
non-unique reference unique reference
non-relational SC, sortal concept:
person, house, verb, wood
IC, individual concept:
Mary, pope, sun
relational RC, proper relational concept:
brother, argument, entrance
FC, functional concept:
mother, meaning, distance,
spouse
Figure 1: classification of concepts
Most languages reWect the classiVcation of concepts. E. g., in English, nouns
expressing concepts without unique reference (SCs and RCs) are usually used
without a deVnite article. Nouns expressing relational concepts (RCs and FCs)
are usually used in possessive constructions, where the possessor is speciVed
synthetically (the cat’s paw) or analytically (the paw of the cat). However, there
is a considerable variation in the expression of deVniteness and possession across
languages.3
2 Frame graphs
Our concept-decomposition framework should be formally explicit and cogni-
tively adequate. Therefore, we aim at keeping our frame model as simple and
rigid as possible. We do not want to introduce any elements into our model lan-
guage for merely technical or computational reasons. In Petersen & Werning
(2007) we explain how our frame model can be extended to account for cognitive
typicality eUects. By using oscillatory neural networks as a biologically motivated
model, we show how frames might be implemented in the cortex.
Since frames for concepts are recursive attribute-value-structures, each attribute
of a frame establishes a relation between the objects denoted by the concept and
3 The four concept classes (sortal, individual, proper relational, and functional) are mutually exclusive
and jointly exhaustive. For more details on our concept classiVcation, on its linguistic reWections,
and on context-triggered meaning-shifts have a look at the webpages of the research group FOR600
Functional Concepts and Frames (http://www.phil-fak.uni-duesseldorf.de/Uf).
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the value of the attribute; e. g., the attribute sex in the frame for woman assigns
the value female to each denoted object. In accordance with the examples in
Barsalou (1992), we assume that attributes in frames assign unique values to ob-
jects and thus describe functional relations. The values themselves can be com-
plex frames. Section 3 discusses attributes in frames in greater detail.
We model frames as connected directed graphs with labeled nodes (types) and
arcs (attributes). Our deVnitions follow the notational conventions in Carpenter
(1992).
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Figure 2: lolly frame
Figure 2 shows the graph of an example frame representing knowledge about
lollies with long green sticks and round red bodies produced in factories. The
double-encircled node lolly is the central node of the frame; it shows that the
graph represents a frame about lollies. The outgoing arcs of the lolly-node stand
for the attributes of the represented lollies and point to their values. Hence,
each denoted lolly has a stick and a body. The values of the attributes body
and stick are themselves complex frames, both having three attributes, namely
color, shape and producer. The fact that the stick and the body of each denoted
lolly are produced in the same factory is indicated by the single factory-node to
which the two producer-arcs from stick and body point. The single factory-
node excludes the possibility that the body is produced in a candy factory in
Belgium while the stick is produced in a paper mill in Canada.
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DeVnition 1 Given a set type of types and a Vnite set attr of attributes. A frame
is a tuple F = (Q, q¯, δ, θ,=) where:
•Q is a Vnite set of nodes,
• q¯ ∈ Q is the central node,
• δ : attr ×Q→ Q is the partial transition function,
• θ : Q→type is the total node typing function,
•=⊆ Q×Q is a symmetric and anti-reWexive inequation relation.
Furthermore, the underlying undirected graph (Q,E) with edge set E =
{{q1, q2} | ∃a ∈attr: δ(a, q1) = q2} is connected.
The underlying directed graph of a frame is the graph (Q, ~E) with edge set ~E =
{(q1, q2) | ∃a ∈attr: δ(a, q1) = q2}
If θ(q¯) = t, we say that the frame is of type t; and if θ(q) = t is true for a node
q, we call the node q a t-node. Furthermore, if δ(a, q1) = q2 is true for a frame,
we say that the frame has an a-arc from q1 to q2; this a-arc is an outgoing arc for
node q1 and an incoming arc for q2. Contrary to other frame deVnitions, we do
not demand that all nodes of a frame can be reached via directed arcs from its
central node.4
The types are ordered in a type hierarchy, which induces a subsumption order
on frames: “We think of our types as organizing feature structures into natural
classes.[. . . ] Thus it is natural to think of the types as being organized in an
inheritance hierarchy based on their generality”, (Carpenter 1992:11).
DeVnition 2 A type hierarchy (type,w) is a Vnite partial ordered set which forms
a join semilattice, i. e., for any two types there exists a least upper bound. A type t1 is
a subtype of a type t2 if t1 w t2.
DeVnition 3 Given a type hierarchy (type,w) and a Vnite set attr of attributes.
A frame F = (Q, q¯, δ, θ,=) subsumes a frame F ′ = (Q′, q¯′, δ′, θ′,=′), notated
as F v F ′, if and only if there exists a total function h : Q→ Q′ such that:
•h(q¯) = q¯′,
• if q ∈ Q, a ∈ attr, and if δ(a, q) is deVned, then h(δ(a, q)) = δ′(a, h(q)),
• for each q ∈ Q: θ(q) v θ′(h(q)),
• if q1 = q2, then h(q1)=′ h(q2).
4 The claim that all nodes of a frame can be reached from its central node is common in most frame
theories (cf. Carpenter 1992; Barsalou 1992) because they usually consider only frames for sortal
concepts.
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Figure 3: subsumption example
An example of the subsumption relation is given in Figure 3: It shows a rather
unspeciVc lolly-frame subsuming the more speciVc lolly-frame from Figure 2.
Bold arrows mark the function h from DeVnition 3. The example shows that
DeVnition 3 captures our general understanding of subsumption: When a con-
cept A subsumes a concept B then A is more general than B, i. e., A imposes less
restrictions on the objects it denotes than B.
The deVnition of frames as labeled graphs yields the problem that two frames
with diUerent node sets are always diUerent, even if all their labels match. E. g.,
the two frames F = (Q, q¯, δ, θ,=) and F ′ = (Q′, q¯′, δ′, θ′,=′) with Q =
{a, b}, q¯ = a, δ(G, a) = b, θ(a) = s, θ(b) = t and Q′ = {c, d}, q¯′ = c, δ′(G, c) =
d, θ′(c) = s, θ′(d) = t are unequal due to the diUerent node sets (Q 6= Q′)
although they can both be drawn as
factory
stick green
long
PR
OD
UC
ER
COLOR
SHAPE
s tG
7
. Since the two frames F and F ′
subsume each other, i. e. F v F ′ and F ′ v F , the subsumption relation deVnes
no partial order on frames, but merely a preorder.
Looking at the lolly example in Figure 2 it is obvious that the information
represented in a frame does not depend on the concrete set of nodes. It depends
rather on how the nodes are connected by directed arcs and how the nodes and
arcs are labeled. However, it is not possible to simply replace the nodes in the
frame deVnition by their labels, since two distinct nodes of a graph can be labeled
with the same type. E. g., we could modify the lolly-frame in Figure 2 so that the
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stick and the body of the described lollies were produced in two distinct factories,
where one is located in Belgium and one in Canada. The frame in the middle
of Figure 4 shows another example of a frame with several equally typed nodes.
Therefore, it is convenient to deVne the alphabetic variance relation: A frame F is
an alphabetic variant of a frame F ′ (written as F ∼ F ′) if and only if F v F ′ and
F ′ v F are both true. The alphabetic variance relation is an equivalence relation
over the collection of frames. It follows immediately that subsumption modulo
the alphabetic variance relation deVnes a partial order on the equivalent classes
of frames. From now on, to simplify matters, we will not distinguish between a
frame and its equivalence class under alphabetic variance.
In order to characterize the graphs underlying frames, we use the following
terminology:
DeVnition 4 A node q0 ∈ Q is said to be a root of a frame F = (Q, q¯, δ, θ,=)
if for each q ∈ Q there is a Vnite sequence of attributes a1 . . . an ∈ attr ∗ with
δ(an, . . . , δ(a2, δ(a1, q0)) . . .) = q, i. e., q0 and q are connected by a Vnite directed
path.
DeVnition 5 A node q ∈ Q is said to be a source of a frame F = (Q, q¯, δ, θ,=) if
q has no incoming arc (i. e., q has indegree 0). Analogously, q is a sink of a frame
if q has no outgoing arc (i. e., q has outdegree 0).
The frame in Figure 2 has exactly one source, namely the node labeled lolly,
and Vve sinks, i. e., the nodes labeled red, round, factory, and green, long. The
source of this frame is simultaneously a root of the frame.
A frame is said to be acyclic if the underlying directed graph is acyclic, i. e., if
it is not possible to Vnd a way along directed arcs leading from a node back to
itself. It is obvious that an acyclic frame has at most one root. Our experience
in decomposing concepts into frames indicates that frames for lexical concepts
are generally acyclic. Through our involvement in the research group FOR600
Functional Concepts and Frames, we have access to more than a hundred frame
graphs of diUerent lexical concepts that were drawn by approximately twenty
(test) persons; none of the frames are cyclic. However, there are some rare self-
referential concepts like egoist or narcissistwhose frame graphs have to be cyclic.5
In spite of these exceptions, we consider only concepts with acyclic frames in this
paper.
5 Thanks to Magdalena Schwager for pointing out the problem of self-referential concepts to us.
50
Representation of Concepts as Frames
factory long
stick
object
P
R
O
D
U
C
E
R
S
H
A
P
E
S
T
I
C
K
factory
object stick green
long
PR
OD
UC
ER
COLOR
SHAPE
STICK
3
personmale
person person
person
M
O
T
H
E
R
M
O
T
H
E
R
FA
T
H
E
R
F
A
T
H
E
R
SEX
6=
person person
person person
person female
F
A
T
H
E
R
M
O
TH
ER
FA
TH
ER
M
O
T
H
E
R
6=
F
A
T
H
E
R
SEX
4
red
body round
lolly factory
stick green
long
CO
LO
R
SHAPE
PRODUCER
PR
OD
UC
ER
COLOR
SHAPE
BO
D
Y
STIC
K
factory
object stick green
long
PR
OD
UC
ER
COLOR
SHAPE
STICK
1
Figure 4: frames for different concepts (left: stick; middle: brother; right: lolly)
Figure 4 shows three frames belonging to concepts of three diUerent concept
classes (again the central nodes are double-encircled).6 The right frame for the
sortal concept lolly has already been discussed abov . The left frame represents
the functional concept stick and the frame in the middle corresponds to the proper
relational concept brother. The stick-frame characterizes a stick by being the stick
of an object (i. e., by a functional relation) and by additional sortal features like be-
ing long and being produced in a factory. Functional concepts diUer fundamentally
from sortal concepts, since their potential referents are the values of an attribute
which is identical with the functional concept. Although the stick-frame seems
to be a substructure of the frame for the sortal concept lolly, the fundamental
diUerence is encoded inherently in the graph structure of the frames: The central
node of the functional frame, i. e., the frame for the functional concept stick, has
an incoming arc while that of the sortal frame for lolly has solely outgoing arcs.
Both frames characteristically have a root. It is the incoming arc (labeled by an
attribute corresponding to a functional concept) which establishes the functional
relation from potential possessors to the referents of the functional concept.
The frame for the proper relational concept brother is more complex. It de-
scribes a brother as a male person for which a second person exists with whom
it shares mother and father. The undirected arc between the two person-nodes
labeled with 6= indicates the inequality relation and ensures that the two nodes
6 Throughout this paper we do not deal with individual concepts since they require a rather diUerent
treatment: The graphs underlying their frames do not diUer but their central nodes are not labeled
by arbitrary types but by particular entity types. Petersen & Werning (2007) give some examples
of frames for individual concepts.
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can never be uniVed.7 The peculiarity of this frame is that the two nodes labeled
person cannot be reached along directed paths from each other and that there
is no third node from which both nodes can be reached. Thus, the potential refer-
ents of the central person-node are characterized by the sortal feature male and
especially by the existence of a referent for the non-central source of type per-
son, which represents the possessor argument of the proper relational concept
brother. The connection between the central node and the node for the posses-
sor argument is established indirectly via the shared values of the father- and
mother-attributes. Since the relation between a person and his or her mother (or
father) is a many-to-one relation, the brother-frame does not set up a functional
relation between the possessor argument and the referents of the central node. It
is characteristic for a proper relational frame, i. e., a frame for a proper relational
concept, that it has a node which is a source but from which the central node is
not reachable along directed arcs.
The example frames show that what type of concept is represented by an
acyclic frame is determined by the properties of the central node and the ques-
tion whether or not the frame has a root or a source. In the remainder of this
section we therefore use the binary features “± has source” (±ES), “± has root”
(±ER), “± central node is a source” (±CS), and “± central node is a root” (±CR)
to classify directed acyclic graphs with central nodes. In order to gain a complete
list of possible classes we apply the attribute exploration technique known from
Formal Concept Analysis (FCA) (Ganter & Wille 1999), which is implemented in
the software Concept Explorer.8 During an attribute exploration, Concept Explorer
successively presents implications of properties (in the terminology of FCA: at-
tribute implications) which the user must either accept or reject (by oUering a
counter example). The process ends when the canonical universe of the proper-
ties is completed (Osswald & Petersen 2003), i. e., the closure of sets of compatible
properties is determined. The procedure guarantees that the number of impli-
cations presented is minimal. Figure 5 shows the result of the exploration: The
implicational statements on the left are those which we aXrmed during the ex-
ploration process. The resulting concept lattice is given on the right side of the
Vgure.
7 The inequality relation becomes important as soon as information combining procedures like uniV-
cation are applied to frames, as these procedures have to preserve explicitly stated inequalities.
8 http://conexp.sourceforge.net/
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(1) necessarily +ES;
(2) if −ER, then −CR;
(3) if −CS, then −CR;
(4) if +ER and −CR, then −CS;
(5) if +CS and −CR then −ER;
(6) if +CS and +ER then +CR;
(7) if +CR then +CS and +ER.
Figure 5: basis of implications and concept lattice
The seven implicational statements are true for the following reasons: The
second and the third statement follow immediately from the meaning of the exis-
tential quantiVer and the deVnition of roots and sources. Since an acyclic directed
graph can be physically modeled by a system of tubes where each tube has a slope,
the remaining statements can be easily veriVed: Roots in such a tube system can
be easily recognized by the fact that water Wows through all tubes if it is poured in
at a root. A source in such a tube system is a tube junction that is not reached by
water poured into the system at any other point. Since water cannot run upwards,
it cannot Wow in circles. Hence, there is never more than one root in a tube sys-
tem; and if there is a root, it is necessarily the only source of the system as well.
The statements (1) and (4)-(7) follow immediately from these considerations.
Taking into account the implicational statements in Figure 5, there are four
property distributions remaining that are consistent. Hence, the chosen prop-
erties classify acyclic frames into four classes. Figure 6 lists them and shows a
typical graph with the required properties for each distribution.
DeVnition 6 A sortal frame is an acyclic frame whose central node is a root. A
relational frame is an acyclic frame with a source which is not the central node. A
proper relational frame is an acyclic frame with at least two sources of which one is
the central node. A functional frame is an acyclic frame with a root which is not
the central node.
53
Wiebke Petersen
CR CS ER ES typical graph frame class
+ + + + sortal
- - + + functional
- + - + proper relational
- - - + ???
Figure 6: classification of acyclic frames
From our experience in modeling concepts with frames, we expect that, at least
in typical unmarked cases, the Vrst three frame classes in Figure 6 correspond to
the concept classes discussed in section 1.2.
Conjecture 1 In general, sortal concepts are represented by sortal frames, func-
tional concepts are represented by functional frames, and (proper) relational concepts
are represented by (proper) relational frames. However, not every arbitrary acyclic
frame models a cognitively relevant or even lexicalized concept.
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Figure 7: frame for father of a niece
The fourth frame class does not correspond as nicely to a concept class as the
others do. We assume that frames for this class model non-lexicalized concepts
like father of a niece whose frame is given in Figure 7.
We only found one frame belonging to the fourth class that seems to be lexical-
ized, namely the one for brother-in-law (and analogically for sister-in-law). The
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corresponding frame is shown on the left in Figure 8.9 Nevertheless, brother-in-
law only appears to be a concept whose frame belongs to the fourth frame class
as the right frame of Figure 8 illustrates. Since the spouse-relation is a symmetric
one-to-one relation, the direction of the spouse-arc of the frame can be reversed.
The content of the left frame can be paraphrased as male person who is the spouse
of someone who has a sibling and the right one as male person whose spouse has a
sibling. Since brother-in-law is a proper relational concept that takes one posses-
sor argument (my brother-in-law), the paraphrases of the two frames show that
the left one analyzes brother-in-law incorrectly as a relational concept with an
extra argument.
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Figure 8: two frames for brother-in-law
From the frames in this section we can draw two main conclusions: First, the
arguments of relational concepts are modeled in frames as sources that are not
identical to the central node. Second, the functionality of functional concepts is
modeled by an incoming arc at the central node.
3 Attributes and type signatures
As Guarino (1992) points out, frame-based knowledge engineering systems as
well as feature-structure-based linguistic formalisms normally force a radical
choice between attributes and types. Therefore, frames like the one in Figure
2 are common, where the rather unspeciVc value stick is assigned to the attribute
stick. The parallel naming of the attribute stick and the type stick suggests a
systematic relationship between the attribute and the type that is not captured by
the formalism.
A second problem addressed in Guarino (1992) concerns the question which
binary relations should be expressed by attributes. If one allows attributes to be
9 Strictly speaking, brother-in-law is polysemous; it means either brother of spouse or husband of
sibling. We only consider the latter meaning here.
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unrestricted arbitrary binary relations, this leads to frames like the following one,
which was Vrst discussed in Woods (1975):
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Although height and hit can be represented by binary predicates, the onto-
logical status of the link established between John and 6 feet and between John
andMary diUers fundamentally.
As stated before, we presuppose that attributes of frames establish many-to-
one, i. e., functional relations between the nodes they are attached to and their
values. The question arises how attributes and functional concepts are connected.
All sample attributes we have used so far (stick, color, . . . ) correspond to func-
tional concepts. Guarino (1992) distinguishes between the denotational and the
relational interpretation of a relational concept. This distinction can be used to
explain how functional concepts can act as concepts and as attributes: Let there
be a universe U and a set of functional concepts F . A functional concept (like
any concept) denotes a set of entities:
∆ : F → 2U
(e. g.,∆(mother) = {m|m is the mother of someone}).
A functional concept also has a relational interpretation:
% : F → 2U×U
(e. g., %(mother) = {(p,m)|m is the mother of p}).
Additionally, the denotational and the relational interpretation of a functional
attribute have to respect the following consistency postulate (Guarino 1992): Any
value of a relationally interpreted functional concept is also an instance of the
denotation of that concept. E. g., if (p,m) ∈ %(mother), then m ∈ ∆(mother).
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Furthermore, the relational interpretation of a functional concept f is a function,
i. e., if (a, b), (a, c) ∈ %(f), then b = c.
These considerations allow us to clarify the ontological status of attributes
in frames: Attributes in frames are relationally interpreted functional concepts.
Hence, attributes are not frames themselves and therefore are unstructured.
Frames decompose concepts into relationally interpreted functional concepts.
Thus, functional concepts embody the concept type on which categorization is
based. The diUerentiation between the denotational and the relational interpre-
tation of functional concepts is consistent with Barsalou’s view on attributes: “I
deVne an attribute as a concept that describes an aspect of at least some category
members. For example, color describes an aspect of birds, and location describes
an aspect of vacations. A concept is an attribute only when it describes an as-
pect of a larger whole. When people consider color in isolation (e. g., thinking
about their favorite color), it is not an attribute but is simply a concept”, Barsalou
(1992:30).
In the theory of typed feature structures, it is common to enrich the plain type
hierarchy by an appropriateness speciVcation. It regulates which attributes are
appropriate for feature structures of a special type and restricts the values of
the appropriate attributes (Carpenter 1992).10 We adapt this technique in order
to restrict the class of admissible frames. However, we consequently dismiss
the artiVcial distinction between attributes and types in our deVnition of type
signatures: In contrast to the standard deVnition (Carpenter 1992:86) the attribute
set is merely a subset of the type set. Hence, attributes occur in two diUerent roles:
as names of binary functional relations between types and as types themselves.
DeVnition 7 Given a type hierarchy (type,w) and a set of attributes attr ⊆ type.
An appropriateness speciVcation on (type,w) is a partial function Approp : attr×
type→ type such that for each a ∈ attr the following holds:
• attribute introduction: There is a type Intro(a) ∈ type with:
– Approp(a, Intro(a)) = a and
– for every t ∈ type: if Approp(a, t) is deVned, then Intro(a) v t.
• speciVcation closure: If Approp(a, s) is deVned and s v t, then Approp(a, t)
is deVned and Approp(a, s) v Approp(a, t).
10 Type signatures can be automatically induced from sets of untyped feature structures, i. e., frames
where the central node is a root and in which only the maximal paths are typed. With FCAType, an
implemented system for such inductions is available (Kilbury et al. 2006; Petersen 2006).
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• attribute consistency: If Approp(a, s) = t, then a v t.
A type signature is a tuple (type,w, attr,Approp), where (type,w) is a type hier-
archy, attr ⊆ type is a set of attributes, and Approp : attr × type → type is an
appropriateness speciVcation.
The Vrst two conditions on an appropriateness speciVcation are standard in the
theory of type signatures (Carpenter 1992), except that we tighten up the attribute
introduction condition. We claim that the introductory type of an attribute ‘a’
carries the appropriateness condition ‘a : a’. With the attribute-consistency con-
dition we ensure that Guarino’s consistency postulate holds and that Barsalou’s
view on frames, attributes, and values is modeled appropriately: “At their core,
frames contain attribute-value sets. Attributes are concepts that represent as-
pects of a category’s members, and values are subordinate concepts of attributes”,
(Barsalou 1992:43). Hence, the possible values of an attribute are subconcepts of
the denotationally interpreted functional concept. This is reWected in the type
signature by the condition that the possible values of an attribute are restricted to
subtypes of the type corresponding to the attribute.
We call a framewell-typedwith respect to a type signature if all attributes of the
frame are licensed by the type signature and if additionally the attribute values
are consistent with the appropriateness speciVcation.
DeVnition 8 Given a type signature (type,w, attr,Approp), a frame F =
(Q, q¯, δ, θ,=) is well-typed with respect to the type signature, if and only if for
each q ∈ Q the following holds:
If δ(a, q) is deVned, then Approp(a, θ(q)) is also deVned and Approp(a, θ(q)) v
θ(δ(a, q)).
The deVnition of the appropriateness speciVcation guarantees that every arc
in a well-typed frame points to a node that is typed by a subtype of the type
corresponding to the attribute labeling the arc. The decomposition of concepts
into frames requires that the frame in question be well-typed.
A small example type signature is given in Figure 9. The appropriateness spec-
iVcation is split up into single appropriateness conditions: The expression ‘taste:
taste’ at type objects means that the attribute taste is appropriate for frames
of type objects and its value is restricted to frames of type taste or subtypes of
taste. The attribute conditions are passed on downwards. Hence, the type apple
inherits the appropriateness condition ‘taste: taste’ from its upper neighbor ob-
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A small example type signature is given in Figure 9. The appropriateness 
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the type apple inherits the appropriateness condition TASTE: taste from 
its upper neighbor objects. It also inherits the appropriateness condition 
SHAPE: shape, but tightens it up to SHAPE: round, which is permissible by the 
specification closure condition. The definition of the type signature makes 
sure that the permissible values of an attribute are subtypes of the attribute 
type. Hence, the possible values of TASTE, i.e., sweet, hot, sour, and so forth, 
are subtypes of the type taste. Notice that the subtypes of an attribute type are 
not generally attribute types themselves. Figure 10 shows two frames, where 
the first one is well-typed while the second one violates the appropriateness 
condition SHAPE: round at type apple.
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Figure 9: exampl type signature
jects. It also inherits the appropriateness condition ‘shape: shape’, but tightens
it up to ‘shape: round’, which is permissible by the speciVcation closure condi-
tion. The deVnition of the type signature makes sure that the permissible values
of an attribute are subtypes of the attribute type. Hence, the possible values of
taste, i. e., sweet, hot, sour, and so forth, are subtypes of the type taste. Notice
that the subtypes of an attri te type are not generally attribute types themselves.
Figure 10 shows two frames, where the Vrst one is well-typed while the second
one violates the appropriateness condition ‘shape: round’ at type apple.
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Figure 10: well-typed versus non well-typed frame
Due to the recursive structure of frames, it is possible to specify the attribute
values with frames of any desired complexity. Since the length of attribute paths
in frames is not restricted, the frames can fan out in depth as depicted in the
upper part of Figure 11. However, Barsalou allows frames to grow in an additional
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respect: “Within a frame, each attribute may be associated with its own frame of
more speciVc attributes. [. . .] These secondary attributes often have frames as
well. [. . .] Even these attributes [of frames of secondary attributes] continue to
have frames”, Barsalou (1992:33). The possibility of further specifying attributes
as well as their values by additional attributes results in the double recursive and
self-similar structure of Barsalou’s frames, which is depicted in the lower part of
Figure 11.
Figure 11: Fanning out of classical frames (top) and Barsalou’s self-similar frames (bottom)
Our approach to frames, which reWects the parallelism of the denotational and
the relational interpretation of functional concepts in the deVnition of type sig-
natures, captures Barsalou’s idea about frames, but avoids the double recursive
structure. Since attributes are types at the same time, further attribute-value pairs
can specify them; this is in accordance with Barsalou’s claim that “frames repre-
sent all types of concepts, whether they are free-standing concepts, such as bird
and vacation, or whether they are attributes such as color for bird and location for
vacation”, (Barsalou 1992:31). However, this further speciVcation will only take
place if the attribute is used as a type, i. e., if it labels a frame node, and never
when it is used as a functional attribute and labels a frame arc. Our lolly-frame
in Figure 2 exempliVes this perspective: The attribute stick labels an arc as well
as a node, but it is the value of the attribute to which further attribute arcs are
attached, such that it constitutes the sortal stick-subframe in Figure 12.
The attributes producer, color and shape are attributes of sticks and not of
the attribute stick, since stick is the partial function that assigns sticks to objects.
Note that the stick-frame in Figure 12 diUers from the stick-frame in Figure 4
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Figure 12: Frame for the sortal reading of stick
(left) in that it does not relate the stick to an object to which it is attached. If
it is not embedded into a larger object frame (e. g., a lolly-frame) it models the
sortal reading of stick as in the sentence these days sticks are mostly produced in
big factories. Such context-triggered meaning-shifts from relational concepts to
non-relational readings are very common; the frame structures of the concepts
help to explain and visualize them. However, we would like to emphasize that
the stick-frame of Figure 4 (left) must not be confused with the attribute stick
itself: Stick is a functional concept whose functional frame is given in Figure 4
(left); although it is functional, it denotes – like the sortal stick-frame in Figure
12 – sticks. However, in contrast to the sortal frame its denotation is determined
by a functional relation from a possessor argument (here the potential referents
of the object-node). The attribute stick is the relationally interpreted functional
concept stick and therefore a function; it is not a frame.
The ability to give explicit frames for functional concepts that diUer fundamen-
tally from frames for the sortal readings of those concepts is a novelty. It is made
possible by our novel deVnition of frames, which no longer demands that the cen-
tral node be a root of the frame graph. We know of no other explicit approach
to frames for functional concepts.
Having motivated our approach to type signatures we will now sketch how it
oUers an elegant solution to problems in grammar engineering that occur when
frames are employed as semantic representations. To model how adjectives mod-
ify the meaning of a noun it has to be explained that in a phrase like red body
the value red is assigned to the attribute color, while round body modiVes the
value of the attribute shape. An unsatisfactory solution would be to have a single
rule for each adjective dimension, i. e., for each attribute. Instead, we propose to
introduce the notion of a minimal upper attribute of a type. An upper attribute
of a type is an attribute which is a supertype of the type with respect to the type
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hierarchy. Hence, a minimal upper attribute of a type is a minimal element of the
set of upper attributes of the type. According to the type signature in Figure 9,
the minimal upper type of red is color and the one for round is shape. Hence,
we can formulate a single rule for all those cases: SimpliVed, it states that in a
frame which represents the meaning of a phrase consisting of an adjective and
a noun, the type corresponding to the adjective is assigned as a value to the mini-
mal upper attribute of the adjective type. Such a rule would even capture some
interesting cases of ambiguity. Consider the polysemous adjective hot, which
means either being very warm or being very spicy. In a type hierarchy the type
hot could be placed such that it is a subtype of the attribute type temperature as
well as of the attribute type taste (cf. Figure 9). Then hot has two minimal upper
attributes and the above mentioned rule applied to the phrase hot pepper would
result in two frames: one representing a very spicy pepper [taste: hot] and one
representing a very warm pepper [temperature: hot], which could be part of a
dish. Due to space limits, we cannot go into more detail here, but a publication
focusing on this issue is in preparation.
4 Conclusion
We have presented a new approach to frames which discards the claim that the
central node of a frame is its root, which is a common claim in standard frame
theories. In addition, we have dismissed the artiVcial distinction between types
and attributes in type signatures. Those two adaptations enable us to give a
classiVcation of acyclic frame graphs that mirrors the classiVcation of concepts
into sortal, proper relational and functional concepts. In particular, the promising
fact that in our frame theory the structure of a functional (but also of a proper
relational) concept diUers fundamentally from that of the corresponding sortal
concept assures us that our modiVcations to standard frame theory can open up
new insights into concept decomposition.
However, a lot of work still has to be done. We need to develop a uniVca-
tion operation in order to account for frame composition. Individual concepts
also have to be accommodated in our frame theory. Furthermore, we expect the
discovery of new ways to explain phenomena from Velds such as composition,
metonymy, metaphors, and meronymy. Finally, powerful software devices have
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to be developed in order to test our frame model in real knowledge engineering
or language processing tasks.
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Notes on the reprint
This text was originally printed in 2007. It is one of the Vrst articles introducing a
formalization of Barsalou’s frame account and connecting it to Löbner’s classiV-
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cation of concept types (this volume). It has to be emphasized that the claim that
a frame reWects the type of the represented concept by pure graph properties (see
Figure 6) only holds for acyclic frame graphs of simple lexical concepts in their
basic reading. As soon as the argument of a relational concept is saturated, it is
not relational anymore. For example, while brother is a proper relational concept,
brother of Anne is a sortal concept denoting the set of all brothers of Anne. The
frame graphs for both concepts do not diUer with respect to the graph properties
discussed in the present article, but only with respect to node labels.
A similar problem occurs when concepts are shifted from one concept type
to another. For instance, take the functional concept Wat. A tenant can usually
only live in one Wat while a landlord can own more than one Wat. Hence, Wat
is a functional concept if it is read as the Wat of someone who is living there. It
is a proper relational concept if it is read as the Wat of someone who is renting
it out. Furthermore, Wat is shifted to a sortal concept when one abstracts away
from its function of living in or being rented out such that Wat solely refers to
the physical 3-dimensional object of a constellation of rooms. In order to account
for both argument saturation and concept type shifting, the argument nodes have
to be explicitly distinguished (see Petersen & Osswald 2014 for details).
At the end of Section 3, I discuss the idea of modeling adjectival modiVcation
in terms of minimal upper attributes. This idea has been worked out in Petersen
et al. (2008). However, note that this analysis is restricted to intersective adjec-
tives and captures adjectival modiVcation by means of modiVcation operations
on frames. An alternative solution with a broader coverage of diUerent adjective
types would consist of modeling adjectives as frames in their own right which are
composed with the noun frames via frame uniVcation.
Petersen, W. & T. Osswald (2014). Concept composition in frames: Focusing on genitive constructions.
In Gamerschlag et al. (eds.), Frames and Concept Types. Applications in Language, Cognition, and
Philosophy, vol. 94 of Studies in Linguistics and Philosophy, 243–266. Springer: Heidelberg.
Petersen, W., J. Fleischhauer, H. Beseoglu & P. Bücker. A frame-based analysis of synaesthetic metaphors.
The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication, New Prairie Press, 3, 1–22,
2008.
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Determination

Uniqueness of the DeVnite Article with
Respect to Cognitive Frames
Ryo Oda
Abstract
It has often been argued in the relevant literature that the use of the singular
deVnite article can be explained with the uniqueness theory, which postulates
that the singular deVnite requires the existence of only one entity that meets
the description. However, there are many instances of singular deVnites, which
seem contrary to the uniqueness requirement, as illustrated by the hospital in
the example “In Paris, I caught the measles and I went to the hospital to receive
treatment.” Some researchers have claimed that the use of such a singular deVnite
cannot be adequately explained with the uniqueness theory. Others have argued
that the hospital in this example refers not to a particular hospital in reality but
to the unique role “hospital” within a “city” frame. This paper argues that the
cognitive frame that supports the felicitous use of the deVnite the hospital in this
example is not an inWexible “city” frame but a Wexible “medical care” frame, which
is evoked by the linguistic context and the situation of the utterance. The paper
aims to explain the enigmatic use of singular deVnite descriptions in English, with
special reference to cognitive frames, and to illustrate the aXnity between the
deVnites in conVgurational use and the deVnite associative anaphora.
1 Previous research and problems encountered
1.1 Uniqueness
This paper examines the use of the singular deVnite article in English1. The
previous related literature has often argued that the use of the singular deVnite
1 At the outset of this study, we began with the analysis of articles in French and then extended our
study to the use of articles in English. The uses of deVnite descriptions in English and in French
are not entirely parallel. However, with regard to the use of a deVnite description without any
unique referent explicitly introduced in the context that we will deal with in this paper, the deVnite
descriptions in English and in French behave in an almost similar manner. Thus, the problems and
Thomas Gamerschlag, Doris Gerland, Rainer Osswald & Wiebke Petersen
(eds.). 2015. Meaning, Frames, and Conceptual Representation. Düsseldorf:
dup.
71
Ryo Oda
article can be explained with the uniqueness theory2. According to this theory,
the speaker uses the deVnite article when he/she supposes that his/her hearer
can apply a unique referent to the deVnite description or can uniquely identify
the referent (Russell 1905, Lambrecht 1994, Gundel, Hedberg & Zacharski 1993,
2001). The comparison of examples (1) and (2) as well as the examination of
example (3) will provide us a general view of this fundamental principle.
(1) Could you pass me the pen?
(2) Could you pass me a pen?
(3) It is not a solution, but the solution.
In example (1), the use of the singular deVnite article in the pen implies that there
exists only one pen in the immediate situation and the hearer can identify this
unique pen. In example (2), on the other hand, the use of the singular indeVnite
article implies that there can be more than one pen in the immediate situation.
Similarly, in example (3), the singular indeVnite in a solution presupposes that
there can be more than one solution, whereas the singular deVnite in the solution
indicates that this is the only solution. However, there are many instances where
the use of the singular deVnite is contrary to the uniqueness requirement.
(4) Emma had a bad headache yesterday, and she went to buy some medicine
at the pharmacy.
In example (4), suppose that there is more than one pharmacy in the city where
Emma lives. The employment of the singular deVnite article in the pharmacy is
quite appropriate, even though the interlocutor does not know exactly which
pharmacy Emma went to. The uniqueness condition, thus, does not seem to
be fulVlled here. In this paper, the pertinence of the uniqueness condition in
instances such as those exempliVed above will be addressed.
our analysis of these problems to be proposed herein with regard to deVnite descriptions in English
will apply mostly to French deVnite descriptions. Because of space limitations, the discussion and
data in this paper will be concerned exclusively with the use of articles in English.
2 Aside from the uniqueness theory, the following familiarity condition has been proposed in some
previous literature: the referent of the deVnite description is familiar within the discourse (Christo-
phersen 1939, Heim 1983). However, we will start oU by assuming that the use of the singular
deVnite description is predominantly governed by the uniqueness condition, and will not discuss
here the validity of the familiarity theory.
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1.2 Birner & Ward (1994)
Birner and Ward cite examples (5) and (6) to illustrate the validity of the unique-
ness theory.
(5) Your 10:00 appointment – a Mr. Johnson – said he’d be late because he had
to stop at the bank Vrst. (Birner & Ward 1994)
(6) As soon as my cousin arrived in Santiago, she broke her foot and had to
spend a week in the hospital. (Ibid.)
(7) *While in Santiago, Bill broke his foot and was rushed to the big hospital.
(Ibid.)3
In example (5), it is obvious that there is more than one bank in the city, but
the use of the singular deVnite article in the bank is appropriate even if the hearer
does not know exactly which bank is being spoken about. Similarly, there must be
several hospitals in Santiago in example (6), but the use of the singular deVnite in
the hospital is adequate even if the hearer cannot identify the hospital in question.
Singular deVnites of this nature do not have any obvious referent in the preceding
context, either in the hearer’s memory or in the immediate situation. Birner and
Ward notice two points from these examples. First, such singular deVnites are
used to refer to “locations” in general, the point which we do not agree with, as
will be shown later. Second, this use of the singular deVnite is acceptable only if
the intended referent is not relevantly diUerentiated from other referents denoted
by the same noun phrase in the context. Thus, the modiVer big attached to the
hospital distinguishes the referent from the other hospitals in example (7), and this
diUerentiation makes the expression the big hospital infelicitous, unless the hearer
can identify this particular hospital. Because there is much evidence in support
of their second viewpoint, we agree with it. However, Birner and Ward4 conclude
that the uniqueness condition is not a necessary condition for the felicitous use of
the deVnite article, because as examples (5) and (6) show, the intended referent
is not always uniquely identiVable.
At this point, we would like to raise two questions: Does the use of such a
singular deVnite really deny the validity of the uniqueness theory? Furthermore,
3 In this paper, the asterisk (*) indicates ungrammaticality or infelicity in the context.
4 Birner & Ward (1994) maintain that familiarity is neither a necessary nor a suXcient condition for
the felicitous use of the deVnite article.
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why is it that some singular deVnite descriptions, when being introduced in the
context without a uniquely identiVable referent, can often refer to a location?
1.3 Epstein (1999)
Epstein (1999) adopts cognitive frames to analyze the deVnite article. According
to him, when a noun phrase designates a role, it refers to a Vxed property, but not
to a particular individual.
(8) The President is elected every four years. (Epstein 1999)
(9) The President is giving a speech tonight. (Ibid.)
In example (8)5, the noun phrase the President is most likely to be interpreted as
the role that designates the property of “being President.” Meanwhile, in example
(9), the same noun phrase, the President, is most likely to be interpreted as the
value that denotes the particular individual fulVlling the role of the President at
the time of utterance; in the context of 1962, the value that satisVes the role of
the President of the United States of America is John F. Kennedy; in 2013, it is
Barack Obama. Following this idea, Epstein developed the theory that “deVnite
descriptions frequently refer to roles representing stereotypical elements within
cognitive frames.” (Epstein 1999:126)
Birner and Ward also examined the concept of the cognitive frame while an-
alyzing the singular deVnite; they arrived at the conclusion that the deVnite
without an obvious antecedent (or a uniquely identiVable referent) cannot be ex-
plained with cognitive frames.
(10) The Vrst thing we did upon arriving in Santiago was to go to the park and
have a relaxing picnic lunch. (Birner & Ward 1994)
(11) When I was six years old, I had to spend a night in the hospital, and I was
terriVed. (Ibid.)
Birner and Ward rejected the analysis of the deVnite article in terms of cognitive
frames because “there is typically more than a single park within a given city”
(Birner & Ward 1994:99). However, in example (10), the use of the singular deV-
5 In this example, the deVnite the President can also be considered as an instance of a functional
concept deVnite (Löbner 1985, 1998).
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nite in the park is felicitous, and in example (11), “there is no mention of a city that
can give rise to a frame that might plausibly contain a hospital” (Ibid.:99). Epstein
disagrees with Birner and Ward, explaining that the deVnite the park in exam-
ples such as (10) does represent a stereotypical element within the “city” frame;
it is not important to identify the exact park where the speaker went. Epstein
points out that “the availability of frame-knowledge is not dependent on explicit
mention of the frame itself in the surrounding discourse”(Epstein 1999:128).
We agree with Epstein that a cognitive frame, regardless of whether it is ex-
plicitly mentioned, can be activated and used in a discourse. However, we will
argue that his analysis of examples (10) and (11) utilizing the “city frame” needs
to be modiVed.
1.4 Abbott (2001)
Abbott (2001) categorizes “conVgurational uses of nouns” (i. e., “non-unique def-
inites” according to her terminology6) into six subcategories: “proprietary items,”
“traditionally unique items,” “predicate nominals,” “products of writing,” “loca-
tions,” and “types.” In this paper, we will not examine each of the six subcategories
individually for conVgurational uses of nouns. Abbott cites examples (12)–(15) as
those of deVnites of “traditionally unique items.”
(12) [Hotel concierge to guest, in a lobby with four elevators]
You’re in Room 611. Take the elevator to the sixth Woor and turn left.
(Birner & Ward 1994)
(13) Switch the light on. (Löbner 1985)
(14) Your 10:00 appointment – a Mr. Johnson – said he’d be late because he
had to stop at the bank Vrst. (Birner & Ward 1994) = (5)
(15) Kim spent the night in the hospital. (Abbott 2001)
Talking about example (12), Abbott argues, “for a long time after the invention of
elevators, it must have been customary for buildings to have only one” elevator.
6 Some previous studies, including Abbott (2001), have often adopted the term “non-unique deVnites”
to refer to deVnite descriptions whose referents cannot be uniquely identiVed by the interlocutor.
However, we prefer the term “conVgurational uses of nouns,” as used by Löbner (1985), or “deVnites
in conVgurational use,” because, as we will see later, the referent of a singular deVnite of this type
will in fact be considered to be a unique element (or a unique role) within a cognitive frame.
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The same holds true for electric lights in example (13): it should be the case
that there has always been only one electric light in a room. This explanation
also holds true for the bank in example (14) and for the hospital in example (15).
Abbott identiVes such deVnites as “traditionally unique items.” She conVrms that
her approach does not essentially contradict Epstein’s frame analysis. The reason
why Birner and Ward reject the frame analysis is that, nowadays, a city generally
has many parks, many hospitals, etc. According to Abbott, however, the frame
analysis is eUective in the explanation of this phenomenon because “if we go back
to when these usages were Vrst being established, it may have been true that there
was typically only one of these things per town, or at least one salient thing for
any group of people.”
1.5 Löbner (1985, 1998)
Löbner (1985) distinguishes three types of nouns: sortal, relational, and functional
nouns. “Sortal nouns classify objects, whereas relational nouns describe objects
as standing in a certain relation to others.” “Functional nouns relate objects unam-
biguously (or one-to-one) to others,” while “the referent (or value) of a functional
noun depends, in general, on the situation referred to.” This logical-semantic dis-
tinction of nouns is signiVcant for the analysis of deVnites. According to Löbner
(1985), “the meaning of the deVnite article consists in the indication that the noun
is to be taken as a functional concept.” Löbner (1998) also argues that “the head
noun of an associative anaphora NP is taken as an FC2” (i. e., a functional concept
that has both a situational and a possessor argument) and the FC2 interpretation
of the head noun yields a one-to-one relation between the referent of the def-
inite associative anaphora and the possessor (or the trigger), hence warranting
the “uniqueness” of the referent. The relation between the referent of a deVnite
associative anaphora and the possessor is based on general knowledge, or more
speciVcally, the discourse referent network, which constitutes a “frame.” Löbner’s
(1998) frame concept is inspired by Barsalou’s frame, which we will examine later.
1.6 Perspective
Our fundamental claim concerning the singular deVnite is as follows: all singular
deVnites are explained with the uniqueness theory, and even singular deVnites,
which do not seem to have any uniquely identiVable referent (i. e., “non-unique
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deVnites” according to the terminology developed in some previous research),
satisfy the uniqueness condition within a cognitive frame. However, we will
argue that the cognitive frame involved in several examples such as the hospital
or the bank in examples (5), (6), (11), and (15) above is not a Vxed idea such as
a “city” frame, as Epstein or Abbott claim. Birner and Ward observe that the
singular deVnites in conVgurational use are generally used to refer to locations.
We shall presently illustrate why singular deVnites of this type often – but not
always – refer to locations.
The zero article plays a part in some varieties of English. We notice the fre-
quent appearance of the word “hospital” without an article in British English, for
instance, in expressions such as “in hospital, go to hospital, leave hospital, be taken
to hospital, and be airlifted to hospital,” whereas the deVnite article in American
English is often retained in the same expressions, as in “in the hospital, go to the
hospital, leave the hospital, be taken to the hospital, and be airlifted to the hospi-
tal.” Our analysis of this point is founded on reWection about data derived from
the American English style. Furthermore, as it has already been pointed out in
some previous research, even in American English, bare nouns are used in several
idioms such as “go to school” or “go to church.” This paper, however, will not deal
with the problem of bare nouns, but focus on the opposition of singular deVnites
with singular indeVnites.
2 The unique role within a cognitive frame
2.1 Cognitive frame
A cognitive frame is a network of knowledge that connects various events, situ-
ations, persons, objects, or their characters and the entire spectrum of relations
among these elements. Cognitive frames were Vrst conceived of by Minsky (1974,
1977) and Schank & Abelson (1977) within the domain of artiVcial intelligence,
and then applied to the domain of cognitive science. Our notion of cognitive
frame is inspired by Fauconnier’s (1984, 1994) mental space theory and Barsalou’s
(1992) frame theory. Barsalou’s frames are based on an attribute-value structure,
within which attributes are Vguring in the scheme. Barsalou’s “attribute” is equiv-
alent to “dimension,” “variable,” “slot,” or “role” under other theories. In this paper,
we adopt the term “role.” Barsalou also assumes that “frames are dynamic rela-
tional structures whose form is Wexible and context dependent” (Barsalou 1992:21)
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and “frames can represent exemplars and propositions, prototypes and member-
ship, subordinates and taxonomies” (Ibid.:21) as well as “conceptual combinations,
event sequences, rules, and plans” (Ibid.:21). We illustrate a simpliVed version of
a cognitive frame for “wedding” in Figure 1.
WEDDING
wedding dress
bride
wedding rings
invitations
bridegroom
bouquets
WD-1
B-1
WR-1
I-1
BG-1
BQ-1
as
pe
ct
asp
ect
aspect
aspect
aspect
aspect
type
type
type
type
type
type
Figure 1: Wedding frame
As shown in Figure 1, the “wedding” frame has a central node labeled with
“wedding,” and nodes for each “role” (i. e., “attribute” according to Barsalou’s ter-
minology), more speciVcally, “bride” and “bridegroom,” “wedding dress,” “wed-
ding rings,” “bouquets,” “invitations,” and so forth, and nodes for its “value.” The
links between the central node and the nodes for roles are assigned general labels
such as “aspect,” and the links between the nodes for roles and those for values are
assigned general labels such as “type.” As Löbner (1998) notices, the roles Vguring
in cognitive frames are functional concepts. Thus, a cognitive frame, in the case
of deVnite associative anaphoras, guarantees the connection between an anchor
(which is represented by a central node) and its roles, hence warranting the use
of a deVnite article for each role. Example (16) shows how the cognitive frame
for “wedding” works in discourse.
(16) A : How are you?
B : I’m Vne. And you? Have you already written the invitations? And
have you thought about the bouquets?
A : Yes, but I haven’t chosen the dress yet. . .
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B : Really? And the wedding rings? You’ve got them already?
A : Yes, Benjamin, he does everything very quickly.
Example (16) is a conversation between two friends, who met on the street, and
one of whom would soon get married. Even if none of them referred to the
context of a wedding, they could use deVnite descriptions such as the invitations,
the bouquets, the dress, and the wedding rings at Vrst mention. The use of these
deVnites is possible because speaker B knew well about her friend’s wedding and
they had in common the cognitive frame for a wedding. When a wedding is
presented explicitly or implicitly, the wedding frame is brought forth, and the
roles that are a part of this frame are activated and ready to be mentioned with
a deVnite article. Each role within a cognitive frame can correspond to various
values, namely various individuals in the real world.
As Barsalou (1992) asserts, we share with each other both cognitive frames
founded on an event or a situation, such as a “wedding” frame or an “anniversary”
frame, and cognitive frames characterized by an individual or an object, such as
the “house” frame, as illustrated in example (17).
(17) [An invited guest, to whom a couple is showing their new house, asks]
Where is the kitchen?
HOUSE
roof
entrance
kitchen
living room
bathroom
bedroom(s)
R-1
E-1
K-1
LR-1
BathR-1
BedR-1
as
pe
ct
asp
ect
aspect
aspect
aspectaspect
type
type
type
type
type
type
Figure 2: House frame
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In example (17), the guest can justly say the kitchen, using a deVnite article, at
Vrst mention, because as shown in Figure 2, the “house” frame contains as “roles”
a roof, an entrance, a kitchen, a living room, a bathroom, (a) bedroom(s), and so
forth. Hence, in a situation where the “house” frame is evoked or activated, we
can employ a deVnite article without an explicit antecedent to mention the roles
with an existential presupposition in the “house” frame.
It must also be mentioned that cognitive frames are culturally and socially de-
Vned, and the elements contained in a cognitive frame may vary across diUerent
cultures and languages and are subject to personal variations.
2.2 Flexibility of cognitive frames: which of the cognitive frames
is inferred?
Singular deVnite descriptions without a unique referent explicitly introduced in
the context (i. e., singular deVnites in conVgurational use) are considered to per-
form a unique role within a cognitive frame. The approach in terms of cognitive
frames concerning this issue has already been adopted by Epstein and other re-
searchers; however, we will propose another interpretation of cognitive frames
for several instances that Epstein (1999) and Abbott (2001) have analyzed.
Compare examples (18), (19), and (20) to ascertain the cognitive frames that
permit the use of the deVnite the hospital.
(18) In Paris, I caught the measles and I went to the hospital to receive treat-
ment.
(19) [In Paris, a woman talks about her husband who is an engineer.]
He is going {*to the hospital/to a hospital } to do some wiring.
(20) [In Paris: the words of a member of a movie camera crew]
Last week, we went to {*the hospital/a hospital } to Vlm a scene.
There are, of course, several hospitals in Paris. In example (18), the singular deV-
nite the hospital is quite appropriate, even though the hearer cannot identify the
particular hospital in Paris where the speaker visited. In examples (19) and (20),
too, the hearer is in no position to know which particular hospital is being talked
about; however, the deVnite the hospital is no longer adequate, and the indeVnite
a hospital is obligatory instead. Where does this diUerence in the acceptability
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of the deVnite the hospital stem from? The answer lies in the diUerent cognitive
frames evoked in each example.
MEDICAL
CARE
doctor(s)
hospital
nurse(s)
D-1
H-1
N-1
asp
ect
aspect
aspect
type
type
type
Figure 3: Medical care frame
In example (18), the context of “catching the measles” brings about a “medical
care” frame, which includes “doctor(s),” “nurse(s),” “hospital,” etc. In the context
of this “medical care” frame, the hospital plays a unique role. On the other hand,
in example (19), it is a “wiring” frame that is evoked, which comprises “wiring
diagram,” “screwdriver(s),” “plier(s),” etc., as stereotypical constituents; “hospital”
does not Vgure in this frame. Similarly, in example (20), it is a “movie Vlming”
frame that is called up, which has “director,” “cameraperson(s),” “projector(s),”
“scenario,” “actor(s),” etc., as stereotypical roles, but not “hospital.” In other words,
there is no intrinsic relation between a hospital and a wiring repair job or the
Vlming of a movie. That is why we cannot use the deVnite expression the hospital
in examples (19) and (20). Hence, we may conclude that the cognitive frame
supporting the felicitous use of the deVnite the hospital in example (18) is not
a “city” frame but a “medical care” frame or a “surgery” frame, which involves
“doctor(s),” “nurse(s),” “hospital,” etc., as roles.
Now, let us compare example (21) with (22) and example (23) with (24). Suppose
that, in the context of all these examples, there are several banks and swimming
pools in the city where the speakers live.
(21) I’ll stop at the bank to withdraw some money.
(22) I’ll go {*to the bank/to a bank } for a job interview.
(23) It’s so hot out today! I’ll go to the swimming pool this afternoon.
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(24) [on cell phone] Listen, my darling, I’m at work. I must go to deliver
a pizza {to *the swimming pool/to a swimming pool} and I don’t really
have time to talk to you now. . .
In example (21), the speaker can use the deVnite description the bankwithout hav-
ing a particular bank in mind, and it will not matter whether the hearer cannot
identify the bank in question. Since the cognitive frame for “withdrawing money”
typically includes “bank,” “cash card,” “ATM,” etc., as constituent elements, the
deVnite description the bank performs a unique role in this cognitive frame. In
example (22), however, the use of the deVnite the bank is not appropriate if the
hearer does not know exactly which bank the speaker is talking about; this is
because the cognitive frame in question is that of “a job interview,” and a job in-
terview frame does not presume a “bank.” That is why we use the indeVnite a bank
and not the bank. The same argument can be applied to examples (23) and (24). In
example (23), the use of the deVnite the swimming pool is quite natural since the
speaker is going to the pool to swim, and it is a perfectly acceptable usage even
if the hearer does not know which particular swimming pool is being referred
to, and even if the speaker himself/herself does not know which swimming pool
he/she is going to. Since the cognitive frame for “swimming” typically contains a
“swimming pool,” the deVnite the swimming pool performs a unique role within
this frame. On the other hand, if the speaker in example (24) is working in a
pizzeria and if he/she is going to a swimming pool to deliver a pizza, he/she does
not use the deVnite the swimming pool; instead, he/she uses the indeVnite a swim-
ming pool. A swimming pool is a place for people to swim, and it has nothing
to do with the delivery of pizza. The context in example (24) calls up a cognitive
frame for “delivery of pizza,” and this frame does not have “swimming pool” as
one of its typical elements; thus, the use of “swimming pool” with the deVnite
article is unacceptable because “swimming pool” does not play a unique role.
Through comparing the given examples, we may reasonably conclude that the
acceptability of conVgurational uses of nouns such as the hospital or the bank
is not due to the “city” frame, as Epstein or Abbott claim, but owing to frames
such as a “medical care” frame, which contains “hospital” as a unique role, or a
“withdrawing money” frame, which contains “bank” as a unique element.
82
Uniqueness of the DeVnite Article with Respect to Cognitive Frames
2.3 Location nouns
Birner & Ward (1994) observe that deVnite descriptions in conVgurational use
with singular countable head nouns are generally used in references to locations7,
and Abbott (2001) agrees. Nevertheless, Epstein (1999) disagrees, and so do we.
Indeed, most of the deVnites in conVgurational use in the examples that we have
examined thus far are location nouns such as “hospital,” “bank,” and “swimming
pool.” This is because locations such as hospitals, banks, swimming pools, post
oXces, cinemas, and pharmacies are part of the services we seek in everyday life,
and consequently, these locations are quite naturally connected to the cognitive
frames that are recalled when these services are mentioned or suggested. For
instance, in banks, we deposit or withdraw money; we go to the swimming pool
for a swim, not for the delivery of a pizza. In hospitals, we undergo medical
treatment or an operation or we may visit someone there. People, in general, do
not go to a hospital to repair wires or to Vlm movie scenes. Similarly, our usual
activity in post oXces is to buy stamps and send letters or parcels. In other words,
information about the relation between these locations and their utilities is con-
structed and crystallized in the form of knowledge networks, otherwise known
as cognitive frames. That is why locations are quite likely to Vgure as stereo-
typical elements and function in unique ways within cognitive frames.8 Another
reason why deVnites in conVgurational use frequently represent locations is that
information concerning a location appears, in many cases, in the background of
a discourse, but rarely as its theme. That is, the identiVcation of the location is
not necessarily essential in the discourse concerned. The conVgurational use of
nouns is acceptable only when there is no necessity to identify the referent of
this deVnite in the discourse in question (cf. Birner & Ward9). This is because
7 Birner & Ward (1994) maintain that non-unique deVnite descriptions (“deVnite descriptions in con-
Vgurational use” or “conVgurational uses of nouns” in our terms) generally occur with one of the
following three types of nouns: mass nouns (the milk), plural nouns (e.g., Pass the rolls), and location
nouns.
8 It is plausible to assume that a location noun by itself can evoke some cognitive frame. However,
it is not the simple use of a location noun that permits the employment of a deVnite article with
this location noun. For example, in example (20), we may suppose that the noun “hospital” evokes a
“hospital” frame, but this is not the frame where the referent of the hospital is to be anchored to;
the entire context in example (20) triggers oU a “movie Vlming” frame, and therefore, the deVnite
the hospital is irrelevant. The use of the deVnite the hospital inevitably needs to be anchored in a
cognitive frame that is related to the functions of a hospital.
9 We do not agree with Birner & Ward (1994) that the uniqueness condition cannot account for
all uses of the singular deVnite article. Nevertheless, Birner and Ward appropriately claim that
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a role within a cognitive frame must be an element that is neither diUerentiated
nor individualized in context: a “role” should be able to take diUerent values in
the real world; therefrom, its name “role” originated.
Now, consider another set of examples involving location nouns. Examples
(25) and (26) describe a scene wherein one person calls up his friend’s cell phone.
The caller asks his/her friend about his/her whereabouts, and the friend answers
him/her. We may suppose that there are many hospitals in the city where these
two people live.
(25) a. I’m in the hospital. / I’m at the hospital.
b. I’m in a hospital. / I’m at a hospital.
(26) a. *I’m in front of the hospital.
b. I’m in front of a hospital.
It is possible to use a deVnite article in “I’m in the hospital,” as shown in example
(25)10, even if the hearer cannot identify the particular hospital in question. In
example (26), however, if the hearer is not in a position to identify the hospital in
question, it is unacceptable to employ a deVnite article, as in “I’m in front of the
hospital”; instead, we use an indeVnite article and say “I’m in front of a hospital.”
What, then, is the basis for such a usage?
Note that there are certain nuanced diUerences in example (25) between the
usage of the deVnite article, as in (25a) “I’m in the hospital,” and the usage of an
indeVnite article, as in (25b) “I’m in a hospital.” The use of the deVnite the hospital
implies that the speaker is in a hospital to receive medical treatment or consult a
doctor (in “I’m in the hospital”) or to visit someone who has been hospitalized (in
“I’m at the hospital”). There are no such implications in the use of the indeVnite a
hospital. The utterance “I’m in a hospital” simply means that the speaker is in a
hospital for a reason that has no relation to the function of a hospital—to deliver
Wowers, perhaps, or to repair elevators. We are fairly certain that the use of the
deVnite the hospital triggers a cognitive frame that inevitably implies elements
“whenever the referent is not uniquely identiVable on the basis of the deVnite NP, it must be both
undiUerentiated and not relevantly diUerentiable in context.” (Birner & Ward 1994)
10 The interpretation of example (25a) varies depending on whether “in” or “at” is used. The utterance
“I’m in the hospital” implies that the speaker is in the hospital as a patient to receive medical
treatment, while the utterance “I’m at the hospital” means that the speaker is at the hospital as a
visitor: he/she is visiting someone who has been hospitalized.
84
Uniqueness of the DeVnite Article with Respect to Cognitive Frames
such as “consultation,” “medical treatment,” “operation,” or “visit to a sick person.”
On the other hand, the act of being in front of a hospital in example (26) hardly
evokes the functions that are attributable to a hospital. If someone is inside a
hospital, we are more liable to imagine that the person is there to receive medical
care or to visit a sick friend. But if someone is in front of a hospital, we do not
necessarily infer that this person is on his/her way to consult a doctor. That is
why no cognitive frame that contains “hospital” is activated to permit the use of
the deVnite the hospital in example (26). These pieces of data demonstrate that
the appropriateness of the deVnite the hospital in conVgurational use depends not
on whether the deVnite designates a location, but on whether the deVnite is used
in a context in which an appropriate cognitive frame with “hospital” is evoked.
We will now present obvious examples to demonstrate that singular deVnites
in conVgurational use are not limited to location nouns.
(27) No problem, I’ll get the maid to do it. (Epstein 1999)
(28) Waiter, I demand to see the menu! (Ibid.)
(29) A : I’d like a cappuccino, but I don’t know if they have it. . .
B : You have only to ask the waiter.
(30) A : I’d like a cappuccino, but I don’t know if they have it. . .
B : *You have only to ask the waiter with blue eyes.
As Epstein (1999) explains, the sentence in example (27) with the singular deVnite
the maidmay be used either in a hotel or in a home where there are several maids;
he argues, “(28) would be felicitous in a situation where both the speaker and the
waiter can see an entire stack of menus on the counter.” Similarly, the use of
the singular deVnite the waiter in example (29) is quite natural even if there are
several waiters working in this café at the moment of utterance. However, none
of these deVnites in conVgurational use refers to a location. The acceptability
of the deVnites the menu and the waiter is explained both by attributing it to
the presence of some cognitive frames such as an “order in a café” frame, which
includes “menu” and “waiter” as a unique role, and by attributing it to the fact
that these deVnites are elements that are neither relevantly diUerentiated nor
individualized in context. Therefore, the use of the deVnite “the waiter with blue
eyes” in example (30) is not adequate as a conVgurational use of nouns.
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There is another well-known type of deVnite in conVgurational use that does
not designate a location.
(31) He tripped on the leg of the chair.
(32) After landing, I got on the wing of the plane and looked up to the sky.
In general, a chair has four legs and a plane has two wings, and yet, the use
of the singular deVnite article for the head noun in the leg of the chair or the
wing of the plane is not paradoxical in the examples above. As Löbner (1998) and
Barker (2005) notice, possessive deVnite descriptions can be quite often used “in
contexts in which more than one object satisVes the content of the description”
(Barker 2005). Barker refers to this type of possessive deVnite description as a
“possessive weak deVnite.” Namely, possessive weak deVnites belong among the
deVnites in conVgurational use that we have discussed thus far. Since the problem
of possessive weak deVnites has been fully discussed in previous research like by
Löbner (1985, 1998) and Barker (2005), we will not go too far into this matter
here, but we would simply point out that as shown in examples (31) and (32),
there are many instances of possessive weak deVnites, that is, possessive deVnite
descriptions in conVgurational use, that do not refer to locations.
2.4 DeVnite associative anaphora
It is quite evident that there is a certain aXnity between the deVnite in conVg-
urational use and the deVnite associative anaphora, because both deVnites have
relevance to some cognitive frame. In this section, we will illustrate their resem-
blance in addition to a slight diUerence between them.
The conVgurational use of deVnite descriptions is felicitous when the noun
functions as a unique role within a certain cognitive frame, which is activated
by the linguistic context or the immediate situation. There are occasions when
an anterior context explicitly introduces some cognitive frame or others with a
linguistic expression, but it is not always the case. Even without any obvious
expression that triggers a cognitive frame, we employ a singular deVnite descrip-
tion when the hearer is supposed to (re)construct the cognitive frame in question
that has a particular noun with a unique role. Examples (33) and (34) report the
utterances of a man who has arrived late for his appointment and is oUering an
excuse after a brief greeting.
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(33) I’m sorry, but {the bus/the taxi} had engine trouble.
(34) I’m sorry, my car sideswiped {*the bus/*the taxi/a bus/a taxi}.
While oUering an excuse for being late, the speaker in example (33) may use
the deVnite the bus or the taxi, whereas the speaker in example (34) uses the
indeVnite a bus or a taxi. Where does this diUerence in acceptability of the deVnite
description come from? Our explanation is as follows: if someone arrives behind
schedule, out of breath, and mentions “the bus” or “the taxi,” the situation forces
us to interpret this bus or this taxi as the bus or the taxi that the speaker took. It
means that the hearer in example (33) reconstructs a cognitive frame of “traXc” or
“transportation” containing “a bus” or “a taxi” as a unique role. The bus or the taxi
that the speaker had employed in reality corresponds to the bus or the taxi that
exists within this cognitive frame. On the other hand, there is nothing in example
(34) that activates a cognitive frame of “traXc” or “transportation” involving a
bus or a taxi as a unique role, which would surely bring about a minor collision.
In other words, when we drive a car, we do not necessarily have an accident with
a car or a taxi. Therefore, there is no existential presupposition of a unique bus or
taxi playing a role within a cognitive frame; the speaker thus inevitably uses an
indeVnite description, “a bus” or “a taxi.” Reconsider examples (33) and (34) from
a diUerent viewpoint. In example (34), if the speaker uses a deVnite description
such as the bus or the taxi, saying “I’m sorry, my car sideswiped the bus” or
“I’m sorry, my car sideswiped the taxi,” the hearer will ask him “Which bus?” or
“Which taxi?” On the other hand, even though the speaker uses the deVnite the
bus or the taxi, the hearer in example (33) will not pose this question because the
deVnite the bus or the taxi indeed functions as a unique role within the cognitive
frame. This fact shows, again, that the singular deVnite description as a unique
role within a frame is employed in a context where the identity of the referent
does not come into question.
As Du Bois (1980), Löbner (1985), Epstein (1999), and others have noted, the
mechanism of the uniqueness of an element in a frame resembles the mechanism
of associative anaphora. Consider examples (35), (36), and (37).
(35) I caught a taxi in front of the library. The driver was very friendly.
(36) I am terribly afraid of going to the dentist. The drill terriVes me. . .
(37) I tried to hang myself. . . but the chair didn’t want to fall.
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Figure 4: Car frame
In associative anaphora, the anaphoric relation between the antecedent and the
anaphoric expression is frequently established by some cognitive frame. In the
cognitive frame of “taxi” or “car,” shown in Figure 4, we can evoke elements such
as “driver,” “steering wheel,” “radiator,” and “clutch,” and this “car” frame in exam-
ple (35) permits the associative anaphora between “a taxi” and “the driver.” The
anaphoric relation in example (36) between “the dentist” and “the drill” is founded
in a “dentist” frame, which includes elements such as “assistant(s),” “chair,” and
“drill.” The anaphoric relation in example (37) between the contextual antecedent
hang oneself and its anaphoric expression “the chair” is also guaranteed by the
cognitive frame of “suicide by hanging oneself,” which contains “rope” and “chair”
as stereotypical components. In these three examples concerning deVnite asso-
ciative anaphora, it is a cognitive frame that appeared in the previous context that
connects the antecedent with its anaphoric expression. In the case of the conVgu-
rational uses of deVnite descriptions, there is no antecedent or no cognitive frame
introduced explicitly in the discourse, but the deVnite in conVgurational use per-
forms a unique role in some cognitive frames that are supported by the situation
of utterance. Even if there is no explicit antecedent or no expression introducing
a cognitive frame, the conVgurational use of nouns is validated through the same
mechanism as in the case of associative anaphora.
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3 Conclusion
In this paper, we have demonstrated that the use of deVnite descriptions, which
has been considered by some researchers to be highly resistant to any explana-
tion with the uniqueness theory, stems from certain unique roles within cognitive
frames evoked by linguistic contexts, circumstances of utterances, or the imme-
diate situation. Epstein (1999) has already adopted the frame approach in his
analysis of the deVnite, but it seems to us that there is a misunderstanding about
the nature of a cognitive frame for the conVgurational use of some deVnites such
as the hospital or the bank. We have argued that the cognitive frame supporting
the acceptable use of the deVnite the hospital is not the “city” frame but a “medi-
cal care” frame, or a “visit to a sick person” frame, and so forth. The deVnites in
conVgurational use often – but not always – refers to a location, as previous re-
searchers have noticed, and we have explained the reason for this high frequency
of location nouns in deVnites of this type: locations such as hospitals, banks, and
post oXces are related with the services we seek in our daily life; the general use
of common services creates certain cognitive frames and typical roles associated
with these frames, which supports the conVgurational uses of nouns.
One of the most essential characteristics of the deVnite description is that it
represents a referent that can be uniquely determined either on the basis of a
cognitive frame, on the basis of a discourse domain, or by shared knowledge.
Some previous studies on this subject have devoted too much attention to the
identiVcation of the referent in reality. However, what is important in the study
of the deVnite description is not to identify the referent in reality, but to discover
the cognitive frame, the discourse domain, or the shared knowledge on which the
interpretation of the deVnite description is founded. In the conVgurational uses
of deVnite descriptions, it is a cognitive frame or knowledge network that serves
as the primary domain for possible interpretations of the deVnite description.
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FrameNet, Barsalou Frames and the Case
of Associative Anaphora
Alexander Ziem
Abstract
This paper introduces and compares the currently most important approaches to
frames: the FrameNet project pursued at the ‘International Computer Science In-
stitute’ in Berkeley and Barsalou’s cognitive frame theory supplemented by Löb-
ner’s concept type theory. On the basis of empirical Vndings of a case study on
associative anaphora, it is argued that both approaches complement each other
in several respects. While, for example, Barsalou’s theory concentrates on sortal
concepts, disregarding semantic and syntactic valences of each word in each of its
senses, FrameNet focuses on relational concepts, particularly verbs and deverbal
nouns. In contrast to frames as described in terms of valency patterns within
FrameNet, linguistic approaches drawing on Barsalou’s theory emphasize that
frames are embedded structures having a rich internal structure. By comparison,
serious shortcomings and drawbacks of each approach become apparent.
1 Introduction
The notion frame goes back to Minsky’s inWuential paper on knowledge repre-
sentation (Minsky, 1975), and since then it has been a central, but also ambiguous
and controversial, concept in many disciplines (for an overview cf. Ziem, 2008,
pp. 13-35), including cognitive semantics (e. g., Fillmore, 1976, 1977, 1985, 2006),
computational linguistics (Petersen, 2007/2015, among others), artiVcial intelli-
gence (e. g., Charniak, 1976; Hayes, 1980), cognitive psychology (e. g., Schank &
Abelson, 1977; Barsalou, 1992), and Media Sciences (Scheufele, 2003; Matthes,
2007). In spite of the vivid discussions in the 1980s, in current research the frame
concept seems to have become less attractive. However, there are two excep-
tions. On the one hand, Fillmore’s early account of semantic frames has been put
Thomas Gamerschlag, Doris Gerland, Rainer Osswald & Wiebke Petersen
(eds.). 2015. Meaning, Frames, and Conceptual Representation. Düsseldorf:
dup.
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into practice within FrameNet, a large-scale computational lexicography project
hosted at the University of Berkeley, California (for an overview cf. Boas, 2005;
Fillmore, Johnson & Petruck, 2003). Similarly, also Barsalou’s frame theory has
recently been readdressed and further developed, namely in the research projects
“Frames and functional concepts” (FOR 600) and “The Structure of Representa-
tions in Language, Cognition, and Science” (SFB 991), both hosted at the Univer-
sity of Düsseldorf.
The starting point of the present paper is the fact that both approaches seem
to be based on a mutually shared deVnition of frames. While FrameNet sees
frames as a “script-like conceptual structure that describes a particular type of
situation, object or event, along with its participants and props” (Ruppenhofer et
al., 2010, p. 5), Barsalou (1992, p. 21) proposes that “frames are dynamic structures
whose form is Wexible and context-dependent”. However, signiVcant diUerences
relate to the theoretical prerequisites of each approach. Barsalou’s frame model is
cognitive in nature; it addresses frames asmental entities. FrameNet, on the other
hand, is Vrst and foremost a linguistic approach to lexical meaning grounded in
the concept of semantic and syntactic valency. As a result, both approaches diUer
substantially in the way their methodology is put into practice.
Taking so-called associative anaphora (henceforth: AA) as a ‘test case’, this
paper aims at providing a theoretical and methodological comparison of the two
currently most sophisticated approaches to frames. An associative anaphor es-
tablishes indirect reference to a previously introduced discourse referent (e. g.,
key → car, cf. Ex. 1). Focusing on the resolution of indirect text reference, the
present paper addresses the following kinds of issues, among others: How does
FrameNet and a Barsalou-inspired approach to frames account for reference res-
olution in the case of AA? Do both approaches adequately describe and explain
the phenomenon addressed? And most importantly: Given the results of the
case study, what are the assets and drawbacks of each approach? Is it possible to
(partly) integrate both approaches in one another, yielding a more comprehensive
frame theory?
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, I will brieWy introduce the
most important properties of associative anaphora. This section also provides
a preliminary typology of AAs, including deVnite associative anaphors with ei-
ther verbal or nominal antecedents as its most important subclasses. Section 3
sketches out Barsalou’s approach to frames and its extensions yielded in the re-
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search project FOR 600 insofar as it is relevant for applications to DAAs. Likewise,
Section 4 introduces the methodology oUered by FrameNet in order to investigate
DAAs. Finally, Section 5 summarizes and compares the results. Based on these
Vndings, it draws some conclusions pointing to promising perspectives for future
frame-semantic research.
2 The case of associative anaphora
Following the standard deVnition, an AA, sometimes also called “bridging ana-
phor” (Clark, 1975) or subsumed under “indirect anaphor” (Schwarz, 2000) is a
Vrst-mentioned use of a deVnite or indeVnite expression that establishes indirect
reference to a previously introduced discourse referent in a text (Löbner, 1998).
In (1), for example, the reader mentally creates a concept for the anaphoric NP the
key that includes information about the previously introduced discourse referent
car, yielding the more complex concept “Peter’s car key”. The possessor argu-
ment of key is saturated with conceptual information that the antecedent his car
provides.
(1) Peter walked to his car [antecedent]. He had forgotten the key [associa-
tive anaphor].
When a referential use of an NP prompts the reader to construe a concept for this
entity, the lexical frame is subsequently enriched by idiosyncratic information
either provided by the context or inferred from background knowledge. In the
context of (1), for example, the concept associated with key indirectly relates to
the NP his car. More speciVcally, the key is interpreted as the key of Peter’s
car. Note that associative anaphors have no deictic quality; in order to determine
the reference of the noun key, for example, a conceptual representation of the
respective referent is construed solely by means of information provided by the
discourse referent car and the AA. It is thus the linguistic and not the situational
context of the anaphorically used deVnite NP the key that helps to identify the
referent of the NP.
To gain a deeper understanding of forms and functions of AAs in texts, it is
useful to distinguish between diUerent types of AAs (for a typology based on
so-called “activation types” cf. Schwarz, 2000). First, a frequently found distin-
guishing criterion relates to deVniteness/indeVniteness of AAs.
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(2) They passed an old monastery. A window was smashed.
IndeVnite associative anaphors, such as exempliVed in (2), are exceptional; the
majority of AAs belong to the class of deVnite associative anaphors (henceforth:
DAAs). This class comprises four important subclasses, exempliVed in (3)-(6). As
the examples (3) and (4) indicate, antecedents of DAAs may be verbal or nominal.
Note that the class of DAAs with nominal antecedents comprise not only deverbal
nouns, like search in (4), which are inherently relational, but also sortal nouns, like
house in (5), which lack this feature (for the distinction of noun types cf. Horn
& Kimm, 2014, also: Löbner, 1998).
(3) Peter bought a new Mercedes. The price was lower than expected.
(4) The search lingers on, but the key remains lost.
(5) They reached Peter’s house. The window pane in the door had been
smashed.
Another distinguishing criterion concerns the kind of reference to be established
between AAs and their antecedents (Greber, 1993; Kleiber, 2001). Associative-
anaphoric reference may be direct or indirect. Indirect DAAs are characterized
by nominal DAAs whose referents are not indirectly anchored in the concept
associated with the antecedent but in a sub- or superordinate concept. In the case
of (6), for example, the associative anaphor the menu is not interpreted as the
waiter’s but as that of the restaurant in which the waiter is serving.
(6) The waiter came to our table. He had forgotten the menu.
In this view, DAAs with verbal antecedents also belong to the class of indirect
DAAs since they are indirectly anchored in a concept associated with the an-
tecedent’s concept. In (3), for example, the DAA the price is not the price of
buying but the purchase price of the product. Table 1 summarizes the subclasses
of AAs mentioned so far. In the following I will concentrate on DAAs as the
prototype of AAs.
In the case of DAA, it is the deVniteness of the NP that triggers a referential in-
terpretation of the NP. Discussing diUerent theories of deVniteness, Lyons (1999)
distinguishes between (a) the familiarity approach (exempliVed in Heim, 1982)
which assumes that the deVnite article exhibits familiarity to both speaker and
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Table 1: Types of associative anaphora (AA)
Type of AA Example Referential properties of AA
Direct definite associative
anaphora
Peter walked to his car. He
had forgotten the key.
Relational, unique reference
of nominal antecedent
Direct indefinite associative
anaphora
Peter passed the house. Awin-
dow was smashed.
Relational, non-unique refer-
ence of nominal antecedent
Indirect definite associative
anaphora
1. with a nominal
antecedent
2. with a verbal
antecedent
The waiter came to our table.
He had forgotten the menu.
Marie left Berlin yesterday.
The train was late again.
Relational, unique ‘indirect’
reference(transitive verb)
hearer, and (b) the identiVability approach which hypothesizes that the deVnite
article indicates that the addressee is able to identify the referent on the basis of
given information. In either approach, the deVnite article in (1) gives rise to a
referential reading of key in such a way that it is interpreted as Peter’s car key.
Analogously, in (2) the DAA unambiguously denotes one particular concept that
serves as a semantic role of the verbal antecedent. This brief description of DAAs
suXces to test and compare in Section 2 FrameNet and Barsalou frames regarding
their descriptive adequacy.
Traditional approaches to AA suUer from three shortcomings. However, as
I will argue later, a frame theory that incorporates insights from both Barsa-
lou’s and FrameNet’s approach might be capable of overcoming these deVcits.
First, traditional approaches fail to explain the ‘felicity conditions’ required for
anaphoric-reference resolution. In his still inWuential approach, Hawkins (1978,
p. 107), for example, hypothesizes that frequent co-occurrences of the anaphoric
and antecedent expression license anaphoric reference. The frequency condition,
however, is not met in many attested examples of associative anaphors (Löbner,
1998, p. 10). Second, it is not clear how contextually ‘enriched’ anaphoric mean-
ings emerge. While Heim’s formal approach assumes an additional mechanism,
namely “accommodation” (Heim, 1982, p. 370), Schwarz (1996) postulates very
abstract semantic constraints. Still, it is anything but obvious how these semantic
constraints or accommodations may account for instances such as (1)-(6). Finally,
a principal problem lies in explicating the relations holding between anaphors and
their antecedents. The relations holding between DAAs and their antecedents
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seem to be less restricted than commonly assumed in literature. Within tradi-
tional frameworks (e. g., Greber, 1993, pp. 379-387; Kleiber, 2001, pp. 263-296),
it seems to be problematic to delimit the number of relations, and it is hard to
provide a precise and maximally exhaustive classiVcation without creating a po-
tentially unlimited number of relations. In the next sections, the application of
FrameNet and Barsalou frames aims at elucidating both the analytic assets and
drawbacks of each approach.
3 Investigating associative anaphora with Barsalou frames
3.1 Frames as recursive attribute-value-structures: Barsalou’s
approach and its extensions in FOR 600
In several papers the cognitive psychologist Lawrence W. Barsalou has outlined a
cognitive frame theory that tries to take account of empirical Vndings in the Veld
of cognitive and experimental psychology (Barsalou, 1992, 1993; Barsalou & Hale,
1993). In contrast to FrameNet, Barsalou’s approach is designed as a genuinely
cognitive theory aiming at a comprehensive account of human knowledge repre-
sentation. Thus, Barsalou’s primary objective is not to develop a semantic theory
but a psychologically realistic theory of knowledge representation, including se-
mantic representations as one component. Accordingly, Barsalou (1992, p. 21)
postulates that frames, deVned as recursive attribute value-structures, provide
“the fundamental representation of knowledge in human cognition”. He presents
arguments why his frame theory is explanatorily more adequate than traditional
feature list representations of categories. In terms of the application scope of
frames, however, it is striking that the great majority of instances discussed in
Barsalou (1992) (e. g., car, vacation, bird, mare, animal) are limited to nominal
sortal concepts.
Barsalou’s frame theory has been adapted, extended, and slightly modiVed
within a linguistic framework. Based on ideas developed in Löbner (1998) and
other papers addressing a theory of concept types (cf. Löbner 2011 for an over-
view), the research unit “Frames and Functional Concepts” (FOR 600) as well as
the research project “The Structure of Representations in Language, Cognition,
and Science” (SFB 991) aim at developing a semantic theory allowing for deep
lexical-semantic decomposition within a formal-logical framework. As a Vrst
step, a formal theory of frames based on Barsalou frames was developed (Pe-
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tersen, 2007/2015). Major advances concern the integration of nominal concept
types, including their interaction with determination. More speciVcally, Löbner’s
concept theory and Barsalou frame approach were integrated into one another
in such a way that frame attributes (in Barsalou’s sense) are essentially equated
with functional concepts. Hence, it is assumed that attributes are characterized
by two constitutive features: relationality and uniqueness of reference. Assum-
ing that each attribute denotes precisely one entity of the respective frame allows
for mathematical modeling and formalizations of frames. As we will see in the
following paragraph, this assumption is also highly relevant for explaining the
resolution of AAs.
3.2 Putting Barsalou frames into practice: DAAs with nominal
antecedents
In Section 2, it has become evident that a distinguishing feature of DAAs is
uniqueness of reference. That is, a DAA is always interpreted in such a way
that it unambiguously refers to precisely one entity which has indirectly been
introduced into the discourse. To come straight to the point: It is one of the ma-
jor merits of Barsalou’s approach to DAAs (extended by Löbner’s concept type
theory) to provide a comprehensive explanation of this property of DAAs.
It is argued that a DAA refers to the (value of an) attribute in the frame of the
antecedent in such a way that the DAA is construed as a functional concept. More
speciVcally, Löbner (1998) argues that deVnite associative anaphors equate with
functional concepts for which a possessor and a situational argument are speciVed
in context. And since functional concepts are equated with frame attributes, a
DAA is interpreted as an attribute of the frame evoked by its antecedent. To
illustrate, consider again (1) where the deVnite article gives rise to a referential
reading of key in such a way that it is interpreted as the key for Peter’s car.
(1) Peter walked to his car [antecedent]. He had forgotten the key [associa-
tive anaphor].
For instances such as (1) it is characteristic that the built-up concept is functional
because it meets the conditions of relationality and uniqueness of reference (for
an overview of concept types and their properties see Löbner 2011; cf. also Horn
& Kimm, 2014). Its indirect reference is unique in that the number of possible ref-
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erents is restricted to only one indirect referent, namely Peter’s car. The observa-
tion that DAAs correspond to attributes in the frame of the antecedent’s referent
provides an opportunity to gain insights in the composition of these frames. To
the extent that the respective attribute can be considered a necessary component
of the antecedent frame, one obtains information about meaning components of
the antecedent nouns.
According to this theory, the head noun of a deVnite associative-anaphoric NP
undergoes a type shift if its underlying lexical concept is not functional (for criti-
cal discussions of type shifts cf. Horn & Kimm, 2014). In example (1) a type shift
is not necessary since the underlying lexical concept of key is already functional:
there is prototypically one and only one key that belongs to a car. Compare, how-
ever, example (7), where window – the head noun of the associative-anaphoric
NP – is not functional but relational on the lexical level.
(7) They reached Peter’s house. The window pane in the door had been
smashed.
The underlying lexical concept of window is relational (and not functional) be-
cause a house usually has more than one window. The possible referents of win-
dow is thus not restricted to only one referent. In order to facilitate uniqueness of
reference, window is the object of a shift from a relational to a functional concept
with a possessor argument speciVed by the antecedent. Such conceptual shifts are
always necessary if the head noun of an NP surfacing as a DAA is non-functional
on the lexical level; only functional concepts allow for unique reference.
Moreover, a frame-theoretical account of DAAs based on Barsalou’s frame con-
ception and Löbner’s concept type theory correctly predicts the type of relation
holding between anaphors and antecedents, and it also provides substantial sug-
gestions how discourse referents in a text may be represented as Barsalou frames.
Since it is assumed that the DAA has a functional head by default, every possible
type of attribute in a frame representing the referent of the antecedent NP is also
a possible type of DAA. The types usually enumerated in literature, such as parts,
roles, contiguity relations, etc. (cf. Greber, 1993; Kleiber, 2001; Schwarz, 2000,
among others), are all subsumed under this methodology. This approach thus
abandons any thematic restrictions on DAAs and their underlying relation, with-
out having to rely on empirical corpus evidence, since the argument presented
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here is theoretical in nature. On the other hand, the approach is more restrictive
than traditional approaches in observing that the relation between the referent of
the antecedent and the DAA referent must in fact be a functional one (cf. Löbner,
1998, 2011).
According to Barsalou (1992), recursivity constitutes an essential property of
frames. The principle of recursivity also holds for a DAA in that it may be the pos-
sessor of another DAA, thereby forming a chain that represents relations between
discourse referents in a network structure (for details cf. Ziem, 2012). Hypothe-
sizing that DAA referents themselves are also represented in frames, the theory
models DAAs as direct conjunctions of antecedent frames and DAA frames. If
a DAA is the possessor of another DAA, frames are recursively linked to each
other, constituting a complex frame network of newly introduced discourse ref-
erents. This is the case in (8).
(8) It was late when John arrived at his brother’s house. The doorwas closed.
Last week, John had lost the key, but fortunately he had received a substi-
tute straight away.
In (8), door is interpreted as the door of the house mentioned before, while key
is conceptualized as the key for this door. Once associative-anaphoric references
are resolved, the construed concepts are ‘enriched’ by context information, yield-
ing the complex concepts “the door of John’s brother’s house” respectively “the
key for the door of John’s brother’s house”. Modeling such chains of DAAs in
frame networks could ultimately lead to a representation of correlated discourse
referents in one single frame.
To conclude, Barsalou’s frame theory supplemented with Löbner’s concept
type theory takes account of at least three basic properties of DAAs. By equating
a DAA with a functional concept surfacing as an attribute of the frame evoked
by the antecedent, the approach Vrst successfully explains the diUerence between
deVnite and indeVnite associative anaphors: the reference of DAAs, but not the
reference of IAAs, is unique in that it is directed to precisely one entity indirectly
introduced into the discourse world before. Second, it correctly predicts the re-
lations holding between a DAA and its antecedent(s). Instead of postulating an
arbitrary number of relation types, it is hypothesized that the number of DAAs
(attributes) associated with a frame is potentially unlimited. Finally, recursiv-
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ity, as a constitutive property of Barsalou frames, allows explanation of chained
associative-anaphoric references, that is, NPs serving as DAAs and antecedents
(for other DAAs) at the same time. However, a major shortcoming concerns the
limitation of the approach to DAAs with nominal antecedents. It is anything
but clear whether the approach can be successfully applied to DAAs with verbal
antecedents, simply because both Löbner’s concept type theory and Barsalou’s
frame theory are restricted to nominal frames. Currently, however, Robert Van
Valin and Rainer Osswald are developing a theory of verb meaning based on
Barsalou frames. In the long run, this theory might help to extend the application
scope of Barsalou frames in the realm of AAs.
4 Investigating associative anaphora within FrameNet
4.1 Frames as valency pattern: background to FrameNet
Frames, as deVned in FrameNet and Fillmore’s early seminal studies on semantic
frames (e. g., Fillmore, 1976, 1977, 1985), are rich conceptual knowledge struc-
tures underlying and motivating the meaning(s) of lexical items and phrasal units.
Building on this deVnition, the FrameNet project pursued at the International In-
stitute of Computer Science in Berkeley tries to develop an online lexical database
for English documenting the semantic and syntactic valences of a word in each
of its senses (Ruppenhofer et al., 2010, p. 5). It has been, and still is, one of the
major aims of FrameNet to put Fillmore’s early theoretical ideas about seman-
tic frames into practice by developing an annotation tool that allows for data-
driven, rather than introspective, lexical-semantic investigations. At the end, the
database is supposed to provide all semantic information required for adequately
understanding lexical and phrasal units in context (Fillmore, Wooters & Baker,
2001).
In FrameNet, the target units are so-called lexical units, that is, word-meaning
pairings. The starting point is the assumption that each word (in each of its
senses) evokes a frame providing a set of “frame elements” (FEs); each sense of
a polysemous word thus belongs to a diUerent frame (Ruppenhofer et al., 2010,
p. 5). FEs are equated with semantic and/or syntactic roles that a lexical unit
takes. A distinction is made between peripheral and core FEs – a distinction
that seems to be analogous to the argument-adjunct diUerentiation in valency
grammar. Unlike valency grammar, however, FEs are not limited in number since
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they are identiVed – and subsequently deVned – “bottom-up”, that is, on the basis
of annotated sentences. It is hypothesized that frames are not isolated entities in
the language user’s mind. Rather, they are linked by a system of frame-to-frame-
relations with one another. Fillmore & Baker (2010, p. 330) list seven relations
falling into three groups: (a) generalization relations (“inheritance”, “perspective”,
“using”), (b) event structure relations (“subframes”, “precedes”), and (c) systematic
relations (“causative of”, “inchoative of”). I will come back to them later when
analyzing instances of DAAs.
Due to the valency-oriented view on word meaning, FrameNet primarily fo-
cuses on frames associated with verbs, relational nouns, and adjectives. Presently,
about 7,700 lexical units have been annotated on the basis of approximately
173,000 sentences. About 3,260 verb senses, 2,940 noun senses, and 1,440 ad-
jective senses have been identiVed. The exemplary investigations of associa-
tive anaphora in the next paragraph will build on these data, particularly on the
(sub-)frames fully annotated so far. Note, as mentioned before, that the methodol-
ogy oUered by FrameNet only allows for detailed investigations of those associa-
tive anaphors whose antecedents surface as verbs or relational nouns; in contrast
to Barsalou’s approach to frames, FrameNet does not focus on sortal nouns as
frame-evoking elements even though they are also addressed and covered in the
database.
4.2 Putting FrameNet frames into practice: DAAs with verbs and
deverbal nouns as antecedents
Although FrameNet’s main focus is on frame-semantic investigations of lexical
units within the limits of the sentences they are embedded in, in a couple of
papers and books it has been argued persuasively that frames play also a crucial
role in the domain of text semantics. Fillmore (1984), for example, takes the view
that text semantics, on a par with lexical semantics, constitute the most prominent
level of semantic investigations. In line with this view, Fillmore & Baker (2001)
illustrate that 16 frames provide semantic prerequisites for the understanding of
a small story about a criminal process. Thus, it is principally possible to apply the
FrameNet methodology to textual phenomena such as AAs.
How does a FrameNet approach to AA proceed? To begin with, consider (9)
where the referent of the deVnite noun phrase (NP) the car refers indirectly to the
concept of driving introduced before.
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(9) We drove [antecedent] to Frankfurt yesterday. The car [associative ana-
phor], however, was a bit too small.
In FrameNet terms, drive evokes in (9) the Operate_vehicle frame provid-
ing vehicle as one of its core elements. By virtue of frame-to-frame rela-
tions, the Operate_vehicle frame imposes a particular perspective on the re-
lated Use_vehicle frame. Hence, the associative anaphor the car speciVes one
particular FE of the frame evoked by the antecedent. In (9) associative anaphoric
reference succeeds because vehicle is not overtly realized in the Vrst sentence.
Given the local context provided in (9), the so-called “deVnite null instantiation”
(cf. Ruppenhofer et al., 2010, p. 24) of the FE vehicle is instantly accessible.
More generally, one can conclude that a FrameNet approach to associative
anaphora supports the assumption that an associative anaphor is anchored in
the frame evoked by the antecedent in such a way that it conceptually speciVes
one of the FEs provided by the antecedent frame. This also holds for cases such as
(4) mentioned above:
(4) The search lingers on, but the key remains lost.
Unlike (9), the antecedent the search is a deverbal noun. However, both the
deverbal noun the search as well as the verb search evoke the Scrutiny frame.
Thus, the frame associated with the verb and the deverbal noun provides the same
FEs, among them the core FE Phenomenon (that is, in traditional case grammar
terms, the semantic role “object”). In (4) it is precisely this FE that is further
speciVed by the associative anaphor the key.
As mentioned above, beyond verbs and deverbal nouns also sortal nouns sur-
face as AAs. For example, in (7) pane is interpreted as a speciVcation of the FE
Descriptor inherent in the Buildings frame evoked by house. Sortal nouns like
house challenge the FrameNet approach in numerous respects, since such nouns
are characterized as words that “typically serve as dependents rather than clearly
evoking their own frame” (Ruppenhofer et al., 2010, p. 5). Although artifact and
natural kind nouns have “a minimal frame structure on their own”, it is nonethe-
less hard to see how analyses within a FrameNet approach can fully take account
of this subclass of AAs.
Note that FrameNet does not systematically diUerentiate between diUerent
types of concepts. Unlike the approach to associative anaphora introduced in
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Section 3, relational, functional, sortal, and individual concepts are distinguished
from one another only in terms of their varying valency pattern. As a result,
a FrameNet approach to associative anaphora is not able to support the strong
hypothesis that deVnite associative anaphors and functional concepts share the
constitutive properties of relationality and uniqueness of reference. I consider this
a methodological drawback, since the property of functionality correctly predicts
uniqueness of anaphoric reference in the case of deVnite associative anaphors. In
(4), for instance, the referent of the key is identiVed with the entity being searched
for.
As mentioned above, FrameNet cannot account for associative anaphors whose
antecedents surface as sortal nouns since they lack valency. It is worthwhile
noting, however, that this does not apply to all cases. Even though in (10), for
example, soup is a sortal noun, FrameNet does provide an explanation for the
associative-anaphoric reference triggered by spoon.
(10) When the waiter served the soup, he noticed that he had forgotten the
spoon.
In contrast to prototypical instances of DAAs with sortal nouns as antecedents,
as evidenced in (1), (2), and (5), a distinguishing feature of (10) is that the anaphor
and its antecedent are mediated by the inferred Ingestion frame, in which the
soup concept speciVes the FE Ingestibles while the spoon concept speciVes the
FE Instrument. In (10) it becomes apparent why it is useful to distinguish be-
tween frame invocation and evocation (Ruppenhofer et al., 2010, p. 15 f.) – a dis-
tinction that is missing in Barsalou’s approach. The associative anaphor spoon
is related to its antecedent soup by the invoked Ingestion frame. In the case of
frame invocation, a FrameNet approach to associative anaphora correctly predicts
that both anaphor and antecedent specify FEs (here: Ingestibles, Instrument)
of the invoked frame.
While, however, instances such as (10) constitute a sub-class of deVnite DAAs
with antecedents surfacing as sortal nouns, other DAAs with sortal nouns as
antecendents cannot be explained within the framework provided by FrameNet.
Yet, in turn, FrameNet allows for concise analyses of deVnite associative anaphors
with verbs and deverbal nouns as antecedents. As shown above, these classes of
DAAs cause serious problems for Barsalou’s approach to frames.
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Can a FrameNet approach to associative anaphora account for recursive ana-
phor-antecedent structures? Although neither Fillmore himself nor his collab-
orators seem to consider recursivity a property of semantic frames, there is no
fundamental caveat to integrating recursivity into frame-semantic investigations
of associative anaphors. Like in (11), an associative anaphor (the car) may be
followed by a subsequent sub-associative anaphor (the owner) thereby forming
a chain of indirect textual references that expresses relations between discourse
referents in a network structure.
(11) Today, Peter drove back home. He borrowed the car from a friend. The
owner, however, was Fred.
The NP the car is embedded in a recursive frame structure in such a way that
it speciVes the FE Vehicle of the Operate_vehicle frame evoked by drive, and at
the same time it evokes the Vehicle frame whose FE Possessor is speciVed by
the associative anaphor owner.
5 Conclusions
To sum up, Barsalou’s approach to frames diUers from FrameNet in a number of
respects. Most importantly, Barsalou envisages a cognitive theory of knowledge
representation in which frames are addressed as a universal mental representa-
tion format. Moreover, Barsalou’s theory is based on empirical evidence in the
Veld of cognitive psychology. On these grounds, Barsalou deVnes frames as re-
cursive attribute-value structures. FrameNet, on the other hand, is a genuine
linguistic project in that it is both grounded in an extended model of semantic as
well as syntactic valency and realized as a large-scale corpus project. Accordingly,
frames are not – at least not Vrst and foremost – deVned in cognitive terms but in
accordance with the annotation categories: on the basis of annotated data FEs and
frame-to-frame-relations are identiVed, and on the basis of these data core FEs are
distinguished from peripheral FEs. Although in FrameNet recursivity is not sup-
posed to be a deVning feature of frames, each so-called “frame deVnition” made
available for each annotated frame comprises a set of attested frame-to-frame
relations (cf. also Fillmore et al., 2003, pp. 304-313). Hence, frames are intercon-
nected with one another, albeit in a much more restrictive way than in Barsalou’s
approach which hypothesizes that each frame element (attribute, value) is re-
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cursive in nature. Table 2 summarizes the most important commonalities and
diUerences of both approaches to cognitive frames.
Table 2: Commonalities and differences of Barsalou’s and FrameNet’s approach to frames
Barsalou’s approach to frames FrameNet
Theory-
oriented
aspects
- cognitive theory of mental repre-
sentation
- linguistic theory based on seman-
tic and syntactic valency
- focus on sortal nouns - focus on verbs and deverbal nouns
- compatible with concept type the-
ory
[unspecified and not integrable]
Methodology - partly data-driven, partly introspec-
tion
- data-driven, bottom-up investiga-
tions by rich semantic annotations
Frame
structure
- distinction between attributes and
values
- distinction of peripheral and core
frame elements
- recursivity [unspecified but integrable]
[unspecified and impossible] - distinction between types of frame
relations
Application of
frames in the
domain of AA
- focus on relational and functional
nouns
- focus on deverbal nouns and verbs
[unspecified but integrable] - distinction between frame evoca-
tion and invocation
- integration of relational/functional
concepts and theory of determina-
tion
- integration of relational concepts
- focus on nominal antecedents - focus on verbal antecedents
What are the beneVts of a FrameNet and a Barsalou-inspired approach to as-
sociative anaphora? In contrast to the latter, FrameNet allows for explaining
anaphors with antecedents surfacing as verbs and deverbal nouns. Given the
analysis above, investigations of associative anaphors provide insights into the
composition of frames evoked by verbs and deverbal nouns on the text level, since
associative anaphors specify FEs of the frame evoked by the anchor frame ele-
ment. Subsequently, new FEs may be deVned on the basis of annotated anaphors,
and lexical entries provided by FrameNet may be supplemented accordingly. Note
also that each associative anaphor establishes a speciVc semantic relation to its
antecedent and thus oUers linguistic evidence for frame-to-frame-relations. Com-
position and inheritance, as described by Fillmore & Baker (2001), are ubiquitous
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relation types but besides the frame-to-frame relations identiVed by FrameNet
many more seem to be relevant to resolve associative anaphors (cf. Kleiber,
2001; Greber, 1993). To this end, an interesting issue for future research would
be whether attested relations are item-speciVc or rather stable across exemplars
within a domain.
A fundamental caveat of a FrameNet approach to associative anaphors con-
cerns the exclusion of sortal nouns as frame-evoking lexical units (Ruppenhofer
et al., 2010, p. 5). In turn, Barsalou has developed his frame theory on the ba-
sis of sortal concept. However, he does not seem to be aware of the limitations
involved in this approach; at least the reader is left wanting some reWections on
the linguistic nature of the analyzed concepts. In Löbner (1998) and within the re-
search projects SFB 991 and FOR 600, Barsalou’s frame theory is supplemented by
Löbner’s concept type theory, yielding a substantial theoretical extension in that
attributes are equated with functional nouns. Nonetheless the extended Barsalou
approach still focuses on nominal concepts. A full-Wedged frame theory of verb
frames based on Barsalou’s approach has not yet been developed.
Apart from sortal concepts also individual and relational concepts are inte-
grated in Barsalou’s frame theory, namely in such way that sortal, relational, and
individual concepts may constitute frame attributes if they are shifted, or coerced,
to functional concepts due to linguistic cues such as deVnitness markers (cf. Löb-
ner, 2011). At this point, however, the empirical issue arises whether it is useful
to principally restrict frame attributes to the set of functional concepts. IAAs, as
exempliVed in (2), prototypically surface as relational nouns (e. g., window), and
due to the property of indeVniteness, they are not object of a conceptual shift.
But, then, are there empirical reasons for the assumption that they do not Vgure
as attributes in the frame evoked by the antecedent? In the case of DAAs, on the
other hand, equating attributes with functional concepts helps to explain the cog-
nitive mechanism underlying anaphora resolution: Since DAAs are interpreted
as functional concepts in context, their possible referents are restricted to only
one referent. In this respect, a FrameNet approach to DAA does not provide a
suitable account of DAA resolution; at the same time, no principal problems arise
in the domain of IAAs. A more comprehensive theory of AA based on Barsalou
frames has to address the following research issues: To what extent and under
which conditions do head nouns of DAAs call for type shifts in order to motivate
a functional interpretation of the nouns in question?
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To conclude, FrameNet and Barsalou’s approach complement each other in
such a way that the latter concentrates on sortal concepts functioning as frame-
evoking elements, while FrameNet focuses on relational concepts, particularly
verbs and deverbal nouns. Barsalou disregards semantic and syntactic valences
of each frame-evoking word, whereas valency provides the very basis for the
FrameNet methodology. This Vnding gives rise to issues of the following kind:
How can FrameNet account for sortal nouns serving as associative anaphors?
And how can, in turn, Barsalou’s approach account for verbs serving as associa-
tive anaphors? What’s the theoretical status of sortal nouns within FrameNet, and
in what respect do verb frames diUer from noun frames in Barsalou’s approach?
More generally, which linguistic elements evoke frames in each approach? It is
beyond the scope of this article to provide answers to these questions. However,
as I hope to have shown, there are several complementary research aspects of
FrameNet and Barsalou’s approach to frames and its extensions within FOR 600
and SFB 991. The diverging viewpoints and starting assumptions stimulate each
other, pointing to a more comprehensive frame theory.
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The DeVniteness EUect and a New
ClassiVcation of Possessive
Constructions
Yuko Kobukata & Yoshiki Mori
Abstract
In this paper, we argue that the occurrence of the deVniteness eUect in possessive
constructions is predictable once we know what type of interpretation is obtained
in the construction. Previous studies concerned with this issue have generally
assumed that there is a strong correlation between the eUect and the notion of
inalienability expressed by the object. We argue, however, that this is not true.
Rather, what we need to take into consideration is the interpretation of the con-
struction as a whole, and by doing so, we can provide a uniVed explanation of the
distribution of the eUect in possessive constructions both in English and Japanese.
We propose that the readings of possessive constructions should be divided into
“possessive” interpretation and “holding” interpretation. Secondly, we argue that
English have is polysemous and has a control reading, while the Japanese verbs iru
(‘be’) and aru (‘be’) cannot express the control relation. Thirdly, we argue that the
deVniteness eUect in there constructions is diUerent from that in possessive con-
structions in terms of information structure. Fourthly, we argue that there are two
more possessive constructions in Japanese in addition to possessive constructions
using iru (‘be’) and aru (‘be’), and that they are all related to typological patterns
of possessive constructions.
1 Introduction: The deVniteness eUect and inalienability
It has apparently been accepted that there is a strong correlation between the
deVniteness eUect observed in English possessive constructions and inalienable
possession expressed by the object of have (de Jong 1987, Keenan 1987, Partee
1999).
Thomas Gamerschlag, Doris Gerland, Rainer Osswald & Wiebke Petersen
(eds.). 2015. Meaning, Frames, and Conceptual Representation. Düsseldorf:
dup.
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When inalienable possession is expressed by using a relational noun such as
sister, which implies that the possessee is conceived of typically as being insep-
arable from the possessor, the deVniteness eUect arises, which can be found in (1).
(1) John has a/*the sister.
By contrast, the eUect does not seem to be relevant to alienable possession
denoted by the object. In the following examples, in which a nonrelational noun
is used as an object expressing alienable possession, the eUect does not arise.
(2) John has a/the book.
These kinds of facts lead many researchers to formulate that the deVniteness
eUect in English possessive constructions is due to inalienability.
However, this issue would seem to require further consideration. The following
example, for example, cannot be accounted for by the previous studies, since the
eUect does arise even when a nonrelational noun is used as the object.
(3) Q. What will you give to Eliza for her birthday?
A. Eliza has a/*the mirror, so I won’t give one to her.
In this dialogue, where Eliza’s ownership of a mirror is in question, the addressee
must use an indeVnite object rather than a deVnite one.
Also, there is another sense in which most previous works still come short of
accounting for the deVniteness eUect in possessive constructions. For instance,
in some cases the eUect does not arise even when relational nouns are used as
objects, as can be seen in (4).
(4) John has his sister as a dance partner.
In (4), the object noun phrase includes a relational noun sister. According
to the previous studies, a relational noun is supposed to be a crucial factor in
determining the occurrence of the deVniteness eUect. However, contrary to their
expectations, the eUect does not arise here.
These facts given in (3A) and (4) should be problems for any previous ap-
proaches, where the deVniteness eUect in possessive constructions is assumed
to be due to the notion of inalienable possession. In other words, this allows
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us to predict that the eUect should not be relevant to the conceptual distinction
between inalienable and alienable possession described by the object in the Vrst
place.
In order to identify the deVniteness eUect of the verb have (henceforth, we will
abbreviate the eUect as “DE”), a new classiVcation will be proposed based on its
readings. This new classiVcation is very useful to account for the DE in possessive
constructions both in English and Japanese.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we show that the occurrence
of the DE in possessive constructions is NOT predictable from the inalienability
of the object noun phrases only. Rather, we claim that it depends on the way in
which the possessive construction is interpreted. In Section 3, we point out the
diUerences between English have and Japanese verbs iru (‘be’) and aru (‘be’). More
precisely, the Japanese verbs cannot encode a speciVc possessive relation, which
is available only in English possessive constructions. In Section 4, we argue that
the DE in there constructions and possessive constructions cannot be accounted
for from the same perspective. In Section 5, we point out that there are other
possessive constructions in Japanese in addition to possessive constructions with
iru (‘be’) and aru (‘be’). We argue that they are all related to the main typological
patterns of possessive constructions Stassen 2009 claims.
2 English and Japanese possessive constructions
As was suggested in section 1, the DE in English possessive constructions does
not have a strong relation to the inalienability expressed by the object. Moreover,
this is not a peculiar fact about English. Rather, it is at least a cross-linguistic
fact. The same problem holds for Japanese possessive constructions. That is, the
occurrence of the DE has nothing to do with inalienability described by the object.
2.1 Subjecthood
In Japanese possessive constructions, stative predicates iru (‘be’) and aru (‘be’) are
used. These verbs take a subject with dative case and an object with nominative
case, which is shown in (5a). Note that the same case pattern (-DAT + -NOM +
iru/aru (‘be’)) is found when a locational or an existential meaning is encoded as
in (5b).
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(5) (a) Kanojo-ni-wa
she-DAT-TOP
otooto-gai
brother-NOM
ru.
be
‘She has a brother.’
(b) Kooen-ni
The park-DAT
kodomo-ga
child/children-NOM
iru.
be
‘There is a child in the park./There are children in the park.’
Although both sentences in (5a) and (5b) take the same case pattern (-DAT -NOM),
the grammatical relation that the nominative phrase assumes is diUerent (Kishi-
moto 2000, 2005). As Kishimoto argues, there are four diagnostic methods for
identifying grammatical subjects in Japanese possessive constructions.
One of the tests for identifying a grammatical subject is reWexivization. The
Japanese reWexive zibun (‘self’) can only take a subject as its antecedent. The
contrast between (6a) and (6b) shows that the antecedent of zibun (‘self’) is a
dative phrase but not a nominative phrase:
(6) (a) Johni-ni
John-DAT
zibuni-no
self-GEN
kodomo-ga
child-NOM
i-ru/a-ru
be
(koto)
(thing)
‘John has his own child.’
(b) *Zibuni-no
self-GEN
tomodati-ni
friend-DAT
kodomoi-ga
child-NOM
i-ru/a-ru
be
(koto)
(thing)
‘A friend of hisi has a childi.’ (Kishimoto 2005:169)
There is another test for identifying which phrase in the construction is the
grammatical subject. We can identify the subject by checking the distribution of
controlled PRO.
(7) (a) Watasi-wa
I-TOP
Johni-ni
Johni-DAT
[PROi kodomo-ga
child-NOM
atte]
be
hosii
want
to
that
omotta.
thought
‘I wanted John to have a child.’
(b) *Watasi-wa
I-TOP
kodomoi-ni
child-DAT
[John-ni
John-DAT
PROi atte]
be
hosii
want
to
that
omotta.
thought
‘I wanted a childi for John to have PROi.’ (Kishimoto 2005:170)
116
The DeVniteness EUect and a New ClassiVcation of Possessive Constructions
The null element PRO in the acceptable example in (7a) is coindexed with the
dative phrase John. When PRO is coindexed with the nominative phrase kodomo-
ga in (7b), on the other hand, the example is unacceptable.
In addition to controlled PRO, there is another type of PRO which is not con-
trolled and has arbitrary reference. This is so-called arbitrary PRO. Arbitrary PRO
is also limited to subject position.
(8) (a) [PRO kodomo-ga
child-NOM
aru/iru]
be
koto-wa
that-TOP
ii
good
koto
thing
da.
COP
‘It is a good thing to have a child.’
(b) *[John-ni
John-DAT
PRO aru/iru]
be
koto-wa
that-TOP
ii
good
koto
thing
da.
COP
‘It is a good thing for John to have PRO.’ (Kishimoto 2005:171)
Irrespective of which verb, aru (‘be’) or iru (‘be’), is used, the dative phrase can
have an arbitrary PRO interpretation as shown in the example in (8a), while the
example in (8b) shows that the nominative phrase cannot have such an arbitrary
interpretation. There is a fourth diagnostic for identifying grammatical subjects
in Japanese possessive constructions. Subject honoriVcation is used to express
the speaker’s respect toward the grammatical subject with a particular marking
on the verb. In (9), the speaker pays deference towards the referent of the da-
tive phrase Yamada-sensei (‘Prof. Yamada’), but not towards the referent of the
nominative phrase zaisan (‘fortune’).
(9) Yamada-sensei-ni
Yamada-Prof.-DAT
zaisan-ga
fortune-NOM
o-ari-ni-naru.
be-HON
‘Prof. Yamada has a fortune.’ (Kishimoto 2000:57)
Therefore, these facts suggest that the subject of the verb aru (‘be’) and iru
(‘be’) in possessive constructions is a dative phrase not a nominative phrase.
2.2 The DE and the interpretation of the possessive construction
When a relational noun is used as the object in Japanese possessive constructions,
some cases display the DE. As is observed in (10), the object nominative phrase
otooto-ga (‘brother-NOM’) is incompatible with strong determiners including the
deVnite article.
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(10) #Kanojo-ni-wa
she-DAT-TOP
{sono/arayuru/hotondo-no/subete-no}
{the/every/most-GEN/all-GEN}
otooto-ga iru.
brother(s) be
‘She has the/every/most-GEN/all-GEN brother(s).’
By contrast, the following case does not exhibit the DE although a relational noun
is used as the object.
(11) John-ni-wa
John-DAT-TOP
Mary-no
Mary-GEN
otooto-ga
brother-NOM
iru.
be
‘John has Mary’s brother (in some role/for some purpose).’
The sentence in (11) does not describe John’s sibling relationship. Rather, the
relation between John and otooto is contextually dependent. For example, otooto
could be just John’s helper.
The same holds for nonrelational objects. The DE does not usually arise when
a nonrelational noun hon (‘book’) is used as the object, as in (12).
(12) John-ni-wa
John-DAT-TOP
ano
that
hon-ga
book-NOM
aru.
be
‘John has that book.’
However, the DE can arise even when a nonrelational noun is used as the ob-
ject of iru (‘be’) and aru (‘be’). The object phrase okane (‘money’), which is a
nonrelational noun, is compatible with the weak determiners takusan-no (‘plenty
of-GEN’), ikuraka-no (‘some-GEN’) as (13a) shows, but it is incompatible with
strong determiners, which is observed in the examples in (13b).
(13) (a) Kanojo-ni-wa
she-DAT-TOP
{takusan-no/ikuraka-no}
{plenty of-GEN/some-GEN}
okane-ga
money-NOM
aru.
be
‘She has {plenty of/some} money.’
(b) #Kanojo-ni-wa
she-DAT-TOP
{sono/arayuru/hotondo-no/subete-no/kanojo-no}
{the/every/most-GEN/all-GEN/she-GEN}
okane-ga aru.
money-NOM be
‘She has {the/every/most/all/her} money.’
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On the basis of these examples, we claim that the previous studies, in which the
DE is dependent upon the inalienability of the object, are not entirely on the right
track.
Now, we are arguing against the previous works, proposing that the DE must
be accounted for in terms of the interpretation of the possessive constructions
independent of the inalienability of the object. SpeciVcally, we postulate that
there are two diUerent interpretations, the “possessive” interpretation and the
“holding” interpretation. To make these interpretations clear, Vrst consider the
following case.
(14) John has a wife of his own.
The sentence in (14) includes a relational noun. The example expresses an in-
herent property attributed to the subject. We call this kind of interpretation a
“possessive” interpretation. It should be noted here that this interpretation can
also be obtained by using a nonrelational noun expressing alienable possession as
in (15):
(15) Eliza has a car.
The utterance in (15) can typically mean that Eliza is the owner of a car. The car
belonging to her can be treated as her property. That is, the example (15) can be
assumed to have a “possessive” interpretation.
On the other hand, the following acceptable examples (16) and (17), where the
second conjunct can negate the implication conveyed in the Vrst conjunct, show
what the “holding” interpretation is. They describe that the subject can avail
herself of the object but cannot claim ownership to it, which Heine (1997) calls
temporary possession. Again, this interpretation can be obtained using both a re-
lational and a nonrelational noun expressing inalienable and alienable possession
respectively.
(16) Eliza has a mirror, but it doesn’t belong to her. (nonrelational noun)
(17) Ann has a sister as her secretary, but she doesn’t have a sister of her
own. (relational noun)
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The occurrence of the DE can be well predicted if we take these interpretations
into consideration. The DE arises when a “possessive” interpretation is obtained,
while it does not when a “holding” one is obtained:
(18) *John has the sister (of his own).
(19) Q. What will you give to Eliza for her birthday?
A. Eliza has a/*the mirror, so I won’t give one to her.
The sentences in (18) and (19A) obtain a possessive interpretation. Note that in
these examples, both relational and nonrelational nouns are used as the objects.
The DE arises when the possessive interpretation is obtained, irrespective of the
type of object noun phrases. By contrast, the acceptable sentences in (20A) and
(21) obtain a holding interpretation. They display no deVniteness eUect.
(20) Q. What can I use to hold these papers down?
A. Eliza has a/the/John’s mirror. (But it’s not hers.)
(21) Anne has Bill’s sister as secretary.
Also, in these sentences, relational as well as nonrelational nouns are used as the
objects. In the traditional view, it is an inalienability described by an object that
causes the DE in possessive constructions. It is clear, then, that the distinction in-
alienable vs. alienable possession only is inadequate as a means of accounting for
the distribution of the DE in possessive constructions. The DE must be accounted
for in terms of the interpretation of the construction in question.
3 SubclassiVcation of the “holding” interpretation in terms
of information structure
When English possessive constructions do not display the DE, i. e., when they
have a “holding” interpretation, the senses of have are assumed to be polyse-
mous. Tham (2006) argues that the meaning of have can be distinguished based
on the informational status of the object. In this section, we follow Tham’s sug-
gestion to set up a subclassiVcation of the “holding” interpretation in a possessive
construction.
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When the object conveys new, focus information for the addressee, the English
possessive construction is assumed to be focal and “presentational”:
(22) Q: Who can help John?
A: He has Sally.
(23) A: We need more trimmings for the tree.
B: The tree has all those lights we got last year. (Tham 2006:145)
When both sentences in (22A) and (23B) are uttered in response to the preceding
questions (22Q) and (23A) respectively, the deVnite object Sally in (22A) and all
those lights we got last year in (23B) convey the new focus information for the
hearer. We will call the interpretation obtained here the focus (presentational)
reading.
It should be noted that the sentences in (22A) and (23B) do not concretely
specify a holding relation between the entities of the subject and the object; the
relation between them is contextually dependent.
In contrast, when the object carries old, presuppositional information, the con-
struction acquires a typical sense of holding meaning, which is attributable to
the verbal interpretation of have. We will call this reading a nonfocal, “control”
reading. Consider the following case in (24):
(24) Q: Where is my umbrella?
A: John has it.
In (24A), the pronoun it refers to an entity already familiar from the previous
discourse. And the sentence maintains a typical holding interpretation.
It should be noted here that the subject of have, in the control sense, must be
animate. On the one hand, the focus reading allows for an inanimate subject. As
we have shown earlier, the context in (23) makes the object of have in (23B) new
information. In this case, the object in (23B) is compatible with the inanimate
subject the tree. On the other hand, the subject must be animate when the control
reading is obtained. The utterance in (25a), for example, sets up the context so
that the object in (25b) is old information for addressee. The reply (25b), therefore,
is not felicitous.
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(25) (a) Where are the mirrors?
(b) #The bathroom has them.
(ok They are in the bathroom.)
(ok Mowgli has them.) (Tham 2006:144)
In this connection, we call attention to the fact that a cross-linguistic contrast
can be observed with respect to the “holding” have: In Japanese possessive con-
structions, the deVnite object is felicitous only when it conveys new information,
which is shown by the example (27A). Unlike English possessive constructions,
the control reading is not available in Japanese possessive constructions, as in
(29A) (cf. Tham (2006) about Chinese).
(26) Q: Who can help John?
A: He has Sally/that man.
(27) Q: Dare-ga
who-NOM
John-o
John-ACC
tetsudau
help
koto-ga
thing-NOM
dekiru
can
no?
Q
‘Who can help John?’
A: John-ni-wa
John-DAT-TOP
{Mary/ano ojisan}-ga
{Mary/that man}-NOM
i-ru.
be
‘John has {Mary/that man}.’ (cf. Kishimoto 2005)
(28) Q: Where is my umbrella?
A: John has it.
(29) Q: Watasi-no
My
kasa
umbrella
doko-ni
where
a-ru
be
no?
Q
‘Where is my umbrella?’
A: *John-ni
John-DAT
(sono
(the
kasa-ga)
umbrella-NOM)
a-ru.
be
‘John has it.’
There are languages in which the objects are not allowed to bear old informa-
tion when the DE does not arise. According to Tham (2005, 2006), an example
of such a language is Mandarin. To make this concrete, compare the question-
answer pairs in (30) and (31).
(30) Q. Sanmao
Sanmao
ca
wipe
shenme
what
dongxi?
thing
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‘What is Sanmao wiping/polishing?’
A. Sanmao
Sanmao
you
have
na
that
xie
some
jingzi.
mirror
‘Sanmao has those mirrors.’ (Tham 2006:146)
(31) Q. Na
That
xie
PL
jingzi
mirror
zai
be
nar
at where
ne?
Q-PRT
‘Where are those mirrors?’
A. #Sanmao
Sanmao
you
have
(na
that
xie
some
jingzi).
mirror
‘Sanmao has those mirrors.’ (Tham 2006:146)
4 DiUerences between the DE in possessive constructions
and the DE in there constructions
There constructions are known to be used for information structural purposes,
i. e., the post-verbal noun phrase conveys new, focus information for the ad-
dressee. It is commonly agreed in the literature that there constructions can be
used to introduce hearer new entities (cf. Abbott 1992, 1993). That is, it is gen-
erally anomalous to assert the existence of an entity presumed to be familiar for
the addressee. Thus, naturally enough, noun phrases with determiners such as
the, every, both, most, as well as proper names and pronouns, are excluded from
the post-verbal positions in there constructions, hence an unacceptable sentence
*There are the candidates for the job. Even in there constructions with a list in-
terpretation, where post-verbal noun phrases are deVnite, the deVnite phrases
should not be used anaphorically. In this sense, there constructions with a list-
reading as well as ‘normal’ there constructions (with a non list reading) are felici-
tous as long as post-verbal noun phrases convey new information for the hearer.
In other words, the DE in the there construction is attributed to its presentational
function.
In possessive constructions both in English and Japanese, on the other hand,
there is not such a restriction on the information structure of the objects, when
the constructions show the DE. That is, the objects can convey old information as
well as new. Observe the following examples:
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(32) Q: Is John married?
A: He has a beautiful wife.
(cf. It is a beautiful wife that John has.)
The utterance in (32A), where the object a beautiful wife conveys new informa-
tion, is a felicitous response to the question in (32Q).
On the other hand, the objects in English possessive constructions can also
express old information:
(33) Q: Who has a wife/lover?
A: John has a wife/lover.
(cf. It is John who has a wife.)
The question in (33Q) sets up a context in which the subject John in the felicitous
response (33A) is focused, while the object a wife or a lover is presupposed.
It should be noted that the same explanation can be applied to the objects in
Japanese possessive constructions:
(34) (a) John-ni-wa
John-DAT-TOP
otooto-ga
brother-NOM
i-ru.
be
‘John has a brother.’
(b) John-ni
John-DAT
i-ru
be
no wa
that-TOP
otooto
brother
dake
only
da.
COP
‘It is only a brother that John has.’
(c) Otooto-ga
brother-NOM
i-ru
be
no wa
that-TOP
John
John
da.
COP
‘It is John who has a brother.’ (Kishimoto 2005:228-229)
As the sentences in (34b) and (34c) illustrate, not only otooto (‘brother’) in the
object position in (34a) but also John in the dative subject position in (34a) can
appear in the focus position of the pseudo-cleft constructions. Thus, the objects
in Japanese possessive constructions also do not have to bear new information;
they can also express old information for the addressee.
In sum, the DE in there constructions and in English and Japanese possessive
constructions cannot be accounted for from the same perspective. The DE in
there constructions is accounted for in terms of the presentational function. By
contrast, the objects of possessive constructions both in English and Japanese do
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not have to convey new information; the information structure of the objects is
underspeciVed.
5 Varieties of possessive constructions in Japanese
In what follows, we point out that there seem to be several competing possessive
constructions besides possessive constructions with iru (‘be’) and aru (‘be’) in
Japanese. We argue that they are all related to main typological patterns of
possessive constructions Stassen (2009) claims.
5.1 ‘Eel’ constructions in Japanese as a focus reading
In this section, we claim that so-called ‘eel’ constructions, which are allegedly
peculiar to Japanese, are another sort of possessive constructions Japanese pos-
sesses, corresponding to the English possessive constructions with a focus read-
ing.
To recapitulate a focus reading and a control (nonfocal) reading, which are
subclasses of a holding interpretation, let us Vrst look at the following contrast.
The sentences in (35aA) and (35bA) obtain a focus reading, while the sentence in
(36A) receives a control reading:
(35) (a) Q. Which group are you taking around?
A. I have the old ladies. (But I can’t seem to Vnd them.)
(b) Q. Who is taking which group around?
A. I have the old ladies. (But I can’t seem to Vnd them.)
(36) Q. Where are the old ladies?
A. I have them. (#But I can’t seem to Vnd them.)
As we have examined earlier, the Japanese verbs iru (‘be’) and aru (‘be’), origi-
nally existential verbs BE, can be used when a focus reading is received (cf. (27A)).
Even when a focus reading is obtained, however, the verbs iru (‘be’) and aru (‘be’)
are not always available. As shown in (37aA) and (37bA), a special construction
seems to be used in some cases:
(37) (a) Q. Kimi-wa
you-TOP
dono
which
guruupu-wo
group-ACC
tsurete iru
take
no?
Q
‘Which group are you taking around?’
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A. Watashi-wa
I-TOP
obaasantachi
old ladies
da.
COP
‘I am taking around the old ladies.’
A’ *Watashi-ni-wa
I-DAT-TOP
obaasantachi-ga
old ladies-NOM
iru.
be.pres
‘I am taking around the old ladies.’
(b) Q. Dare-ga
who-NOM
dono
which
guruupu-wo
group-ACC
tsurete iru
take
no?
Q
‘Who is taking which group around?’
A. Watashi-wa
I-TOP
obaasantachi
old ladies
da.
COP
‘I am taking around the old ladies.’
A’ *Watashi-ni-wa
I-DAT-TOP
obaasantachi-ga
old ladies-NOM
iru.
be.pres
‘I am taking around the old ladies.’
The sentence (37aA) and the sentence (37bA) are so-called ‘eel’ constructions in
Japanese, which are said to be fairly peculiar to Japanese (cf. Okutsu 1978). ‘Eel’
constructions contain the copular verb -da, which is diUerent from iru (‘be’) and
aru (‘be’). The copular verb -da in this construction appears in place of other
semantically speciVc verbs. Suppose that you are in a Japanese restaurant and
call a waitress to order a delicious grilled eel and rice. You will give your order
with the following words:
(38) Boku-wa
I-TOP
unagi
eel
da.
COP
‘What I want to eat is an eel./I’ll have/take an eel.’
The copular verb -da in this construction is a shortened substitute for all possible
speciVc verbs (taberu (‘to eat/to have’), chuumonsuru (‘to order’), etc.). For a felic-
itous use, some sort of “pair-list” reading with the contrastive topic is necessary.
5.2 Varieties of Japanese possessive constructions
and their typological status
So far, we have suggested two varieties of the possessive constructions in Japanese:
the one with the originally existential verbs aru (‘be’) and iru (‘be’) and the other
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with the copular verb -da (COP). In this section, we suggest another possessive
construction in Japanese based on the continuative form of the verb mot- (‘take,’
‘hold’: TAKE).
In the following possessive constructions with mot- (‘take,’ ‘hold’) (39)–(40), a
possessive interpretation is intended, because each example expresses an inherent
property attributed to the subject. As is illustrated in (39) and (40), under a
possessive interpretation, nonrelational nouns, but not relational nouns can be
used in the object position. It should be noted here that this construction is
acceptable only if the subject is animate and the object is inanimate.
(39) (a) Watasi-wa
I-TOP
{ie/kaisha}-o
{house/company}-ACC
mot-teiru.
take-CONT
‘I have a house/company.’ (nonrelational, inanimate)
(b) *Watasi-wa
I-TOP
untenshu-o
driver-ACC
mot-teiru.
take-CONT.
‘I have a chauUeur.’ (nonrelational, animate)
(40) (a) *Watasi-wa
I-TOP
8-gatsu-ni
August-DAT
tanjoobi-o
birthday-ACC
mot-teiru.
take-CONT
‘My birthday is August.’ (relational, inanimate)
(b) Watasi-wa
I-TOP
{*imooto/??musuko}-o
{sister/son}-ACC
mot-teiru.
take-CONT
‘I have a sister/son.’ (relational, animate)
Also, the animacy restriction of this kind holds for the object of possessive con-
structions with mot- (‘take,’ ‘hold’) when a focus reading is received:
(41) Q: Watashi-ni-wa
I-DAT-TOP
nani-ga
what-NOM
aru
be
no?
Q
‘What (on earth) do I have?’
A. Kimi-wa
you-TOP
daiteitaku-o
villa-ACC
mot-teiru.
take-CONT
‘You have a villa.’
(42) Q: Dare-ga
who-NOM
John-o
John-ACC
tetsudau
help
koto-ga
thing-NOM
dekiru
can
no?
Q
‘Who can help John?’
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A: *John-wa
John-TOP
{Mary/ano ojisan}-o
{Mary/that man}-ACC
mot-teiru.
take-CONT
‘John has Mary/that man.’
(43) A. Sono
the
ki-ni-wa
tree-DAT-TOP
mou sukoshi
a little more
kazari-ga
trimmings-NOM
iru
need
ne.
PRT
‘We need more trimmings for this tree.’
B. *Kono
this
ki-wa
tree-TOP
kyonen
last year
katta
bought
denkyu-o
light-NOM
mot-teiru
take-CONT
yo.
PRT
‘The tree has all those lights we got last year.’
Moreover, the same restriction can be found in a control reading, which is re-
ceived when the object conveys old information:
(44) Q. Dare-ga
who-NOM
Chomsky-no
Chomsky’s
hon-o
book-ACC
mot-teiru
take-CONT
no?
Q
‘Who is holding the Chomsky book?’
A. John-ga
John-NOM
Chomsky-no
Chomsky’s
hon-o
book-ACC
mot-teiru.
take-CONT.pres
‘John is holding the Chomsky book.’
(45) Q. Dare-ga
who-NOM
obaasantachi-o
old ladies-ACC
tsure-teiru
take-CONT
no?
Q
‘Who’s taking the old ladies?’
A. *Jane-ga
Jane-NOM
obaasantachi-o
old ladies-ACC
mot-teiru.
take-CONT.pres
‘Jane has them.’
In sum, there are three kinds of possessive constructions in Japanese: posses-
sive constructions with the verb BE, ‘eel’ constructions with the copular verb -da,
and possessive construction with the verb mot-teiru (‘take’). This indicates that
a natural language may have plural strategies to express the notion of possession.
In this connection, Stassen (2009) has newly proposed a typology of possessive
constructions. His classiVcation with four major classes is introduced in (46).
Japanese possessive construction with BE roughly corresponds to (46a), whereas
the construction with the transitive verb mot-teiru can be related to construc-
tions with transitive have (46d). ‘Eel’ constructions with the copular verb -da are
compared with (46b).
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(46) (a) The locational possessive: Korean
(b) The topic (or double subject) possessive: Highland Chontal
(Tequistlatecan)
(c) The with possessive: Bari (Nilo-Saharan, Nilotic)
(d) The have possessive: Miskito (Chibchan in Nicaragua)
(e) minors (genitive, adjectival, conjunctional, . . . )
6 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we Vrstly argued that every instance of contexts in which the DE
is found in possessive constructions is attributed to the possessive interpretation
of the construction, and not to the inalienability expressed by the object. The
explanation in terms of a new classiVcation of interpretations is adequate enough
to account for the DE in possessive constructions both in English and Japanese.
Secondly, we argued that the approach in terms of information structure makes
it clear that there is a diUerence between English and Japanese possessive con-
structions. Put diUerently, only English have allows possessive constructions to
have a control reading. The Japanese verbs iru (‘be’) and aru (‘be’), however,
cannot license the old or presupposed object.
Thirdly, the DE in there constructions and in possessive constructions both in
English and Japanese diUer from one another in that the former comes from the
presentational function of there constructions and the latter, by contrast, cannot
be attributed to a restriction on the information structure of the object.
Finally, we have argued that there are at least three diUerent possessive con-
structions in Japanese, namely, possessive constructions with iru (‘be’) and aru
(‘be’), ‘eel’ constructions with the copular verb -da and possessive constructions
with the verb mot-teiru (‘take’). We have argued that they are all related to ty-
pological patterns of possessive constructions.
In sum, we have proposed a “verbal solution” with respect to the DE phenom-
ena in the object position of the verb have. This is contrasted to the traditional
“nominal solutions,” which are based on the distinction of the object head noun
in its inalienability or relationality. However, the latter need not be rejected in
our verbal solution. Whereas the strong theory in the verbal solution means that
the verbal meaning alone (“possession” vs. “holding”) decides on the existence
of DE on the object irrespective of the argument structure of the object NP, the
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weak theory may well concede that its argument structure plays a part depending
on the verbal meaning. We have argued that the meaning of the verb is settled
Vrst in the given context, which then determines the argument structure of the
object NP. Therefore, the VP level is inevitably involved in this theory (on its
grammatical part).
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Abstract
In this paper, we argue that nouns in each of their lexicalized meanings have cer-
tain referential properties encoded in their lexical entries. Due to these referential
properties, the meaning variants of nouns are predisposed for certain determina-
tion. However, in actual use nouns often occur in grammatical contexts that diUer
from these predisposed uses. On the basis of data from typologically diUerent lan-
guages, we argue that such grammatical variations follow systematic referential
modiVcation patterns of the respective meaning variant of a noun. In accordance
with Löbner (2010), we will refer to the underlying cognitive processes as type
shifts and show that they provide a stimulating approach to widely discussed phe-
nomena such as deVnite article splits and alienability splits.
1 Introduction: Types of nouns and types of determination
Over the past few decades, several noun-type distinctions have been discussed,
including considerations about common nouns, proper nouns, count nouns, and
mass nouns (e. g., Krifka 1989, Chierchia 1998, Payne & Huddleston 2002, Pelletier
2009). The distinction between sortal and relational nouns is generally taken as
a distinction between one-place predicates and two- (or more-) place predicates
(Partee 1983/1997, Barker 1995, Jensen & Vikner 2002, Asudeh 2005). Löbner
1 The research reported in this paper was Vnanced by the German Research Foundation, research
unit FOR 600, “Functional Concepts and Frames”. We would like to express our gratitude to Se-
bastian Löbner, Albert Ortmann, Nicolas Kimm, and James Kilbury. This paper is based on our
considerations in 2009 and 2010 and on an earlier outline of Löbner’s theory of concept types and
determination in (2010), published (2011).
Thomas Gamerschlag, Doris Gerland, Rainer Osswald & Wiebke Petersen
(eds.). 2015. Meaning, Frames, and Conceptual Representation. Düsseldorf:
dup.
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(1985, 2010) takes this distinction as a starting point for a classiVcation of nouns
into four logical types that diUer with respect to their referential properties, i. e.,
uniqueness (inherently unique vs. nonunique) and relationality (inherently
relational vs. nonrelational). Löbner distinguishes between sortal nouns (‘SN’
such as Wower, table), relational nouns (‘RN’; sister, friend), functional nouns (‘FN’;
mother, president), and individual nouns (‘IN’; sun, pope, proper names). Within
this classiVcation, individual and functional nouns are inherently unique in the
sense that the number of possible referents is restricted to one in a given context.
In contrast, for sortal and relational nouns the number of possible referents is un-
restricted. Relational and functional nouns are inherently relational and require
the speciVcation of an additional argument for reference. Löbner (2010) assumes
that the lexical referential properties of nouns inWuence the way they are used
grammatically. In accordance with their referential properties, functional and
relational nouns can be seen as predisposed for possessive use. Due to their in-
herent uniqueness, individual and functional nouns exhibit a predisposition for
deVnite use. However, the classiVcation of nouns into four logical types faces
some challenges, including the following: (1) Most nouns are polysemous (Puste-
jovsky 1995, 1996, Yael 2000). Lexicalized (Löbner 2010) meaning variants may
have diUerent logical types due to their diUerent referential properties. If nouns
can be classiVed with respect to their logical type it seems plausible to assume
one logical type for each lexical entry of a noun. We refer to the logical type of a
lexical entry as its lexical type. In this paper, we will use Löbner’s terms SN, RN,
FN, IN to refer to the lexical types of meaning variants. (2) One can observe that
in actual use (e. g., within the NP) the logical type of a noun often diUers from
its lexical type. Sortal nouns, for example, often occur with deVnite marking (the
table, this Wower). However, if the lexical distinction holds, these uses can be ex-
plained by systematic type shifts. Löbner (2010) argues that nouns can be shifted
between the four type classes. Hence, we need another term to refer to the logical
type of a noun in actual use. In order to stay close to the established terms, we
will speak of sortal concepts (SC), relational concepts (RC), individual concepts
(IC), and functional concepts (FC) in such cases. For illustration, consider the
following examples:
(1) The sun is rising.
(2) The suns are rising.
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(3) A sun is rising.
(4) This sun is rising.
Sun can be regarded as an IN (i. e., as a unique, cf. Hawkins 1978, Lyons 1999). In
everyday life, we experience only the one sun of our solar system rising. (2)–(4)
contradict this perception and require the (mental) construction of a situation
with more than one sun. This eUect is reWected by the mismatch of number (as in
(2)) and determination (as in (3), (4)) in contrast to the lexically unique reference
of the noun. In these contexts, the IN sun is shifted to an SC.
(5) Maria is Peter’s mother.
(6) Maria is the mother.
(7) Maria is a mother of Peter.
(8) Maria is a mother.
Conceptually, every person has only one mother and a mother is always the
mother of someone. Hence,mother is a FN. The use in (5) is perfectly interpretable
without further context and agrees with the lexical type of the noun. In (6)
mother is used as an IC; it still occurs with the deVnite article but without a
possessor argument. Hence, without further context, the utterance in (6) would
naturally lead to the addressee asking the question “Whose mother?”2 In both
(7) and (8) mother occurs with the indeVnite article. (7) sounds awkward since
the uniqueness condition is given up and the mother is shifted to a relational
concept. Still, (7) may be acceptable in certain contexts (e. g., if Maria is Peter’s
stepmother). However, the crucial point is that such contexts are – in contrast
to (5) – required for interpretability. The expression in (8) diUers from (7) in the
nonpossessive use which leads to a focus on the sortal characteristics of being a
mother; here mother is shifted to a SC.
The goal of our paper is to present typological evidence for the noun type clas-
siVcation and to have a closer look at type shifts. For these purposes, it seems ob-
vious to look at languages that explicitly reWect the categories uniqueness (inher-
ently unique vs. nonunique) and relationality (inherently relational vs. non-
2 Horn (thesis, in prep.), takes this characteristic of [+R] nouns as a test criterion for distinguishing
[+R] from [-R] concept types.
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relational) grammatically, the more Vne-grained the better. As for the uniqueness
distinction, we will focus on several regional variants spoken in Germany which
exhibit two diUerent deVnite articles (Ebert 1971, Hartmann 1982, Himmelmann
1997, Studler 2004, Schwager 2007, Schwarz 2009). These articles are assumed
to mark diUerent kinds of uniqueness, i. e., inherent uniqueness and inherent
nonuniqueness (section 2). We also highlight a phenomenon mostly neglected
so far, i. e., the unpredicted use of inherently nonunique nouns with the weak
deVnite article. For the relationality distinction, we investigate typologically dif-
ferent languages that show explicit marking for diUerent kinds of relationality
with a strong focus on alienable and inalienable possession (section 3).
2 Insights from deVniteness marking
2.1 Approaches to uniqueness
Many approaches to unambiguous reference focus on the function of the deVnite
article. Lyons (1999) and Abbott (2004) discuss the principle approaches: accord-
ing to the familiarity account (Heim 1982), the deVnite article indicates that the
referent of the particular NP is already familiar to both speaker and addressee.
The identiVability approach assumes, as Lyons (1999) points out, that the deVnite
article directs the addressee to the referent by signaling that she is able to identify
the intended referent (Chafe 1976, Birner & Ward 1994). Löbner (1985) builds his
theory on a third approach, the uniqueness theory (Russell 1905, Strawson 1950,
Donnellan 1966). The main assumption of the uniqueness approach is that the
deVnite article indicates that there is only one entity which satisVes the used def-
inite description, i. e., an entity that is unique. Löbner (1985) proposes a distinc-
tion between semantic and pragmatic deVniteness that also includes uniqueness
coming from other parts of the expression. For semantic deVniteness the referent
is established independently of the immediate situation or context of utterance.
Pragmatic deVniteness depends on special situations and contexts for the nonam-
biguity (and existence) of a referent. In this paper, we will use the terms semantic
and pragmatic uniqueness instead and reserve the term deVniteness to refer to the
grammatical marking of uniqueness. We will apply the distinction to the analysis
of some regional variants in Germany that exhibit two deVnite articles, one of-
ten referred to as the strong, the other as the weak deVnite article. This article
split has been analyzed as reWecting semantic versus pragmatic uniqueness (cf.
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Löbner 1985 for Fering, Ripuarian, Himmelmann 1997 for Ripuarian, Studler 2004
for Alemannic, Schwager 2007 for Bavarian, Ortmann 2014 also for Dutch and
Swedish): pragmatic uniqueness is signaled by the strong, semantic uniqueness
by the weak deVnite article. If we consider INs and FNs as semantically unique
and SNs and RNs as pragmatically unique, one might expect that SNs and RNs
only occur with the strong deVnite article. However, we will provide a type shift-
based explanation as to why the latter also occur with the weak deVnite article
under certain conditions.
2.2 DeVnite article splits in language
A frequently mentioned example is Frisian, a West-Germanic language, as inves-
tigated by Ebert (1971). Table 1 shows the paradigm of the deVnite article split
for Frisian Fering (spoken on the island of Föhr).
masc. fem. neutr.
weak a at at
strong di det det
Table 1: Definite articles (singular) in Fering (forms according to Ebert 1971)
Ebert (1971) argues that the use of the weak deVnite article (‘A-article’) signals
that the speaker presupposes the referent of the NP is either part of the universe
of discourse (we prefer the term ‘participants’ shared reference set’, henceforth
‘SET’) or is related to a familiar referent in a well-known relationship. The strong
deVnite article (‘D-article’) contains an additional deictic element which points to
the situation of utterance, to anaphoric or cataphoric specifying information, and
helps to select the appropriate referent. Hence, INs and FNs which refer uniquely
by deVnition should occur with the weak deVnite article, unless they undergo
shifts that change their logical type.
Fering (Ebert 1971: 71,97)
(9) A
Defweak
san
sun
skiinjt
shine
‘The sun is shining.’
(10) Kreske
Kreske
Vng
got
een
one
üüb
on
anöös
Defweak nose
‘Kreske got hit on her nose.’
San (‘sun’) as an individual noun has already been discussed. In (9) it is used with
the weak deVnite article as predicted. Nöös (‘nose’) is a good example of an FN
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since every person has one and only one nose. In accordance with the predictions,
it occurs with the weak deVnite article in (10). In contrast, the anaphoric use
of the Fering SN kü (‘cow’) in (11) and the Bavarian SN biachl (‘book’) in (12)
requires the strong deVnite article. It signals that the referent is only referred to
in anaphoric use.
Fering (Ebert 1971: 107)
(11) Peetje
Peetje
hee
has
an
a
kü
cow
slaachtet.
slaughtered
Jo
they
saai,
say
det
Defstrong
kü
cow
wiar
was
äi
not
sünj.
healthy
‘Peter slaughtered a cow. They say the cow was not healthy.’
Bavarian (Schwager 2007)
(12) Da
Defweak
Maxi
Maxi
hod
has
a
a
biachl
book
kaft.
bought
Sei
his
Mama
mom
hod
has
des
Defstrong
biachl
book
scho
already
glesn.
read
‘Maxi bought a book. His mom has already read the book.’
Proper names in Bavarian, such as Maxi in (12), and in Ripuarian (et Waltraud) in
general occur with the weak deVnite article. However, Hartmann (1982) reports
that proper names may also be used with the strong deVnite article (dat Waltraud)
in Ripuarian if the speaker is annoyed about the respective person which can
hence be considered a marked use of the proper name.
2.3 Permanently established ICs
As we will see now, SNs and RNs may occur with the strong or with the weak
deVnite article when shifted to ICs or FCs – something which is not predicted
by Löbner’s approach. With respect to the noun type classiVcation, INs would
naturally refer within the participants’ shared reference set. One question that
is widely discussed in the literature (also in diUerent terms and diUerent frame-
works) is when an IC actually becomes part of the reference set (cf. Hawkins
1978, Prince 1992, Gundel, Hedberg & Zacharski 1993, Ariel 1998, for example).
We cannot fully answer this question here but want to shed some light on it from
the noun type perspective. An IC may be the result of an ad hoc shift for reference
in the respective situation of utterance only. Also, ICs may become more perma-
nent between participants and hence refer just like proper names. Consequently,
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we assume that in such cases type shifts are not required and the IC is established
as what we will call a ‘permanently established IC’ (PEIC) within the participants’
shared reference set. In this view, PEICs are semantically unique within the re-
spective SET. This could, for example, be the case for ICs that have been used
frequently enough or those that are seen as very prominent between participants
so that a PEIC would reduce the cognitive eUort of disambiguation and type shift-
ing. For illustration, imagine a family that has a dog. Within the family, the SN
hünj (‘dog’, Fering) refers as a PEIC to the dog (of the family) just like its given
name. This analysis is reWected by the use of the weak deVnite article in (13) (cf.
also Hawkins 1978: 117 ‘larger situation use with speciVc knowledge’).
Fering (Ebert 1971: 83)
(13) A
Defweak
hünj
dog
hee
has
tuwwark.
toothache
‘The dog has toothache.’
Ebert (1971) calls such concepts ‘situative Unika’ (‘situational uniques’). How-
ever, to refer to a dog on the street or in anaphoric use, the strong deVnite article
is generally used (Det hünj hee tuwwark). The German dialects Ripuarian (spo-
ken in the Rhineland) and Bavarian reWect the use of the weak deVnite article
discussed so far. Consider the SN kenk (‘child’) in (14a) which is shifted to an IC
with the strong deVnite article indicating that the child is not part of the SET.
Kenk in (14b) and kind (15) are other examples of PEICs (e. g., in the sense of “our
own child” or “the child that we take care of”).
Ripuarian (Hartmann 1982: 196)
(14) (a) Dat
Defstrong
kenk
child
es
is
am
progr
jriene
cry
‘The child is crying.’
(b) Et
Defweak
kenk
child
es
is
am
progr
jriene
cry
‘The child is crying.’
Bavarian (Schwager 2007)
(15) Ogott,
o.god
mia
we
ham
have
vogessn,
forgotten
das
that
ma
we
’s
Defweak
Kind
child
abhoin!
pick.up
‘Oh god, we forgot to pick up the child!’
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PEICs and INs can diUer with respect to their lexical type. Whereas INs are
lexically constructed as uniquely referring to one entity only, PEICs can be the
result of shifts of any noun type. They are not necessarily lexically unique. With
respect to their uses, however, INs and PEICs resemble each other. Proper names
(belonging to INs in Löbner’s classiVcation), for example, may have only one
referent within a certain SET but also multiple potential referents in a diUerent
SET. PEICs may refer semantically uniquely between very few participants only
or (as an extreme) within a whole speech community. They can also be seen as
one way of assigning a noun a unique referent which can be temporary or become
lexicalized.
3 Insights from possession marking
3.1 Approaches to possession and alienability
Several notions of possession have been proposed (cf. Seiler 1983, Heine 1997,
McGregor 2009). We follow Heine (1997) in interpreting possession as all kinds
of constructions in language that express a conceptual relation between entities.
Within these relations, the possessor is seen as the grammatical realization of the
entity that owns the other entity or entities, has control over it, is it’s producer
or represents a whole entity with the other being part of it. In a possessive con-
struction, we refer to the entity that is possessed, controlled, produced or part-of
as the possessum. Some languages reWect diUerent relations grammatically (cf.
Seiler 1983). They distinguish, for example, between certain possessive construc-
tions exclusively used for kinship relations and body-part relations on the one
hand and other kinds of possessive constructions for all other kinds of relations
on the other (cf. Chapell & McGregor 1996). According to McGregor (2009), the
most widespread distinction with respect to possession is that between alienable
and inalienable possession (Nichols 1988), often referred to as an alienability split.
For alienable possession, the relation between possessor and possessum is separa-
ble and not inherently determined; moreover, the relation need not be permanent.
In contrast, inalienable possession is considered inseparable under normal con-
ditions, and the kind of relation is Vxed (cf. McGregor 2009). The inalienability
of a relation between possessor and possessum is determined by the semantics of
the latter, i. e., the kind of relation is inherent (Seiler 1983). Heine (1997: 10) lists
the following terms as primary candidates for inalienable relations: kinship terms
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(Peter’s mother), body parts (The girl’s nose), relational spatial concepts (The end of
the semester), part-whole relations (The trees branch), physical and mental states
(Lisa’s strength), nominalizations (The planting of the bananas), and what Heine
calls individual concepts3 (name, voice). Not all languages that exhibit an alien-
ability split treat all mentioned candidates as inalienable. The language speciVc
distribution heavily depends on cultural concepts (McGregor 2009).
The alienability split is often grammatically reWected in language, sometimes to
a very Vne-grained extent (cf. Classical Nahuatl in 3.2). According to Seiler (1983),
inherently relational (including inalienable) nouns tend to occur unmarked or less
marked across languages since the kind of relation between possessor and pos-
sessum is already determined by the latter and needs not to be made explicit.
Contrastively, alienable nouns tend to occur with additional lexical material in
possessive constructions, such as classiVers or predicative possession. Seiler calls
this relation ‘established’ since the kind of relation has to be made explicit. Some
possessive markers used in alienable possessive constructions provide further
information about the kind of established relation (as shown in section 3.2 for
Oceanic classiVer languages or as can be stated for predicative possession). Ort-
mann & Handschuh (2004) link the analysis of alienability splits with Löbner’s
noun type classiVcation, an approach we will follow in 3.2. We will also see that
the diUerent marking of alienable and inalienable nouns can provide clues for the
identiVcation of lexical and shifted types (see also Partee & Borschev 2000).
3.2 Alienability splits in language
Ortmann & Handschuh (2004) analyze three Mayan languages (Yucatec, Itzaaj,
and Mam) with respect to the so-called derelationality marker. They consider this
kind of marker a shift marker indicating the conceptual shift from an inalienable
RN to a SC. Compare the examples in (16).
Yucatec (Mayan; Lehmann, 1998: 70U)
(16) (a) in
p’or1sg
tàatah
father
‘my father’
3 Heine (1997) uses the term ‘individual concept’ to refer to individual characteristics of persons and
entities.
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(b) le
df
tàatah-tsil-o’
father-derel-art
‘the father’
The FN tàatah (‘father’) receives no special marking when used in accordance
with its lexical type (16a). The possessive pronoun only indicates whose father
is referred to. When used in a nonrelational way, the derelativization morpheme
-tsil- is added to the noun in order to signal that the inherent relationality has
been given up as in (16b) (Ortmann & Handschuh 2004). This kind of shift marker
occurs also in Paamese, Cahuilla, Koyukon and Q’eqchi indicating the process of
‘derelativization’ (Seiler 1983) or ‘absolutivization’ (Lehmann 1998).
Paamese (Oceanic; Crowley 1996: 417)
(17) vat-in
head-3Sg.poss
a-vat
derel-head
‘his/her head’ ‘head’
Cahuilla (Uto-Aztecan; Seiler 1983: 25)
(18) hé-puš
3sg.poss-eye
púč-il
eye-derel
‘his eye’ ‘eye’
Koyukon (Athabaskan;
Thompson 1996: 654-667)
(19) se-tlee’
1sg-head
k’e-tlee’
derel-head
‘my head’ ‘head’
Q’eqchi (Mayan,
Kockelman 2009: 346)
(20) in-ch’ool
1sg-heart
ch’ool-ej
heart-derel
‘my heart’ ‘heart’
The use of inalienable body-part terms (such as ‘head’ in (17), (19), ‘eye’ in (18),
and ‘heart’ in (20)) as SCs requires an additional marker for derelativization. Thus,
they are explicitly marked when shifted from an inalienable FN (‘head’, ‘heart’)
or RN (‘eyes’) to a SC. In Paamese, the suXx for derelativization is only realized
when the inalienable noun is used absolute (Crowley 1996). When shifted to an
alienable noun, a marker indicating alienability is required (vat ona-k, head poss-
1sg, ‘my head’ (in the sense of ‘my leader’) (Crowley 1996: 421)). In Koyukon,
however, the morpheme indicating derelativization occurs also in the alienable
relational construction: se-k’e-k’e-tlee’; ‘my (animal’s) head’ (Thompson 1996:
667, Löbner 2010).
Classical Nahuatl not only exhibits a marker for derelativization (21a) for the
absolute use of a relational noun but also one marker for alienable and one for
inalienable constructions:
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Classical Nahuatl (Amerindian, Launey 1981: 100 f)
(21) (a) omi-tl
bone-derel
‘bone’
(b) m-omi-yo
2sg-bone-inal
‘your bone (part of your skeleton)’
(c) m-omi-uh
2sg-bone-al
‘your bone (on a plate)’
Bone is a RN and can be realized as an inalienable (21b) or alienable RC (21c)
with the respective morphemes. According to Launey (1981: 89–105) the use of
the alienability morpheme on an inalienable noun indicates that the possessum
is external to the possessor, i. e., the part-whole relation is given up. Thus, the
inherent relation is not the one expressed in the alienable possessive construction;
instead a diUerent kind of relation is established.
Oceanic classiVer languages exhibit an alienability distinction which reWects
Seiler’s assumptions in that they mark inalienable relations only with a posses-
sive suXx and alienable relations with additional classiVers. Depending on the
richness of the possessive classiVer system, the relation established can be made
more explicit and indicate the kind of possession (e. g., a legal ownership posses-
sion or a possession for food purposes). Lichtenberk (1983: 148) states that the
use of possessive (“relational” in his terms) classiVers is not determined by the
properties of the possessum but by the nature of the relation between possessor
and possessum. The possessive classiVer categorizes the possessum with respect
to the relation to its possessor (Lichtenberk 2009: 263). In Manam, kinship terms,
body parts, and part-whole terms belong to the category of inalienable entities.
When used in a possessive construction, they take a personal possessive suXx
indicating person and number of the possessor. Alienable nouns are additionally
marked with one of the two possessive classiVers depending on what kind of re-
lationship they encode. ‘ana- indicates that the possessum is food or something
associated with food (garden, bottle, basket), while ne- is used for all other kinds
of possession.
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Manam (Oceanic; Lichtenberk 2009: 249)
(22) (a) paŋana-gu
head-1.sg.poss
‘my head’
(b) uma
garden
‘ana-gu
poss.clf-1sg.poss
‘my garden’
The FN paŋana (‘head’) in (22a) takes only the possessive suXx representing its
inherent kind of relationality. It is used with the inalienable possessive marker in
accordance with its lexical type. For the SN uma (‘garden’) the ‘food’-possessive
classiVer is used (22b). However, FN and RN can also take possessive classiVers.
Consider the FN paŋana (‘head’) in the following examples:
Manam (Lichtenberk 1983: 302)
(23) (a) paŋana
head
‘ana-gu
poss.clf-1.sg.poss
‘my head (to eat)’
(b) paŋanane-gu
headposs.clf-1.sg.poss
‘my head (I found, I cut oU)’
In (23a) and (23b), a diUerent kind of possession is established and the possessive
relationship is indicated no longer by the possessive suXx only but by a posses-
sive classiVer which now speciVes the relation between possessor and possessum.
In (23a) paŋana occurs with the food-possessive classiVer, while in (23b) the gen-
eral possessive classiVer is used to indicate that the established relation diUers
from the inherent one and does not concern food. In both (23a) and (23b), the
inalienable FN is shifted to an alienable FC in a speciVed relation which does not
take the preferred relation (which is determined by the possessum) into account.
Toqabaqita, another Oceanic language, has no possessive classiVers but uses a
separate marker for alienable possession.
Toqabaqita (Oceanic; Lichtenberk 2005: 343)
(24) (a) gwau-ku
head-1sg
‘my head’
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(b) gwau
head
nau
1sg.poss
‘my (e. g., Vsh) head’
The inalienable FN gwau (‘head’) occurs with a suXx indicating person and num-
ber of the possessor and is used in accordance with its lexical type in (24a). In
(24b), the relation is established with a separate possessive marker expressing an
alienable kind of relation and the FN is shifted to an alienable FC. (25a) and (25b)
show that diUerent meaning variants of nouns can have diUerent lexical types:
Toqabaqita (Oceanic; Lichtenberk 2005: 345)
(25) (a) fote-ku
shoulder.blade-1sg
‘my shoulder blade’
(b) fote
paddle
nau
1sg.poss
‘my paddle’
The relational meaning variant of fote (‘shoulder blade’) is used in accordance
with its lexical type in the inalienable construction (25a) and the sortal variant
in (25b) in the alienable construction.
An alienability split can also be observed in Hungarian. In adnominal posses-
sive constructions, the possessum always takes a possessive marker that agrees
with the person and number of the possessor. Certain nouns, however, take
an additional suXx when used with the third-person singular possessive marker
(Moravcsik 2003) and diUer with respect to their meaning (ElekV 2000).
Hungarian (Finno-Ugric, own data)
(26) (a) a
def
cipő
shoe
talp-a
sole-Poss3Sg
‘The shoe sole’
(b) Péter
Peter
talp-a
sole-Poss3Sg
‘Peter’s sole (of foot) ’
(c) Péter
Peter
talp-j-a
sole-Al.shift-Poss3Sg
‘Peter’s sole (of a shoe)’
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Examples (26a) and (26b) illustrate the use of the RN talp (‘sole‘) in accordance
with its lexical type. A sole is typically a part of a shoe or a foot. In (26c), an
alienable ownership relation is established. This modiVcation is marked by the
j-suXx and applies systematically for certain nouns in Hungarian (ElekV 2000).
When the j-suXx is not realized, only the inherent interpretation is possible. The
established relation always results in an alienable relation. Note that the j-suXx
can only be realized in combination with the possessive suXx.
4 Conclusion
The purpose of this paper was to present typological evidence for the noun type
classiVcation with respect to uniqueness and relationality and to introduce the no-
tion of permanently established ICs. With respect to uniqueness, Fering, Bavarian
and Ripuarian have shown that FNs and INs generally occur with the weak deV-
nite article when used in accordance with their lexical types; proper names as INs
in the unmarked case also take the weak deVnite article but also allow the strong
deVnite article in pejorative uses. SNs and RNs, in contrast, may occur both with
the strong as well as with the weak deVnite article when shifted to ICs or FCs.
We have argued that the use of the weak deVnite article signals that the speaker
considers the referent of the NP to be a permanently established IC in the shared
reference set with the addressee. In contrast, the use of the strong deVnite article
indicates that the referent is not part of the set at the time of utterance. Hence,
we can summarize that the distribution of the two deVnite articles in principle
matches the predictions made by the noun type classiVcation. The data show that
SNs, RNs and FNs can be shifted to ICs. These ICs may refer within the context of
utterance only (and then occur with the strong deVnite article) or become refer-
entially permanently established (and then occur with the weak deVnite article)
within the respective shared reference set. We conclude that permanently estab-
lished ICs refer semantically uniquely within the respective shared reference set.
With respect to their uses, INs and PEICs resemble each other, which is reWected
by the use of the weak deVnite article in the languages investigated.
For relationality, the investigation has also shown further support for the noun
type distinction. First, Yucatec Mayan, Koyukon, Cahuilla, Paamese, Q’eqchi, and
Classical Nahuatl exhibit a derelativization morpheme which clearly indicates a
type shift from an inalienable RN/FN to an SC. Second, the analysis of alienabil-
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ity splits in the languages investigated has shown that in inalienable possessive
constructions, we only Vnd inalienable RNs and FNs used in accordance with
their lexical type. Hence it seems that these constructions are good indicators
for lexical RNs and FNs. In contrast, all noun types can be used in alienable
possessive constructions which signal for nonrelational nouns and inalienable
nouns a shift to an alienable RC or FC. In the languages investigated, such shifts
are marked with a possessive marker for alienable possession. The investigated
Oceanic classiVer languages exhibit possessive classiVers for diUerent kinds of
alienable possession. These classiVers not only indicate a shift of the noun but
also explicitly indicate the kind of established alienable possession.
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TheMeaning of Adjectives, Nouns,
and Verbs

Non-Intersectivity in Manner
Adjectives∗
Sascha Alexeyenko
Abstract
This paper examines a class of adjectival modiVers that includes such adjectives
as skillful, careful, good, active, etc., which have been traditionally analyzed as
non-intersective, intensional modiVers, based on the substitution failure test. The
paper provides arguments against the intensional analysis of these adjectives and
further develops an alternative account in terms of manner modiVcation of events
proposed by Larson (1998), according to which an event argument is present in the
semantic structure of nouns modiVed by adjectives of this type. Furthermore, it
suggests that the event variable is bound by a generic quantiVer in this case, which
accounts for the restrictions on the type of eventualities that these adjectives can
take as arguments.
1 Introduction: Substitution Failure
It has long been recognized that the part of speech “Adjective” in English is se-
mantically not uniform and not all English adjectives can be given an extensional
analysis in terms of properties of individuals. This has usually been demonstrated
using entailment patterns and the possibility of substitution with co-extensional
terms. As to the former, not all adjectives license both the NP is an N and NP is
Adj entailments from NP is an Adj N, as, e. g., married does:
∗ This text was written as far back as 2009/2010 and thus contains ideas that I no longer believe in
or that have been developed further since. However, a revision of this paper would have meant
to write a new paper, therefore I decided to leave it basically unchanged, except for some minor
corrections.
Thomas Gamerschlag, Doris Gerland, Rainer Osswald & Wiebke Petersen
(eds.). 2015. Meaning, Frames, and Conceptual Representation. Düsseldorf:
dup.
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(1) Peter is a married engineer.
(a) |= Peter is an engineer.
(b) |= Peter is married.
An analogous pair of entailments cannot be drawn, for instance, for electrical,
simply because (2b) is ungrammatical:
(2) Peter is an electrical engineer.
(a) |= Peter is an engineer.
(b) 6|= *Peter is electrical.
If being electrical were a property of Peter ascribed independently of his prop-
erty of being an engineer, as it is the case with being married, electrical should
be able to occur predicatively.
Furthermore, an analysis of all adjectives in English as properties of individ-
uals is not able to account for the following fact of substitution failure with co-
extensional terms, observed at least as early as in Parsons (1968):
(3) (a) Francis is a skillful surgeon.
(b) Francis is a violinist.
(c) 6|= Francis is a skillful violinist.
The reason for the lack of implication in (3) is intuitively clear: Being skillful
means quite diUerent things for a surgeon, a violinist, a driver, etc. Thus, the
meaning variability arises due to attribution of skillfulness to diUerent activities,
for skillful with respect to making a surgery implies something else than skillful
with respect to playing the violin. Yet, postulating diUerent meanings for skillful
would be certainly an inelegant and inadequate solution that would vastly over-
complicate the lexicon. A more adequate solution may be found on the level of
semantic composition.
Note that the entailment patterns alone would not attest skillful as a problem-
atic case for the property of individuals analysis, since Francis’ being a skillful
surgeon seems to entail Francis’ being skillful. However, the substitution failure
in (3) suggests that this is not quite right; rather, the sentence in (3a) entails that
Francis is skillful with respect to his being a surgeon, but not skillful simpliciter.
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In fact, the substitution failure test played a central role in early semantic theo-
ries of adjectives as an argument for an intensional analysis. I will show, however,
that the lack of substitutivity may have diUerent reasons and thus cannot be used
as an unequivocal indicator for a single semantic phenomenon, such as intension-
ality, for instance. In this paper, I will focus on one semantic phenomenon that
gives rise to substitution failure and is associated with adjectives like skillful, care-
ful, good, active, etc., which I refer to as manner adjectives throughout the paper.
I will argue that substitution failure with manner adjectives is due to the presence
of a hidden event argument in the logical form that they are predicated of.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 outlines Siegel’s (1976) in-
tensional analysis and discusses its drawbacks. Section 3 shows that substitution
failure may have diUerent reasons, all of which can be explained in terms of hid-
den relationality, including the case of manner adjectives. Section 4 provides a
formal semantic analysis of manner adjectives as predicates of events and sug-
gests that the event variable is bound by a generic quantiVer in this case, which
accounts for the restrictions on the type of eventualities that can be modiVed
by manner adjectives. Finally, Section 5 contains some concluding remarks and
considerations regarding future work.
2 Previous Analyses: ModiVcation of Intensions
2.1 Siegel’s (1976) Doublet Theory
In early formal semantic approaches, in particular, in the Doublet Theory devel-
oped by Siegel (1976), the entailment and substitution failure data have been inter-
preted as reWecting a semantic type ambiguity within the word class of adjectives.
On the one hand, Siegel’s classiVcation distinguishes adjectives like male, aged,
nude, blond, tall, married, etc. that are given an extensional analysis as proper-
ties of individuals (of type 〈e, t〉 extensionally), for which a conjunction account
illustrated in (4) holds:
(4) Jmale nurseK = λx.[male(x) & nurse(x)]
Siegel establishes the term “intersective” for this type of adjectives, since the
semantic composition of such adjectives with nouns can be characterized in terms
of an intersection of their extensions.
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On the other hand, electrical in (2) and skillful in (3) are examples of “non-
intersective” adjectives, along with good, careful, medical, former, alleged, poten-
tial, etc. The conjunction account cannot be true of them: The entailment and
substitution failure data speak against it. In terms of sets, these adjectives are
subsective, rather than intersective, since the extension of an NP containing an
adjective of this type is a subset of the extension of its head noun.
Siegel analyzes adjectives like electrical and skillful as intensional modiVers,
which operate on the intensions rather than the extensions of predicates (exten-
sionally they are thus properties of properties, type 〈〈e, t〉,〈e, t〉〉):
(5) Jskillful surgeonK = λx.[skillful(ˆ surgeon)](x)
Thus, Siegel accounts for substitution failure with non-intersective adjectives
by appealing to intensionality: Applied to diUerent intensions, they do not neces-
sarily give the same value.
2.2 Arguments Against the Intensional Analysis
Siegel’s analysis of adjectives faces a number of problems, which suggest that it
provides a too course-grained classiVcation of adjectives and, at the same time,
makes too strong predictions. In what follows, I will brieWy discuss these prob-
lems.
2.2.1 Heterogeneity in Non-Intersective Adjectives
The distinction between intersective and non-intersective adjectives appears to
be not diUerentiated enough, since it neglects obvious semantic and syntactic
diUerences within the class of non-intersective adjectives. First, they reveal quite
diUerent entailment patterns, as summarized below:
(6) NP is a musical N NP is a skillful N NP is an alleged N
|= NP is an N |= NP is an N 6|= NP is an N
6|= *NP is musical ?|= NP is skillful 6|= *NP is alleged
In order to account for these diUerences, Siegel formulates meaning postulates
which ensure correct entailments. For instance, the meaning postulate in (7)
guarantees the subsectivity entailments that can be drawn from electrical engineer
in (2). Similarly, another meaning postulate is needed for the so-called “privative”
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adjectives, like alleged and former, which license neither the entailment NP is an
Adj, nor the entailment NP is an N. This introduces a diversity into the class of
non-intersective adjectives, but the semantic motivation for it is missing.
(7) [[α(ˆ β)](u)→ β(u)]
Relatedly, diUerent non-intersective adjectives can have diUerent syntactic dis-
tributions. For example, whereas skillful can be used both attributively and pred-
icatively, medical and alleged allow only for the attributive use:
(8) (a) Ruth is a skillful nurse.
(b) This nurse is skillful.
(9) (a) Robert is a medical assistant.
(b) *This assistant is medical.
(10) (a) Oswald is the alleged murderer of Kennedy.
(b) *This murderer is alleged.
Intuitively, these distributional and entailment facts hint at semantic diUer-
ences among non-intersective adjectives that are not reWected in Siegel’s classiV-
cation. I assume that the semantic heterogeneity of non-intersective adjectives is
a result of the fact that substitution failure, which is used as the main method to
attest (non-)intersectivity in Siegel’s analysis, may have diUerent reasons. We will
see in Section 3 that a number of semantic phenomena can trigger substitution
failure.
More generally, the content of the notion of non-intersectivity is not very spe-
ciVc. It is used in the Vrst instance to say what certain predicates are not, namely,
that they are not properties of individuals, rather than to explain what they are.
The idea that they modify intensions does not say much about their semantics, as
the exact mechanism of this modiVcation is not speciVed in detail. Furthermore,
the diversity within the class of non-intersective adjectives suggests that there
may be more than one mechanism of non-intersective modiVcation.
Finally, the simple version of intersectivity, which is assumed by Siegel (and, in
fact, many others), is not unproblematic either. According to it, an intersective ad-
jective is just a one-place predicate which applies to an individual independently
of the predicate denoted by the head noun. This view on adjectival modiVcation
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implies that there may be no semantic inWuence of the modiVed noun on the ad-
jective (or the other way around). However, this appears not to be quite the case.
The meaning variation in the adjectives in such examples as male dentist / male
suit, nude person / nude rock, red tomato / red hair / red wine / red face suggests that
the simple version of the conjunctive account does not work as neatly as assumed
even for what is usually taken as paramount examples of intersective adjectives.
A critical discussion of the notion of intersectivity is, however, outside the scope
of this paper; more on this issue can be found, e. g., in Lahav (1989) and Bosch
(1995).
2.2.2 ModiVcation Beyond Intensions
The idea of intensional modiVcation arose from the consideration that certain
adjectives cannot denote semantically independent properties of individuals and
that the Vrst candidate they most obviously depend on is the semantics of their
head nouns. There is however some evidence that the semantic dependence of
non-intersective adjectives goes beyond their dependence on the meaning of the
modiVed nouns.
First, some non-intersective adjectives can modify what Bolinger (1967) called
“semantically bare nouns”, such as woman, person, or guy:1
(11) (a) Benjamin is clearly an experienced guy.
(b) Not always will the most skillful person win.
Obviously, experienced and skillful in (11) mean ‘experienced / skillful with re-
spect to some activity’; these activities are however not recoverable from the
intensions of the nouns guy and person. In this connection, Siegel (1976) suggests
that adjectives like experienced and skillful are ambiguous between an intersec-
tive and a non-intersective reading and that their occurrences with semantically
bare nouns, as in (11), are intersective. Moreover, she assumes that, in fact, the
majority of English adjectives are “doublets”, i. e., have two distinct lexical entries
for the intersective and the non-intersective variant. It is unclear, however, how
experienced and skillful can be intersective in (11) if they mean ‘experienced /
skillful with respect to something’.
1 Note, however, that not all non-intersective adjectives can modify such nouns; for instance,medical
and alleged cannot. This is yet another manifestation of heterogeneity among non-intersective
adjectives.
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Some adjectives seem to be in fact good candidates for cases of ambiguity; see,
for instance, the contrast between criminal in (12a) and (12b), where the meaning
diUerence is quite obvious and the entailments are diUerent. Yet, it is questionable
that the majority of English adjectives are ambiguous in this sense. There just
seems to be little diUerence in meaning between skillful when applied to surgeon,
as in (3), and skillful when applied to person, as in (11), that would justify such
a complication of the lexicon.
(12) (a) A criminal lawyer has studied the aspects of criminal law.
(b) A criminal policeman engaged in a stitch-up cannot hide now so
well as before.
Second, Hare (1957), Sampson (1970), and Beesley (1982), among others, showed
that non-intersective modiVcation cannot be tied to the meaning of the modiVed
nouns, because context can always suggest a diUerent interpretation. For in-
stance, in the context of a chess school that specializes in teaching musicians,
skillful violinist in (13) will be interpreted relative to playing chess, rather than
relative to playing the violin (cf. Beesley 1982: 221):
(13) A: How are your new students?
B: I’ve got some very skillful violinists.
Such examples clearly demonstrate that non-intersective modiVcation cannot
be reduced to the modiVcation of noun intensions, although the default interpre-
tation of adjectives like skillful may in fact be relative to the meaning of their
head nouns.
3 Reasons for Substitution Failure
As discussed in Section 2.2.1 above, one of the problems with Siegel’s account
is the semantic diversity of adjectives falling under the label of non-intersective
modiVers. It has been suggested that this diversity results from the fact that
substitution failure, which is used by Siegel to attest adjectives as intersective
or non-intersective, can be triggered by diUerent factors. This section discusses
some of such factors. Note that the classes of adjectives associated with these fac-
tors cut across the intersective/non-intersective distinction, since the adjectives
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discussed in Sections 3.1 and 3.2 are intersective according to Siegel, while those
in Sections 3.3 and 3.4 are non-intersective.
3.1 Gradable Adjectives
The following example from Partee (1995) demonstrates that substitution failure
can occur with gradable adjectives, such as tall and expensive:
(14) (a) Win is a tall 14-year-old.
(b) Win is a basketball player.
(c) 6|=Win is a tall basketball player.
However, the reason of substitution failure in this case is generally assumed
not to be intensionality, but rather the fact that the semantics of gradable adjec-
tives depends on a standard of comparison, which is calculated with respect to a
relevant comparison class (cf., e. g., Cresswell 1976, Klein 1980, von Stechow 1984,
Bierwisch 1989, Kennedy & McNally 2005, Kennedy 2007).2 More speciVcally, it
is a change in the standard of comparison for the set of individuals denoted by
the head noun that can give rise to substitution failure with gradable adjectives.
For instance, in Partee’s example above, the class of basketball players intro-
duces a speciVc standard of comparison for tallness which is diUerent (higher)
from the standard of tallness for 14-year-olds. Being a tall 14-year-old thus does
not imply being a tall basketball player because one has to be signiVcantly taller
than an average teenager and even an average adult in order to be attested as
a tall basketball player. In other words, one’s height can be above the standard
of tallness for 14-year-olds, but still below the standard of tallness for basketball
players, as shown formally in (15) on a degree-based approach to the semantics of
gradable adjectives in the spirit of Kennedy (2007).
(15) (a) 14-year-old(win) & ∃d [tall(win) = d & d ≥ d14s ]
(b) basketball-player(win)
(c) dbps > d14s
2 This view is also adopted by Siegel (1976), who assumes that gradable adjectives are intersective
and thus has to accept the fact that substitution failure cannot be used as an unequivocal test for
non-intersectivity.
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(d) 6|= basketball-player(win) & ∃d [tall(win) = d & d ≥ dbps ]
This analysis of substitution failure with tall in (14) predicts that substitution
failure will not occur in the inverse direction, that is, that the implication from
a higher standard to a lower one should be valid. This prediction is, of course,
borne out, as (16) demonstrates.
(16) (a) Win is a tall basketball player.
(b) Win is a 14-year-old.
(c) |=Win is a tall 14-year-old.
Note that the fact that substitution failure with gradable adjectives occurs only
in one direction distinguishes them from manner adjectives such as skillful, with
which implications in both directions do not hold; for instance, neither the substi-
tution in (3) nor the inverse one are valid. This suggests that substitution failure
with manner adjectives cannot be due merely to changes in the standards of com-
parison for diUerent comparison classes.
3.2 Color and Material Adjectives
Adjectives that denote colors and materials, such as red or wooden, are often
regarded as typical instances of intersective adjectives. Interestingly, they can
nevertheless give rise to substitution failure, as, e. g., in the following example:
(17) (a) This object is a red grapefruit.
(b) This object is a juggling ball.
(c) 6|= This object is a red juggling ball.
Although the example in (17) is somewhat artiVcial (in general, it appears not
to be easy to construct natural examples of this sort with color and material
adjectives), the logic of substitution of co-extensional terms seems to be preserved
in it. Intuitively, substitution failure has little to do with intensionality in this
case; rather, it originates from the fact that a color or material property can be
attributed to an object as a whole, while being true only of a relevant part of it.
Thus, red pen is true of a pen even if only its external part or only its internal
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part (i. e., the ink) is red and glass table is true of a table even if its legs are
made out of metal – important is that it has a glass plate. And since it usually
remains implicit which part is relevant in such cases, reference to the object as a
whole may imply a switch between diUerent relevant parts of it and this, in turn,
will lead to substitution failure, like in (17). The implicit ascription of redness
only to certain relevant parts of the same object in this example, namely, to the
internal part when it is conceptualized as a grapefruit and to the surface when
it is conceptualized as a juggling ball, can thus be formalized as follows:3
(18) (a) grapefruit(this-object) & ∃x [inside-part(x)(this-object) & red(x)]
(b) juggling-ball(this-object)
(c) 6|= juggling-ball(this-object) & ∃x [outside-part(x)(this-object)
& red(x)]
If the semantic representation of (17) is as given in (18), the non-validity of this
implication is explained without appeal to intensionality, namely, as being due to
the presence of an implicit parameter, relative to which the adjectival property
is predicated.
3.3 Relational Adjectives
Also relational adjectives, such as electrical andmedical, are able to trigger substi-
tution failure, as can be shown with the following example. Imagine that Carl is a
young man produced during the early days of in vitro fertilization and, as such,
is a medical miracle; besides, he is a student of architecture.4 In this context we
have:
(19) (a) Carl is a medical miracle.
(b) Carl is a student.
(c) 6|= Carl is a medical student.
3 Which part of an object is relevant is probably a matter of world knowledge in some cases and can
be inferred from the context of utterance in some others.
4 I am indebted to MuUy Siegel, who suggested me a slightly diUerent version of this example.
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Naturally, the fact that Carl is a medical miracle as well as a student does
not imply that he is a medical student. According to Siegel, the reason for this
lack of implication is that adjectives like medical are non-intersective intensional
modiVers. But there is also an alternative analysis of such denominal relational
adjectives, according to which the semantic structure of a relational adjective
contains the predicate denoted by its base noun (i. e., the noun it is derived from)
and a relational predicate that links the internal argument of the base noun and
the internal argument of the noun modiVed by this adjective (cf., e. g., Mezhevich
2002, Fradin 2008). Hence, under this analysis, the non-validity of the implication
in (19) is due to a change in the implicit relation; speciVcally, the fact that Carl
is a miracle produced by medicine does not imply that he studies medicine:
(20) (a) miracle(carl) & ∃x [Rprod(carl)(x) &medicine(x)]
(b) student(carl)
(c) 6|= student(carl) & ∃x [Rstud(x)(carl) &medicine(x)]
Thus, also in the case of relational adjectives, intensionality is not the only
possible explanation of substitution failure; it can as well be explained by the
presence of an implicit relation.
3.4 Manner Adjectives
What the analyses of substitution failure with gradable, color/material, and rela-
tional adjectives discussed in Sections 3.1–3.3 have in common is the assumption
about the presence of a hidden parameter in the semantic structure: a standard of
comparison, a relevant part, or an additional relation. Accordingly, substitution
failure occurs if there is an implicit change in this parameter. Similarly, also sub-
stitution failure with manner adjectives like skillful, cf. (3), can be accounted for
as a result of a change in a hidden parameter, rather than as a matter of intension-
ality, given that there are reasons to assume that there is some hidden parameter
in this case as well. Section 4.1 below shows that there are indeed reasons to
assume an additional parameter to be present in the semantic structure of nouns
modiVed by manner adjectives, namely, a Davidsonian event argument (see also
McConnell-Ginet 1982, Larson 1998, for arguments to this extent).
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4 Event-Based Analysis of Manner Adjectives
4.1 Presence of Event Arguments
There are several pieces of data that speak in favor of an event-based analysis of
manner adjectives.5 First, NPs containing manner adjectives can be paraphrased
in terms of verbal structures with manner adverbs, as is pointed out already in
Vendler (1968), cf. the examples below.
(21) (a) Peter is a careful driver.
(b) ∼ Peter drives carefully.
(22) (a) David is a just king.
(b) ∼ David rules justly.
When the manner adjective is interpreted relative to the meaning of the noun it
modiVes, the verb in such paraphrases is related to the modiVed noun morpholog-
ically, like in (21), or at least semantically, like in (22). By contrast, in cases when
the relevant interpretation is suggested by the context, as in the example in (13)
from Section 2.2.2, repeated in (23) below, the head noun of the manner adjective
and the verb in the paraphrase can be completely unrelated semantically.
(23) [in a chess school for musicians]
A: How are your new students?
B: I’ve got some very skillful violinists.
∼ I’ve got some violinists who play chess very skillfully.
Crucially, the adverbs in such paraphrases are manner adverbs, which are stan-
dardly treated in event semantics as co-predicates of the event argument intro-
duced by the verb (cf. Davidson 1967, Parsons 1990). Thus, in order to have a
uniVed analysis of manner adverbs and manner adjectives, also the latter need to
be analyzed as predicates of events. This would imply that an event argument is
present in the semantic representation of phrases like careful driver and just king,
being responsible for substitution failure with manner adjectives.
Note also that the possibility of manner adverbial paraphrases distinguishes
manner adjectives both from intersective adjectives and from other types of non-
5 These data were not considered by Siegel (1976) and cannot be easily incorporated into her inten-
sional theory.
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intersective adjectives, which either do not have adverbial counterparts at all
(*tally), or whose adverbial counterparts are not manner adverbs (medically, al-
legedly), as the unavailability of the corresponding adverbials of the form in a(n)
adj way demonstrates (*in a medical way, *in an alleged way).6
(24) (a) Win is a tall basketball player.
(b) 6∼ *Win plays basketball in a tall way.
(25) (a) Robert is a medical assistant.
(b) 6∼ *Robert assists in a medical way.
(26) (a) Oswald is the alleged murderer of Kennedy.
(b) 6∼ *Oswald murdered Kennedy in an alleged way.
Second, manner adjectives can modify event nominalizations, as the examples
below show, which provides further evidence for an analysis of them as predicates
of events.
(27) (a) Peter’s careful driving
(b) David’s just rule
Since manner adjectives can normally be predicated both of DPs that denote
individuals, as in (28a), and of DPs that denote events, e. g., DPs containing event
nominalizations, as in (28b), it is not immediately clear if they should be analyzed
as predicates of individuals or predicates of events.
(28) David is a skillful violinist.
(a) David is skillful (w.r.t. playing the violin).
(b) David’s violin playing is skillful.
(c) David plays the violin skillfully.
It should be pointed out in this connection, though, that in fact not all manner
adjectives can be predicated of individual-denoting DPs, while all of them can
be predicated of DPs denoting events, as is shown in (29) and (30) for deep and
lawful.
6 For a discussion of diUerent semantic classes of adverbs, see, e. g., Ernst (2002).
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(29) John is a deep sleeper.
(a) *John is deep (w.r.t. sleeping).
(b) John’s sleep is deep.
(c) John sleeps deeply.
(30) John is a lawful owner of a Cadillac.
(a) *John is lawful (w.r.t. owning a Cadillac).
(b) John’s ownership of a Cadillac is lawful.
(c) John owns a Cadillac lawfully.
The contrast between (28), on the one hand, and (29)–(30), on the other hand,
suggests that, while manner adjectives are event modiVers, the meaning of many
of them “involves properties of an agent”, as Mittwoch (2005, p. 77) put it dis-
cussing a related case of manner adverbs, which allows such manner adjectives
to be predicated of individual-denoting DPs, as in (28a).
Thus, in what follows, I will analyze manner adjectives as predicates of events,
as has been suggested also by Larson (1998). In particular, Larson argued, Vrst,
that some nouns contain in their semantic structure both an individual and an
event argument and, second, that adjectives can be predicated of the individual or
of the event argument of nouns. He furthermore assumed that some adjectives,
such as, e. g., beautiful, can be predicated of either argument, giving rise to an
ambiguity represented in (31) below. The manner interpretation of beautiful is
thus captured by the semantic representation in (31b).7
(31) Olga is a beautiful dancer.
(a) Qe [dancing(e,olga) ... beautiful(olga,C)] (“Olga is beautiful”)
(b) Qe [dancing(e,olga) ... beautiful(e,C)] (“Dancing is beautiful”)
Larson does not specify the event quantiVer (and hence also the connective)
in these semantic representations, but suggests that a natural candidate for it is
a generic quantiVer. Intuitively, this is right, as is evident from the fact that the
verbs in the paraphrases in (21)–(23) above have a habitual interpretation. Indeed,
sentences like that in (31) do not seem to allow a true episodic interpretation; if
there is only one actual event of Olga’s beautiful dancing, (31) can be true only
7 C in (31) represents the comparison class relative to which beautiful applies.
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in case this single event is interpreted as an indication for a series of potential
future events of her beautiful dancing (i. e., a generic interpretation with only one
actual instantiation). Further, such sentences also do not seem to require a plain
extensional universal interpretation, tolerating exceptions; not every single event
of Olga’s dancing must be beautiful for (31) to be true. Being a modalized uni-
versal quantiVer (Krifka et al. 1995), the generic quantiVer adequately captures
these features. Section 4.2 will present some additional data which provide fur-
ther evidence for the presence of a generic quantiVer in the semantic structure
of sentences like (31).
Given this analysis of modiVcation by manner adjectives, substitution failure
with them can be accounted for without reference to intensionality, namely, as
being due to an implicit change in the modiVed event, as shown formally in (32)
for the substitution failure in (3).8
(32) (a) gene [make-surgery(francis)(e)][skillful(e)]
(b) gene [C(francis)(e)][play-violin(francis)(e)]
(c) 6|= gene [play-violin(francis)(e)][skillful(e)]
Larson (1998) assumes that sentences like that in (31) have one non-eventive
and one eventive reading, formalized in (31a) and (31b), respectively. In fact,
however, sentences of this type seem to have at least two distinct eventive inter-
pretations, which becomes particularly apparent when the noun modiVed by the
manner adjective is an -er nominalization. One of them, which I will refer to as
the ‘non-occupational’ interpretation, corresponds to Larson’s reading in (31b);
its semantic representation for Peter is a skillful teacher is given below.
(33) Peter is a skillful teacher. [non-occupational reading]
gene [teach(peter)(e)][skillful(e)]
‘In contextually appropriate situations in which Peter teaches, he teaches
skillfully.’
Importantly, the non-occupational interpretation in (33) does not imply that
Peter is a teacher professionally, nor that he teaches habitually; it merely states
8 In this paper, I use the generic quantiVer gen, which is associated with a tripartite structure (cf.,
e. g., Krifka et al. 1995). However, see, e. g., Rimell (2004), Boneh & Doron (2008), who argue against
gen and propose instead the non-quantiVcational habitual operator hab.
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that, whenever he teaches, he does so skillfully, i. e., that he is skillful at teaching
(e. g., when he helps someone with assignments).9 Thus, on this reading, Peter is a
skillful teacher is equivalent to Peter teaches skillfully:
(34) Peter teaches skillfully.
gene [teach(peter)(e)][skillful(e)]
Yet sentences like Peter is a skillful teacher also have an ‘occupational’ interpre-
tation, which is not discussed in Larson (1998). This reading does imply that Peter
is a (professional) teacher or, at least, that he teaches habitually; this entailment is
secured by an additional conjunct, as in the semantic representation below.
(35) Peter is a skillful teacher. [occupational reading]
gene [C(peter)(e)][teach(peter)(e)] & gene′ [R(peter)(e′)][skillful(e′)]
An important diUerence between the occupational and the non-occupational
readings is the fact that, unlike the latter, the former does not require the event
modiVed by the manner adjective to come from the semantics of the modiVed
noun; rather, the relevant event may also be provided contextually. Accordingly,
the event predicate in (35) is left underspeciVed (R), such that it can be understood
as, e. g., play-chess in a context of a chess school for teachers (see the discussion
of example (13) in Section 2.2.2), even if its default value in most contexts is prob-
ably teach. Furthermore, the possibility to supply the relevant event predicate R
contextually also accounts for the interpretations available to such sentences as
in (11), in which manner adjectives modify semantically bare nouns like person,
whose semantics can hardly suggest an event.
Finally, let us brieWy discuss the interaction between manner modiVcation and
the availability of the occupational and the non-occupational readings. In the case
of predicative nouns, the non-occupational reading emerges only in the presence
of manner adjectives; the occupational reading is, by contrast, always available:
(36) (a) Peter is a teacher. [occupational]
(b) Peter is a skillful teacher. [occupational/non-occupational]
9 In this sense, the non-occupational reading is a version of the “Port-Royal Puzzle” (Leslie 2008,
16–17), which is otherwise usually constructed with bare plural subjects (cf. Carlson 1977).
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Given the analysis above, the lack of the non-occupational reading with non-
modiVed predicative nouns can be explained as follows. Since the predicate de-
noted by the noun speciVes the restrictor of gen on the non-occupational reading,
cf. (33), in the absence of a manner adjective there would be no material to Vll
its nuclear scope.
The situation in the case of habitual verbs is similar. In addition to the occu-
pational reading, which is available to such non-modiVed habitual verbs as teach
or drive the bus (Lawler 1973), they also acquire a non-occupational reading when
a manner adverb (or some other modiVer) is present:
(37) (a) Peter teaches. [occupational]
(b) Peter teaches skillfully. [occupational/non-occupational]
Like (36b), (37b) can be interpreted both occupationally and non-occupationally,
even if its occupational reading might be less salient than in the non-modiVed
version in (37a).
4.2 Restrictions on Event Types
According to the analysis presented in Section 4.1, manner adjectives are pred-
icated of an event argument which is bound by a generic quantiVer. Since gen
undergoes the Plurality Condition on quantiVcation (cf., e. g., de Swart 1991), this
analysis predicts that manner adjectives should be no good with nouns that con-
tribute “once-only” predicates of events, i. e., predicates denoting singleton sets of
events. This prediction is borne out, as we will see in what follows.
In most of the examples used so far, the underlying eventualities are activities,
such as drive, rule, or play the violin, which do not prohibit a repetitive interpreta-
tion. Some of these examples are repeated below.
(38) (a) Peter is a careful driver.
(b) David is a just king.
(c) John is a skillful violinist.
By contrast, manner adjectives seem not to be easily compatible with nouns
that are derived from achievement and accomplishment verbs, as the following
examples demonstrate.
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(39) (a) #John is a skillful inventor of an artiVcial language.
(b) #John is a skillful discoverer of a continent.
(40) (a) #John is a skillful painter of a landscape.
(b) #John is a skillful designer of a theatre.
Yet, what is responsible for the oddness of the sentences in (39) and (40) is
not the aspectual class of the base verbs itself (achievements/accomplishments),
but the fact that these particular achievements and accomplishments are once-
only predicates. The examples in (41)–(43) show that manner adjectives easily
combine with nouns formed from achievements/accomplishments which can be
repetitive – due to the presence of a bare plural or mass noun complement.
(41) John is a skillful inventor of computer languages.
(42) John is a skillful Vnder of water.
(43) John is a skillful painter of landscapes.
If modiVcation by manner adjectives is only possible when the modiVed event
is repetitive, manner adjectives should be compatible with nouns derived from
stage-level states (e. g., sleep, hold, wait, as well as Dowty’s (1979) “interval sta-
tives” like sit, stand, lie), but not individual-level states, since the latter, unlike the
former, are once-only predicates as well (de Swart 1991). This seems to be the
case, as the examples below demonstrate:10
(44) (a) John is a loud/sensitive sleeper.
(b) John is a patient waiter.
(45) (a) #John is a good owner of a Cadillac.
(b) #John is a skillful lover of Mozart.
In fact, however, the infelicity of the sentences in (45) may have to do with
agentivity, rather than with repetitivity. Individual-level states are not agentive
(diUerently from stage-level states, cf. Katz 2008), while manner adjectives like
10 The sentences in (45) possibly become slightly better if the states denoted by own and love are
coerced to what Katz (2008) calls the “event-related” reading, that is, are interpreted as activities
associated with these states. E. g., a good owner of a Cadillac may mean that the owner of the
Cadillac treats it well, while a skillful lover of Mozart may be used for a musician who admires
Mozart and hence skillfully performs his works.
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good and skillful “involve properties of an agent”, as has been discussed in Section
4.1. In contrast, manner adjectives like lawful, whose meaning does not involve
properties of an agent, can modify nouns that are derived from verbs denoting
individual-level states:11
(46) (a) John is a lawful owner of this Cadillac.
(b) John is a hopeless lover of chocolate.
If manner modiVcation implies repetitivity, it is not clear why manner adjec-
tives like lawful can modify individual-level statives as in (46), which denote once-
only predicates. Although an analysis of this fact is outside the scope of this paper,
an explanation of it may possibly be given along the lines of Chierchia’s (1995)
account of individual-level predicates as being inherently generic. In particular,
individual-level statives may be assumed to introduce a generic quantiVer of a
special type, which is not pluractional, i. e., does not presuppose repetitivity.
5 Conclusion and Outlook
This paper presented arguments for an analysis of manner adjectives, such as
skillful and good, as predicates of events introduced either in the semantics of the
modiVed nouns or contextually. Furthermore, the event argument that manner
adjectives are predicated of has been argued to be bound by a generic quantiVer,
which accounts for the restrictions on the type of events that can be modiVed by
manner adjectives. To conclude, I will brieWy discuss how this analysis relates to
some other accounts proposed in the literature and point out directions for future
research.
In knowledge representation, it is common to formalize generic events of the
sort discussed in this paper as a special ontological type of roles (Guarino 1992,
Sowa 2000, Steimann 2000, Masolo et al. 2005, Loebe 2007), and the same strategy
is occasionally employed in semantics (cf., e. g., Croft 1984). Thus, using the
11 In some cases, manner adjectives that involve properties of an agent are able to modify nouns with
underlying individual-level states, as, e. g., in Bill is a passionate admirer of Picasso’s art. However,
following Katz (2008), I assume that passionate in this example is not a manner modiVer of a state.
Rather, it is either a manner modiVer of an activity associated with the state of admiration (the
“event-related” reading), or a degree modiVer that indicates how much Bill admires Picasso’s art
and not how he admires it. Note that the latter reading is therefore unavailable with non-gradable
states, as, e. g., in David is a passionate owner of a Stradivarius.
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semantic type of roles, Croft represents the ambiguity of beautiful dancer as in
(47); cf. Larson’s (1998) semantic representation of this phrase in (31).
(47) Marya is a beautiful dancer.
(a) dancer(marya) & ∃r [beautiful(r,marya)]
(b) dancer(marya) & beautiful(marya)
This analysis may be seen as a formal implementation of an idea that goes
back to Aristotle, who argued that an adjective like good modiVes relative to the
“function” of its argument, since someone can be a good man and a bad cobbler
at the same time (Sophistical Refutations, 177b). Nouns can be then assumed
to have an additional role argument that corresponds to Aristotelian functions.
Accordingly, being good with respect to one role will not imply being good also
with respect to some other role, which will account for substitution failure.
Roles seem to be indeed linguistically real, as they can be explicitly introduced
by means of as-phrases, which can accompany manner adjectives, as in the ex-
amples below.
(48) (a) Peter is a careful driver.
(b) ∼ Peter is careful as a driver.
(49) (a) David is a just king.
(b) ∼ David is just as a king.
(50) (a) John is a skillful violinist.
(b) ∼ John is skillful as a violinist.
Moreover, the ability to take such as-phrases appears to distinguish man-
ner adjectives from intersective adjectives, as well as from some types of non-
intersective adjectives, as the following examples demonstrate:
(51) (a) Peter is a married engineer.
(b) 6∼ *Peter is married as an engineer.
(52) (a) Peter is an electrical engineer.
(b) 6∼ *Peter is electrical as an engineer.
(53) (a) Peter is a former engineer.
(b) 6∼ *Peter is former as an engineer.
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In fact, however, manner adjectives are not the only variety of adjectives that
can take such as-phrases; for example, adjectives like useful, necessary, famous,
and respected, which are not manner modiVers, are able to take them as well:
(54) (a) This paper is a useful background reading.
(b) ∼ This paper is useful as a background reading.
(55) (a) Knowledge of statistics is a necessary prerequisite for this course.
(b) ∼ Knowledge of statistics is necessary as a prerequisite for this
course.
Hence, a role-based analysis is likely not to be Vne-grained enough, as it does
not distinguish between manner adjectives and such adjectives as useful and nec-
essary, all of which intuitively seem to be predicated relative to roles. Moreover,
a role-based analysis will need to provide an independent explanation for the
restrictions on the type of eventualities that manner adjectives can modify, see
Section 4.2. By contrast, the analysis presented in this paper straightforwardly
accounts for these restrictions. Finally, a more general advantage of it compared
to a role-based analysis is that it does not extend the ontology of basic semantic
types by an additional type of roles, modeling roles as events in the scope of a
generic quantiVer.
On the other hand, manner adjectives diUer from adjectives of other semantic
classes insofar as they can take in-/at-gerunds of the following type:
(56) (a) Peter is a careful driver.
(b) ∼ Peter is careful in driving.
(57) (a) David is a just king.
(b) ∼ David is just in ruling.
(58) (a) John is a skillful violinist.
(b) ∼ John is skillful at playing the violin.
Thus, the analysis presented in this paper needs to be extended such that it
accounts for the semantics of these prepositional gerunds. This is a direction for
future research.
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Converging Evidences on the Eventivity
of Italian Nouns
Irene Russo & Tommaso Caselli
Abstract
This paper aims at shedding lights on the semantic concept of “event noun”. Start-
ing with the working hypothesis that linguistic context and corpus-based distribu-
tional information can be decisive, we propose a measure for eventivity that relies
on syntagmatic cues. By means of a comparison between speakers’ judgments
and syntagmatic evidence obtained from a corpus study, we propose a measure of
eventivity for nouns. The comparison with annotated data proves its soundness.
1 Introduction
DeVning what is an event noun is not an easy task: this notion is widely based
on deverbal nouns as morphologically marked items, but some deverbal nouns
are not purely eventive and other event nouns are not morphologically derived,
i. e. do not have a corresponding verb. Most previous research (Grimshaw 1990,
Zucchi 1993, Alexadiou 2001, Alexadiou & Grimshaw 2008 among others) on the
status of event nouns and methods for their identiVcation has mainly concen-
trated on nominalizations (i. e. the morphological process of creating a noun from
a verb), but providing this kind of deVnition for an event noun cannot assure a
well balanced semantic description of this concept.
Following Firth’s 1957 intuition that “[y]ou shall know a word by the company
it keeps” (Firth 1957:11), the relevance of linguistic context and corpus-based
distributional information for the deVnition of word semantic representations
is widely acknowledged (Hovy 2010, Basili & Pennacchiotti 2010, McDonald &
Schillcock 2001 among others). The idea that co-occurrence statistics of words
Thomas Gamerschlag, Doris Gerland, Rainer Osswald & Wiebke Petersen
(eds.). 2015. Meaning, Frames, and Conceptual Representation. Düsseldorf:
dup.
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extracted from text corpora can provide a basis for semantic representations has
been investigated in Computational Linguistics (see the distributional semantic
models proposed by Baroni & Lenci 2010) but it is useful also from a theoretical
point of view (Lenci 2008).
In this work we support the hypothesis that the notion of event noun is a
scalar concept which can be modulated along a continuum of eventivity (see also
Simone 2008). The identiVcation of event readings for nouns is accomplished in
the linguistic context, i. e. by exploiting selectional preferences in terms of verbs
and adjectives which co-occur with the noun. The focus of our work is on the
factors that can potentially determine the emergence of a noun as eventive apart
from morphological marking. We propose a measure for eventivity that relies on
syntagmatic cues. The comparison between syntagmatic evidence and speakers’
judgments will provide useful insights for event nouns that are not deverbal.
A measure of eventivity can be useful for practical implementations such as au-
tomatic event detection for information extraction and question-answering sys-
tems but it is also promising for theoretical linguistics because it is not suXcient
to say that words display along a continuum, but it is necessary to Vnd out how
to represent this continuum and how to enrich it. Moreover, we believe that a
measure for eventivity could be useful for detection of coercions as well.
In Section 2, we clarify the theoretical background of our analysis, without
forgetting to highlight limitations and diXculties that arose in our work. Data
gathered form corpora will support our assertions, paving the way for more de-
tailed corpus analysis.
In Section 3, we describe the preliminary corpus analysis that has been useful
to deVne our working hypothesis. First, we present the corpus-based measure of
eventivity and, then, we evaluate its relationship with respect to other kind of
information (speakers’ judgements). Finally, we wrap up with conclusions and
some suggestions for future research.
2 Decisive variables for the identiVcation of event nouns
We started this analysis wondering what are the crucial factors which may help in
identifying nouns that denote events. The Vrst, most plausible variable pertains
to morphological suXxation. In Italian, as well in other languages, nouns can
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be derived by verbs and diUerent suXxes can apply to this derivation process.
However, only a subset of them allows the derivation of eventive nouns.
Morphological derivation is only one of the factors which contribute to the in-
dividuation of an event noun because it is possible that a deverbal noun codiVes
more than one meaning and just one of these is eventive. As Bisetto & Melloni
(2007) note, deverbal nominals, such as “traduzione” [translation], are semanti-
cally ambiguous since they can refer either to the action/event expressed by the
base verb or to its result, i. e. the outcome of the action:
(1) La traduzione di questo testo è lenta e faticosa. [EVENT]
[The translation of this text is slow and diXcult.]
(2) Molte traduzioni sono piene di errori. [RESULT]
[Many translations are full of mistakes.]
Moreover, according to the authors, nominals can also have a concrete result
interpretation through metonymic transposition, for instance, when they denote
the (physical) object which contains the translation:
(3) La traduzione è sul tavolo. [PHYS_OBJ]
[The translation is on the table.]
The well-known polysemous alternation between an event and a result reading
of a deverbal noun (Grimshaw 1990) poses a Vrst, interesting constraint on the
relationship between deverbal nouns and event nouns.
As a starting point to investigate this issue, we chose the Vrst 12 most frequent
deverbal nouns with suXxes –mento, -aggio, -tura, -zione in the corpus La Repub-
blica (Baroni et al. 2004). A detailed analysis of the senses of these nouns (Table
1) encoded in a lexicographic dictionary – the De Mauro-Paravia dictionary (De
Mauro 2004) – has shown that among these deverbal nouns only 40 % encode only
the eventive reading. On the other hand, in the vast majority of the cases, there
is an eventive and a result reading or, even, idiosyncratic meanings that are not
related to the meaning of the verb, i. e. which do not correspond to the classic
pattern meaning of deverbal nouns “the act/process of -V”.
A preliminary research question we address in this paper is: if morphological
suXxes will not be suXcient variables for event nouns identiVcation, how to Vnd
these items in a corpus?
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Table 1: Number of morphologically derived nouns with a non-eventive sense
Suffix nouns non_eventive
-zione 12 9
-mento 12 10
-tura 12 8
-aggio 12 2
48 29
Since Grimshaw’s characterization of nominalizations, syntagmatic co-occur-
rences emerge as cues to disambiguate between an eventive and a non-eventive
reading of the same noun. As Zucchi (1993) points out “[t]he of-phrase and the by-
phrase occurring in event-denoting NPs are arguments of the nouns with which
they combine.” (Zucchi 1993:135).
(4) La costruzione (del palazzo) è durata due anni. [EVENT]
[The building (of the house) took two years.]
(5) La costruzione (*del palazzo) è alta due piani. [RESULT]
[The building (*of the house) is two Woors high.]
Unfortunately, such information is not explicitly available in corpora. To over-
come this shortcoming, we considered as relevant cues for the identiVcation of
event readings of deverbal nouns other syntagmatic cues. To accomplish this
task, the following quote by Vendler (1967: 141) suggested a promising direction:
“There are certain nouns that are not verb derivatives, yet behave like nomi-
nalised verbs; that is, they can enter container contexts without suggesting sup-
pressed nominals. Fires and blizzards, unlike tables, crystals, or cows, can occur,
begin, and end, can be sudden or prolonged, can be watched and observed – they
are, in a word, events and not objects.” (Vendler 1967:141).
If events are basically things that happen, event nouns denote things that hap-
pen, that occur, that begin, that can be prolonged. Such an approach is not in-
novative per se, because according to linguists co-occurrences with some verbs
(e. g. to attend) can be used as a diagnostic for eventivity even when nouns are
not morphologically derived:
(6) I rarely attend beer festivals. (BNC)1
1 Examples (7) and (8) are extracted from the British National Corpus (BNC), available at http://
www.natcorp.ox.ac.uk/
182
Converging Evidences on the Eventivity of Italian Nouns
(7) He wished to attend a workshop in Hawaii. (BNC)
Even among non-deverbal nouns, issues linked to polysemy and alternate read-
ings between eventive and non-eventive readings are present and the role of the
co-textual elements with which they co-occur is pivotal to disambiguate and iden-
tify the correct reading, as illustrated in examples (8) and (9) below:
(8) L’assemblea ci sarà il 20 Marzo. [EVENT]
The meeting will be on March, 20th
(9) L’assemblea ha deliberato l’approvazione del bilancio. [HUMAN_GROUP]
The board/assembly has approved the budget proposal.
In (8), the noun “assemblea” [meeting] acquires an eventive reading due to the
presence both of the verb “to be” and of the temporal expression which locates
the event on the time line, while in (9), the verb “deliberare” [to approve] has a
semantic preference for the ontological type of “human/human group” in the sub-
ject position which is realized by the noun “assemblea” [assembly/board]. Notice
that these two cases are not to be confused with cases of type coercion of the
noun “assemblea”, but they are due to the intrinsic polysemy of this noun2.
Previous semantic analyses (Gross & Kiefer 1995) exploited a limited set of
tests based on the occurrences with peculiar verbs, such as phasal or aspectual
predicates like “to begin”, “to conclude”, adjectives (10a), modiVcation by temporal
adverbs (10b) or temporal prepositions (10c). However, we believe these tests
are not fully satisfying because they don’t asses the ultimate import of all these
syntagmatic cues in determining to what extent a noun denote an event, i. e. its
degree of eventivity.
(10) (a) The frequent trips were a nuisance.
(b) The destruction of the city in only two days appalled every one.
(c) During the party, John left.
One intuitive way to deal with this problem – the imperfect matching between
deverbal nouns and event nouns – is to characterize contextually an event noun,
discovering salient syntagmatic cues.
2 Notice that the English translations of the Italian noun “assemblea” are two diUerent nouns, namely
“meeting” for the eventive sense and “assembly” for the human group
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It is promising to operationalize classical diagnostic tests in corpus analysis by
providing representations with prototypical and less prototypical elements that
sound at least more objective than representations based only on intuitions. Dis-
tributed and contextually derived representations obtained by syntagmatic evi-
dence are useful to make automatic identiVcation of semantically similar words
and categorical distinctions among semantic classes (Lin 1998, Boleda et al. 2004).
As a consequence, summing the frequencies in several syntagmatic contexts
could potentially guarantee a better understanding of the concept of event noun.
On the basis of an extended corpus analysis we have identiVed a preliminary list
of verbal and adjectival cues of eventivity for Italian nouns (see Section 3 for a
detailed description of the methodology used). Here, we report the data relative
to nouns not morphologically derived that most frequently co-occur in the corpus
La Repubblica with the verbs “continuare” [to continue], “cominciare” [to begin]
and with the adjectives “precedente” [previous] and “successivo” [following] (see
Table 2 below). They are – at least partially in several cases – nouns that de-
note events but are not morphologically derived by verbs, such as “guerra” [war],
“campionato” [championship], “crisi” [crisis].
If we compare their co-occurrence frequencies divided by the overall corpus
frequency with those of the most frequent deverbal nouns, it clearly emerges that
not morphologically derived nouns frequently co-occuring with “cominciare” and
“successivo” can be as eventive as deverbal nouns (see Table 3 and Table 4).
Table 2: Most frequent nouns that co-occur with relevant syntagmatic cues.
Noun frequency cominciare continuare precedente successivo
guerra 133072 202 246 34 19
trattativa 51517 172 189 27 25
campagna 56937 166 62 40 11
partita 89172 145 15 88 51
campionato 36762 116 11 28 25
avventura 19428 101 35 14 11
attività 84840 62 112 49 16
riunione 52559 55 17 105 112
colloquio 28830 48 36 17 36
crisi 107664 60 33 56 39
battaglia 49687 125 194 4 7
offensiva 10215 21 60 0 5
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Table 3: Normalized frequencies of nouns with the verb “cominciare” [to begin/to start].
Non – deverbal
nouns
Normalized
Frequency
Deverbal
nouns
Normalized
Frequency
avventura .519 pestaggio .410
trattativa .333 montaggio .170
campionato .315 monitoraggio .146
campagna .291 operazione .137
battaglia .251 riciclaggio .105
offensiva .205 marcatura .094
colloquio .166 boicottaggio .093
partita .162 lettura .092
guerra .151 trasferimento .091
riunione .104 manifestazione .070
attività .073 risanamento .059
crisi .055 sabotaggio .057
Table 4: Normalized frequencies of nouns with the adjective “successivo” [following].
Non – deverbal
nouns
Normalized
Frequency
Deverbal
nouns
Normalized
Frequency
riunione .213 passaggio .334
colloquio .124 pestaggio .082
campionato .068 riapertura .062
partita .057 dichiarazione .054
avventura .056 monitoraggio .048
offensiva .048 montaggio .048
trattativa .048 elezione .047
crisi .036 pagamento .026
campagna .019 sondaggio .019
attività .018 movimento .019
guerra .014 fallimento .018
battaglia .014 fornitura .016
2.1 A caveat on polysemy
The graded representation available for event nouns, i. e. the existence of a con-
tinuum of eventivity, is mainly due to polysemic alternations: a single word is
less perceived as an event by a speaker and displays a lower eventivity value if
it has also another sense – for instance a result reading – available.
The degree of eventivity for a deverbal noun could intuitively depend on the
number of non-eventive senses codiVed. For instance, if we consider the senses
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encoded into a lexical resource like ItalWordNet (IWN), we could state that the
lexeme “sabotaggio” [sabotage] is more eventive than “formazione” [training]: the
former has 3 senses/readings encoded into the resource and all of them denote
an event, while the latter has 6 senses/readings encoded and only 3 of them are
eventive.
However, for polysemous nouns it is not so automatic to establish a ranking
because a sense could be more salient than the others. Looking at the normal-
ized frequencies of co-occurrences with relevant syntagmatic cues (from column
“cominciare” to “sum” in Table 5 below) could be useful because they provide a
graded representation in place of the static representation of the lexicographic
resources (columns “# of senses”, “eventive senses” Table 5 below).
Unsurprisingly, syntagmatic cues select as more eventive nouns that codify just
eventive sense(s), such as “pestaggio” [beating], “manifestazione” [manifestation],
“risanamento” [recovery]. On the other hand, the salience on the eventive reading
for polysemous nouns is signalled by the frequent co-occurrences with “contin-
uare” [to continue], “cominciare” [to begin/to start] and similar, even when the
nouns have just one eventive sense while the others are not eventive, such as for
“dichiarazione” [declaration] and “lettura” [reading].
Table 5: Eventive readings from IWN vs. occurrences with relevant syntagmatic cues (“continuare”
[to continue], “cominciare” [to begin/to start], “precedente” [preceeding] and “successivo”
[following])
noun # of
senses
eventive
senses
comiciare continuare precedente successivo sum
pestaggio 1 1 .410 .493 .0 .082 .986
dichiarazione 3 1 .021 .029 .250 .054 .359
operazione 3 3 .137 .056 .101 .015 .311
sondaggio 1 1 .014 .009 .242 .019 .285
montaggio 2 2 .170 .0 .024 .048 .243
manifestazione 4 4 .070 .099 .041 .010 .223
amministrazione 3 1 .005 .001 .199 .001 .207
lettura 3 1 .092 .076 .025 .010 .204
risanamento 4 4 .059 .126 .0 .0 .185
produzione 3 2 .053 .051 .055 .016 .177
regolamento 3 2 .054 .006 .088 .013 .163
riciclaggio 1 1 .105 .052 .0 .0 .158
sabotaggio 3 3 .057 .057 .0 .0 .115
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Through syntagmatic co-occurrences, it is possible to Vnd out common nouns
occasionally coerced to an event reading. As stated in Pustejovsky (1995), type-
coercion is a directional phenomenon. Although additional research is needed, it
is the syntactic head which preserves its type in composition and determines the
typing of the other element(s). If we consider the syntagmic cues previously
reported (“continuare”, “cominciare”, “precedente”, “successivo”) and we look at
nouns that rarely co-occur with them, we Vnd coercions as occasional usages
of non-eventive nouns like for the noun “bombe” [bombs] and “fumo” [smoke] in
example (11) and for the noun “impegni” [commitments] in (12):
(11) Rimanemmo quieti senza parlare, con raXche di mitraglietta, ma a quel
punto cominciarono le bombe, così forti che parte dell’ediVcio cadeva, e
cominciò il fumo.
[We stood quietly without talking, with bursts of machine gun, but then
the bombs began, so strong that part of building fell, and the smoke
began.]
(12) Come è pensabile chiudere il contratto con un governo fortemente inde-
bolito che assumerebbe impegni che poi dovrebbero essere realizzati da
un esecutivo successivo.
[How is it thinkable to terminate the contract with a government weak-
ened to make commitments which should then be made by a new gov-
ernment the following year.]
The notion of coercion has been widely investigated in linguistics (de Swart
1998, Michaelis 2004, among others) and, in general terms, can be described as a
semantic-type shifting, that is an implicit contextual reinterpretation necessary
to resolve semantic conWicts.
Verbs are not the only items which can cause the coercion of noun types; ad-
jectives have a role as well, even if in the GL model adjectives show less coercive
power (Pustejovsky & Bouillon 2004).
However, looking at real data, coercions caused by adjectives seem to be equally
plausible with respect to coercions caused by verbs. For example, “frequent” is an
adjective used as a diagnostic criterion for event-denoting nouns. As Meinschae-
fer (2005) notes, there are nouns not morphologically derived by verbs which are
compatible with “frequent” (example (13)).
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(13) (a) Jane’s frequent illness lead to her dismissal.
(b) Video technology has made this a frequent topic of male sporting
conversation. (BNC)
(c) Frequent trains run from London Victoria and Charing Cross. (BNC)
Frequency adjectives, such as “frequent”, “occasional”, and “yearly”, can be in-
terpreted in a formal semantics framework (Schäfer 2007) as quantiVcation over
realizations of kinds of events. As a consequence, they can highlight coercions
from simple common nouns to complex event expressions (through the enrich-
ment of nouns with an event-kind argument) as in (14):
(14) Agent Cooper likes an occasional cup of coUee.
The importance of adjectives in selecting event nouns – the relevance of syn-
tagmatic cues as “frequent”, “future”, and “sudden” for coercion – is undeniable.
3 Methodology and Experiments
In this section, we will illustrate the methodology used in order to develop a
set of experiments for the identiVcation of a statistical measure of eventivity for
nouns. The main motivation behind the idea of an eventivity measure for nouns
is related to the hypothesis that the notion of event is a scalar one (Simone 2008
among others). Such a measure may provide empirical support to this statement.
The methodology is adapted from Rumshimky et al. (2007), Pustejovsky &
Jezek (2008) and Pantel & Pennacchiotti (2006). For the identiVcation of event
triggers, we have not limited our choice to verbs but we have included adjectives
as well.
3.1 Identifying relevant event triggers cues
The identiVcation of syntagmatic cues that trigger the eventive reading has been
conducted by means of an extensive corpus exploration on two sets of data.
The Vrst set of data is composed by the most frequent nouns in the ISST
(Italian Syntactic Semantic Treebank, Montemagni et al. 2003). We have used
this reference corpus of Italian to extract the most frequent common nouns.
Due to its small dimension (only 305 K tokens), we have set the threshold for
“highly frequent” to all common nouns which occur in the corpus with a min-
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imum frequency of 20 occurrences. In order to ease the identiVcation of event
nouns, we have connected this set of nouns, which for clarity reasons we will
call Nouns_Treebank, to a Generative Lexicon-based Lexical Resource, namely
SIMPLE/CLIPS (Ruimy et al. 2003).
In SIMPLE/CLIPS lexical units are structured in terms of a semantic type sys-
tem and are characterized and interconnected by means of a rich set of semantic
features and relations. The type system consists of 157 language- and domain-
independent semantic types designed for the multilingual lexical encoding of
concrete and abstract entities, events and properties. The Ontology is a multi-
dimensional type system based on both hierarchical and non-hierarchical con-
ceptual relations, which reWects the Generative Lexicon assumption that lexical
items are multidimensional entities with diUerent degrees of internal complexity
and thus need lexical semantic descriptions able to account for diUerent ranges
of meaning components.
By means of a set of queries, we have extracted from the Noun_Treebank set
only those nouns which have at least one semantic type belonging to the “event”
node in the SIMPLE/CLIPS Ontology. This reduced set of nouns contains both
purely eventive nouns and instances of dot types. We will call this list of nouns
SIMPLE_nouns.
The identiVcation of the event triggers, or syntagmatic cues, has been accom-
plished by means of a second corpus exploration and through a deep exploitation
of the SIMPLE_nouns list. In this second experiment, we have used a larger cor-
pus of Italian, namely the La Repubblica corpus which is composed by 308 million
tokens. The large dimensions of this corpus allows the identiVcation of a relevant
and restricted set of event trigger cues on the basis of the co-occurrences with the
SIMPLE_nouns list. In particular, we have queried the La Repubblica corpus with
four patterns of occurrence, namely:
• noun – VERB;
• VERB – noun;
• ADJECTIVE – noun
• noun – ADJECTIVE
Due to the lack of access to a parsed version of the La Repubblica corpus, the
position of the noun in the co-occurrences patterns with verbs try to mimick the
syntactic / grammatical position of subject and object.
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After having extracted the four patterns of occurrence for each noun in the
SIMPLE_noun list, we have selected only those event trigger cues with a high
frequency, namely at least 800 occurrences for verbs and 1,000 occurrences for ad-
jectives. This reduced list of patterns of occurrence has been manually inspected
in order to identify which semantic type of the nouns in the SIMPLE_nouns list
was selected. Only those verbs and adjectives which selected the event reading of
the nouns were retained and considered good syntagmatic cues for eventivity. In
this way, we have selected 76 syntagmatic cues: 37 verbs and 39 adjectives. In
Table 6 below we report a sample of the selected cues:
Table 6: Verbal and Adjectival syntagmatic cues.
Verbs for nouns in
subject position
Verbs for nouns in
object position
Pre- and postmodifier
adjectives
avvenire
continuare
restare
risultare
annullare
auspicare
cessare
evitare
ostacolare
anticipato
attuale
imprevisto
odierno
successivo
The exploration of the extracted data from the La Repubblica corpus has led
to the identiVcation of a further set of cues, namely three verbs which frequently
co-occur in light verb constructions in Italian, i. e. “mettere” [to put], “fare” [to do]
and “dare” [to give]. Though in these cases it is the whole construction (verb +
noun in object position) which acquires an eventive reading, we choose to include
these verbs both because the nouns co-occurring with them are assumed to have
an eventive reading.
3.2 Normalized frequencies of nouns
The development of the eventivity measure relies on the idea that speciVc syn-
tagmatic cues, if relevant, may determine the perception of the degree of even-
tivity for nouns. Under this perspective, the eventivity measure corresponds to
the normalized frequency of a noun in a reference corpus, that the sum of the
co-occurrence frequencies of the noun with the syntagmatic cues divided by its
absolute frequency, according to the formula in (15):
(15)
frequency noun_cue1+frequency noun_cue2+...+frequency noun_cue76
absolute frequency noun
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To test the validity of this hypothesis and the relevance of the selected cues we
choose a subset of 200 nouns from the ISST (ISST_test). The nouns which form
the ISST_test list have been selected by taking into account two parameters:
• the opposition between morphologically marked (e. g. “costruzione” [build-
ing], “occuppazione” [occupation], “pestaggio” [beating],) and “frenata” [brak-
ing]) and morphologically unmarked nominalizations (e. g. “accusa” [pro-
secution], “disegno” [drawing], “corsa” [run]) from corresponding verbs ; and
• non-derived nouns (e. g. “guerra” [war], “assemblea” [meeting], “barone ”
[baron]).
For the Vrst set of nouns, we have taken into account the productivity of the
morphological suXx as reported in Gaeta (2004), in order to balance our data set.
The two groups are well balanced since we have 100 nouns for derived forms and
100 nouns for not derived ones.
For each noun in the ISST_test list, we have extracted from the La Repubblica
corpus the frequencies of each noun with the set of syntagmatic cues, and have
computed its normalized frequency on the basis of the formula described in (15)
A sample of the results is reported in Table 7 below:
Table 7: A sample of the results from the first experiment.
Noun Event measure
assemblea .040
aumento .032
relazione .015
aborto .010
partecipazione .007
telegiornale .004
biotecnologia .001
A preliminary analysis of the normalized frequencies shows that the nouns in
the ISST_test list cluster into three main groups along a continuum whose poles
are represented by eventive nouns and non-eventive nouns. It is interesting to no-
tice that the eventive pole of the continuum does not contain only purely eventive
nouns such as “pestaggio” [beating], “sconVtta” [defeat] but also the vast majority
of dot types of the kind “EVENT ◦ NOT_EVENT” (45 out of 88, 51.13 %) such as
“dichiarazione” [declaration], “incremento” [increase]. This element provides sup-
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port to the hypothesis that the types which compose a dot type are not always on
the same level, but it can be the case that one type is more salient that the other.
3.3 Lexical resources, eventivity ans syntagmatic cues
A further experiment for the validation of the syntagmatic cues and the eventivity
measure is the analysis of the correlation between the normalized frequencies
of the nouns in the ISST_test list and two language resources, namely a lexical
resource, ItalWordNet (IWN), and the De Mauro-Paravia Dictionary. Such an
analysis is also useful to provide a preliminary evaluation of the two language
resources in terms of quality and coverage of the lexical items.
In this case, we have considered the degree of eventivity of a noun as the ratio
of the sum of the eventive readings of a noun in the two resources by the total
number of senses encoded for that noun, as illustrated in the formula (16):
(16)
event readings IWN_noun1 + event readings De Mauro_noun1
total number of senses IWN_noun1 + total number of senses DeMauro_noun1
The two resources are very diUerent in terms of their internal structure and this
has called for the application of diUerent strategies for the identiVcation of the
eventive readings. As for IWN, we have extensively exploited the internal hier-
archical organization of the lexical resource and its corresponding ontology by
looking for each sense of the nouns in the ISST_test list for the “event” node
among its hypernyms. On the other hand, in the De Mauro dictionary, we have
looked for key phases in the sense deVnitions such as the “act of X”, or the “process
of X” and similar. In Table 8 below we report a sample of the eventivity measures
we have obtained in this experiment.
Similarly to that for speakers’ judgements, to evaluate the soundness of the
eventivity measure obtained by the formula in (16) we have computed the Spear-
man correlation between the values obtained from the lexical resources and the
syntagmatic cue frequencies. The results are positive since we have obtained a
r value of .516 for IWN and of .607 for the De Mauro. Though these values are
statistically signiVcant, they are somehow biased by the nature of the two lan-
guage resources which contain information with potential errors. In particular,
a detailed analysis of the entries showed that some largely used senses of some
nouns are not present in IWN, and that some eventive readings in the De Mauro-
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Table 8: Average of eventivity from the two language resources (IWN and De Mauro).
Noun Event average from language
resources (IWN & De Mauro)
assemblea .125
aumento .333
relazione .625
aborto .433
partecipazione .751
telegiornale .0
biotecnologia .0
Paravia are quite obsolete and infrequent. For these reasons, we have decided
not to include the contribution of the language resources in the development of
the eventivity measure, without integrating the formula in (16) with that reported
in (15).
3.4 Speakers’ judgments on eventivity and correlation with the
normalized frequencies
The normalized frequencies we have obtained from the corpus data are numbers:
they are not very informative about the validity of the eventivity measure. The
only reliable result is represented by the evidence that eventive nouns are more
frequent with event triggers cues and non eventive ones are less frequent. Never-
theless, the most interesting results can be derived from the analysis of the “grey
zone” of the continuum, that is the large cluster of nouns in the middle between
the eventive and non eventive poles.
Since we support the idea that theoretical semantic concepts should be cogni-
tively plausible (Pustejovsky 1995), we compare the results of the corpus analysis
with speakers’ judgements. When the focus is on semantic categorizations, hu-
man judgments are widely acknowledged as a useful source to establish a gold
standard or, more generally, they represent the best benchmark, especially when
the representation is fuzzy. In computational linguistics, human judgments are
used for the evaluation of automatic approaches to linguistic tasks but they also
help theoretical linguistics because they provide insights complementary to in-
trospective analysis or evidences gathered from corpora.
Following Hoey’s (2005) theoretical characterization of the psycholinguistic
notion of priming, according to which every word is mentally primed for col-
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locational use and our knowledge of it includes its co-occurrences features, the
comparison between the speakers’ representations and corpus information is es-
sential to understand the regularity of the lexical structure. In particular, under
this perspective a lexical item is primed for eventivity when its frequencies of
co-occurrences with speciVc triggers are statistically relevant.
Even if the cognitive status of frequency is undeniable for linguistic phenom-
ena, there is a lively debate on the correlation between salience and frequencies
in corpora because mappings between structural properties of the mental lexi-
con and corpus descriptive operationalitions in terms of semantic associations
measures could not be straightforward (Lindsey et al. 2007).
To test the validity of the syntagmatic cues, we have performed an experiment
with 7 Italian subjects, all of them BA students in Linguistics, in order to compare
the speakers’ judgements and the corpus observations.
The subjects were asked to classify each noun in the ISST_test list on an even-
tivity scale ranging from 1 to 5, where 1 states that the noun has no eventive
reading, 5 states that the noun has only the eventive reading, while the other
numbers in the scale correspond to mixed readings. The subjects did not receive
a special training for this task, but they were provided with a brief description of
the task and some examples. It is important to point out the fact that the deV-
nition of event which was provided corresponds to the most intuitive deVnition,
i. e. “the noun describes or denotes something which happen or occur in the world”.
In Table 9 below, we report the average measures of eventivity provided by the
speakers:
Table 9: Average of the speakers’ judgments on eventivity
Noun Event average from speakers’
judgements
assemblea 2,86
aumento 3,86
relazione 2,86
aborto 5
partecipazione 3,86
telegiornale 1,71
biotecnologia 1
In order to identify a statistical threshold of eventivity, we have computed the
correlation between the speakers’ judgments and the normalized frequencies by
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means of the Spearman coeXcient. The results of the correlation are very encour-
aging since we have a highly convergent r value (r = .731). This value, on the one
hand, supports the validity of the syntagmatic cues we have identiVed and, on the
other hand, it provides further support to the proposal of the notion of eventivity
as a scalar concept in the noun domain. In addition to this, it is interesting to
notice that the speakers’ judgments correlate more with the syntagmatic cues for
non morphologically derived nouns than with the morphologically marked ones.
4 A practical application: event annotation by means of the
eventity measure
On the basis of the analyses described in the previous sections, and in particular
on the basis of the high correlation between the normalized frequencies between
the syntagmatic cues and speakers’ judgments, we have decided to consider as a
good threshold for eventivity a measure of the normalized frequencies equals or
higher than 0.01 (it corresponds to the 4th quartile of the frequency distribution).
We thus propose to use this measure as a statistical parameter to support the
annotation of event nouns in corpora.
In order to evaluate our proposal, we have performed an annotation experi-
ment on an Italian corpus. The corpus is composed by 149 newspaper articles,
for a total of more than 63 thousand tokens, with 18,308 of them being labelled
as nouns. Six human annotators have manually applied TimeML speciVcations
(Pustejovsky et al. 2003) by distinguishing between temporal expressions, events
and signals. 4,369 noun tokens have been tagged as event. The overall annotation
accuracy is 77 %, a level which guarantees a good reliability. The set of nouns
in the annotated corpus will represent the gold standard against which we will
evaluate the validity of the eventivity measure. Before applying the eventivity
measure, we have lemmatized the nouns and cleaned this list by means of two
stop-word lists which have been created from SIMPLE/CLIPS. The Vrst is a list of
items which are always eventive. This list contains words such as “causa” [cause],
“occasione” [occasion] and all the nouns belonging to type “phenomenon” which is
a subtype of the “event” type, but excluding nouns like “calore” [heat] which are
phenomena but may assume an eventive reading only in special contexts. The
second list, on the contrary, is a list of words which are never events. This second
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list has been obtained by extracting all the nouns which belong to the types “time”
and “amount”.
After this operation the following data are available to be analyzed by means
of the eventivity measure: (i) 811 lemmas which have never been annotated as
eventive (non-eventive nouns); (ii) 485 lemmas which have been annotated as
eventive and on which annotators agree (eventive nouns); (iii) 78 lemmas on
which annotators disagree (disagreement). Once again, the measure has been
computed by means of queries from the corpus La Repubblica. Each lemma in the
three groups – non eventive nouns, eventive nouns and disagreement – has been
automatically annotated either as eventive or as non-eventive on the basis of the
threshold. The results are illustrated in Table 10.
Table 10: Percentages of eventive items retrieved by applying
the eventivity measure to the three groups of nouns.
Noun subgroup Eventive items
non-eventive 105 (13%)
eventive 288 (60%)
disagreement 22 (29%)
The Vgures are impressive since following the measure more that 60 % of the
lemmas which had been annotated as event by humans have been identiVed.
This suggests that the eventive measure could be used either as a feature for
automatic annotation of event nouns or to support the development of manual
datasets for event nouns. Moreover, the very low number of false positives – i.e
non-eventive noun types which are above the threshold – is encouraging since it
supports the validity and consistency of the syntagmatic cues we have identiVed.
Finally, the non-eventive nouns which are above the threshold can be considered
as good candidates for identifying instances of qualia exploitation and coercion
phenomena. As for the disagreement group, the eventivity measure suggests that
some items could have an eventive reading, thus providing a statistical index for
identifying challenging cases which require a more Vne-grained analysis.
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5 Conclusion and Future Work
The main contribution of this paper is the identiVcation of a measure for the
eventivity of nouns based on syntagmatic cues that is promising from a theoret-
ical point of view (i. e. Generative Lexicon) and useful for practical applications.
In a lexical semantic theory the inclusion of a lexical item in wide semantic
classes such as the event nouns class should be based on language usages. The
continuum that emerges by the corpus based analyses proposed in this work indi-
cates that the membership is a matter of degree.
From a practical point of view, the eventivity measure can be used as a statis-
tical measure to automatically annotate event nouns in corpora. Moreover, the
measure can be used as a strategy to implement robust annotation systems which
integrate information from large lexical resources, like SIMPLE/CLIPS and IWN.
A further advantage of the measure is the fact that it could be used to discover
probable instances of dot types or coerced events. This can be achieved by lower-
ing the threshold. For instance, nouns with an eventivity measure very near to
the threshold, e. g. 0.008, could be good candidates.
It is interesting to point out that the eventivity measure can be used also to
weight noun types. For instance, it could be the case that some dot types objects
are perfectly balanced between the two types, but it could also be the contrary,
that is, several dot type objects could be assembled with components that vary for
their salience. Evidence to this hypothesis could be found among the disagree-
ment nouns which are above the threshold.
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Diachrony of Stative Dimensional Verbs
in French1
Brigitte Schwarze & Hans Geisler
Abstract
In the present paper we will trace the evolution of French verbs like peser ‘weigh’
and coûter ‘cost’ which encode a dimension – weight and price, respectively –
and allow for the external speciVcation of a value of this dimension as in peser 2
kilos ‘weigh 2 kilos’ and coûter 5 euros ‘cost 5 euros.’ We call these verbs stative di-
mensional verbs (SDVs). Our main focus will be on SDVs which evolve from verbs
encoding sensorimotor concepts such as main body postures (e. g., standing) or
elementary hand actions (e. g., grasping). We will try to delineate the semantic
changes they undergo in the course of their development. Special attention will
be paid to the correlation between source concepts and the emergence of speciVc
dimensional readings.
1 Stative dimensional verbs, functional nouns and
dimensional adjectives
Stative dimensional verbs (henceforth SDVs) include verbs such as peser ‘weigh’
and coûter ‘cost’ that encode a dimension (or attribute) – weight and price,
respectively – and allow for the external speciVcation of a value of this dimension
as in peser 2 kilos ‘weigh 2 kilos’ and coûter 5 euros ‘cost 5 euros.’ Constructions
with SDVs can be described in terms of a mathematical function f(x)=y, where f
is the dimension given by the verb meaning, x is the subject argument and y is
1 The subject matters tackled in the present paper are part of two projects (“Dimensional Verbs” and
“The development of functional concepts in French”) funded by the German Research Foundation
(DFG) within the Research Unit FOR 600 “Functional Concepts and Frames.”
Thomas Gamerschlag, Doris Gerland, Rainer Osswald & Wiebke Petersen
(eds.). 2015. Meaning, Frames, and Conceptual Representation. Düsseldorf:
dup.
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the predication, i.e., the value speciVed for the subject argument with respect to
the dimension:
x f y
Le pain
Le pain 5 euroscoûte
pèse 2 kilos ZdZbread weighs 2 kilos[
ZdZbread costs 5 euros[
Table 1: SDV construction
SDVs correspond to a class of nouns that we term ‘functional concept nouns’
or, for the sake of simplicity, ‘functional nouns’. As for SDVs, functional nouns
serve to denote functional concepts; that is, concepts which can be described by
a function. Functional nouns have an obligatory possessor argument, which in
French is often realized as de-complement, and a unique referent per possessor,
therefore they are usually deVnite.2 This is illustrated in Table 2.
f x =
Le poids
Le prix 5 eurosdu pain
du pain est ZdZweight of the bread is 2 kilos[
ZdZprice of the bread is 5 euros[
y
est
2 kilos
Table 2: Functional noun construction
The variants presented in Tables 1 and 2 both specify the value ‘2 kilos’ for the di-
mension weight and ‘5 euros’ for the dimension price. However, in the nominal
variant in 2, the dimension is explicitly referred to, whereas in the verbal variant
in 1, the verb encodes the respective dimension without explicitly expressing it.
Moreover, there is a third means of expressing functional concepts, namely by
dimensional adjectives such as Fr. lourd ‘heavy’ and cher ‘expensive.’ Dimen-
sional adjectives only imply the dimension and, in contrast to SDVs and func-
tional nouns, they are usually value-speciVc, i.e., they themselves denote a cer-
tain value. Thus, they are generally less Wexible; in most cases, they cannot be
combined with explicit value speciVcations, as demonstrated in Table 3.
However, some languages – like German, for example – allow for the use of
the verbal, the nominal, and the adjectival variant at the same time. As shown
2 For the notion of functional concept, the corresponding lexical noun type and the role of determi-
nation cf. Löbner (1979), (1985), (2011).
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x = f
Le pain
*Le pain de 2 kilosest
est lourd
y
lourd
Le pain est cher
*Le pain est cher de 5 euros
Table 3: Dimensional adjective construction
in Tables 4 to 6, the dimension price may be encoded alternatively by a verb, a
noun or an adjective in German.3
x f y
Das Brot wiegt 2 Kilo ZdZbread weighs 2 kilos[
Table 4: SDV construction (German)
f x =
Das Gewicht des Brotes ist ZdZweight of the bread is 2 kilos[
y
2 Kilo
Table 5: Functional noun construction (German)
x = y
Das Brot schwerist
f
2 Kilo ZdZbread is 2 kilos ZÀÇ[
Table 6: Dimensional adjective construction (German)
The lexical devices for expressing functional concepts vary considerably across
languages. In modern Indo-European languages, the nominal variant seems to
outweigh dimensional verbs and dimensional adjectives, both in number and fre-
quency. Our cross-linguistic investigation of functional concepts clearly shows
3 In French, the combination of dimensional adjectives and explicit value speciVcations is mainly
restricted to a subset of spatial adjectives (e. g., long ‘long,’ haut ‘high,’ large ‘large, wide,’ profond
‘deep,’ etc.), whereas such a restriction does not exist in German. This does not mean that there
are no restrictions at all in German; in many cases, the availability of the adjectival paraphrase is
at least questionable (cf.: ?Das Brot ist fünf Euro teuer. Lit.: ‘The bread is Vve euros expensive.’).
Starting out from a large-scale analysis of German SDVs, Gamerschlag (2014) demonstrates that
even in German only few SDVs can be paraphrased by adjectives.
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Lt. pendĕre ‘let hang down’
Lt. pendĕre ‘weigh’
Lt. pensum ‘weighed’
Fr. poids ‘weight’
V
SDV
PP
FN
Figure 1: Lt. pende˘re > Fr. poids
that this class of nouns saw a signiVcant upsurge in German and French in scien-
tiVc discourse and all kinds of expository texts that try to impart depersonalized,
objective knowledge during the last centuries. Nevertheless, there are many di-
mensions which are encoded alternatively by nouns or by SDVs. Furthermore,
in many cases SDVs seem to have constituted a preliminary stage for the later
nominal encoding of functional concepts. This is true, for example, of French
poids ‘weight.’ It can ultimately be traced back to the Latin verb pende˘re which
originally meant ‘let hang down.’ As it was used in the context of weighing (‘let
the scales of a balance hang down in order to weigh something’), it acquired the
transitive reading ‘weigh something’ as well as the dimensional reading ‘weigh’;
the noun then derives from a nonVnite form of pende˘re, namely the past participle
pensum.
A comparable development is attested in case of Fr. coût ‘(the) cost(s),’ a near
synonym of prix ‘price.’ Coût goes back to Lt. consta¯re which is composed of
the preVx con/com (from the Old Latin comitative preposition cum) and the verb
sta¯re ‘stand.’ Its original meaning is ‘come to stand’ or ‘stand still.’ In commercial
discourse it developed the dimensional reading ‘cost.’ Here again it is a nonVnite
form, the inVnitive in this case, from which the noun is Vnally derived.
A third example is Fr. contenu ‘content.’ It stems from the Latin verb contine¯re
‘hold (together).’ Once more, an SDV reading, ‘enclose’/‘contain’ in this case, had
been acquired before the functional noun was coined on the basis of the nonVnite
past participle form of the verb.
These examples also indicate that the dimensional reading of the verbs them-
selves can often be traced back to nondimensional usage. The verbs initially refer
to intersubjectively stable bodily experience, to body posture or motion and hand
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Lt. constare ‘come to stand’
Lt. constare ‘cost’
Fr. coûter ‘cost’
Fr. coût ‘cost(s)’
V
SDV
INF
FN
Figure 2: Lt. constare > Fr. coût(s)
Lt. continere ‘hold (together)’
Lt. continere ‘enclose’, ‘contain’
Fr. contenu ‘contained’
Fr. contenu ‘content’
V
SDV
INF
FN
PP
Figure 3: Lt. continere > Fr. contenu
action. In the following sections we will take a closer look at possible origins and
lines of development of SDVs. We will try to outline how these anthropomorphic
concepts are transformed into more abstract concepts by means of associative
processes like metonymy and metaphor, and how this Vnally leads to the iso-
lation of a single semantic property that allows us to assign a dimension to an
object.
2 Diachrony of stative dimensional verbs in French
2.1 Data
Our inventory of French SDVs has mainly been developed by analyzing approx-
imately 2500 entries in the verb dictionary compiled by Busse & Dubost (1977/
21983). The SDVs and SDV readings identiVed here were revised and extended
by means of other synchronic dictionaries (e. g., Petit Robert and TLFi), the syn-
tactic semantic thesaurus of French verbs by Dubois & Dubois-Charlier (1997),
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the data oUered in the realm of lexicon-grammar,4 and French text corpora (Fran-
text). We eventually distinguished more than one hundred items5 which have
been examined in terms of their diachronic sources and stages of development
using diUerent etymological dictionaries (e. g., EWFS, FEW, Robert Historique).6
2.2 Origins of SDVs
The analysis has shown that the majority of SDVs are transparent. Most of them
do indeed go back to dynamic verbs or special groups of stative verbs, which
originally encode sensorimotor concepts. In many cases, the source concepts
which can be attested for the Latin period, e. g., basic hand actions like holding
reoccur in more recent developments. This can, for example, be illustrated by Fr.
tenir < Lt. tene¯re ‘hold.’ In modern French tenir is still used in the sense of ‘hold’
in sentences like (1a) and (b)
(1) (a) La petite Vlle tient un sac à main.
‘The little girl holds a handbag.’
(b) Tiens-moi ça un instant, s’il te plaît.
‘Hold this for me a moment, please.’
but it is also used as an SDV denoting capacity, e. g., in (2):
(2) La cuve tient mille litres.
‘The vat holds a thousand liters.’
4 See particularly the material available on the website (http://infolingu.univ-mlv.fr/).
5 Note that the number of SDV readings is actually higher than the number of items (verbs) in our
inventory, since one verb generally displays several SDV readings (cf. infra).
6 There are diUerent types of SDVs which we cannot discuss in detail in this paper. Some SDVs like
peser and sentir can take an absolute use without a value argument. In this case, they denote a Vxed
(positive or negative) high value (cf.: Ce sac pèse. ‘This bag weighs (a lot).’/Ce poisson sent. ‘This Vsh
smells (bad).’). Other verbs can adopt a dimensional reading in special contexts (cf. vendre ‘sell’ in
Cette voiture se vend bien. ‘This car sells well.’). Still others may be used to specify more than one
dimension like, for instance, German sitzen ‘sit’ (posture and location) or kleben ‘stick’ (contact
and location). As has already been pointed out in other contexts (cf. Talmy 1985, Schwarze 1993),
these ‘bidimensional’ uses can be described as rare in Modern French as well as in other Romance
Languages; French makes use of resultative constructions instead (cf. être assis ‘be seated’, être collé
‘be stuck’). For an overview of the diUerent types of SDVs cf. Schwarze (2008), for a more detailed
account cf. Gamerschlag (2014).
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Not every speaker accepts this kind of construction, but it is attested.7 So once
again, it is the concept of holding which gives rise to a capacity reading.
Another example which is completely uncontroversial among native speak-
ers of French is composer. It is derived from OFr. poser ‘rest’/‘put in a place’
which goes back to Lt. pausare ‘pause, halt, seize’ and whose meaning was pre-
sumably inWuenced by Lt. ponere ‘lay down’/‘put down’ and componere ‘put to-
gether’/‘compose.’ Although the sense of Lt. componere is (still) vivid in Modern
French, the middle construction as well as the resultative yield a dimensional
reading and allow us to specify the dimension structure or composition:
(3) (a) Le groupe se compose/est composé de garçons et de Vlles.
‘This group is composed of/consists of boys and girls’
(b) Cet ouvrage se compose/est composé de trois parties.
‘This work is composed of/consists of three parts.’
Only minor groups of SDVs do not evolve from verbs but from adjectives – such
as Lt. durus ‘hard’ which gives rise to Lt. durare, Fr. durer ‘last.’ Another (and
apparently more frequent) source is nouns. Denominal derivation can be of two
kinds: Derivation from sortal nouns which designate (classes of) objects with
speciVc salient characteristics seems to be typical of particular semantic groups
of SDVs, such as SDVs denoting light emission (cf.: chatoyer ‘shimmer’ < chat ‘cat’
(supposedly because of the cat’s eyes), étinceler ‘sparkle’ < étincelle ‘spark,’ Wam-
boyer ‘blaze’ < OFr. Wambe ‘Wame’/‘blaze’ etc.). On the other hand, we assert that
more concrete functional nouns, such as bouche ‘mouth’ or bout ‘limit’/‘endpoint,’
constitute the basis for the derivation of verbs displaying an SDV reading. Bouche
gives rise to déboucher (dans/sur) ‘Wow into’/‘lead to,’ bout yields aboutir (à) ‘lead
to (an end)’; both specify the dimension endpoint, goal or outcome:
(4) (a) La rue débouchait sur une place immense.
‘The street led to an enormous square.’
(b) Une philosophie qui débouche sur l’action.
‘A philosophy which leads to action.’
7 The example is taken from Dubois & Dubois-Charlier (1997). Standard dictionaries of modern
French do not unambiguously account for a capacity reading. The judgements of native speak-
ers on the acceptability of capacity denoting uses vary considerably. According to Petit Robert
one meaning of tenir is “occuper (un certain espace)” (Petit Robert s. tenir I, 8), TLFi is more explicit
in this respect, since they add “avoir une certaine capacité” (TLFi s. tenir IV/A, 2).
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(5) (a) Le chemin aboutit au village.
‘The path leads to the village.’
(b) Ses recherches n’ont abouti à rien.
‘His research didn’t lead to anything.’
However, we have to be considerate here because in some cases this kind of
denominal derivation as well as the deadjectival derivation does not immediately
lead to an SDV reading. As for Fr. déboucher (dans/sur) and Lt. durare, dynamic
uses of the verbs in question might be older.8 Taking this into account, we state
that the SDV readings develop, once again, from a verb.9 Nevertheless, these verbs
usually do not pertain to the most prototypical group of source verbs, namely the
one encoding sensorimotor concepts, which we will look at in the remainder of
this paper.
2.3 From sensorimotor concepts to functional concepts
Some of the most frequent sensorimotor concepts originally expressed are ‘drag,’
‘put,’ ‘give,’ ‘hold,’ ‘take,’ ‘touch,’ ‘carry,’ etc. These concepts give rise to a number
of diUerent dimensional readings. In (6) to (10) this is illustrated by French porter
which also keeps the ‘original’ meaning, that is the meaning of the Latin verb
portare ‘carry.’10
(6) range: Le canon porte (jusqu’) à 10 km.
‘The range of the cannon is 10 km.’
(Lit.: ‘The cannon carries (up) to 10 km.’)
(7) subject: Cette étude porte sur le chômage.
‘This study deals with unemployment.’
(Lit.: ‘This study carries on unemployment.’)
8 Déboucher is initially used in the sense of ‘appear,’ ‘come out of,’ durare Vrst means ‘make hard.’ Less
controversial for the second denominal type are German verbs like abstammen < Stamm ‘trunk (of
a tree)’ and beinhalten < Inhalt ‘content.’
9 Moreover, the nominal base of the verb in question may ultimately go back to a dynamic verb
(cf. bout ‘limit’/‘endpoint’ which, according to most scholars, is derived from bouter < Old Low
Franconian *bo¯tan ‘push’/‘beat’).
10 Note that the following SDV uses are not meant to cover the full meaning range of French porter.
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(8) location: L’accent porte sur la dernière syllabe.
‘The accent lies on the last syllable.’
(Lit.: ‘The accent carries on the last syllable.’)
(9) potential: Un argument qui porte.
‘A convincing/valid argument.’
(Lit.: ‘An argument that carries.’)
(10) pregnancy time: La chatte porte soixante jours.
‘Cats’ pregnancy lasts sixty days.’
(Lit.: ‘Cats carry sixty days.’)
The development of deverbal SDVs from the above mentioned source concepts is
propelled by associative processes such as metonymy and metaphor. These pro-
cesses rely on gestalt principles of perception (like Vgure and ground, proximity
or contiguity and similarity) and can be speciVed for every step in concept de-
velopment.11 In initial stages, metonymic proVling strategies in verbally encoded
event frames appear to dominate. Metonymies serve to highlight speciVc mean-
ing components and to proVle noncanonical roles (like theme, path, source, goal,
instrument etc.). Subsequently, metaphors enable domain mapping of functional
concepts.
This development can be illustrated by means of Lt. ducere ‘drag’ (Figure 4).
According to diUerent syntactic as well as semantic parameters (such as animacy,
control and volitionality on the side of the agent), Lt. ducere can be regarded as
a prototypical transitive verb. The semantic changes motivated by metonymies
involve a gradient loss of transitivity. In a Vrst step, the meaning of du¯cere shifts
from the concept of dragging to the concept of leading and accompanying,
and this is how Fr. conduire (< VLt. conducere) is Vrst used. Apart from the agent
and the experiencer, the underlying concept frame comprises elements such as
instrument, path and goal. Since Old French, the orientation or goal component
becomes central, while the comitative reading recedes.12 This tendency seems
to be a prerequisite for subsequent argument alternations and the emergence of
11 There is a whole wealth of contemporary literature dealing with the diUerent associative processes
and their relevance in (synchronic) language variation and (diachronic) change. For comprehensive
discussions which draw especially on French and other Romance Languages cf. Blank (1997),
Waltereit (1998), Koch (2001) and Gévaudan (2007).
12 “Dès l’ancien français, l’extension des sens s’est faite [. . . ] par la valorisation de l’idée d’«orientation»
aux dépens de celle d’«accompagnement»” (Robert Historique, s. conduire).
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dimensional readings: The agent is Vnally shifted out of its canonical subject
role and the noncanonical role of path becomes subject. At the same time, the
comitative reading (‘accompany sb,’ ‘escort sb’) is lost completely. This is where
the SDV reading endpoint, goal is acquired. Finally, metaphorical leaps allow
for other uses.
Lt. alqd/alqm ducere ‘drag sth/sb’
Fr. conduire qn (par la main) (sur un chemin) (à l'école)
‘lead sb (by the hand) (on a way) (to school)’ 
Fr. le chemin (nous) conduit à l'école
‘the way leads (us) to school’
Fr. cette politique conduit à l'échec
‘this strategy leads to disaster’
metonymy
metonymy
(path à agent)
metaphor
(path = method)
Figure 4: Lt. ducere > Fr. conduire à
Unergative and unaccusative verbs denoting elementary movements, such as go,
run, fall, transform in a similar way. In accordance with transitive verbs, less
prominent components of the original event frame become highlighted while all
anthropomorphic and dynamic aspects are lost. Starting from a complex event
verb, the associative processes even allow us to single out diUerent attributes lead-
ing to diUerent dimensional readings, as has already been illustrated for French
porter above. In the following, we will go into more detail for the intransitive
French verb descendre to demonstrate how this diversity may occur.
For French descendre (< Lt. descandere ‘move down’/‘go down’ < scandere ‘jump
up’/‘climb’) at least three SDV readings can be distinguished:
(11) origin: Elle descend d’une ancienne famille./L’homme descend du singe.
‘She descends from an ancient family.’/‘Man descends from ape.’
(12) gradient: La rue descend à pic.
‘The street falls away/drops steeply.’
(13) depth: Le puits descend à 40 mètres.
‘The well is 40 meters deep.’
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The original reading given in (11), which is Vrst attested in the 12th century, is
metaphorically motivated. The underlying conceptual metaphor is genealogy
is a path. The relevant aspect of the descendre concept is that descendre is a
movement that implies a change of location of the subject referent leading from
a starting point, the high point A, down to a low point B (descendre = ‘move/go
down from A to B’). The starting point of the downward movement is overtly
expressed when descendre is followed by a prepositional phrase introduced by
de (e. g., descendre du grenier ‘move/go down from the loft’). Transferred to the
concept of genealogy, descendre de acquires a purely relational meaning. Since
movement is lost, it serves to express the ‘starting point,’ i.e., origin of the subject
referent.13
The SDV reading in (12) dates back to the 17th century and is based on a tran-
sitive use of descendre (e. g., descendre une rue ‘move/go down a street’). The
gradient reading arises out of a metonymical shift parallel to the one observed
in the ducere example above. In the case of descendre, the coding of the path argu-
ment in the subject position leads to the isolation of the downward orientation
(=gradient); accordingly, the adverbial, which in the underlying event frame
would serve to express the manner of the downward movement (cf. descendre
rapidement/en courant ‘go/move down fast/in a running manner’), turns out to
express the value that the object acquires with reference to this dimension (i.e.,
measure of gradient).
Finally, the depth reading given in (13) is best interpreted as the outcome of a
metaphorical transfer. Due to its downward orientation descendre can be applied
to (subterranean) vertical cavities such as wells and shafts. From the point of
view of the observer, objects of this nature are essentially characterized by the di-
rectional dimension down (or having depth). Now, descendre à which originally
serves to express the endpoint of the downward movement (e. g., descendre à la
cave ‘move/go down to the cellar’) allows the speciVcation of the value that the
object acquires along the dimension of depth.14
13 In our opinion, the downward orientation of descendre does not play any crucial role for the
metaphorical transfer. Nevertheless, descendre originally may have been preferred against other
options due to its orientation, since family trees, for example, are usually arranged in a top-down
manner.
14 Note that the depth reading is neither recorded in etymological dictionaries nor in standard dictio-
naries of modern French. It is attested in Dubois & Dubois-Charlier (1997) and the online version of
the Larousse encyclopedia (Larousse Encyclopédie sur Internet, cf.: http://www.larousse.fr/).
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2.4 Correlation between source concepts and dimensional
readings
Up to now, we have seen how diUerent dimensional readings emerge from one
and the same source concept – depending on which aspect or attribute of the
underlying frame becomes isolated. However, if we take speciVc dimensional
readings as a starting point we have to note that some dimensions at least, such
as origin and cause as well as content, seem to be linked systematically to
particular source concepts both within a given language and across diUerent lan-
guages. A majority of SDVs denoting origin and cause can be traced back to
verbs of movement or, more precisely, locomotion:
ORIGIN/CAUSE
movement
locomotion
Fr. procéder de
Fr. provenir de
Fr. résulter de
ß Lt. procedere
ß Lt. provenire
ß Lt. resultare
ß Lt. cedere ‘go’
ß Lt. venire ‘come’
ß Lt. salire ‘jump’
Figure 5: Correlation of source and dimension: ORIGIN/CAUSE
SDVs which encode content often stem from verbs related to speciVc hand ac-
tions like grasp, hold and carry:
CONTENT
grasping
holding
Fr. comprendre
Fr. contenir
Fr. comporter
ß Lt. comprehendere
ß Lt. continere
ß Lt. comportare
ß Lt. prehendere ‘grasp’
ß Lt. tenere ‘hold’
ß Lt. portare ‘carry’
Figure 6: Correlation of source and dimension: CONTENT
The meaning changes leading to the SDV readings are usually motivated by com-
mon types of metonymies and metaphors which remain stable over time, e. g.,
starting point of movement→ origin of state or entity→ cause of state or entity,
container → contained/content. Therefore they occur more than once within a
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given language and in a similar fashion across languages; as can be illustrated by
the German examples given in Figure 7.
ORIGIN/CAUSE
movement
locomotion
Ge. zurückgehen auf
Ge. herkommen von
Ge. entspringen
ß Ge. gehen ‘go’
ß Ge. kommen ‘come’
ß Ge. springen ‘jump’
CONTENT
grasping
holding
Ge. erfassen
Ge. enthalten
ß Ge. fassen ‘grasp’
ß Ge. halten ‘hold’
Figure 7: ORIGIN/CAUSE and CONTENT in German
3 Conclusion
Our analysis of the historical development of SDVs shows that even highly
abstract functional concepts are rooted in sensorimotor experience. There are
striking parallels to concept formation in general as put forth by the embodied
cognition theory (cf. Ziemke 2003 for an overview). The idea that concepts are
embodied assumes that we have a species-speciVc view of the world, due to the
nature of our physical bodies. This is corroborated by our work on SDVs (and
functional concepts in general), since we could demonstrate that a restricted set
of action and posture verbs combined with a handful of locational and directional
particles and prepositions seem to be a convenient remedy for all denotational
needs.
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Semantic Fields

Linguistic Realizations
of the Concept of FEAR
Liane Ströbel
Abstract
There is something about fear. . . This paper is an attempt to look into patterns
of use and variation concerning the conceptualization of ‘fear.’ Analyzing the
semantic Veld and syntactic structure of fear expressions in French, the following
questions will be tackled: Which of the parameters associated with fear play a role
in the linguistic encoding? Are there conceptual diUerences between the diUerent
realizations of this complex concept? Is it possible that ‘fear’ only has one central
core or source? And Vnally, can members of the semantic Veld of fear function
as a conceptual source themselves?
1 Introduction1
‘Fear’ is an emotional response to threats and danger and one of our most impor-
tant survival mechanisms. Fear can be conditioned, based on experience, gender
speciVc, real or imaginary. Fear can be regarded as a characteristic of a person
(trait anxiety) or a reaction to the loss of control in a speciVc situation (state anxi-
ety). In the latter case, the experience of fear involves two cognitive processes and
is followed by an adequate reaction to the situation. The Vrst stage (Stage 1) is
marked by a primary appraisal of a negative, dangerous or even life-threatening
situation (involving physical or mental pain). This stage is followed by a sec-
ondary appraisal of the resources needed in order to react to the situation (Stage
1 The research presented in this paper was supported by the Collaborative Research Center 991,
funded by the German Research Foundation (DFG).
Thomas Gamerschlag, Doris Gerland, Rainer Osswald & Wiebke Petersen
(eds.). 2015. Meaning, Frames, and Conceptual Representation. Düsseldorf:
dup.
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2). Finally, Stage 3 presents an adequate response to this danger (Faust 1986, Fries
2000, Boerner 2003, Bandelow 2003, 2004).
While the last two stages hardly help to enlighten the concept of fear, Stage
1 represents a productive analyzing ground in order to illustrate the complexity
of the semantic Veld of ‘fear’ in French. In this stage, the sensation of fear and
its dimensions (life-threatening, individual, etc.) must be deVned. This cognitive
process will have a great impact on the linguistic realizations (see Sections 2 to
4). In the following, an overview about the complexity of the concept of fear
and the diUerent resulting linguistic encodings will be displayed. The semantic
core of fear will be redeVned by analyzing the distinct semes of the nominal
representations of fear (see Section 2) and certain salient conceptual sources of
prototypical fear metaphors and metonymies (see Section 3).
Furthermore, in Section 4, a hypothesis for the predominance of analytic con-
structions (and support verb constructions in particular) will be presented. Fi-
nally, it will be demonstrated that the parameters at work, in order to classify
the diUerent degrees of the fear experience, and the semantic core inherent to
all fear expressions, also have an impact on further linguistic developments and
even lead to the fact that formerly negatively marked lexemes from this domain
can turn – via their function as intensiVers – into positive markers (see Section 5).
2 The parameters of the fear experience
Fear is a primary universal emotion; therefore it comes as no surprise that the
semantic Veld of ‘fear’ in French is very complex and broad. The single entities of
this complex semantic Veld can be regarded as diUerent stages of an emotional
process (Shah 1993: 321 f.). At the same time, the entities themselves can be com-
posed of various diUerent sensations, ranging from excitement to nervousness.
Therefore, from a semantic perspective, there does not seem to be a clear-cut de-
lineation between the single members of this particular semantic Veld, but rather
a spectrum of Vxed parameters with potential contextual overlaps, variations and
interpretations.
Before looking at the parameters, it is important to separate the semantic core
of fear, which exists independently from its contextual readings. Wierzbicka
(1972:59-63) deVnes emotions as ‘shorthand abbreviations for complex expres-
sions, i. e., descriptions of some kind’. The semantic primitives for ‘fear’ could
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therefore be subsumed as: ‘bad, do, happen, know’ (Wierzbicka 1972: 59–63).
In other words, the semantic Veld of ‘fear’ consists of a conglomeration of short
forms expressing – in diUerent degrees and depending on the context – the belief
that something bad and unavoidable is very likely to occur in the near future. In-
terestingly, the degree or intensity of this ‘bad event coming towards somebody’
does not seem to be anchored in the core meaning. In contrast to this deVnition,
the current paper will illustrate that it is the intensity of the experience which
plays a role in the rise of new (grammatical and lexical) linguistic functions of
these fear expressions.
In the following, the continuum of the prototypical linguistic realizations of
‘fear,’ will be analyzed without including speciVc fears, such as French trac ‘stage
fright’ or diatopic, diastratic or diaphasic varieties. The nominal fear examples
cited in this section also have (causative or non-causative) adjectival counterparts
(for a detailed analysis see Masseron 2008). Semantic changes of the adjectival
counterparts will be illustrated in Section 5.
The existence of adverbial counterparts with the suXx -ment (indicating the
state of the subject while fulVlling an action, e. g., peureusement ‘fearfully’), and
the preposition ‘with’ (focusing on the experience the subject is exposed to in
a given situation, e. g., avec angoisse [lit. ‘with anguish’]) will be analyzed in
terms of the coexistence of synthetic and analytic constructions (Section 4) and
their semantic divergences, e. g., avec horreur ‘with horror’ vs. horriblement ‘hor-
ribly/tremendously’ (Section 5).
The diUerent parameters, such as degree in relevance, intensity, duration, ap-
pearance, control level and extension, will be illustrated with the help of di-
chotomies such as: strong vs. weak, permanent vs. non-permanent, sudden vs.
(more or less) expected, loss of control vs. control, real vs. imaginary, and individ-
ual vs. non-individual, whereby: STRONG, PERMANENT, SUDDEN, CONTROL,
REAL, and INDIVIDUAL serve as indications.
The deVnitions in this Section are derived from examples from Frantext (FT),
Dubois, Dubois-Charlier (DDC), Trésor de la langue française (TLF) and related
analyses of the semantic Veld of fear (Cislaru 2009, Fersenmeier 2010) and interna-
tional classiVcation schemata (Dilling, Mombour, Schmidt, & Schulte-Markwort
2004, Krohne 2010, Rupprecht & Moeller 2004).
As already mentioned, fear can be regarded as a characteristic of a person (trait
anxiety) or a reaction to the loss of control in a speciVc situation (state anxiety).
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Certain fear terms can be associated with negative and permanent traits or char-
acteristics of a person and are therefore regarded as ‘fear disorders.’ Others refer
more to a speciVc situation without necessarily inWuencing the mental health of a
person on a permanent basis.
The most general widespread term in order to express the feeling of fear in
French is peur [+ STRONG, +/- PERMANENT+, +/- SUDDEN, +/- REAL, +/- IN-
DIVIDUAL].
In contrast to Spanish miedo or Portuguese medo (both outer Romance Lan-
guages), which are derived from Latin metus ‘fear’, French peur and its Italian
counterpart paura (both central Romance Languages) are both derived from Latin
pavor ‘fright.’ Another nominal representation, the Latin term timor, which origi-
nally signiVed the fear of God and is only preserved in Spanish to express a fear
based on an experience (Spanish sin temor de exagerar ‘without fear of exaggera-
tion’), did not survive in French. Nevertheless, traces of this concept can be found
in French timide. In French the feeling of preoccupation, worry or concerns is
expressed through crainte ‘worry’ or craindre ‘to worry’ (see Section 4), which
are derived from Latin tremere (> cremere) ‘to shiver.’ In the construction de/par
crainte/peur que/de ‘worrying/fearing that,’ in particular, both nouns, crainte and
peur, appear synonymous (Fersenmeier 2010).
While the term peur is generally used to describe the reaction of avoiding
or anticipating a certain dangerous situation, the alternative term anxiété can
be regarded as a response to a higher stress level due to an accumulation of
repetitive and unprocessed fears (Hock, Kohlmann 2009, Ohman 2000). The use
of the term anxiété underlines an inability to adequately react [- CONTROL, +
INDIVIDUAL] to a particular situation (state anxiety) or indicates a permanent
and/or repetitive inability [+/- PERMANENT, -/+ SUDDEN] faced with a speciVc
situation or problem (trait anxiety). In the latter case, it can already be regarded
as a disorder and linked to the physiological state of a person.
The word panique (derived from the god Pan, who took pleasure in suddenly
appearing and frightening wanderers) focuses on the individual loss of control in
a given situation [- CONTROL, + INDIVIDUAL] and subsumes a sudden, frantic
and often groundless or at least not (always) life threatening fear [+ STRONG,
+ SUDDEN, -/+ REAL].
The major diUerence to phobie is the appearance and duration of the suUering.
Phobie originally expressed the fear of an immediate danger (state anxiety), but
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over time started expressing a trait anxiety [- SUDDEN, + PERMANENT] and can
therefore be regarded as a chronic version of panique [- PERMANENT]. Besides
the prototypical phobias such as acrophobia, there also exist a great number of
peripheral phobias, such as bibliophobia (fear of books), cynosiophobia (fear of
knowledge), and caligynophobia (fear of beautiful women). In general, this lex-
eme is associated with a disproportional reaction to a potential or only imaginary
danger [- REAL].
State anxieties, such as those described by the French word terreur, can be re-
garded as a ‘short term abbreviation’ for an intense, sudden and overpowering
fear [+ STRONG, + SUDDEN, - CONTROL], which can be either individual or
also underline that this negative feeling is forced upon a community [+/- INDI-
VIDUAL]. The latter reading, is often linked to historic events [+ REAL], such
as in the la régime de la terreur ‘the reign of terror’. It shares its key features
[+ STRONG, + SUDDEN, - CONTROL] with horreur, but diUers from the latter in
respect to its peripheral features [-/+ REAL, + INDIVIDUAL]. Horreur can there-
fore be described as a sudden combination of real or imaginary fear or aversion.
The feelings aroused by the Vrst realization of a potential danger can be ex-
pressed in French through frayeur and eUroi. Both denote a sudden change of
something and refer to a strong, sudden, momentary and individual experience
[+ STRONG, + SUDDEN, - PERMANENT, + INDIVIDUAL].
The term appréhension is associated with a negative feeling of not being pre-
pared enough for a speciVc future event, e. g., exam or speaking in public [+ REAL,
+ STRONG, - PERMANENT, - SUDDEN, + CONTROL, + INDIVIDUAL].
The term angoisse can, like anxiété, be regarded as a vague unpleasant emo-
tional state and can be used to underline an inability to adequately react to a
given situation [- CONTROL]. In contrast to anxiété, the focus of angoisse, is more
on a speciVc event or situation [- PERMANENT, - SUDDEN], and most of the
time is accompanied by a feeling of restraint. Etymologically, both can be traced
back to Proto-Indo-European *angh- ‘painful, tight, restraint’ (Cf. Watkins 1985,
Drosdowski & Grebe 1963 or Kluge 1975). Nevertheless, the original meaning of
‘tenseness, tightness,’ a symptom accompanying the fear experience, appears to
be more transparent in the latter.
Alongside this abundance of possibilities for expressing the sensation of fear, it
is very salient that explicit fear terms are often avoided. Jacqueline de Romilly
(Membre de l’Académie française) illustrates this phenomenon in her book Dans
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le jardin des mots (2007:244–247, highlighted by the author of this paper) with the
help of an anecdote describing a train ride:
‘J’étais dans un compartiment de chemin de fer avec un homme inconnu et
nous avons été mêlés à une sorte d’aventure policière, un troisième voyageur
s’étant caché dans notre compartiment. Il fut repris par la police. Et, au matin,
j’avouais à mon compagnon de voyage que j’avais eu vraiment peur, À quoi il
me répondit, l’air très satisfait, « non, non, je n’ai pas eu peur: simplement,
je n’étais pas rassuré ! »’
This tendency to shrink from using fear expressions might be due to the fact that
they are considered too ‘strong’ and therefore appear inappropriate in certain
situations.
To sum up, all of the fear expressions analyzed in this section share the at-
tribute that regardless of whether the sensation of fear is real (due to a perceiv-
able cause) or imaginary, short or permanent, individual or not, and independent
of the degree of control [+/- REAL, +/- PERMANENT, +/- SUDDEN, +/- CON-
TROL, +/- INDIVIDUAL], this sensation is always experienced as a powerful
feeling [+ STRONG]. Therefore the intensity [+ STRONG], the only parameter,
that all fear expressions display can be regarded as the common semantic core
of all fear expressions. The intensity inherent in all fear expression and its in-
Wuence on the rise of new analytic constructions and as intensiVer markers will
be analyzed in detail in Sections 4 and 5.
Finally, it is also interesting that many fear expressions focus on the parameters
REAL and INDIVIDUAL. This might be due to the fact that, at least in situ, for the
one experiencing fear, the fear (whether real or imaginary) always appears true
and real and primarily a threat to oneself and one’s own body. This also explains
why a majority of fear expressions can be traced back to bodily reactions or
movements accompanying the fear experience, e. g., anxiété or angoisse [<‘painful,
tight, restraint’], crainte [<‘to shiver’], etc. This close connection between fear
expressions and embodiment will be analyzed in the following two sections.
3 FEAR and embodiment
Fear is not only expressed in a semantic primary form (as illustrated in Section
2) but – from a linguistic perspective – metonymic and metaphoric processes are
at work to create new ways of expressing fear in language.
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Metaphor and metonymy have long been regarded by cognitive linguists (Lak-
oU 1987, 1993, Niemeier 1997, Schwarz-Friesel 2007, Sharifan, Dirven & Niemeier
2008, Steen et al. 2010) as the result of conceptual mappings and as a productive
source for meaning extension. In metaphor mappings – which take place between
diUerent semantic Velds – the source domain is used to illicit the target domain.
Metonymy mappings, in contrast, are hierarchically structured within one single
domain (Koevecses & Radden 1998).
Fear as a bodily experience starts in the brain. The amygdala, the hippocam-
pus and the prefrontal cortex can be regarded as the key to and source of our
fear experience (Ledoux 1996 or Roth 1997). From there it spreads to the whole
body. The typical symptoms of fear include the widening of the eyes, the raising
of the eyebrows, an either widely opened or shut and dry mouth, a feeling of
breathlessness, a motionless body, a change in heartbeat, muscles shivering, etc.
All these symptoms also play a role in the linguistic realizations of fear. Their
function is not only to describe the physical and emotional state of a person in a
certain situation, but also to reduce the subjectivity of this emotion by attributing
it linguistically to speciVc bodily reactions or inabilities. By doing so, diUerent do-
mains can be distinguished which allow a better identiVcation of diUerent degrees
of fear.
Davitz (1969) produced a model consisting of twelve clusters (out of a corpus
of 556 statements referring to 50 diUerent emotions) and four dimensions of emo-
tional meaning, namely activation, relatedness, hedonic tone, and competence.
Table 1: Davitz (1969) twelve clusters (slightly changed)
DIMENSIONS CLUSTERS
Activation activation hypoactivation hyperactivation
Relatedness moving towards moving away moving against
Hedonic tone comfort discomfort tension
Competence enhancement dissatisfaction and inadequacy
(~incompetence)
The twelve clusters consist of activation, hypoactivation, hyperactivation,
moving towards, away and against, comfort, discomfort, tension, enhancement,
dissatisfaction and incompetence. Taking this model as a base, it is possible to dis-
tinguish at least three clusters (highlighted in bold in Table 1), namely ‘hyperacti-
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vation’, ‘tension’ and ‘incompetence,’ which are closely related to the experience
of fear.
Hyperactivation subsumes symptoms such as an increase in heart rate or lapses
in heartbeat (avoir le cœur qui bat très fort/la chamade/à grands coups), physical
agitation, as in il tremblait de peur, or sweating (Il avait des mains moites), etc. A
drop in temperature, as in des sueurs froides, and diUerent incompetences, such as
the inability to move (Il était pétriVé) or to speak (la gorge serrée), can be regrouped
as signs of dissatisfaction or inadequacy.
Given the fact that fear is a very complex emotion and furthermore closely
linked to neighboring emotions such as worry and concern (Gustafsson, Kron-
qvist, & McEachrane 2009, see Section 3), its symptoms and therefore also its lin-
guistic realizations can spread to other clusters (highlighted in gray in Table 1),
such as ‘hypoactivation’ (avoir la bouche sèche), ‘moving away’ (la peur les pous-
sait à fuir [Frantext, Jonquet 1993:208, 26]) and ‘discomfort’ (je n’étais pas rassuré,
as illustrated, for example, in the anecdote in Section 2).
What the examples have in common is that they indicate fear without directly
referring to it: the physiological eUects and behavioral reactions of fear stand for
the experienced fear and increase with the increase of this fear.
In addition to the metonymic expressions there are also a large number of meta-
phorical expressions used to express the feeling of fear. While in the metonymic
representation the term fear is usually avoided or can be suppressed (e. g., Il était
petriVé [de peur]), in the metaphoric representation fear can even be personiVed,
e. g., la peur grandissait, la peur s’en va, etc.
In contrast to Koevecses (1990) detailed distinctions (e. g., fear as a Wuid in a
container, an intrusion, an opponent, a vicious enemy, a tormentor, a natural
force, a superior, etc.), his classiVcation will be simpliVed and divided into two
categories in this paper: ‘internal fear’ and ‘external fear.’
The advantage of this contrastive classiVcation is, Vrstly, that possible overlaps
between semantically neighboring subcategories such as FEAR AS AN OPPO-
NENT, VICIOUS ENEMY, TORMENTOR or SUPERIOR, which can all be traced
back to the same source domain attribute [somebody wants to harm the sub-
ject], can be neglected here. Secondly, that a higher categorization level of the
underlying source domains of the fear metaphors becomes distinguishable.
As members of the Vrst group, ‘internal fear’ can be regarded all metaphors
based on the perception that fear is already a part of the body before even being
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confronted with a dangerous situation, such as FEAR IS A FLUID IN A CON-
TAINER (e. g., Il était rempli de peurs).
The second group, ‘external fears,’ subsumes all metaphors grounded in the
assumption that fear is originally not a part of the body, but something forced
upon it from the outside, such as an INTRUSION, e. g., la peur s’empare de lui.
In the latter case, there is no distinction made as to whether the cause of the
fear is personiVed (human, animal or ghost) or perceived as an illness or a natural
force (être submerge par la peur).
Both categories, internal and external fear, share the attribute that ‘fear’ can ap-
pear in form of a Wuid in both of them, e. g., il était rempli de peurs (CONTAINER)
vs. être submerge par la peur (NATURAL FORCE).
Interestingly, given the fact that the semantic Veld of fear shares many of the
cited metonymies and metaphors with other emotions such as ‘love’ (le cœur qui
bat la chamade), the only metonymy which can be considered as exclusive for
the domain of fear, the simultaneous appearance of hot and cold temperatures
(avoir des sueurs froides), a very intense sensation, can also be traced back to a
Wuid taking over the whole body of the experiencer (Dobrovol’skij & Piirainen,
2005).
The fact that all fear metaphors Vt either one of these two categories shows
that fear is closely linked to the body. Fear is a bodily experience and this fact is
also expressed linguistically with the help of the body as an anchorage point. Due
to this close connection to the body, it comes as no surprise that the contrastive
analysis represents little variation. The metaphoric and metonymic realizations of
‘fear’ seem to be very similar in French, Spanish, German and English: e. g., Span-
ish estar dominado/atenazado por el miedo/pánico, quedarse petriVcado/clavado de
miedo, ser invadido por el miedo, ser vencido por el miedo, German von Angst be-
herrscht sein, vor Angst wie versteinert sein (Bresson & Dobrovol’skij 1995, Dobro-
vol’skij & Piirainen 2005, Gyoeri 1998) with only slight diUerences or speciVca-
tion, such as in example 2c:
(2) (a) French
Elle tremblait comme une feuille.
(b) Spanish
Temblaba como una hoja.
‘She was trembling like a leaf.’
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(c) German
Sie zitterte wie Espenlaub.
‘She was trembling like an aspen leaf [lit. aspen leaves]’
Interestingly, the color spectrum diUers slightly from language to language. While
in English a person experiencing fear can be pale, white as a sheet, gray with fear
or caught in a blue funk, or even green about the gills (similar to French pâlir
or blêmir ‘to become pale’, être blanc/bleu de peur ‘to be white/blue from fear’,
être/rester bleu ‘to be/stay blue’, devenir vert de peur/verdir de peur ‘to go green
with fear’), in Spanish and Italian a scared person can also turn yellow (Spanish
ponerse amarillo, Italian diventare giallo ‘to go yellow’). The reaction of the skin is
expressed in all analyzed languages through a comparison with poultry: ‘goose’
in English and German (English goose bumps, goose pimples, German Gänsehaut
[lit. goose skin]), ‘hen’ in French avoir la chair de poule and Spanish ponérsele
carne de gallina [lit. to have/get hen Wesh].
To sum it up, the aim of this section was not to single out as many features
as possible but to show that fear is – even linguistically – a bodily experience.
As has been illustrated, the bodily reactions (including the hypothalamus and
the vegetative system) activated after the Vrst realization of a potential danger
(fear as a physical emergency state), such as accelerated heartbeat, changes in
blood pressure, breathing, muscle tension, sweating, constipation, faint, rubes-
cence, etc. have all left linguistic traces.
Fear in language is either presented as a physical reaction or as a threat to
the body. The metonymic processes describe the symptoms of experience of fear
(direct or internal process). In other words: fear and body are one.
The metaphoric examples represent fear as something that is already a part of
the body (internal fear) or added to the body (external fear): fear and body are
connected.
Both strategies, metaphor and metonymy, are used to render an entity of the
so-called ‘invisible world,’ namely ‘fear,’ which attacks the whole body without
always being visible or detectable for an outsider or potential recipient, although
more visible for the latter. A similar strategy, which has even led to lexical and
grammatical changes, will be analyzed in the following section.
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4 Fear and the discourse world
The concept of ‘fear’ can be expressed with the help of nouns (Section 2), meta-
phors and metonymies (Section 3). This section will focus on the verbal real-
ization of fear. In dealing with the semantic Veld of fear, it is very salient that
the verbal counterparts seem either restricted or are absent. For example, the
French terms peur ‘fear’, anxiété ‘anxiety’ and horreur ‘horror’ do not display
verbal counterparts (e. g., in the case of French peur or horreur there only exist
causative counterparts: apeurer or horriVer).
The gap in French is Vlled with verbs derived from diUerent stems such as re-
douter or craindre. The semantic range of redouter and craindre varies, depending
on the context, between ‘to worry’ and ‘to fear.’ In certain contexts, the meaning
of these two verbs can even be interpreted as ‘to expect,’ as in examples (3a) and
(3b). In combination with a negation craindre can also mean ‘to like,’ as in example
(3c).
(3) (a) French (Manchette 1973:224 [FT])
Il a pris les choses beaucoup mieux que je ne craignais.
(b) French (Jonquet 1993:387 [FT])
Dès que j’ai appris que KaVn avait vécu ici, j’ai redouté le pire!
(c) French (DDC)
On ne craintpas un peu de cognac?
As the quote from Stendhal ‘Je tremble toujours de n’avoir écrit qu’un soupir,
quand je crois avoir noté une vérité’ and the etymology of French craindre (<Latin
tremere ‘to shiver’) illustrate, fear can be expressed, as already shown in Section
3, as a bodily experience:
(4) French (Jonquet 1993:81 [FT])
(a) L’humidité le Vt frissonner. (. . . )
(b) L’homme resta encore quelques minutes posté derrière sa fenêtre (. . . )
puis disparut. Nadia frissonna (. . . ).
While in example (4a) the shivering is not caused by fear, in example (4b) fear
is not only the source of the shivering but the experience of fear is also the
intended interpretation of the verb. A similar interpretation of ‘fear as the target’
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is intended in Tremblez riches votre Paris est encerclé on le brûlera (Manchette
1972:164 [FT]).
The semantic Veld of fear can also be combined with a number of verbs marking
the aktionsart or in other words focusing on a speciVc phase of the experience of
fear, such as the French prendre peur [lit. ‘take fear’] (inchoative), perdre peur
‘lose fear’ (terminative) or faire peur, inspirer de la peur [lit. ‘make/inspire fear’]
(causative). Interestingly sentences such as je ressens de la peur ‘I am feeling fear’
are not used in order to express fear at the actual moment of experiencing it
(Cislaru 2009).
The immediate experience of fear is not communicated synthetically but with
the help of an analytic construction of a noun or adjective and a copula or empty
verb (Stroebel 2010, 2011). The fear experience is expressed as ‘possessing’ a
psychological state, e. g., Marie a peur [lit. ‘Mary has fear’] ‘Mary is scared’ or as
being in a psychological state as in French Marie est angoissée, anxieuse, eUrayée
‘Mary is afraid, scared.’
In English too, to fear seems to be restricted to expressing the fact that some-
body is experiencing fear at the moment of speech and an analytic construction
such as ‘to be afraid’ or ‘to be scared’ is preferred. One of the reasons for this
might be that ‘to fear’ is transitive and therefore needs an object. In many fear
situations, the source of the fear is not always clear; most of the time it is just
a vague feeling. With an analytic construction, the reason for the experience of
fear can be left open and does not have to be named. Another reason – if we com-
pare this with other utterances lacking syntactic verbal counterparts such as ‘I am
hungry’ – is that by using the copula or an empty verb construction the utterance
not only appears more closely linked to the speaker but also the relevance of the
utterance for the discourse world is explicitly underlined (Stroebel 2010).
In other words, an utterance with ‘to be afraid’ is not only more closely linked
to the speaker, but also refers to a more immediate or tangible situation. ‘To
fear,’ in contrast to ‘I am afraid,’ implies a lack of knowledge and underlines the
uncertainty of a future event (e. g., fear the worst vs. *to be afraid of the worst,
Wierzbicka 1999:74). The meaning of to be afraid can also be disconnected from
fear and simply be used as an intensiVer, e. g., I am afraid, I cannot help you ( I
really cannot help you, see Section 5), while to be scared is still clearly associated
with the sensation of fear.
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The semantic Veld of fear shares the fact that stative constructions are used
in order to express a physical sensation relevant to the actual speech act (e. g.,
‘have + abstract noun’) with many other sensations connected to the discourse
world (e. g., French J’ai faim, soif, mal à la tête [lit. ‘I have hunger, thirst, (a)
headache’]). While the use of avoir is possible with a great number of nominal
representations of fear, e. g., avoir peur, crainte, eUroi, frayeur, terreur, angoisse,
appréhension, couardise, frousse, trouille, panique, trac, etc., the use is restricted
with other emotions such as *avoir (de la) jalousie, *avoir (du) colère, etc. This
might be due to the fact, that in these cases the focus is more on the fact that the
speaker is in a state of jealousy or anger (je suis jaloux, je suis en colère), than on
the relevance to the discourse world. The combination with avoir can therefore
be regarded as an attempt to render an ‘entity of the invisible world’ such as ‘fear’
less abstract by presenting it as an object in the possession of the speaker at the
moment of speech.
The relation between fear and the body of the speaker is strengthened and the
importance of the utterance for the actual situation is underlined.
While the French copula construction Il est peureuxmarks the trait of a person,
the combination with avoir in Il a peur (lit. ‘He has fear’) underlines the relevance
to the ‘here and now’ of the speech act. In these constructions, or in other words
in combination with an abstract noun, avoir has lost its (original) durative or trait
character (e. g., elle a des yeux bleus, une maison, etc.). As a consequence, in order
to express that avoir in these examples is not related to a speciVc moment or
situation, another linguistic element, such as ‘always’ has to be added, e. g., Il a
toujours peur [lit. ‘He has always fear’]. Or vice versa, a speciVcation, such as ‘in
this (particular) situation’ has to be added to the copula construction in order to
get rid of the durative interpretation, e. g., Il était trop peureux dans cette situation
‘He was too afraid in this situation.’
In other words, the analytic or empty verb construction expresses that an in-
dividual experiences fear in the discourse world. This close connection to the
present can fade with a rise in frequency of this construction. Further semantic
developments will be analyzed in the following section.
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5 Fear as source
In Sections 2 to 4 the semantic Veld of ‘fear’ has been analyzed with a focus on
the nominal, metaphoric, metonymic and predicative representations of fear. In
all these cases, the aim of the linguistic encoding was to express the experience of
‘fear.’ ‘Fear’ can be seen as the target – even outside of a linguistic perspective.
This last section will focus on the opposite case: ‘fear as the source.’ More
speciVcally: the source for intensity markers.
With time, the close connection between the physical reactions that result
from being confronted with a potential danger can fade, but also the connection
with the trigger, or, in other words, the relevance to the dangerous situation
itself. As a consequence, fear expressions can also surface in utterances, such as
French J’ai peur qu’il ne revienne très tard (Vian 1948:29, FT). In these examples,
expressions originating in the semantic Veld of fear are used in order to underline
an assumption or even a conviction.
In French, it is quite common to see members of the semantic Veld turn into
intensity markers of subjective statements, e. g., ça craint! [lit. ‘it fears’] ‘It sucks!’
or formidable (< Latin formidare ‘to fear’) ‘great,’ similar to awesome (< Old En-
glish ege ‘fear’ [EO]).
In noun-adjective combinations, e. g., une peur panique, une peur terrible, it
becomes clear that the adjective in the semantic Veld of fear is being used in
order to intensify the noun from the same semantic Veld. The association to
‘fear’ can also be preserved in combination with a noun out of a diUerent semantic
Veld, e.g., une expérience horrible, une chaleur horrible, un eUrayant genie (similar
Iñesta & Pamies 2002). In other words, even the negative meaning vanishes and
the adjectives and adverbs from the semantic Veld of fear are used as simple
intensiVers, such as c’est horriblement cher, il faisait horriblement chaud, sa lettre
m’a fait terriblement plaisir, etc.
In all these examples, fear expressions are used as intensiVers. In other words,
members of the semantic Veld of fear are used as a source in order to express
‘intensity’ [target]. In this particular use, fear expressions are – via semantic
bleaching – deprived of their original negative connotations and even function as
‘positive’ markers.
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6 Conclusion
The analysis of the semantic Veld of fear has shown, that ‘fear’ – an entity of the
‘invisible world’ – is particularly suitable for analyzing the interaction between
semantic and conceptual properties or, in other words, between the source and
the target domain (LakoU 1987, 1993).
It has been illustrated that the imagery and the meaning are closely connected.
Embodiment plays a predominant role in the synthetic (e. g., nominal, adjectival
and verbal realizations) and analytic (e. g., metonymic, metaphoric expressions
and complex predicates) representations of this particular Veld. Embodiment can
be regarded as a universal source domain for fear with two diUerent ways of
perception. First, fear as a part of the body independent of whether somebody is
exposed to a dangerous situation or not, or secondly, as something external forced
upon the body. Furthermore, the range of the linguistic encoding of fear combines
two broad categories of experience, namely sensory and subjective. While the
Vrst type is related to image schemas (as presented in Sections 3 and 4), the
second operates along Vxed parameters (Section 2). Finally, it has been shown
that ‘intensity’ plays an important factor not only in the experience of fear, but
also in its linguistic encoding. As a consequence, negative marked expressions
can not only function as a productive source for intensiVers (or quantiVers), but
can also allow a positive reading in certain contexts.
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Metonymic Euphemisms from a
Cognitive Linguistic Point of View
Alexander Tokar
Abstract
This article presents a classiVcation of metonymy-based euphemism-formation
mechanisms from a cognitive linguistic point of view. It is argued that all met-
onymic euphemisms can be analyzed as products of three major euphemism-
formation strategies: 1) violation of the principle important over less impor-
tant; 2) violation of the principle specific over generic; and 3) violation of the
principle more true over less true.
1 Introduction
It is a well-known fact that taboo-marked concepts are often expressed by met-
onymic euphemisms, i. e., expressions like to sleep with somebody and boyfriend,
whose euphemistic senses “to copulate with somebody” / “a regular male sexual
partner of almost any age over puberty in a non-marital sexual relationship”
are contiguously related to their literal senses “to be in the state of sleep” / “a
friend who is a boy.” Thus, a person with whom a woman has a regular non-
marital sexual relationship is often perceived as her friend in the literal meaning
of this word, i. e., as any person whom she “know[s] well and regard[s] with
aUection and trust” (WordNet). Additionally, copulation is often followed by
physical sleeping, i. e., lovers have sex and then fall asleep together in the same
bed.
However, despite the recognition of the role of metonymy as an important
euphemism-formation mechanism (e. g., Blank, 1999), there have been almost no
studies on the typology of metonymic euphemisms, i. e., studies dealing with the
Thomas Gamerschlag, Doris Gerland, Rainer Osswald & Wiebke Petersen
(eds.). 2015. Meaning, Frames, and Conceptual Representation. Düsseldorf:
dup.
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question of whether metonymy-based euphemisms prefer a particular semantic
pattern (e. g., part-for-whole metonymy) and, if so, why this is the case. Drawing
upon the seminal work on metonymy by Kövecses & Radden (1998), this article
attempts to Vll in the research gap by classifying metonymic euphemisms into the
following three categories: 1) metonymic euphemisms whose vehicle concepts vi-
olate the principle important over less important; 2) metonymic euphemisms
whose vehicle concepts violate the principle specific over generic; and 3) meto-
nymic euphemisms whose vehicle concepts violate the principle more true over
less true.
The article utilizes the following structure. The next section discusses the de-
Vning characteristics of euphemistic expressions. That is, for example, how do we
know that the aforementioned to sleep with somebody and boyfriend are indeed eu-
phemisms? The following section provides a general classiVcation of euphemism-
formation mechanisms into semantic and non-semantic types: Among other
things, it will be argued that all semantically motivated euphemisms can be an-
alyzed as products of either metonymic or metaphoric semantic change. The Vnal
sections present a critical discussion of the distinction between default and non-
default metonymies proposed by Kövecses & Radden (1998) and elaborate on the
classiVcation of metonymic euphemisms into the three categories named above.
2 Euphemism and related phenomena
A euphemism can be deVned as an indirect means of expressing a taboo-marked
(i. e., a distasteful, unpleasant) concept.1 For example, the euphemistic phrase
to sleep with somebody expresses the taboo-marked meaning “to copulate with
somebody” without explicitly referring to the taboo subject sex: To sleep with
somebody literally means “to spend time together while being in the state of sleep,”
not “to have sex.” Similarly, the compound boyfriend expresses the taboo-marked
meaning “a regular male sexual partner in a non-marital sexual relationship”
1 In this respect, a euphemism may not diUer from a dysphemism. For example, just like the eu-
phemism to sleep with somebody, the dysphemism to bang somebody can also be seen as an indirect
means of expressing the taboo-marked meaning “to have sex with somebody”: To bang does not
literally mean “to copulate” but “to strike sharply” (Merriam-Webster Online). The diUerence be-
tween the two expressions is that the euphemism to sleep with somebody is a much more polite
means of expressing the meaning “to have sex” than the dysphemism to bang somebody: According
to Merriam-Webster Online, the latter is a vulgar expression.
238
Metonymic Euphemisms from a Cognitive Linguistic Point of View
without explicitly referring to the fact that a boyfriend is a sexual partner: If we
consider only the literal meanings of the components boy and friend, we arrive
at the taboo-free meaning “a friend who is a boy,” not “a sexual partner.”
According to Holder (2008:vii), “In speech or writing we use euphemism for
dealing with taboo or sensitive subjects. It is therefore the language of eva-
sion, hypocrisy, prudery, and deceit.” A more recent study (Moskvin, 2010:75–99),
however, insists on the separation of euphemism from related phenomena, such
as, for example, lie. To illustrate this point, let us consider the following utter-
ance: Daddy’s in Heaven to explain that “Daddy is dead.” Like sexuality, death
is (in many cultures) a taboo-marked topic, which has given rise to numerous
euphemistic expressions. Already in 1936, Louise Pound published an article enti-
tled “American Euphemisms for Dying, Death, and Burial: An Anthology” (1936),
in which she mentioned such death-related phrases and utterances as he has left
us, gone from us, sunk into his last sleep, called to the eternal sleep, laid to rest, rests
in peace till we meet again, gone to his Heavenly Father, gone to meet his Savior,
answered the Vnal call, played his last card, etc.
What is particularly interesting about these expressions is that most of them
can be used as both euphemisms and non-euphemisms. With regard to the latter,
consider the following situation: The speaker of Daddy’s in Heaven is a religious
person who Vrmly believes in the afterlife. Evidently, the utterance Daddy’s in
Heaven is, for that speaker, in no respect diUerent from an utterance like Daddy’s
in Berlin now (uttered when the speaker knows that Daddy is indeed in Berlin
now) and, accordingly, cannot be regarded as a euphemism (Moskvin, 2010:105).
Consider the opposite situation: The speaker of Daddy’s in Heaven does not be-
lieve in life after death. S/he knows that, in reality, Daddy is not in heaven, but is
dead and buried in the ground. However, in order not to shock the dead Daddy’s
small child who wants to know where his/her father now is, the speaker does not
tell the truth, Daddy’s dead, but instead says Daddy’s in Heaven. In this case, the
utterance in question is also not a euphemism but a lie, just like the utterance
Daddy’s in Berlin now uttered when the speaker knows that Daddy is now not in
Berlin but instead in, e. g., Kabul.
According to Moskvin (2010:93–94), euphemism is diUerent from lie in that
in the former case, the speaker does not intend to deceive or mislead the hearer.
That is, for example, when a speaker of English utters a euphemistic utterance like
John sleeps with Sarah and John is Sarah’s boyfriend, s/he does not want to disguise
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the facts that John and Sarah do not merely sleep together in the same bed and
that John is more than just a friend who is a boy. Instead, the speaker wants to
communicate the taboo-marked meanings “John copulates with Sarah” and “John
is Sarah’s regular sexual partner to whom she is not oXcially married” without
explicitly referring to the taboo subject sex. Hence, a death-related utterance like
Daddy’s in Heaven can be regarded as a euphemism only in one case: When the
speaker wants to indirectly communicate the taboo-marked meaning “Daddy is
dead,” but not when the speaker wants to conceal the fact of Daddy’s death from
the hearer. While the former is a euphemism, the latter is a lie. (We will return
to this distinction in the Vnal section of this article.)
3 Euphemism-formation mechanisms: a general
classiVcation
Having speciVed the deVnition of euphemism, we can now proceed to euphemism-
formation mechanisms, i. e., the question of how euphemistic expressions like to
sleep with somebody, boyfriend, to be in Heaven, gone from us, etc. come into
existence. This issue has been extensively dealt with in a number of studies.
For example, Moskvin (2010:163–227, 2001:64–67) discusses how euphemisms are
formed in present-day Russian. Reutner (2009:119–154) addresses the same ques-
tion with respect to French and Italian. Farghal (1995) deals with euphemism-
formation mechanisms in Arabic. Adams (1981) is concerned with the formation
of sexual euphemisms in Latin. As far as the English language is concerned, this
question has been dwelled upon by Warren (1992) and, more recently, by Linfoot-
Ham (2005), Crespo Fernández (2008, 2007, 2006a, 2006b), and Halmari (2011).
(The latter article is concerned with one particular instance of euphemization:
a recent replacement of premodiVed nouns like disabled people by postmodiVed
nouns like people with disabilities.)
Traditionally, euphemism-formation mechanisms have been classiVed into se-
mantic and non-semantic types (e. g., Warren, 1992:134). An instance of the lat-
ter is the famous inVxed form with an expletive meaning absoschmuckinglutely
(which, according to Adams (1999), can be better described as a euphemistic dys-
phemism). The euphemistic eUect is achieved here by means of a consonant
change in the original expletive inVx –fucking–: [f] is replaced by the cluster
[ʆm], as a result of which absoschmuckinglutely can express the same expletive
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meaning as absofuckinglutely, without, however, evoking the negative connota-
tions inherent in -fucking-. Also, instead of changing [f] to [ʆm], fuck can be
abbreviated to f – e. g., I’m sorry I said the f-word (Davies, 2008-).
Apart from consonant interchange, abbreviation, and other phonetic modiV-
cations, non-semantic strategies are sometimes said to include borrowing (e. g.,
Moskvin, 2001:67). However, as will be shown below, a loanword often functions
as a euphemism not only because it is a loanword, but also because its source
language literal meaning is not identical with the taboo-marked meaning that it
expresses in the language of a borrowing community. For instance, a doctoral
thesis defended at a German university can be graded with the Latin expression
cum laude, which literally means “with praise” (Brockhaus, 2005-2006). How-
ever, despite its literal meaning in Latin, cum laude is a rather poor dissertation
grade in Germany. Thus, a person whose doctoral degree was awarded cum laude
is not eligible for most post-doctoral stipends or fellowships, and his thesis will
most likely not be accepted for publication by a serious academic press (see, e. g.,
“Forschungsstipendien für promovierte Nachwuchswissenschaftler (Postdoc-Pro-
gramm),” n. d.). Accordingly, the euphemistic use of cum laude is possible not
only because of the non-German origin of the phrase under consideration (i. e.,
the fact that the majority of German speakers do not know what cum laudemeans
in Latin), but also because of its literal meaning in Latin (“with praise”), which is
a converse of what it actually stands for in German (“poor dissertation”). (The
latter fact allows the grader to maximize praise2 of his doctoral student who pre-
sented a poorly written dissertation.) A somewhat similar example is the French
borrowing à outrance (literally “to the utmost”), which, in English, is sometimes
used as a euphemism for extramarital copulation – e. g., I think if anyone read
carefully they would say it was an aUair à outrance (Holder, 2008:75). Again, as
in the case of cum laude in German, it can be argued that à outrance functions
as a euphemism in English not only because it was borrowed from French but
also because its French literal meaning of “to the utmost” is not identical with the
euphemistic sense “extramarital copulation.” (As a matter of fact, à outrance can
be used in English not only as a euphemism for “extramarital copulation” but also
as a non-euphemistic adverb meaning “to the limit” (Merriam-Webster Online),
i. e., what à outrance means in French.)
2 In the sense of the maxim of praise of the Leechian politeness principle (see, e. g., Cruse, 2004:37).
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As for purely semantic means, euphemistic expressions can be classiVed into
instances of metonymic and metaphoric semantic change. Following LakoU and
Turner (1989:103), the diUerence between metonymy and metaphor can be de-
scribed as within-domain mapping (metonymy) versus cross-domain mapping
(metaphor). A conceptual domain is “a more generalized ‘background’ knowledge
conVguration against which conceptualization is achieved” (Taylor, 2002:195). For
example, in order to understand the meaning of cum laude in German, we need
the concept of dissertation grades in German universities, of which the concept
of cum laude is a part. Accordingly, we can claim that the former is the domain
against which the latter is conceptualized in German.
Like other metonymic expressions, metonymic euphemisms can be classiVed
into whole-for-part, part-for-whole, and part-for-part metonymies. A part-for-
part metonymy is a metonymy like cum laude, whose vehicle concept (i. e., its
literal meaning) stands for another element within the same conceptual domain.
Thus, both the literal meaning “with praise” and the euphemistic sense “poor
quality” can be regarded as evaluative characteristics of a doctoral dissertation:
i. e., a grader can come to the conclusion that a Ph.D. thesis either deserves praise
or is of poor quality. However, when the latter is the case, the thesis is graded
cum laude, even though the grader knows that the thesis is of poor quality and
thus does not deserve to be praised. (When the grader comes to the conclusion
that the thesis is of good quality and hence deserves praise, s/he grades it with
either magna cum laude or summa cum laude, but never with cum laude.) Ac-
cordingly, the euphemistic use of cum laude as a dissertation grade in Germany
is an instance of part-for-part metonymy: one element of the domain evalua-
tive characteristics of a doctoral thesis (“with praise”) stands for another
element of the same domain (“poor quality”).
A part-for-whole metonymy is a metonymy like boyfriend, whose vehicle con-
cept stands for an entire conceptual domain of which it is a part: As stated in
the beginning of the article, boyfriends are often perceived by their girlfriends
as friends in the literal meaning of this word (i. e., as any persons whom they
know well and regard with aUection and trust). Accordingly, the literal concept
of friendship can be said to constitute part of the concept of boyfriend-ship, i. e.,
a boyfriend is not only a sexual partner in a non-marital sexual relationship but
also a friend.
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Finally, a whole-for-part metonymy is a metonymy like adult for “erotic /
pornographic” – e. g., in the phrase an adult Web site – whose euphemistic sense
“erotic / pornographic” is an instance (or a part) of the vehicle concept “adult.” The
adjective adult literally means “fully developed and mature” (Merriam-Webster
Online). Accordingly, the phrase an adult Web site could have meant “any Web
site suitable for fully developed and mature people.” However, an adult Web site is
a particular instance of a Web site appropriate for adults: a Web site that contains
pornographic material.
Metaphoric euphemisms fall into those that realize conceptual metaphors and
those that are based on one-shot or image metaphors. Conceptual metaphors
are characterized by systematic correspondences between their source and target
domains (e. g., LakoU & Johnson, 1980:52–55). This means that more than one
expression pertaining to one and the same source domain can be used in con-
nection with one and the same target domain. For example, the collocation to
come to an orgasm (as well as its elliptic version to come) realizes the conceptual
metaphor purposes are destinations (cf. Crespo Fernández, 2008:101): Apart
from an orgasm, we also come to a conclusion, a solution, a decision, a verdict,
a result, etc. Also, in addition to coming, an orgasm can be reached (e. g., “Are
you having trouble reaching orgasm? A guide for women,” 2011, May 22) and
arrived at (e. g., A very distinctive feature with the female orgasm is that women
Vnd it quite hard to arrive at an orgasm from intercourse alone, “How to Make
Your Woman Reach an Orgasm Fast!”, 2012, February 29). By contrast, one-shot
metaphors involve less systematic correspondences between their source and tar-
get domains and are, therefore, perceived as more metaphoric and Vgurative than
conceptual metaphors (Tokar, 2009:8–10). For example, to ride meaning “to cop-
ulate with a man in the woman-on-top position” seems to have a much higher
degree of metaphoricity than to come meaning “to achieve an orgasm.” This is
because apart from the visual similarity between a person sitting on a horse / bi-
cycle while riding it and a woman sitting on her sexual partner while copulating
with him, no other element of the source domain riding a horse / bicycle takes
part in the mapping onto the target domain copulating in the woman-on-top
position. Thus, a male sexual partner whom a woman rides is neither a horse nor
a bicycle. We are justiVed in claiming this because neither to ride a horse nor to
ride a bicycle occurs in the sense “to copulate with a man while being on top.”
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Since metonymic mappings involve no more than one conceptual domain while
metaphoric mappings are cross-domain mappings, metonymic euphemisms can
usually be relatively easily distinguished from metaphoric euphemisms: In the
former case, we feel that there is a more or less real link between what the ex-
pression under analysis literally means and what it denotes as a euphemism. For
example, there is a real link between the meanings “with praise” and “poor qual-
ity”: Both are evaluative characteristics that can be given to a doctoral thesis.
Similarly, there is a real link between the meanings “a friend” and “a sexual part-
ner”: Sexual partners are often perceived as friends. Finally, there is a real link
between the meanings “adult” and “pornographic”: Pornography is believed to
be harmful to children and is, therefore, appropriate for adults only. By contrast,
in the case of a metaphoric euphemism, no such link can be established. Thus,
there is no real link between the meanings “to come” and “to achieve an orgasm”:
Because copulation typically does not involve motion (i. e., lovers do not move
from one place to another while having sex), reaching an orgasm cannot be an
instance of coming. Similarly, there is no real link between the meanings “to ride”
and “to copulate with a man while being on top of him”: Since a male lover whom
a woman copulates with while being on top is neither a horse nor a bicycle, sexual
riding cannot be an instance of physical riding.
In addition to metonymic and metaphoric euphemisms, Warren (1992:131–
132) classiVes semantically motivated euphemisms into instances of the following
mechanisms:
• particularization; e. g., satisfaction for “orgasm.” This euphemistic meaning
of “orgasm” represents a subcategory of the literal meaning “satisfaction”:
an orgasm is a kind of satisfaction.
• implication; e. g., to go to the toilet for “to urinate and / or defecate.” There
is an antecedent–consequent relationship between the literal meaning of “to
go to the toilet” and the euphemistic meaning of “to urinate / defecate”: First
of all, we physically move to the place toilet, and only then do we urinate
and / or defecate in it.
• reversal or irony; e. g., enviable disease for “syphilis.” The euphemistic use
of this expression creates an ironic eUect, since syphilis is, of course, not an
enviable disease.
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• understatement or litotes; e. g., drug habit for “drug addiction.” The undesir-
able feature drug addiction is downgraded to drug habit, which can be
any habit concerning drugs.
• overstatement or hyperbole; e. g., sanitary engineer for “garbage collector.”
The non-prestigious occupation of a garbage collector is upgraded to that of
an engineer.
This article argues against this classiVcation. The major problemwithWarren’s
approach is the fact that it distinguishes between particularization, implication,
and metonymy-based euphemisms. Let us begin with the category of particu-
larization. As stated above, particularization euphemisms are expressions like
satisfaction for “orgasm,” whose euphemistic senses represent a subcategory of
what they literally mean. To be more precise, there exists a hyponym–hypernym
relationship between the former and the latter. For example, the meaning “or-
gasm” is a hyponym of the meaning “satisfaction,” since, as already mentioned,
an orgasm is a kind of satisfaction. Similarly, the euphemistic meaning of the pill,
as in, for example, she is on the pill, which stands for “she uses contraceptive pills,”
is a hyponym of the literal meaning of “pill”: A contraceptive pill is a kind of pill.
In summary, in particularization euphemisms, such as satisfaction and the pill,
the euphemistic eUect results from the replacement of a taboo-marked hyponym
(orgasm, contraceptive pill) by a taboo-free hypernym (satisfaction, the pill), the
latter having a very broad meaning that subsumes a number of taboo-free hy-
ponyms – e. g., apart from contraceptive pills, there are headache pills, sleeping
pills, vitamin pills, etc.
Following Moskvin (2001:65, 2010:194–195), this euphemism-formation mecha-
nism can perhaps be better referred to as hypernymization, rather than as partic-
ularization; regardless of our terminological choice, however, it must be stressed
that all euphemisms of this type are metonymies. Indeed, as correctly analyzed by
Kövecses (2006:104), just like the previously mentioned example adult for “porno-
graphic,” the euphemistic use of the pill represents a whole-for-part metonymy
in which the conceptual domain pill evokes one of its members: the category of
contraceptive pills. In the same way, in the case of satisfaction for “orgasm,” the
conceptual domain satisfaction stands for one of its parts: sexual satisfaction
/ orgasm.
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Now, let us proceed to the category of implication. That the distinction be-
tween metonymy-based and implication euphemisms is untenable can be illus-
trated with the example bathroom for “toilet.” According to Warren, bathroom
can be analyzed as a metonymic euphemism because of the locative relationship
between the senses “a room with a bath” and “toilet”: Toilets often contain a
bathtub. (Or alternatively, a bathroom is a room that, apart from a bathtub, also
often contains a lavatory pan.) At the same time, however, it can be argued that
the euphemistic use of bathroom is motivated by the antecedent–consequent rela-
tionship between the events of using a lavatory pan and using a bath. That
is, before taking a bath, people usually urinate / defecate in a lavatory pan. (The
fact that one and the same room often contains both a bathtub and a lavatory pan
corroborates the antecedent–consequent motivation of bathroom.)
A very similar example is the utterance Where can I wash my hands? which,
as Kövecses & Radden (1998:72) point out, can stand for “Where is the nearest
toilet?” On the one hand, the underlying motivation seems to be of a locative
character: Toilets contain washbasins so that toilet visitors can wash their hands.
At the same time, however, the euphemistic use of this utterance can be said
to be motivated by the antecedent–consequent relationship between the events
urination / defecation andwashing hands. In the prototypical case, the latter
immediately follows the former: People urinate / defecate in a lavatory pan and
then wash their hands in a washbasin. (This explains why toilets are places that
contain washbasins.)
The fact that one and the same euphemism can be plausibly analyzed as an
instance of both implication and metonymy clearly indicates that the distinc-
tion between these two categories cannot be sustained. Like particularization
euphemisms, euphemisms involving an antecedent–consequent relationship be-
tween their literal and euphemistic senses are also metonymies. The only diUer-
ence is that implication euphemisms – such as to go to the toilet and Where can
I wash my hands? – are not whole-for-part, but rather, they are part-for-whole
metonymies. That is, for example, the act of (literally) going to some toilet is part
of the prototypical scenario of using toilets: In order to urinate / defecate, we,
Vrst of all, literally go to the place toilet. The same can be said about washing
hands. This concept is also part of the prototypical scenario of using toilets: After
urination / defecation, we typically wash our hands.
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With regard to the categories of litotes / understatement and hyperbole / over-
statement, the following must be noted. As analyzed by Warren (1992), using
drug habit for “drug addiction” is an instance of litotes because the negative
feature drug addiction is downgraded to drug habit (which can be any fea-
ture regarding drugs), whereas the use of sanitary engineer acts as an instance
of hyperbole because the non-prestigious occupation garbage collector is up-
graded to engineer. The problem with this analysis is that it confuses semantic
euphemism-formation mechanisms (metonymy and metaphor) with pragmatic
eUects achieved by them (under- and overstatement). What is meant by this is
that, similar to satisfaction and the pill, drug habit can also be analyzed as a whole-
for-part metonymy in which the conceptual domain drug habit stands for one
of its members: the category of drug addiction. This semantic strategy underlies
the euphemistic use of drug habit and results in the pragmatic downgrading of
the negative feature drug addiction. (This eUect arises because drug addiction
is perceived as a bad habit. In contrast, in the case of satisfaction and the pill, there
is no pragmatic downgrading because neither an orgasm nor a contraceptive pill
is perceived as a bad subcategory of the domains satisfaction and pill: An or-
gasm is not a bad satisfaction, and a contraceptive pill is not a bad pill.) Similarly,
in sanitary engineer the underlying semantic strategy is not overstatement but a
part-for-part metonymy in which one member of the domain profession (engi-
neer) stands for another member of the same domain (garbage collector). As in
the case of drug addiction, the upgrading eUect arises because the occupation of a
garbage collector is perceived as less prestigious than that of an engineer.
In stark contrast to Warren (1992) and some more recent studies (Reutner,
2009:119–154; Moskvin, 2010:163–227), which propose even more reVned classiV-
cations, the present article recognizes only two semantic euphemism-formation
mechanisms: either a metonymic or a metaphoric extension of the euphemism’s
literal meaning. This view is in full accord with present-day diachronic seman-
tics (e. g., Traugott & Dasher, 2002), which recognizes only two types of seman-
tic change: metonymy and metaphor. On the contrary, authors like Warren
and Moskvin, who distinguish between metonymy and particularization / hy-
pernymization, seem to be inWuenced by the very old logico-rhetorical typology
of semantic change, whose origins “go back to Aristotle’s analysis of metaphor”
(Ullmann, 1967:203). Thus, for Anttila (1972:148) the semantic development of
hound (“any dog” in Old English > “a hunting dog of a particular breed” in Mod-
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ern English) is not a whole-for-part metonymy (in which, like in the case of
satisfaction and the pill, the name of the conceptual domain has begun to be
used as a metonym for one of its members) but an instance of semantic narrow-
ing. Whereas metonymy and metaphor involve a “transfer to another conceptual
sphere,” narrowing of meaning as exempliVed by hound constitutes a “change
within the same conceptual sphere,” i. e., a change that did not aUect the semantic
range of the item under consideration: Hound has retained the semantic com-
ponent [dog]. As stated above, this article rejects the logico-rhetorical approach
and regards semantic narrowing as a whole-for-part metonymy. Correspond-
ingly, cases of semantic widening, such as to arrive for “to arrive at sea” in Old
English > “to arrive anywhere and by any means of locomotion” in Modern En-
glish (Ullmann, 1967:204) are regarded as part-for-whole metonymies.
4 Default and non-default metonymies
In their landmark article entitled “Metonymy: Developing a Cognitive Linguistic
Point of View,” Kövecses & Radden (1998) raise the question of why some meto-
nymic expressions are hardly recognizable as expressions that do not mean what
they literally stand for. For example, Prime Minister of England is an unrecog-
nizable part-for-whole metonymy meaning “Prime Minister of the entire United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (of which England is a part)”: Eng-
land does not have its own Prime Minister. If Prime Minister of England were a
recognizable metonymy, its use would most likely give rise to a semantic anomaly
(cf. Prime Minister of Wales). Similarly, black coUee seems to be a hardly recog-
nizable part-for-whole metonymy meaning “coUee without added milk or cream”
(Mel’čuk, 1995:182): The vehicle meaning “black color” is a characteristic of the
intended target meaning “coUee without milk or cream” (i. e., the absence of milk
or cream in a cup of coUee usually results in its black color).
According to Kövecses & Radden (1998), the non-recognizability of metonym-
ies like England for the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland and black color for absence of milk or cream stems from the fact
that the choice of their vehicle concepts England and black color fulVlls at least
some of the cognitive principles of relative salience. These include, for example,
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• human over non-human
• concrete over abstract
• interactional over non-interactional
• immediate over non-immediate
• dominant over less dominant
• specific over generic
• good gestalt over poor gestalt
• central over peripheral
• relevant over less relevant
• important over less important
These principles “relate to three general determinants of conceptual organiza-
tion” (p. 63):
1. human experience; e. g., human over non-human, concrete over ab-
stract, etc.
2. perceptual selectivity; e. g., immediate over non-immediate, dominant
over less dominant, etc.
3. cultural preference; e. g., central over peripheral, important over less
important, etc.
What is important here is that “the more of [these] principles apply to a par-
ticular metonymic expression, the greater the cognitive motivation. As a result,
the metonymy will be regarded as natural or ‘default’” (p. 71). Thus, the unrec-
ognizable metonymy Prime Minister of England is a default metonymy because
its vehicle concept England fulVlls the principle dominant over less domi-
nant (relating to perceptual selectivity): England is the most dominant part of
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and can, therefore, be
easily understood as a metonym for the entire UK. Similarly, the hardly recog-
nizable metonymy black coUee is a default metonymy because its vehicle concept
black color fulVlls the principle immediate over non-immediate (also relating
to perceptual selectivity): i. e., Vrst of all, we see that a coUee is black, and only
then do we conclude that it contains no milk and cream.
Default metonymies like Prime Minister of England and black coUee can be con-
trasted with non-default metonymies, i. e., metonymic expressions whose vehicles
violate one or more of the above-named principles. For example, the euphemism
boyfriend can be considered a non-default metonymy because its vehicle concept
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friend violates the principle important over less important (or, alternatively,
the principles relevant over less relevant or central over peripheral), re-
lating to cultural preference. The most important characteristic of boyfriend-ship
is not friendship, but, rather, the sexual / romantic relationship between a woman
and her boyfriend. Friendship is, by contrast, a less important and / or less rel-
evant, even peripheral, characteristic. Thus, a woman can have more than one
literal friend, but only the one, who, in addition to being her friend, is also her
sexual partner qualiVes as her boyfriend. Similarly, the euphemism bathroom can
be analyzed as a non-default metonymy because its vehicle concept room with a
bath violates the same principles. The deVning characteristic of a toilet is that
its visitors urinate / defecate in a lavatory pan, not that they wash themselves in a
bathtub.
Given what has been said above, a question arises as to whether all metonymic
euphemisms can be regarded as non-default metonymies. (This question is left
unanswered by Kövecses and Radden because the focus of their article is not on
metonymic euphemisms but on all kinds of metonymic expressions and semantic
patterns underlying them.) The answer to this question depends on whether the
researcher equates default metonymies with unrecognizable metonymies, i. e., if
a given metonymic euphemism is not consciously recognized as an expression
that underwent metonymic reinterpretation, it can be considered a non-default
metonymy. Consider again the copulation euphemism to sleep with somebody.
As a Vrst approximation, this euphemism is also analyzable as a non-default
metonymy in which the choice of the vehicle concept violates the principle im-
portant over less important. Physical sleeping is a peripheral characteristic
of the copulation scenario: Far more important than spending time together in
the same bed at night or day time while being in the state of sleep is the fact
that lovers engage in sexual intercourse. At the same time, however, it is not
clear whether English speakers are consciously aware of this euphemism’s met-
onymic nature. Thus, observe the euphemistic use of to sleep with somebody in
contexts that do not involve physical sleeping; e. g., sex with a prostitute, after
which the customer typically goes away without literally sleeping with her (e. g.,
I recently learned that my husband has slept with many prostitutes in third world
countries, “Reckless Endangerment of Spouse – Legal Recourse?”, 2010). If to sleep
with somebody were a recognizable metonymy, than this euphemism would most
likely occur in sleeping contexts only. That is, it would refer not only to sexual
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intercourse (euphemistic meaning) but also to physical sleeping (literal meaning),
in other words, to a prototypical copulation scenario in which the former is im-
mediately followed by the latter. That to sleep with somebody does, however, occur
in non-sleeping contexts as well (and, what is more, this use does not give rise to
a semantic anomaly) corroborates the suggestion that the euphemistic meaning
“to copulate” does not activate the literal meaning “to sleep.” In this respect, to
sleep with somebody does not seem to be diUerent from the default metonymy
Prime Minister of England.
Alternatively, we can discard the recognizability criterion, i. e., regard a meto-
nymic euphemism like to sleep with somebody as non-default if its vehicle concept
violates at least some of the above-named principles. However, in this case, we
will inevitably run into the problem of mixed metonymies, i. e., metonymic ex-
pressions whose vehicle concepts simultaneously fulVll and violate one or the
other principle. A good example illustrating this point is to go to the toilet. On the
one hand, this euphemism is a non-default metonymy violating the principle im-
portant over less important: The literal act of going to a toilet is undoubtedly
a less important aspect of the using-a-toilet scenario than the act of urination /
defecation in it. On the other hand, however, to go to the toilet can be considered a
default metonymy because it is motivated by the antecedent–consequent relation
between its literal and euphemistic meaning and, accordingly, fulVlls the princi-
ple immediate over non-immediate: First of all, we physically go to the place
toilet and only then urinate / defecate in it. What is, then, the status of to go
to the toilet? Is it a default or a non-default metonymy?
5 Classifying metonymic euphemisms
Since it is not entirely clear in which case a metonymic expression qualiVes as de-
fault, this article does not apply the default–non-default distinction to metonymic
euphemisms. What it does instead, however, is classify metonymic euphemisms
with respect to the violation of one particular principle, the one which underlies
its euphemistic use. Thus, the fact that the vehicle concept of to go to the toilet
fulVlls the principle immediate over non-immediate does not really explain why
this expression can function as a euphemism for urination / defecation. (This does
explain, however, why to go to the toilet can be understood as a metonym for uri-
nation / defecation: In order to urinate / defecate, we, Vrst of all, need to literally
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go to some toilet.) What underlies the euphemistic function of to go to the toilet
is that the literal act of going to a toilet is a less important and a taboo-free aspect
of the using-a-toilet-scenario. Similarly, the literal act of sleeping is a less impor-
tant and a taboo-free characteristic of the copulation scenario; literal friendship
between a woman and her boyfriend is a less important and a taboo-free char-
acteristic of the concept of boyfriend-ship; etc.
5.1 Euphemisms violating the principle
important over less important
Metonymic euphemisms belonging to this category are metonymies like the afore-
mentioned examples to sleep with somebody, boyfriend, to go to the toilet, and
bathroom. In all of them, the euphemistic eUect results from the replacement of a
taboo-marked concept by a less important but taboo-free characteristic associated
with the same taboo subject.
Below are some other examples of metonymic euphemisms whose vehicle con-
cepts violate the principle important over less important. All of these ex-
amples have been taken from Richard Holder’s (2008) Oxford Dictionary of Eu-
phemisms.
As has been mentioned in connection with to sleep with somebody, metonym-
ic euphemisms belonging to this category can be used in contexts that are not
compatible with their literal meanings. That is, we can say John sleeps with Sarah
even if John and Sarah never fall asleep together in the same bed (e. g., McGlone
& Batchelor, 2003:251). Similarly, as Holder (2008:90) points out, the euphemistic
query Where’s the basement? can be “made in a building manifestly devoid of a
lower level.” The reason for this is obvious: Metonymic euphemisms like to sleep
with somebody and basement have vehicle concepts denoting peripheral charac-
teristics of the taboo-marked concepts that they express. That is, lovers do not
always fall asleep together after sex, and lavatories are not necessarily located in
building basements.
Given these uses of to sleep with somebody and basement, one of the anonymous
reviewers of this article raises the question of whether euphemisms like these can
still be regarded as metonymic euphemisms. That is, if lovers who have sex do
not always literally sleep with each other in the same bed, can we still claim that
in the case of to sleep with somebody, there exists a real link between the literal
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Table 1: Metonymic euphemisms violating the principle SPECIFIC OVER GENERIC
Euphemism Euphemistic
meaning
Violation of the principle
1 African-American “black” Much more important than being a person
whose ancestors came from Africa is the
fact that an African-American is a person
who has a black skin.
2 basement “lavatory” The fact that a lavatory is frequently lo-
cated in the basement of a shopping mall,
school, etc. is a rather peripheral charac-
teristic of the concept LAVATORY.
3 evacuee “a German citizen
(usually a Jew)
killed by the
Nazis”
Much more important than being literally
evacuated (i. e., removed from a military
zone or a dangerous place) is the fact that
evacuees were actually killed.
4 disturbed, as in,
e. g., disturbed
child
“naughty” Much more important than being literally
disturbed by somebody or something is the
fact that a disturbed child is naughty, i. e.,
that he or she does not behave well.
5 massage parlor /
sauna
“brothel” Much more important than being a place
where customers can get a massage / wash
themselves in a sauna is the fact that both a
massage parlor and a sauna are places for
paid sex.
6 mature “old” Much more important than being literally
mature (i. e., fully developed) is the fact
that a mature person is relatively old.
7 non-industrial
country
“poor and
relatively
uncivilized
country”
Much more important than the absence
of industry is the fact that a non-industrial
country is a poor country.
8 oldest profession “prostitution” Being the oldest profession is a peripheral
characteristic of the concept PROSTITUTION.
9 red lamp / red
light, as in, e. g.,
red light district
“brothel” Even though many brothels use red lamps
as their sign, this is, nevertheless, a periph-
eral characteristic of the concept BROTHEL.
10 visible “not
white-skinned”
Much more important than being literally
visible is the fact that a visible person does
not have a white skin.
meaning “to sleep” and the euphemistic meaning “to copulate”? According to the
reviewer, it can also be argued that “the two activities (sleeping with someone
and having sex with someone) share the aspect of privacy / intimacy, so that one
may be used as a metaphoric expression for the other.”
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In my view, the proposed analysis of to sleep with somebody as a metaphoric
euphemism is not correct. Despite the fact that sex is not always followed by
lovers’ co-sleeping, the expression to sleep with somebody still remains a meto-
nymically motivated euphemism. That is, when asked “Why can to sleep with
somebody be used as a euphemism for ‘to have sex’?”, a speaker of English, who
uses this expression in both sleeping and non-sleeping contexts, will still attribute
the idiomatic meaning “to have sex” to the antecedent–consequent relationship
between the events of having sex and sleeping: The latter is often immediately
followed by the former.
It is true that the activities of having sex and sleeping with someone share
the aspect of privacy / intimacy. However, this does not mean that to sleep with
somebody can be analyzed as a metaphoric euphemism. Quite the contrary – this
fact corroborates the metonymic analysis advocated in this article: We can claim
that to sleep with somebody is a part-for-part metonymy in which one element of
the domain privacy / intimacy – the concept of sleeping with someone – maps
onto another element within the same domain: the concept of having sex.
5.2 Euphemisms violating the principle specific over generic
Another euphemism-formation strategy involving metonymy is the violation of
the principle specific over generic (which, according to Kövecses & Radden
(1998:67–68), relates not to cultural preferences, but to perceptual selectivity).
This strategy underlies all whole-for-part metonymies like the previously men-
tioned adult Web site for “pornographic Web site,” satisfaction for “orgasm,” and
the pill for “contraceptive pill,” which Warren (1992) and Moskvin (2001, 2010) an-
alyze as instances of particularization / hypernymization. Euphemisms belonging
to this category violate the principle specific over generic because they express
rather speciVc concepts like pornographic Web site, orgasm, and contracep-
tive pill by means of rather generic concepts like adult Web site, satisfac-
tion, and the pill. Usually, the latter represents a hypernym of the former, but
observe the euphemistic use of do it in sentences like They did it, meaning “they
had sex with each other.” It is clear that do it cannot be a hypernym of copulate
because it is a deictic pronoun, which has no literal meaning of its own. As ar-
gued by Moskvin (2010:197–201), in the case of euphemistic utterances like They
did it, we are dealing with pronominalization, another important euphemism-
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formation mechanism, which must be distinguished from hypernymization. In
my view, however, this distinction is superWuous. In both pronominalization and
hypernymization euphemisms, the euphemistic eUect results from the violation of
one and the same principle: specific over generic: As in the case of adult Web
site, satisfaction, and the pill, do it represents a vehicle that has a very generic
meaning, i. e., apart from the taboo-marked target concept copulation, it can
refer to almost any activity.
Table 2 provides some further examples of euphemistic expression whose vehi-
cle concepts violate the principle specific over generic. All of these examples
have been taken from Holder (2008).
5.3 Euphemisms violating the principle
more true over less true
Finally, there are metonymic euphemisms like the previously mentioned cum
laude for “a bad dissertation grade defended in a German university” and sanitary
engineer for “garbage collector,” whose vehicle concepts provide rather inaccurate
characteristics of what these expressions denote as euphemisms. Thus, as argued
in the previous section, a dissertation awarded cum laude is, in reality, a rather
poor dissertation that does not deserve any praise. Similarly, the profession of a
garbage collector is considerably diUerent from that of an engineer. (Kövecses &
Radden (1998) do not mention the principle more true over less true in their
article, but I believe that it is precisely the violation of this principle that accounts
for the euphemistic use of all metonymic expressions discussed in this section of
the article).
Euphemisms whose vehicle concepts violate the principle more true over less
true can often be found among names of various insurances. For example, a
health insurance, which covers medical expenses when the insured falls ill, can
be better described as an illness (rather than as health) insurance: We need this
insurance mainly when we are ill, not when we are healthy. Similarly, a life insur-
ance, which “guarantees a speciVc sum of money to a designated beneVciary upon
the death of the insured” (American Heritage Dictionary), can be better referred
to as a death (rather than as life) insurance. According to Holder (2008:211), in
the case of health insurance and life insurance, the taboo subjects illnesses and
death are avoided by talking about their converses: health and life.
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Table 2: Metonymic euphemisms violating the principle IMPORTANT OVER LESS IMPORTANT
Euphemism Euphemistic
meaning
Violation of the principle
1 abnormal “homosexual” One can be perceived as abnormal in a variety
of ways, not only by being homosexual.
2 to adjust your
dress
“to do up the
fasteners on your
trousers”
One can adjust his dress in a variety of ways,
not necessarily by doing up the fasteners on his
trousers.
3 to betray / to
deceive
“to copulate with
a third party
while married”
One can betray / deceive in a variety of ways,
not only by copulating with a third party while
being married / having a regular sexual partner.
4 career change “dismissal from
employment”
Our careers can change in a variety of ways,
not necessarily through dismissal from employ-
ment.
5 to cleanse “to free from
enemy
occupation or
sympathizers”
One can cleanse in a variety of ways, not only
by freeing from enemy occupation or sympa-
thizers.
6 to do the right
thing
“to marry a
woman you have
impregnated”
One can do a right thing in a variety of ways,
not only by marrying an impregnated woman.
7 to downsize “to dismiss
employees”
One can downsize in a variety of ways, not
only by dismissing employees.
8 erection “an enlargement
of the penis due
to sexual
excitement”
Erection literally means “the condition of being
upright” (Holder:169). There are many things
that can be in that condition, not only the penis
of a sexually excited male.
9 financial
assistance
“state aid for the
poor”
State aid for the poor is not the only kind of
financial assistance.
10 good time “a sexual
experience with
a stranger”
One can have a good time in a variety of ways,
not only by having a sexual experience with a
stranger.
Some other examples of metonymic euphemisms belonging to this category are
given in Table 3.
Metonymic euphemisms of this type are often hardly distinguishable from
metaphoric euphemisms (and can perhaps be regarded as a borderline case be-
tween metonymy and metaphor). Like the former, the latter can also be analyzed
as violations of the principle more true over less true. For example, we can say
that the vehicle concepts of the metaphoric expressions to come for “to achieve an
orgasm” and to ride for “to copulate with a man in the woman-on-top position”
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Table 3: Metonymic euphemisms violating the principle MORE TRUE OVER LESS TRUE
Euphemism Euphemistic meaning Violation of the principle
1 academy “brothel” The institution of an academy is
considerably different from that
of a brothel.
2 actress “prostitute” The profession of an actress is con-
siderably different from that of a
prostitute.
3 to angle with a silver
hook
“to pretend to have
caught a fish that you
have bought”
A person who behaves in such a
way does not literally angle with
a silver hook.
4 art “pornographic” Pornography is not an art.
5 as planned (used as
“corporate-speak
when managers wish
to suggest that their
failure is not due to
their incompetence”;
Holder:83)
“regrettably” Failures like these are not really
planned by managers.
6 aunt “a promiscuous woman
or an elderly prostitute”
A promiscuous woman or an el-
derly prostitute is not an aunt in
relation to the person who refers
to her as an aunt.
7 bamboozled “drunk” A drunk person has not literally
been bamboozled, i. e., deceived
by underhanded methods (Merri-
am-Webster Online)
8 beaver3 “the female genitals
viewed sexually” (“from
the slang meaning a
beard, whence the pubic
hair”; Holder:92 )
The pubic hair is not a beard.
9 bikini wax “a procedure for the
removal of women’s
pubic hair”
It is the skin of a woman’s body
that is waxed, not the bikini.
10 bimbo “a sexually complaisant
female” (“from the
Italian, meaning ‘little
(male) child’”;
Holder:95)
A sexually complaisant female is
not a little male child.
3 Like to bang somebody, beaver is in present-day English a dysphemism (i. e., a rather vulgar expres-
sion for “the female genitalia viewed sexually”), rather than a euphemism. It is not entirely clear
why Holder (2008) analyzes it as a euphemism.
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provide very inaccurate descriptions of what happens when people come to an
orgasm and copulate while being on top. The reason why to come and to ride can,
nevertheless, be better analyzed as instances of metaphor, while the examples in
Table 3 are products of a metonymic semantic change, is that in contrast to the
former, the latter fulVll the aforementioned within-domain-mapping requirement
of metonymy. Consider, for example, the noun beaver for “the female genitals
viewed sexually.” At Vrst glance, there does not seem to exist a real link between
the meanings “beaver” and “the female genitals”: Beavers do not seem to have
much in common with the female genitalia viewed sexually. However, as Holder
argues, the sexual sense of beaver goes back not to the literal meaning “beaver,”
but to the slang meaning “a beard” (which is a product of metaphorization of
the literal meaning “beaver”: There is a visual similarity between a beaver and a
beard). In this case, beaver can be analyzed a part-for-part metonymy whose ve-
hicle concept beard maps onto the target concept the female genitalia within
the same domain human body. Similarly, we can analyze bimbo as a part-for-part
metonymy, rather than as a cross-domain metaphor, because its literal meaning
in Italian, “a little male child,” and its euphemistic sense in English, “a sexually
complaisant female,” are both human characteristics: i. e., a human being can be
a little male child and a sexually complaisant woman. Accordingly, bimbo is a
part-for-part metonymy whose vehicle concept little male child maps onto
the target concept sexually complaisant woman within the same domain of
human characteristics.
In addition to metaphoric euphemisms, metonymic euphemisms whose vehicle
concepts violate the principle more true over less true are also often not easily
distinguishable from instances of lying. Consider, for example, the famous ab-
breviation GDR for “German Democratic Republic.” Like the examples discussed
above, GDR is a part-for-part metonymy in which one element of the concep-
tual domain political systems – democracy – stands for another element within
the same domain: totalitarianism. Since democracy is radically diUerent from
totalitarianism and GDR was indeed a totalitarian state rather than a democracy,
it can be concluded that, in this abbreviation, the choice of the vehicle concept
democratic violates the principle more true over less true. (This is presum-
ably the reason for the inclusion of GDR in Holder’s dictionary of euphemisms.)
However, recall that euphemism is diUerent from lie in that, in the former case,
the speaker does not intend to deceive or mislead the hearer. That is, a German
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professor who grades a doctoral dissertation with cum laude does not want to
be understood literally (i. e., that he indeed thinks that the dissertation he has
graded deserves praise). On the contrary, by using the grade cum laude, s/he
wants to indirectly communicate the meaning “this is a rather poor dissertation
that cannot be praised.” By contrast, the coiners of the abbreviation GDR (as well
as GDR rulers) wanted to be understood literally (i. e., that GDR was a genuinely
democratic country and not a totalitarian state). The use of German Democratic
Republic as the oXcial name of the East German State was, thus, a lie because the
leaders of the country knew that GDRwas not a democracy but nevertheless used
this abbreviation for political propaganda.
5.4 Mixed types
A number of metonymic euphemisms have vehicle concepts that simultaneously
violate the principles important over less important and more true over less
true. A good example is industrializing country for “a poor and relatively unde-
veloped country.” On the one hand, its vehicle concept clearly violates the prin-
ciple important over less important: The most important characteristic of an
industrializing country is its poverty and underdevelopment, not that it has an
ongoing industrialization, as the adjective industrializing suggests. In addition
to this, however, there is also a violation of the principle more true over less
true: As Holder (2008:226) points out, industrializing country is a “coinage based
on aspiration rather than reality.” What is meant by this is that an industrializing
country is typically a poor and underdeveloped country that has very little or
no industry at all. (There is no ongoing industrialization.) Similarly, the educa-
tional euphemism diUerently-abled for “crippled or of low intelligence” violates
both the principles important over less important and more true over less
true. With regard to the former, the deVning characteristic of a diUerently-abled
person is his crippleness or low intelligence, not the presence of other abilities.
With regard to the latter, diUerently-abled, like industrializing country, also seems
to be a coinage based on aspiration rather than reality: A diUerently-abled person
does not really have any diUerent abilities. Finally, recall that to sleep with some-
body and basement can be used to refer to lovers who do not fall asleep together
in the same bed after having sex and to lavatories that are not located in build-
ing basements. Given these facts, we can claim that the vehicle concepts of the
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euphemisms to sleep with somebody and basement simultaneously violate the prin-
ciples important over less important and more true over less true: Physical
sleeping with somebody is a peripheral characteristic of the prototypical copula-
tion scenario, which, in a number of cases (e. g., during sex with prostitutes), does
not immediately follow the more important characteristic sexual intercourse.
Additionally, the fact that lavatories are often located in building basements is a
peripheral characteristic of a lavatory that is not true of all lavatories. (As the
examples to sleep with somebody and basement demonstrate, euphemisms whose
vehicle concepts violate the principle important over less important are par-
ticularly prone to develop into euphemisms violating the principle more true
over less true.)
6 Concluding remarks
The central claim of this article is that there exists a relatively small number of
metonymy-based euphemism-formation mechanisms. One is to express a taboo-
marked target by means of a less important but taboo-free vehicle associated with
the target (violation of the principle important over less important). In addi-
tion, a euphemism can be created by means of replacing a taboo-marked target by
either a very generic taboo-free vehicle (violation of the principle specific over
generic) or by a not entirely accurate or even untrue taboo-free vehicle (viola-
tion of the principle more true over less true). The major advantage of this
classiVcation is that it provides an explanation for why a particular euphemistic
expression can function as a euphemism, i. e., be used for indirectly expressing
taboo-marked concepts. For example, boyfriend can function as a euphemism
for “a male sexual partner in a non-marital sexual relationship” because its vehi-
cle concept friendship provides a peripheral characteristic of the target concept
boyfriend-ship; adult Web site can function as a euphemism for “a pornographic
Web site” because its vehicle concept adultWeb site provides a very generic de-
scription of what an adult Web site is. Furthermore, health insurance can function
as a euphemism for “illness insurance” because its vehicle concept health insur-
ance provides a rather inaccurate description of why we need a health insurance.
Another major advantage is that this classiVcation demonstrates a connection be-
tween metonymy- and metaphor-based euphemism-formation mechanisms. As
we have seen, metaphoric euphemisms like to come and to ride also violate the
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principle more true over less true and are, therefore, sometimes not easily dis-
tinguishable frommetonymies like health insurance, sanitary engineer, beaver, and
the like.
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Philosophical Conceptual Analysis as an
Experimental Method
Michael T. Stuart
Abstract
Philosophical conceptual analysis is an experimental method. Focusing on this
helps to justify it from the skepticism of experimental philosophers who follow
Weinberg, Nichols & Stich (2001). To explore the experimental aspect of philo-
sophical conceptual analysis, I consider a simpler instance of the same activity:
everyday linguistic interpretation. I argue that this, too, is experimental in nature.
And in both conceptual analysis and linguistic interpretation, the intuitions con-
sidered problematic by experimental philosophers are necessary but epistemically
irrelevant. They are like variables introduced into mathematical proofs which
drop out before the solution. Or better, they are like the hypotheses that drive
science, which do not themselves need to be true. In other words, it does not
matter whether or not intuitions are accurate as descriptions of the natural kinds
that undergird philosophical concepts; the aims of conceptual analysis can still be
met.
Experimental philosophers have called into question the use of intuitions in philo-
sophical conceptual analysis, which is claimed to be a cornerstone of traditional
philosophical methodology. They argue that intuitions about philosophical con-
cepts are unreliable because we cannot calibrate them against the world. What
this or that group of people think of justice, is not necessarily what justice is. We
need a way for conceptual analysis to make contact with the object of study—and
bringing our culturally-indoctrinated and unstable intuitions into reWective equi-
librium is not the way. Philosophy, it is claimed, is most reliable when it operates
like science: collecting empirical data, testing hypotheses, and formalizing em-
pirical generalities into mathematical relationships. Perhaps conceptual analysis
should be left behind.
Thomas Gamerschlag, Doris Gerland, Rainer Osswald & Wiebke Petersen
(eds.). 2015. Meaning, Frames, and Conceptual Representation. Düsseldorf:
dup.
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One reason this conclusion is mistaken is that conceptual analysis is already
quite scientiVc. Science is a reVnement of our normal thinking patterns with its
roots going all the way back to child’s play (see for example, Cook, Goodman
& Schulz 2011). Why think that conceptual analysis, a reVned version of other
linguistic practices, is divorced from those same proud origins? Imre Lakatos
argued that all of mathematics is nothing more than a series of conceptual refor-
mations, which produces better and better deVnitions of mathematical concepts
by a never-ending onslaught of counterexamples (1976). For Lakatos, this process
is at once a mental, linguistic, and community activity and it achieves some epis-
temic good. Mathematics is thought to yield certainty, and plays an indispensable
role in physical science. Perhaps philosophical conceptual analysis can be legit-
imated in a similar way, if philosophy plays an indispensable role in science as
well. Yet this is not the argument I want to make. Rather, I argue that conceptual
analysis in philosophy is a dynamic process which can be defended epistemologi-
cally because of important features it shares not with mathematics, but with the
scientiVc method.
Conceptual analysis can be deVned functionally. One of its goals is to specify
the extension of a concept. For example, what does justice refer to? Part of this
is Vnding properties common to all or most instances of a concept, or outlining
relationships between the extensions or intensions of concepts. For example, are
all the instances of water instances of H2O? Are electrons only to be found in
the context of an atom? Another goal that is somewhat independent of the last
few is specifying the “normative proVle” (or normative characteristics) of a con-
cept. This goal asks what should be the extension of a concept, or its relation
to other concepts. A successful conceptual analysis of knowledge should there-
fore reveal which things count as known, what it is about them that makes them
known (for example, as opposed to only believed), how known things relate to
true things, and so on. But also, such an analysis must tell us what should count
as known, what should be the relation between the known and the true, and so
on. The diUerence between conceptual analysis in philosophy on the one hand,
and science on the other, is that the normative proVles of scientiVc concepts (for
example, quark) can be quite thin. Determining their extensions and conceptual
relations are often more important than sketching their normative proVles. Ask-
ing what quark should refer to is a sensible question, but in practice it is less
central to scientiVc research than Vnding the properties common to quarks and
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the relations between quarks and other physical-theoretical entities. A diUerent
emphasis is often found in philosophical conceptual analysis, wherein normative
considerations predominate. However, the diUerence is only one of degree.
One important motivation ofMeaning, Frames, and Conceptual Representation is
to push interdisciplinary boundaries, and considering conceptual analysis as an
experimental method takes this motivation seriously because it brings together
evidence from the study of language, cognitive science and philosophy of science.
I argue that in both conceptual analysis and scientiVc inquiry we form hypothe-
ses and then “test” them. The literature on scientiVc experiment is massive (for
example, Ackermann 1985, Batens & Van Bendegem 1988, Bogen & Woodward
1988, Cartwright 1983, Collins & Pinch 1993, Franklin 1986, 1990, 2002, Galison
1987, 1997, Gooding 1990, Gooding et al. 1989, Hacking 1983, Latour & Woolgar
1986, Pickering 1985, Pinch 1986). Yet aside from a few German Idealists, very
few have written about experimenting with concepts as linguistic entities (see
Fehige & Stuart 2014). After presenting the problem from experimental philos-
ophy in more detail, I look at conceptual experimentation from two sides. First, I
examine some relevant literature from cognitive science as an attempt to describe
the mechanisms at work in conceptual experimentation. Second, I propose a pre-
liminary account that attempts to defend the epistemological status of conceptual
analysis conceived as a type of experimental linguistic interpretation.
1 Experimental philosophy and skepticism about
conceptual analysis
Weinberg, Nichols, and Stich helped found a sub-discipline in philosophy with
their 2001 paper, “Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions.” In it, they identiVed a
type of philosophical strategy they called “Epistemic Romanticism.” Accounts that
employ this strategy, like Plato’s, rely on the premise that conceptual knowledge,
for example, knowledge of the Forms, is already implanted in us, and we may
extract it in dialogue. Weinberg, Nichols and Stich call the family of theories
that work this way “Intuition Driven Romanticism,” since they consider shared
intuitions as evidence for a kind of innate, a priori knowledge.
For these authors and many of those who followed them (for example, Alexan-
der et al. 2010, Knobe & Nichols 2008, Machery et al. 2004, Mallon et al. 2009,
Swain et al. 2008, Weinberg et al. 2006), an intuition is simply a spontaneous
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judgment about the properties of some case for which the agent may not be able
to oUer any plausible justiVcation. Intuition Driven Romanticism takes intuitions
as data, and then produces normative epistemic claims that are dependent on the
intuitions used, at least in part. That is, if the input were diUerent, the output
would also be diUerent (in proportion to the change in the input). Two examples
they give of Intuition Driven Romanticism are reWective equilibrium (see Good-
man 1955) and Alvin Goldman’s “justiVcatory rules” (see Goldman 1986:60).
Thus, some group of cognitive agents might have intuitions and belief-forma-
tion processes that are diUerent from those of western philosophers, and when
they run their intuitions through their chosen method (for example, reWective
equilibrium) they will emerge with diUerent epistemic norms. The question is:
how can we decide which set of norms to follow? There is no answer that is
not also subject to objections about relativity, so the whole process is misguided.
Epistemic norms will be relative to diUerent cultures, socio-economic classes,
and even the number of philosophy courses taken. And it is argued that such
intuition-relativity does in fact exist. Here is a famous example of the type of
evidence presented.
A scenario called “the Trutemp Case” is presented to survey volunteers. The
case consists of the following report: A child on a deserted island gets hit on
the head by a coconut, and as a result knows the exact temperature all the time,
but does not know that he has this power. The survey volunteers are asked:
when the child says, “It is 30 degrees Celsius,” does he know this, or does he only
believe it? Apparently, East Asian people are more likely than Westerners to
say that a person so aUected only believes their temperature guess. However, if
you say instead that a team of scientists secretly tinkered with the boy’s brain
to cause this ability, the situation reverses and East Asian people become more
likely than Westerners to report that the boy knows what he says. And Vnally, if
you also say that many other people in the boy’s community were secretly given
the ability to tell the temperature, and then ask the knowledge question about a
single member’s belief about the temperature, East Asians are even more likely to
attribute knowledge. The Westerners keep their judgments essentially constant
over all these changes. The conclusion drawn is that the relation between a
person and their community aUects the epistemological status of their beliefs,
but only if you are East Asian.
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In another well-known example, a Gettier case is presented to diUerent cultural
groups with each group providing consistently diUerent responses. A standard
case is about my friend who thinks George has an American car. In fact, just
yesterday George traded in his Buick for a Pontiac (which is still American),
so my friend says something true, and justiVed, when she says “George has an
American car.” Now, when asked if my friend knows the above statement, more
East Asians than Westerners respond in the aXrmative.
Weinberg, Nichols and Stich conclude that intuition-based analyses only pro-
vide information about the people who participate in them, and not any mind-
independent truths about the referents of philosophical concepts. Unfortunately,
mind-independent truths are precisely what “epistemically romantic” philoso-
phers seek.
If the above analysis of intuition-relativity is correct, I want to argue that this
still would not aUect the possibility of successful conceptual analysis, since the
epistemic status of those intuitions is irrelevant to the outcome of conceptual
analysis. They are epistemically irrelevant in exactly the same way that hy-
potheses in science are epistemically irrelevant to the status of the output of
the experimental method: namely, good science can be done with false hypothe-
ses. If successful, this argument would not make that output infallible: there are
well known issues concerning the epistemic status of the scientiVc experimental
method. Someone might object that it is not meaningful to talk about “the” ex-
perimental method as though it were one thing. Yet I will assume that there are
interesting commonalities shared by diUerent instances of experimental methods
in science which we may focus on in a general way; that there is something we
can call the experimental method of science, and it is among the best epistemic
methods we have at our disposal, will be a shared assumption given the exper-
imental nature of “experimental” philosophy.
Now that we know the criticism, let us look more closely at the role of intuition
in conceptual analysis.
2 Conceptual analysis and linguistic interpretation
Conceptual analysis can be understood as an instance of linguistic interpretation
(Cohnitz & Häggqvist 2009:9). When philosophers try to discover the content
of say, knowledge or justice, they often begin by outlining how the concept is
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used (in philosophy, or in some other context of discourse) in order to discover
the purpose it serves. Using this knowledge, we attempt to extrapolate or create
meaning. We do the same thing when we consider the meaning of a linguis-
tic entity. Conceiving of conceptual analysis as an act of interpretation helps to
clarify the connection to experimentalism and avoid the problems of intuition
skepticism, since the intuitions involved in linguistic interpretation need not be
epistemically justiVed to serve their purpose. In cases of linguistic interpretation,
we need to start somewhere to Vgure out the meaning of an utterance. If we begin
with intuitions based on previous experience with a speaker, or a perceived type
of speaker, or other contextual features, this will usually speed things up. But
we need not begin with accurate information or accurate intuitions. Given the
script of a conversation not meant speciVcally to deceive us, we can discover a
great deal about the meaning of unfamiliar terms. This sort of activity is what
Quine and Davidson discussed using models of Radical Translation and Radical
Interpretation. The intuitions we begin with need not be true or accurate or in-
nate or epistemically privileged because interpretation is a special kind of iterated
process, one that can begin with false premises and proceed to true conclusions
by repeated application of the same method. Perhaps beginning the process of
interpretation with very bad intuitions will drag it out, because we have to throw
out the unhelpful intuitions and begin again with others until we Vnd the truth,
but it will always be possible to complete, at least in principle. It is one of the
very few methods that enjoy this status, the scientiVc method being another.
Here is a quick example. If my friend gestures towards a nearby harbour and
remarks, “What an aggressive chine,” I may guess that a chine is a type of boat,
an in-harbour manoeuvring technique, a person, or almost anything else. What I
know about my friend and human linguistic behaviour generally will constrain
my guesses signiVcantly. The resulting conversation will disqualify many possi-
ble interpretations and if we continue to discuss chines, I can adjust my questions
and guesses without needing to ask what a chine is, until I arrive at the conclu-
sion that it refers to the angle of a boat’s hull. From there I can come to learn
the diUerences between hard and soft chines and the advantages of each. This a
common experience, especially for those who learn a new language. Is something
similar going on when we perform conceptual analysis?
When we set out to analyze a concept in philosophy, we are immediately faced
with several diUerent aspects of that concept out of which we identify one (or
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some) to be more interesting than the rest. For example, concerning knowledge
we have knowledge that and knowledge how. We could ask whether such a
division is a natural division in the concept, for example, by comparing similar
ones embodied by the French savoir and connaître and the Spanish saber and
conocer. What we decide to analyze depends on what we want to know. This
tells us that some complex concepts must be divided into sub-concepts for easier
study, but it also informs us of the diUerent norms that may lie hidden in the
concept. Concepts can take the form of exemplars, prototypes, atoms, theories,
family resemblances, necessary and suXcient conditions, and all kinds of hybrids
(see Margolis & Laurence 1999, DePaul & Ramsey 1998). Instead of arguing which
of these really captures what we desire from a theory of concepts (pace Prinz
2002), we should ask what these diUerent characterizations of concepts are good
for; what kinds of concept use they capture and which concepts types are better
for characterizing speciVc concepts.
Despite being more complex, philosophical conceptual analysis appears essen-
tially similar to the above example with the chine. We provisionally propose some
deVnition for a concept. Then we imagine diUerent cases in which the actual use
(or proper use) of a term conWicts with the proposed deVnition. If by this process
we do not reach an acceptable deVnition, we begin to look for ways of splitting
up the concept, or ways of softening the requirement of necessary and suXcient
conditions by seeking only exemplars, prototypes, or family resemblances. Sup-
posing that there are correct answers to questions like, “What does S mean when
she says x?” and, “What should S mean when she says x?”, then likewise there
will be answers to questions like, “What do we mean when we use concept x?”
and, “What should we mean when we use concept x?”
Assuming that conceptual analysis is indeed an instance of linguistic interpre-
tation, what evidence is there that the mechanisms which underlie these actions
are experimental? Consider what Francis Jacob, a Nobel Prize winning biologist,
recently had to say about the practice of science:
In art as in science, the essential thing is to try out. On the one hand, to try out
oppositions of colour or harmonizing themes or combinations of words, then to
reject what you don’t like. On the other hand, to try things; to try ideas, each
idea that comes into our heads; each possibility one by one, systematically; then
to toss out what doesn’t work experimentally and accept what does work, even
if that goes against our tastes and biases. Most of the time such attempts lead
nowhere. But sometimes the most outlandish experiment happens to open up
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a new rail. The beginning of any research is always a leap into the unknown.
It’s always after the event that we form judgements on the level of interest of
the initial hypothesis. Wrong ideas and outlandish theories abound in science.
They are as abundant as bad works of art. (Jacob 2001:118)
Science, for Jacob, is clearly continuous with everyday thinking. When faced
with something we want to understand, we begin by “trying out” ideas, combina-
tions of words, and so on, and many of these avenues become closed. What makes
science special is the thoroughness with which the new ideas are tested. But, as
he says, “The beginning of any research is always a leap into the unknown.” Could
the same be true of linguistic interpretation and conceptual analysis?
Recent research seems to indicate that it is. Reiner & Gilbert (2004) asked
students to analyze a physical mechanism that behaves in an unexpected way
(thanks to some hidden magnets). Given a list of the materials out of which the
mechanism was built, diUerent sets of students all followed a common natural
method of inquiry: Vrst they constructed various models that could capture what
they observed in the mechanism. Then they created what the authors called a
“representational space” or in other words, a series of abstract concepts and rela-
tions between them, often using pen and paper, that would capture the behaviour
of the mechanism as represented in their models. Finally, they tested their ab-
stract models in imaginary worlds using thought experiments.
Reiner and Gilbert argue that all of this is done spontaneously. Physical exper-
iments and thought experiments intertwine seamlessly in the learning process.
They claim that “the process of alternating between these twomodes—empirically
experimenting and experimenting in thought—leads towards a convergence on
scientiVcally acceptable concepts” (p. 1819). According to Reiner and Gilbert,
“Conceptual construction starts by negotiating meaning, with self and with oth-
ers, through ‘what-if’ questions that turn into imaginary experiments in thought,
ultimately being applied to the original physical situation (p. 1821). This senti-
ment is echoed in Reiner & Burko (2003), which argues that “as in the physics
community, through social discussions of thought experiments, conclusions and
thought processes are negotiated, leading to conceptual reVnement” (2003:380)
(see also Gilbert & Reiner 2000, Stuart forthcoming, Velentzas & Halkia 2013).
I highlight these passages which focus on thought experiments because of their
use of the imagination. In the process of conceptual reVnement, both students and
experts have been documented using imaginary worlds to invent and reVne hy-
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potheses, in many diUerent problem solving scenarios (see for example, Stephens
& Clement 2006, Clement 2009, Kosem & Özdemir 2014).
Perhaps it is not far-fetched to claim that everyone, not just students of science,
learn to build and evaluate models to invent, evaluate and reVne new concepts in a
way that draws on general knowledge about the world and individual experience,
using the imagination. And this is precisely what we should expect if linguistic
interpretation is in some sense an experimental method.
If this is true, we should discuss how conceptual analysis works by discussing
the mechanisms that underlie it. We could begin with the input from the imagina-
tion, since hypotheses in science and proposed deVnitions in conceptual analysis
both depend on it. Hypotheses are not beliefs; they are imaginings of ways the
world could be. What makes a belief good or bad is whether it is true or false.
This is not the case with an imagining. For example, my imagining an empty soda
can on the dark side of the moon is not better (qua imagining) if there is in fact an
empty soda can there.
What does make one imagining better than another? The answer to this de-
pends on what we want to do with the imagining. Perhaps we want to devise
an imagining that shows us an example of pure altruism. In this case, reading
A Tale of Two Cities might be better than watching a children’s cartoon. A more
common and general aim is to provide a counterexample to a modal claim, and
examples of these abound in science and philosophy (see Cohintz 2003, Häggqvist
1996, Sorensen 1992). Better imaginings will serve their purpose faster and more
eXciently, or they will have wonderful consequences. But they need not be true.
Christopher Columbus had a hypothesis about a route to India, and it was mis-
taken. But it was still eminently useful when tested (Lakatos 1976:14). The same
considerations hold for scientiVc hypotheses. Atomism, for example, was im-
portant as a metaphysical hypothesis in Ancient Greece, but it was not a good
scientiVc hypothesis until much later. And the phlogiston-theory was a good hy-
pothesis although it was false, because it was fruitful, testable and had a certain
degree of explanatory power. (For an argument against the use of the imagination
in philosophy, see Thagard 2014. For a defence, see Stuart 2014).
In the case of science, conceptual analysis, and linguistic interpretation, we
propose judgments which are then in some sense, tested. In science, these judg-
ments are called hypotheses, and in conceptual analysis and linguistic interpreta-
tion they may be called intuitions. In all cases, they rely heavily on the imagi-
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nation, and they appear at many stages of inquiry, even in testing. Furthermore,
they need not be true or even formed reliably. No one is surprised or distraught
that many or even most scientiVc hypotheses are incorrect as descriptions of the
world, because science has a method for screening these out. Likewise, we should
not be concerned that many or most of our intuitions concerning the referents
of philosophical concepts are incorrect. Nevertheless, to justify the use of intu-
itions which are spontaneous and stem in the imagination in conceptual analysis,
a philosophical account is necessary.
3 Epistemological considerations
Intuitions are involved as part of the guessing process we adopt on the way to
understanding linguistic actions and events. Your friend asks if you would like to
go to the restaurant across the street. But you know the street well and there is no
restaurant there. You immediately have an intuition that she means the jazz bar,
which does not serve food. Perhaps you have this intuition because your friend
loves jazz, and the music has just now become audible. This intuition becomes
your working assumption concerning the meaning of the term “restaurant” in
this context, until it is conVrmed or denied.
I propose to relate the epistemology of intuitions like these and the roles they
play in linguistic interpretation to hypotheses and their roles in science. As Ja-
cob said above, hypotheses are leaps into the unknown, and can be bad or even
outlandish. In science they are found in all levels, from experimental, for exam-
ple, in planning an experiment, to the most theoretical, for example, in dealing
with anomalies or developing new formalisms. Leaving aside the exact sciences,
hypotheses are never ultimately proven or disproven: they remain open to con-
tradiction or vindication by future experience. The two things most important for
my purposes is that they are not used as proof or evidence, and while they are
being tested they are not true or false. We should oppose them to ideas, beliefs
and commitments which are in this analogy like theories—put forth as candidates
for knowledge. Extending this analogy, the goal of interpretation is the meaning
of a term, including its intension, extension, relation to other terms and norma-
tive proVle. The end goal of scientiVc investigation is something like accuracy
or truth, but the more common achievement, which is taken to be a sign of a
successful investigation, is what Francis Bacon called “power over nature.” If I
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introduce a new term in discourse, I will be satisVed that you have understood it
at least partially when you can use the new term in conversation to achieve your
ends. Likewise, we understand a phenomenon in science at least partially when
we can use it to achieve our ends. These practical abilities are signs of success,
and are therefore epistemologically signiVcant. In science, the iterated process
of hypothesis, test and theoretical revision is well-known (see for example, Lau-
den 1973, Peirce 1898). Hasok Chang has coined the term “epistemic iteration”
to refer to the scientiVc process in which “we start by adopting an existing sys-
tem of knowledge, with some respect for it but without any Vrm assurance that
it is correct; on the basis of that initially aXrmed system we launch inquiries
that result in the reVnement and even correction of the original system. It is this
self-correcting progress that justiVes (retrospectively) successful courses of de-
velopment in science, not any assurance by reference to some indubitable foun-
dation” (2004:6). In science, we always have multiple hypotheses being developed
at once, if for no other reason than underdetermination of theory by evidence.
“Accepting plurality means accepting imprecision, which we can actually aUord
to do in quite a few cases, with a promise of later tightening” (Chang 2004:158).
This “later tightening” consists in empirical testing, calibration of measurement
devices, and reVnements of cogency and applicability (p. 234). If the analogy to
linguistic interpretation is to hold, there must be a tightening process analogous
to the one in science.
I would like to argue that Donald Davidson’s “principle of charity” could be
seen as one such tightening mechanism. Davidson was not the Vrst to propose a
principle of charity, but his is perhaps the most inWuential account (see his 2001a,
2001b, 2005). For Davidson, the principle of charity is not one thing; it is an
umbrella term that covers many diUerent and complementary constraints. This
group of constraints makes possible successful communication within reasonable
time periods. By successful we do not mean Wawless: we make mistakes and
will be wrong about many of the beliefs and meanings we attribute. Here is
Davidson’s account.
We must know both the meaning of someone’s utterance and their relevant
underlying beliefs and their propositional attitudes (believing, doubting, fearing,
etc.) if we want to understand their utterance. However, we can guess some of
these elements if we know the others. For example if I say “The World Cup is
my favourite sporting event” and you know what this sentence means and that
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I believe it, then you will be able to surmise some of my beliefs about soccer.
Likewise, if you know my beliefs about soccer and tournaments, you can garner
an idea of what the sentence “The World Cup is my favourite Sporting Event”
means when I point to the match schedule and I jump up and down clapping my
hands, even if I utter the sentence in a language with which you are unfamiliar.
But how can you understand my meaning if you do not know either my relevant
beliefs, attitudes, or the meaning of my words? This is Davidson’s famous case
of Radical Interpretation. Here, the key is the propositional attitude of assertion.
Davidson thinks we can easily discern this without help from either meaning or
belief. If you can tell what someone holds true (or seems to hold true) you can
make and test hypotheses for what they mean, and since these attributions will
be constrained by certain factors, you can tighten your guesses until you Vnd the
correct theory of meaning. The principle of charity explains the way we do this
guesswork. It tells us that we superimpose our logic on the speaker, posit events
and objects as the ontology of our shared realities (known to both speaker and
interpreter) and assume that the speaker’s beliefs are mostly true. And we do
not just assume them to hold mostly true beliefs; we try to maximize the truth
of their beliefs, whenever possible. If I hear you say, “I saw the Grand Canyon
Wying to California” there are at least two ways to understand this, and you can
bet I will not select the option which attributes to you the belief that canyons can
Wy. While it is not necessary that any speciVc belief of our speaker be true, his or
her beliefs must be true on the whole, because you could not interpret someone
who was in systematic error (that is, in error about everything). You could not
even disagree with them. Given the way a speaker uses their words and this
principle, we can create a theory of meaning for a speaker that could provide in
advance the meaning of every possible utterance they might make, by recursion
and composition.
However, using a principle of charity that maximizes the truth of your speaker
to provide an account of meaning is not without its critics. Analysing some
criticism is a good way to explore and update Davidson’s principle of charity
as an epistemological tool analogous to the method of scientiVc experimentation.
I will focus on the inWuential criticism of Timothy Williamson.
Williamson argues that any principle of charity that “crudely maximizes true
belief” (2004:139) will often recommend incorrect attributions. If I believe many
things that are false about X but true about Y, it would seem that such a principle
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would recommend that my interpreter ascribe Y as the object of my X-utterances
and beliefs so as to maximize the number of true beliefs that I hold, regardless
of my intention that they be about X. We would like to think that some causal
history between X and myself is what makes my thoughts have X-content, but
why? Williamson says it is because causal history often implies past perceptual
experience, which is a “channel” for knowledge (p. 140).
I bring up this worry because a similar objection is levelled at conceptual anal-
ysis from experimental philosophers, mentioned at the start. Namely, without
an objective perspective on knowledge or justice themselves, we do not know
whether we are analysing the same thing when diUerent groups of people anal-
yse their versions of these concepts. That is, our tightening procedure does not
tighten enough.
Here is an example from Williamson. A psychic makes a prediction about the
life history and personality of Santiago. It turns out that this life story and person-
ality more accurately describe a third person, say, Nico. According to Williamson,
Davidson’s principle recommends that we attribute all of the psychic’s beliefs
about Santiago’s character traits and history to Nico and not Santiago, since this
will make more of our psychic’s beliefs and utterances true. Since we know that
the physic actually intends to have their utterances be about Santiago, and David-
son’s principle forces us to attribute them to Nico, we have a reductio against
Davidson’s account. It is because of the causal (in this case visual) connection be-
tween the psychic and Santiago that we still take his or her beliefs and utterances
to be about Santiago, even though they are truer of Nico.
And the same could be true about conceptual analysis. Making our own beliefs
come out true and consistent would not guarantee that they refer to the right
things, or even that such things exist and we can refer to them.
Another example concerns ascribing knowledge of quantum physical laws to
people from the Stone Age, since this will help maximize the truth of their be-
liefs. These ascriptions do not occur on Williamson’s account since we need to
have a knowledge-channel (or causal connection) between the speaker and his or
her objects of speech in order to ascribe something as the source of their belief.
For these reasons, Williamson suggests a knowledge (instead of truth) maximiz-
ing principle of charity, which relies on being in the relevant position to know
something.
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According to Williamson, you cannot be in a position to know something un-
less that something is actually happening (that is, you cannot know that it is rain-
ing unless it true that it is). You also need the right kind of causal contact with the
object of your utterance or thought. Finally, we also will not ascribe knowledge
to people if that ascription would rely on inferences that are not sound.
My reply to this worry is that truth is a simpler concept than knowledge.
It is easier to understand and less presumptuous to assume. Davidson calls it
“beautifully transparent” (2001b:139). It seems natural to think that “snow is
white is true” is equivalent to “snow is white.” On the other hand, saying “snow is
white is known” makes little sense without a subject that knows, and a context
in which that something is known. If we provide a subject for whom “snow is
white” is known, then several things might still be meant by such an ascription.
To counter on behalf of Williamson, we could argue that “snow is white is true”
can also be relativized to a person and context. However, to do so would be
to ignore the adage: ex contradictione sequitur quodlibet—from a contradiction
everything follows. If we allow truth to be relative to a speaker, then we must
admit that, from a higher level, the same sentence can be both true and false.
If this is granted, it makes possible the derivation of anything, even absurdities,
from a set of beliefs we thought were conservative and rational (for more on this
principle, see Priest et al. 1989). So it is unlikely that any account that allows this
kind of simple truth relativization will be used by an opponent of Williamson.
Another point for the simplicity of truth is that in philosophical logic it is a
much more basic concept than knowledge. Knowledge is usually introduced as
an operator, and doing so creates intensional or opaque contexts. If we assume
our speakers and audiences share a basic level of rationality, and we also as-
sume that philosophical logic is a reasonably good model of that rationality, then
truth is the simpler concept since logic tells us that an understanding of truth is
necessary and antecedent to argumentative reasoning, unlike knowledge which
creates situations where substitution of co-referential expressions does not nec-
essarily preserve truth. Further, unlike knowledge, truth does not suUer from
Gettier cases or the cultural variation eUects found by experimental philosophers
like Weinberg, Stich, and Nichols. What is simpler is also perhaps more likely to
Vt into an evolutionary picture of the development of language and interpretive
strategies.
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This focus on simplicity might seem strange; after all, Williamsonmight be pro-
viding a more complicated albeit more accurate account, and surely that would
be relevant. And in some cases we do seem to attribute knowledge (and not just
truth) when we interpret someone. Williamson argues that causal history is the
connection between subject and object which opens the channel to knowledge.
Whether something is true or false does not matter—what matters is whether
there is a causal connection between the subject and some scenario that justi-
Ves their knowledge claims. This is appealing, but although he is not credited,
Davidson also knew such causal history would be necessary. In fact, it is part of
what his charity demands. He says, “[W]e interpret so as to make an agent as
intelligible as possible . . . Vnding him right means identifying the causes with
the objects of his beliefs, giving special weight to the simplest cases, and counte-
nancing error where it can be best explained” (2001b:152). It is a subtler principle
than Williamson gives him credit for, as the causal history requirement falls right
out of the rationality constraints. You would not ascribe an object as the source
of someone’s belief if they had never had any contact with it. And you wouldn’t
ascribe quantum physical knowledge to people in the Stone Age, either. For much
the same reasons as Williamson, then, Davidson’s principle explains why we as-
cribe what we do as the cause or content of people’s beliefs or utterances, only
if they have had relevant causal contact with them.
Finally, for Williamson, ascribing knowledge to a person means that such a
person must have been in the requisite position to know. This means that the
proposition known refers to a state of aUairs that was actually happening, exist-
ing, or was in whatever sense, actual at the time of utterance. In other words, the
proposition known is also true, since it matches the world. This means that when-
ever we ascribe knowledge we are also ascribing truth. So again, Williamson was
right to focus on the causal connection, but not about truth being less desirable
for charity than knowledge.
Williamson has a second and independent worry: should we agree with David-
son in thinking that the principle of charity is a maximizing process? Since our
belief set is inVnite (that is, all the beliefs that can be ascribed to any one of us
at any time is inVnite, because of recursion), and if we think of maximization as
a simple, linear process, Williamson is surely right when he objects that maxi-
mizing truth is impossible. How do you maximize the amount of anything in an
inVnite set? An answer is given by Henry Jackman (2003). He argues that charity
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should be seen as applying only to the weighted sum of a speaker’s commitments.
You can think of the weighing function as analogous to the way we place dif-
ferent values on questions when devising a test. It need not be esoteric. And
those beliefs to which we are committed form a set that is not inVnite, because
it contains only the beliefs to which we would be disposed to assent if queried.
(It also contains our implicit presuppositions and assumptions, but these are in-
cluded insofar as they can be clearly inferred from our actions, so the set remains
Vnite). The heaviest (or core) commitments are those we would Vght the hardest
to retain in cases of conWict.
To understand the charity we confer to others, Jackman examines the way
we interpret ourselves in cases where core commitments conWict. If, in Quinean
fashion, we always save those beliefs we treasure the most, then in cases where
some core commitments conWict, we will eliminate beliefs on a case-by-case basis
by maximization. We do this depending on the level of importance we assign to
our commitments. Jackman argues that such a process would naturally go hand
in hand with the way we interpret others. Consider a situation in which you take
a sip of what you believe is a mug of hot chocolate, and Vnd that it tastes exactly
like tea. Now you have a conWict between your belief that your cup contains
hot chocolate, your belief that it contains tea, and your belief that the same cup
cannot contain tea and hot chocolate at the same time. This conWict may be dealt
with in various ways, but it is much more likely that you will give up the belief,
for example, that your drink is hot chocolate, than your belief in the law of non-
contradiction, or your belief that hot chocolate does not turn into tea without
some serious chemical tampering. This is a simple example where maximization
is used, to show that such a process is uncontentious as far as the maximization
component is concerned.
If the application of Jackman’s idea to this context is correct, this adds to the
above defense of Davidson’s principle of charity. Namely, if the object of our
maximization is the weighted sum of commitments held by the speaker, then
having a causal history with the cause of the belief or utterance will certainly
make some beliefs heavier than others in meaning ascriptions. This helps to show
that being in a position to know will be important for the way that we maximize
truth, without showing that knowledge is what should be maximized. Being in
a position to know is important for the practice of interpretation; it Vgures into
the way we do it.
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If the process of maximizing truth applies to the weighted sum of a speaker’s
commitments, and if we are also trying to minimize the amount of unexplained
error, then we will usually be maximizing knowledge as well. Especially if Jack-
man is correct that “Capturing the interpretee’s perspective on the world . . . in-
volves trying to understand the interpretee as she would, ideally, understand her-
self” (2003:161), because Vguring out which beliefs the interpretee weighs the
heaviest, will likely yield the beliefs that the interpretee feels she knows. This
account is consistent with the results of psychological studies in empathy, which
show that those who attempt to think like others really do understand them bet-
ter (see Ickes 2003, Stueber 2006), and it also coheres with studies that show
sociopaths have diXculty communicating because their ability to see things as
others do is reduced (see Baron-Cohen 2011, MeUert et al. 2013, Skeem et al.
2011).
I do not deny that knowledge maximization is part of linguistic interpretation.
But the simplicity and fundamentality of truth for interpretation suggests at least
a logical and temporal order to the way we apply the principle of charity. First,
we ascribe rationality, then truth, and then knowledge. These three levels will
be separated in time because the psychological constraints that apply to each
are diUerent in terms of their respective strengths, and because there are more
or less ways to complete each operation. There are very few ways to satisfy
the rationality constraint, but there are more options in satisfying the truth con-
straint, and even more in maximizing knowledge. Since more and more conscious
thought will be necessary to complete the latter requirements, they should take
longer to complete, hence the chronological nature of the principle of charity.
This demands empirical testing. For now, however, I will merely add a few more
theoretical considerations.
Let us consider again the urgency of each type of constraint, beginning with
rationality. Davidson says, “We have no choice . . . but to read our own logic into
the thoughts of a speaker” (2001b:149). If I had to determine consciously whether
a speaker was following rules of logic that were relevantly similar to my own, I
would never be able to communicate with anyone. If this were the case, it seems
unlikely that language would have developed in the Vrst place. Turning to truth,
Jackman says that when we interpret ourselves we must assume the general truth
of our weighed set of commitments. To see this, notice that we generally see little
diUerence between our beliefs about the world and the beliefs that we hold true.
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We could not interpret ourselves if we needed to determine the overall truth of
our beliefs Vrst. Instead, we merely assume they are true. However, if pressed
we admit the unlikelihood that all of our beliefs are true, and we do expect to Vnd
some contradiction between them (2003:160). To extend this to our interpretation
of others, not only will we generally assume the truth of most of our own beliefs,
but we must assume the general truthfulness of someone else’s beliefs, because
again, if they were in massive error (if most of what they believed was false)
they would not make any sense to us. It is easy to imagine talking to someone
who thought up was down and alive was dead and real was fake and trees were
lampshades, but it is very diXcult to imagine understanding them. In this way,
we must attribute truth and rationality to a speaker to understand them.
However, do we need to attribute knowledge to a speaker? Imagine someone
who had mostly true but unjustiVed beliefs because they were raised by parents
who were experts in creating Gettier cases. We would still easily understand
the meaning of his or her words, since they would be talking about the same
objects, events and relations with which we are familiar. However, we should not
attribute to them knowledge of what they say. And this is the point. Williamson is
right that we should take casual histories into account when we interpret others,
he is wrong when he says that we should reject truth maximization in favour
of knowledge maximization. Let me Vnish by presenting a case where ascribing
knowledge leads to undesirable results.
Imagine you are certain that a mobster has committed murder. He told you
he was going to kill Rocco, and shortly after the time speciVed, the police Vnd
Rocco murdered in the manner antecedently speciVed to you by the mobster. The
mobster gloats and reveals that he knows speciVcs of the crime scene to which
no one besides the police and the killer had access. You call the police and he
is arrested. The police agree that he is guilty. Yet, there is not enough evidence
to put him away (it is your word against his, he has a good lawyer and his alibi
is carefully worked out). Suppose you say something true when you say, “That
man is guilty.” This, however, is not something that you can provide complete
justiVcation for, either to a jury of your peers in a court of law, or with absolute
certainty to yourself. And this is the problem with knowledge maximization as
a part of applying charity: knowledge is intimately linked to justiVcation, which
is not something we can maximize.
284
Philosophical Conceptual Analysis as an Experimental Method
In fact, maximizing justiVcation would be dangerous. It might invite overconV-
dence in ourselves, and lead us to expect radicalism or fanaticism in others. Most
of our everyday beliefs, even the true ones, simply are not justiVed in any ro-
bust, skepticism-defeating sense. Williamson could reply that justiVcation is not
linked to knowledge this intimately, but I think his use of “positions to know”
shows that it is. These positions are meant to justify knowledge ascriptions to a
third party, but if we can interpret ourselves, and if knowledge is recursive, then
you may only know that you know when you know you are in the requisite posi-
tion to know, that is, when you know you have enjoyed the right kind of causal
connection with the object of your knowledge. That is, when you are justiVed.
When we interpret a speaker, we apply the principle of charity and maximize
the truth of their beliefs, and perhaps their knowledge as well. But without
educated guesses concerning what our speaker means, we have nothing on which
to work. Such guesses are a necessary Vrst step, although this is not something
Davidson focused on. These “guesses” Vt the description of “intuition” given by
experimental philosophers. That is, they are not themselves justiVed by anything,
and we do not feel any need to justify them; they are not quite beliefs, and they
appear seemingly out of nowhere. Finally, the outcomes of interpretation are
counterfactually dependent on them. And yet, as we have seen, it is not important
if these guesses are good or bad, since the constraints involved in applying the
principle of charity are so strong that we are quickly forced from our starting
point to converge on a better interpretation.
But we do not always stop when we have interpreted our speaker. Occasionally
we ask if that speaker is using his or her terms according to the norms that he
or she upholds. This is far more diXcult than simply understanding someone’s
words, and there is evidence that this skill only appears later in life. According
to Gilbert & Reiner (2000:276), students around 9 years of age attribute the same
meaning to the phrases “theories which explain phenomena” and “the behaviour
of phenomena.” At ages of 12-16 years, students can see the diUerence between
true and false explanations, but not until they are about 16 do they fully appre-
ciate that knowledge claims are mostly conjectural. The ability to distinguish
between what someone says and what they should say, is hard won. How do
students decide what a concept should mean? As we saw above, students often
invent imaginary scenarios to test their concepts and inter-conceptual relations.
So again, guesses (or intuitions) are a necessary Vrst step in the act of determin-
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ing what a person should mean as opposed to what they do mean. And those
intuitions are the material on which to run the method; they do not bear all of the
epistemological weight of the method’s output.
Let us now turn back to conceptual analysis and see how the principle of
charity can be used to defend the charge from experimental philosophy.
Remember there are several aims of philosophical conceptual analysis: speci-
fying and exploring the intension and extension of a concept, its relation to other
concepts, and its normative proVle. Just as in linguistic interpretation, which has
similar goals, charity and intuition are called for in all cases. To determine the
extension of a concept we often begin by considering its explicit or implicit def-
inition in the hands of certain individuals (for example, knowledge for Plato or
Descartes). We try to adopt these deVnitions ourselves, and assuming our own
standards of rationality, try to maximize the truth of our beliefs. We invent imag-
inary scenarios in which to test the consistency of those beliefs. Once we have
a handle on the problems and possible relations between this concept and others,
we try to improve the concept. The point is that in many of the stages of this
process, intuitions are involved as raw materials, which do not need to be accu-
rate or true or justiVed. In this sense, intuitions in conceptual analysis function
like scientiVc hypotheses. And so, only if the scientiVc method is a bad one, is
philosophical conceptual analysis unreliable in principle.
One reply to this line of reasoning is the following. My argument attempts to
justify one use of intuition in conceptual analysis. But there are others that are
used as evidence, and it is those which are the focus of the Weinberg, Nichols
and Stich school of experimental philosophy. For example, if you give me a coun-
terexample to my proposed deVnition for justice, I might have an intuition that
your counterexample is a good one, that indeed it disproves my deVnition. This
sort of intuition is not a preliminary guess used to begin the process of conceptual
analysis. Rather, it is the source of justiVcation for this or that conceptual revision.
However, this type of intuition can also be treated as a provisional hypothesis
that should be tested. It is nothing but another hypothesis, although it is accom-
panied with a strong emotional response. But it is not the response that justiVes
the eventual outcome of the test. Of course, some provisional hypotheses are
more attractive, and upon hearing them we think “Yes! That must be the case!”
however they later prove false. The reason they seem so attractive is perhaps
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because they highlight a new perceived coherence between what we have, and
what we want (see Thagard & Stewart 2011).
Another objection is that by portraying conceptual analysis as linguistic inter-
pretation, I have likened it once again to reWective equilibrium, since the focus
here has been on making others and ourselves rational, consistent, true, and so
on. However, applying the principle of charity calls for both coherence and cor-
respondence. Our words have no meaning without interaction with the world
and with others, which is why causal connection is one of the constraints in the
principle of charity.
There is another important diUerence between interpretation, conceptual anal-
ysis and the scientiVc method on the one hand, and reWective equilibrium on the
other. ReWective equilibrium is a method that has as its goal a very speciVc end
state, and there are rules which we use to proceed to that state given the current
state. Namely, proceed in a stepwise manner evaluating the system and its con-
sequences with our intuitions until we achieve coherence. This is not the case
with the scientiVc method or, in my view, conceptual analysis or linguistic inter-
pretation. In general, science progresses from vague to speciVc, from less precise
to more precise, from less mathematical to more mathematical. But these general
trends are violated all the time, especially during scientiVc revolutions. And while
many philosophers talk meaningfully about the “end of science”, it is not such an
end point that drives today’s scientiVc investigations. It is local goals. And the
same goes for conceptual analysis. We would like, we suppose, a perfectly clear
deVnition of all human concepts, but that is not what motivates us in our quest
to understand knowledge and justice. We have subsidiary aims which are more
important. And even concerning individual concepts, we care more about Vnding
a workable deVnition that is enlightening and useful than we do about the one
true deVnition. I think this is because we recognize that concepts will and should
change over time. And the same is true of linguistic interpretation. We would
like to have a complete theory of meaning for a speaker, but we never actually
try to Vnd one. We use whatever methods we have until we reach a satisfactory
understanding of our speaker’s utterances. Perhaps we do not try to gain a com-
plete theory of meaning because we know that what a speaker means will change
over time, and so a complete theory of meaning is not a realistic end point for us.
In each of science, conceptual analysis and linguistic interpretation, we do not
contextualize our actions with reference to an end point, and we do not follow a
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simple strategy to get there. So with respect to these important points, conceptual
analysis has not been reduced to reWective equilibrium.
The natural question to ask at this point is: well then, what are the sources
of evidence for conceptual analysis? There is probably no simple answer to this,
because a reliable method does not guarantee knowledge. A valid argument is
not necessarily a sound one. Cognitive scientists who study conceptual change
focus on the development of categorization schemas in children, undergraduates,
scientists, and so on, mapping out complex webs of conceptual connections and
simulating them in computers. But the exact way in which experience plays a
role in learning and (re)evaluating concepts is not yet known, and this collection
is a testament to how complex the problem is. What is necessary is some mid-
dle ground between the grand philosophical pictures (rationalism, empiricism,
naturalism) of the relation between experience and knowledge, and the work of
cognitive scientists and linguists.
To conclude: what I have tried to achieve in this paper is not a direct episte-
mological justiVcation of the output of conceptual analysis, but merely to provide
reasons to believe that the method of conceptual analysis is reliable. If we accept
the practices of experimental science and everyday linguistic interpretation, we
should also accept the method of conceptual analysis.
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Analyzing Concepts in Action-Frames
Gottfried Vosgerau, Tim Seuchter & Wiebke Petersen
Abstract
In this paper, we want to argue for a frame-based analysis of action-related con-
cepts as a means for understanding the thesis of grounded cognition, i. e. the thesis
that concepts are grounded in sensorimotor processes. We will give an overview
of frame analysis and specify frames for action-related concepts. We will then
argue for the employment of the frame-based analysis-method and show why this
method of analysis has clear advantages over other methods of analysis. The ad-
vantages of frames especially become apparent in the capability to specify sensori-
motor parts of a concept, as well as in highlighting abstraction mechanisms within
concepts. The representation of modal attributes without introducing modal oper-
ators is another speciVc advantage of frames over other formats of representation.
1 Introduction
The research concerning the problem of grounding language in action so far is
mostly empirical. The Veld is dominated by cognitive psychology and neuro-
science, where behavioral and neurological measures are used to relate the pos-
session and processing of conceptual knowledge to sensorimotor processes. The
work of Pulvermüller (2005) or Glenberg & Kaschak (2002), just to name two,
clearly showed that there is a connection between concept processing and motor-
processes. However, the theoretical framework of grounded cognition is not yet
spelled out in detail, so it remains still an open question of what it exactly means
for concepts to be grounded in action.
In this paper we will present and discuss a tool for adequately analyzing con-
cepts. This special kind of concept analysis will then provide a better understand-
ing of what it means for a concept to be grounded in sensorimotor processes. The
Thomas Gamerschlag, Doris Gerland, Rainer Osswald & Wiebke Petersen
(eds.). 2015. Meaning, Frames, and Conceptual Representation. Düsseldorf:
dup.
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idea is, in short, to analyze action-related concepts within frames. The frame the-
ory in question was originally developed by Barsalou (1992) as a theory of a gen-
eral format of concept representation; the frame theory underlying this paper is a
speciVed and reVned modiVcation of Barsalou’s proposal. According to this mod-
iVcation, frames are understood as recursive attribute-value structures. Frames
have a lot of advantages over other forms of representing concepts, but due to
brevity, we will focus on one special feature of frames concerning action-related
concepts: The decomposition of action-related concepts via frame-analysis is able
to specify motor-values within these concepts. If motor-values can be analyzed as
very basic values in the frame of a certain concept, the conclusion clearly is that
this concept is grounded in motor processes. Concepts that do not have motor
values as very basic values can hardly be grounded in the relevant sense.
In the following, we will give examples of frames and the idea of special motor
values, and we will then show why frames have clear advantages over other
formats of representation e. g. Vrst-order predicate logics. First of all, however,
we will introduce the strategy of frame analysis.
2 Concepts and frames
Barsalou (1992) proposes that the content of concepts (understood as mental enti-
ties as opposed to linguistic entities) can be naturally accounted for in terms of
frames. Frames as recursive attribute-value structures have been widely used as a
general format for knowledge representation, e. g. for capturing linguistic knowl-
edge (Fillmore 1970) or situational knowledge (Minsky 1974). Minsky (1974:1)
regards a frame as a “data-structure for representing a stereotyped situation [. . . ].
Once a frame is proposed to represent a situation, a matching process tries to
assign values to each frame’s terminals, consistent with the markers [restricting
the admissible values] at each place.” Minsky’s aim is to simulate this cognitive
process in applications of artiVcial intelligence. Like Minsky, most approaches
consider a frame as a Vxed Wat set of attributes or slots the values of which get
Vlled by the situation, the linguistic context or whatsoever. By sticking to a Vxed
set of attributes, those frames essentially reduce to feature lists and categorization
to value pattern recognition (1992:23). In contrast, Barsalou (1992:21) argues in fa-
vor of frames as “dynamic relational structures whose form is Wexible and context
dependent”. He presents psychological evidence for attribute-value structures de-
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rived from behavioral animal studies. These studies indicate that animals encode
stimulus information as attribute values and not as independent features. Fur-
thermore, he gives empirical evidence for the importance of conceptual relations
in human cognition. Here we will brieWy sketch our frame account which builds
on Barsalou’s Wexible cognitive approach, but provides it with a rigid formal foun-
dation.
The attributes in a concept frame are the general properties or aspects by which
the respective concept is described (e. g. SHAPE, LOCATION).1 Their values are
concrete or underspeciVed speciVcations (e. g., [SHAPE: round], [LOCATION: for-
est]). The attribute values can themselves be complex frames and thus described
by additional attributes. For example the value forest of the attribute LOCATION
can be further speciVed by attributes like SIZE or TREE SPECIES. Due to their
recursivity, frames are Wexible enough to represent information of any desired
grade of detail. We assume that attributes in frames assign unique values to ob-
jects and thus describe functional relations. Formally, frames can be represented
by connected directed graphs where the arcs correspond to attributes. As at-
tributes are functions, no node may have two equally labeled outgoing arcs. The
nodes may be labeled by types which restrict the attribute domains and ranges,
i. e. the set of objects for which an attribute is adequate and the set of values an
attribute can take. Figure 1 shows a simpliVed frame of the concept ‘round shelter
in an oak forest’.
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Figure 1: Frame of the concept ‘round shelter in an oak forest’
Figure 1 shows two additional notational devices which we use in our graph
representations of frames: First, the double border at the shelter node marks it
as the central node of the frame; it indicates that the graph represents a frame
1 Throughout this paper attributes are typeset in capitals and their values in italics.
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about shelters. Second, by using a rectangular node for the central shelter node,
we identify the whole frame as a concept or category frame which corresponds
to a 1-place predicate the argument of which is represented by the shelter node.
A round central node would indicate instead that it is a frame of a not further
speciVed category member of the category ‘round shelter in an oak forest’. As
types correspond to 1-place predicates and attributes to functions, the informa-
tion modeled in the frame can be expressed in the logical formula:
λx.shelter (x) ∧ round (SHAPE (x)) ∧ forest (LOCATION (x))
∧ oak (TREE SPECIES (LOCATION (x)))
In contrast to other frame theories, our frames are capable of representing not
only sortal concepts like ‘shelter’, which denote classical categories, but also re-
lational ones like ‘sibling’or ‘mother’ (Petersen 2007/2015); the referents of the
latter concepts are given by a relation to a possessor (‘sibling of’, ‘mother of’).
Frames of relational concepts diUer from frames of sortal concepts in that they
have an additional rectangular node for the possessor argument. Figure 2 shows
the frame for the sibling concept. It consists of three nodes, one for the sibling
itself (rectangular, double border), one for the person it is the sibling of (rectangu-
lar, single border) and one for the mother of both (round). The relation between
the two persons is constituted by the fact that they both have the same mother.2
This is modeled by the single node to which the two MOTHER-arcs point. Note
that in contrast to classical frame accounts our approach does not presuppose
that the central node of a frame, i. e. the node which determines what is denoted
by a frame, is a root node of the frame graph.3
An adequate frame theory needs means of restricting the set of admissible
frames. Therefore, frame nodes may be labeled by types. The types are ordered in
a type hierarchy which is enriched by appropriateness conditions which constrain
the domain and range of attributes. Thus the type signature tells which type of
entities can have a certain attribute and of which type the values of each attribute
are. Thus we can infer the type of a nodes from the connecting attribute, unless it
2 Note that all frames in this paper are severely simpliVed. For example, the frame in Vgure 2 models
the sibling concept as being purely determined by the mother relation, leaving aside fathers or
socially established family relations.
3 A root of a directed graph is a node from which all other nodes can be reached via paths of directed
arcs.
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Figure 2: Frame for the concept ‘sibling’
is further restricted by other constraints in a particular frame. For example, if a
type signature speciVes that the domain of the attribute MOTHER is person and
that its range is woman, then the information modeled by the frame in Vgure 2
can be expressed by
λyλx.MOTHER(x) = MOTHER(y) ∧ person (x)
∧ person (y) ∧ woman (MOTHER (x))
In contrast to Vgure 2, Vgure 1 shows an example of a frame in which the type
labels at the nodes eUectively restrict the attribute domains and ranges. For in-
stance LOCATION is a very general attribute which applies to all kind of physical
objects (not only to shelters) and which takes all kinds of locations as values (not
only forests). The formal details of our frame account can be found in Petersen
(2007/2015) and Petersen & Osswald (2014).
Although the informational content of a frame can be expressed in classical
logical formulas, it is more natural to assume that concepts are mentally stored
in terms of frames than in terms of formulas. As Barsalou (1992) points out,
there is empirical evidence for attribute-value sets and relations in cognition.
In frames, concepts remain units although they may be highly structured. This
unity is concealed in logical formulas by multiple occurring variables. Within
frame theory we are not forced to stipulate a Vxed arity for each predicate as
in predicate logic where predicates are constants. Finally, due to the non-linear
structure of frames, one is not required to stipulate an order on the arguments.
Rather, substructures can be addressed via labeled symbols instead of ordered
argument positions which is cognitively more adequate. By using oscillatory
neural networks as a biologically motivated model, Petersen & Werning (2007)
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give evidence for the cognitive adequacy of our frame model and shows how
frames might be implemented in the cortex.
3 Motor processes in frames
This framework can now be used to address the question of how the nature of
grounded concepts can be speciVed.
We will introduce some examples of concepts which explicitly involve action
and show how action-involvement as a property of a concept can be deVned in
frames. Because these concepts have a quite simple structure, they serve as an
ideal starting point. In the next step, the framework will be generalized to cover
other types of (and especially linguistically expressible) concepts.
As we have seen above, frames are characterized by recursive attribute-value
structures. Attributes are taken to assign unique values to objects. The values of
our interest here are motor-values. They are understood as explicitly representing
a movement or a set of movements within a frame. So, the values in these action
frames are really parameters that are used in movement control, and not mere
numbers or other kinds of abstract values.
Let us start with a simple example: Ants are dynamically representing the
location of their nest in terms of the angle to the sun in which the ant has to
walk and the number of steps it has to make (Gallistel 1993, Wittlinger et al.
2006). A frame for the ant’s representation of the location of the nest is shown
in Vgure 3.
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Figure 3: Frame for an ant’s representation of the location of the nest
What is crucial here is the meaning of the two values in the lower nodes.
Although the graphic shows number variables, the values in the nodes represent
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speciVc motor-parameters, in this case the angle the ant has to turn and the
number of steps it has to make.4 As ants are generally held to be unable to
count, for ants have no concept of numbers as numbers, those values are simply
movements the ant can make. Of course, the ant “knows” how many steps it takes
to return to the nest, but it does not “know” it in terms of numbers (Franks et al.
2006). One would be inclined to say that a speciVc motor-program is running
that determines how long and in which direction the ant has to travel to reach
the nest. But the ant is not just unable to count, it is also unable to represent these
movements as a property of the nest, so we would not want to speak of the ant
representing various properties of the nest, namely the heading and the distance
(Vosgerau 2007). Rather, it is a good example of a movement representation.
As our interest is in grounded concepts, we need to give an example of a
conceptual representation which implies action in the above sense. To stick with
the example, a frame thus characterized is shown in Vgure 4.
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Figure 4: Frame for a conceptual representation of the location of the nest
4 In the current paper, the dynamic changes of the motor values which occur while actual moving are
not in focus. These changes could be modeled as dynamic updates of event frames in a multi-layered
architecture as proposed by Naumann (2012).
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Here, the location of the nest is represented as a property of an object, namely
the nest. Thus, the representation can in principle be used to represent very
diUerent locations of diUerent objects. Technically, this is done by exchanging
the speciVc value of the central node to denote another object. In this sense, this
representation can be said to be conceptual: One and the same property can be
ascribed to diUerent objects (Newen & Bartels 2007), and we can clearly analyze
one part of the frame to stand for an object (the central node) and another part
to stand for a property (the rest of the frame standing for the property of being
located at this-and-that point) (Vosgerau 2008).
What we have here is a tool for describing the internal structure of concepts.
A concept is constituted by a central node to which properties are assigned by
diUerent attributes which assign values. These values, as we have shown, can be
motor-processes, in that they represent movements.
The next question obviously has to address the motor-values. What are the
constraints to represent motor processes?
Every concept can be analyzed and decomposed. This process of analysis will
at one point or another come to a basal level. Basal-level properties are reWected
in the end nodes of a concept-frame. One way of dealing with motor processes
in concepts is to deVne them as basal-level-values and to put them in the end
nodes of a frame. A concept which contains motor values as basal-level-values
can then be said to be grounded in motor abilities. However, if a concept does
not contain basal-level-values (i. e. it only contains values that can be further
analyzed) or if it contains basal-level-values that are not motoric, then it cannot be
characterized as being grounded in motor abilities. (It might still be the case that
a concept is grounded in sensory processes if its basal-level-values are sensory
values; however, this is not the focus of this paper.)
4 SigniVcance of frames over other methods of analyzing
concepts
The crucial point so far is that end-values in frames can be motor-parameters.
This means that the same values can Vgure in motor-control mechanisms. This
can be displayed most easily when motor processes are represented in frames
as well. The possibility of analyzing motor processes (and the speciVc represen-
tations involved in them) in frames directly follows from the claim that frames
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Figure 5: Frame for a specific reaching movement
constitute a general format of representation. In this sense, the frame of a speciVc
reaching movement can be displayed like shown in Vgure 5.
According to this (simpliVed) analysis, the movement is speciVed by param-
eters which are in turn further speciVed and transformed into a speciVc motor
command (cf. diagrams of motor control in Synofzik et al., 2008). This motor
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command can now be executed (i. e. be sent to the muscles) or not. In the latter
case, the movement is merely “imagined” or “simulated” (although not necessar-
ily consciously). The important point here is that the upper part of Vgure 5 has to
be understood as a representation of the location of an object whereas the lower
part is a representation of a movement; these parts in combination represent a
location of an object as a movement (or in terms of a movement).
Usually, motor control mechanisms are depicted in Wow-charts (e. g. in Synofzik
et al., 2008). The general idea is that each movement (except for reWexes) starts
with a “motor intention”, which is a usually unconscious and non-conceptual part
of motor control (as opposed to the “primary” intention; see Vosgerau & Synofzik,
2010). For example, if you are going to chop up an onion, your primary intention
is to chop up the onion (completely). In contrast, for every cutting of a slice there
is a separate motor intention to move the knife in a speciVc way. This motor
intention is usually unconscious and is already in a motor format (something like
to move the knife forward while pressing it down). However, the motor intention
does not suXce for executing a movement, since several background conditions
have to be taken into account. For example, the movement will depend on the ac-
tual posture (e. g. where your hand with the knife is) and the surroundings (e. g.
where the onion is). Moreover, general facts about the kinematics of the own
body have to be taken into account (speciVed in the “body schema”; see e. g. Vos-
gerau, 2009). The part of the motor control process, in which the exact parameters
of the movement are speciVed, is often called “speciVcation of movement”. The
output of the speciVcation is then a motor command which can be sent to the ef-
fectors to elicit the movement. However, this last step is not obligatory—indeed,
our ability to imagine movements is usually explained by the capacity to run
through the motor control sequence without actually executing the movement.
Thus, the motor control mechanisms can be used “oU-line” to represent a move-
ment rather than to elicit a movement. This aspect of frame analysis provides two
main advantages over other formats of description (e. g. logical notations):
First, motor processes can be described as processes in which certain param-
eters play a role (e. g. motor intentions, posture). Therefore, the speciVc features
of motor control mechanisms can be displayed as shown in Vgure 6, as opposed
to logical notations in which there is no diUerence (explicitly) displayed between
motor-attributes and conceptual attributes (they are, in logical terms, all predi-
cates).
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Figure 6: Frame description of motor control
This allows for a reformulation of the question of how grounded abstract con-
cepts are in terms of frames: Are the values of the end-nodes of frames of con-
cepts values that we can also Vnd in sensorimotor processes? In other words:
Concept-frames can be combined with motor-control-frames if and only if there
is a certain overlap, i. e. if motor-values occur in the concept frame. This formula-
tion of the thesis of grounded cognition directly shows the explanatory advantage
of the thesis: It would explain why and how concepts can have a direct impact
on our behavior. For example, the motor intentions in the example above (onion
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chopping) could be values that also occur in the concept frame for ‘knife’, since
cutting is an aUordance of knifes.
Second, the conceptual categorization of an object does, of course, not auto-
matically lead to a behavior. The movement which is speciVed by the motor-
values needs not be executed. Thus, entertaining a concept like ‘knife’ can in-
volve the “activation” of a motor-representation without triggering the according
movement (this is what Barsalou Barsalou, 1999 calls “simulation”). In this sense,
frames can represent possibilities without introducing a modal operator: The pos-
sible movement is represented by motor values which build the basis for a motor
command although the motor command is not executed. This fact makes the
representation modal in the sense that it represents a merely possible movement
and not an actual movement. The speciVc advantage of frames over other for-
mats of representation is twofold: 1) we can represent modal attributes without
introducing modal operators, and 2) there is a straightforward sense in which
attribute values can be motor-parameters and not just arbitrary symbols which
do not stand in any meaningful relation to motor processing (as it is the case for
constants in predicate logic, for example).
5 Implications for the thesis of grounded cognition
According to the thesis of grounded cognition, the content of concepts is based
on sensorimotor processes, which are constitutive for the relevant concept. What
is to be analyzed to understand cognition in general is not mechanisms of com-
putation and abstract symbol manipulation, but rather the relation between con-
ceptualization and basal motor-processes. These motor processes therefore have
to be somehow encoded in the concept, they have to be a part or a property of
the concept. This view conforms with the fact that these encoded motor processes
are not (necessarily) reWected in the verbal structure of the concept. However that
holds as well for other functional and physical properties of a concept, which are
not reWected in the word form in most cases: The word for the concept ‘dog’ does
not reWect dog-properties nor does it refer to physical or functional properties of
dogs (Glenberg & Kaschak 2002).
Decomposition of concepts via frame analysis is a way to get to a cognitively
adequate account of the concept-structure, i. e. the properties assigned to objects
by this concept. The most important point, however, is that frame analysis of
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concepts allows us to speciVcally deVne what being grounded in action means:
If and only if the frame of a concept contains motor-values as base-level-values, it
is grounded on motor abilities. Concepts that do not contain such values cannot
be said to be grounded in action. Thus, frame analysis goes beyond the rather
vague and unspeciVc claim that concepts are based on modal representations as
opposed to abstract symbols (Barsalou 2008). It gives us a clear notion of being
grounded which can be applied not only to concepts tout court, but also to parts
of concepts. In this way, the “internal” structure of a concept can be taken into
account, which leads to a more speciVc notion of groundedness that can come in
well-deVned degrees: The transition between grounded and abstract concepts is
not a matter of on and oU; rather, it is possible that a mid-level concept contains
some grounded parts and at the same time already involves other non-grounded,
abstract parts.
Weber & Vosgerau (2012) discuss diUerent ways in which the (unspeciVc) thesis
of grounded action cognition can be interpreted. They argue that three versions
can be distinguished: The strong thesis basically collapses into the thesis that
thoughts (and a fortiori concepts) are a kind of motor ability. The moderate
thesis states that some concepts are constituted by motor processes but others
not. The weak thesis amounts to the claim that some motor abilities are necessary
to acquire certain concepts but can be lost after acquisition without damage to
the concept (i. e. motor abilities are among the acquisition conditions for some
concepts but they do not constitute them). In their paper they argue on theoretical
and empirical grounds, that the moderate thesis is the most plausible one.
The problem with the strong thesis is present already at a theoretical level,
since this thesis faces a serious threat of inVnite regress (for details see Vosgerau
& Newen, 2007). Moreover, the thesis is somewhat self-refuting: If it is true
that all concepts are a kind of motor ability, then it cannot be said anymore that
they are grounded in motor abilities.5 Thus, the strong thesis has to be refuted.
The weak thesis, on the other hand, can be rejected on the basis of results from
empirical studies (see Weber & Vosgerau, 2012 for details).
Having rejected both the strong and the weak version, there still is evidence
that at least some concepts are grounded in motor processes, and this exactly can
5 This is, of course, not a counter-argument against the thesis that thoughts are motor processes.
However, this thesis cannot be understood as a thesis of grounded cognition, and this is the im-
portant point here.
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be shown in frames. Obviously, not every part of a frame for a concept is based on
or related to motor-processes, but at least some parts of it should be interpreted
as values for motor-processes. So it is empirical evidence on the one hand that
advises for the rejection of both the strong versions of grounded cognition, but
on the other hand, conceptual frame-analysis oUers good reason to defend and
even further reVne the moderate version. As reasons for dismissal of a version of
a thesis are not suXcient reasons for accepting another version, the contribution
of frame-analysis can be seen in the light of giving independent motivations to
support the moderate version as described above.
6 Development of concepts
The analysis of concepts in terms of frames yields a cognitively adequate repre-
sentation of concepts. In particular, the sensorimotor grounding of concepts is
represented in frames by introducing sensorimotor values. However, concepts
apparently diUer in degree of groundedness: There are a lot of concepts that are
very unlikely to contain motor values (e. g. concepts like ‘state’, ‘freedom’, or
‘kinship’). Thus, the question of how abstract concepts can develop on the basis
of sensorimotor-grounded concepts has to be answered by theories of grounded
cognition.
Again, frame analysis turns out to be a useful tool for this task. As shown
above, frame analysis is apt to analyze simple representations as they occur in
ants. These representations are grounded in the full sense and are not yet abstract
enough to be called “concepts”. Starting with such simple frames, we have shown
that more and more abstract frames of concepts can be developed. First of all,
other nodes are added in order to represent a certain property (e. g. the location)
of an object as the property of the object. This concept is more abstract since it
now allows the representation of one and the same property in diUerent objects
and the representation of diUerent properties of the same object (Newen & Bartels
2007).
One possible next step is to abstract from the concrete values specifying a
movement to more abstract forms of motor-representations specifying general
schemata of movements. For example, the frame in Vgure 5 may be appropriate
to display my representation of the location of a discussion partner in terms of
the head movement I have to execute in order to look at him/her. At the same
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time, it is very plausible that I am able to represent the location of a discussion
partner in a more general format that comprises not only head movements but
also arm movements (how to reach him/her). Even more abstract are represen-
tations in terms of allocentric coordinates that occur both later in the ontogenesis
of humans and later in the evolutionary development of species (Vosgerau 2007).
In this way, frame analysis provides a powerful tool to detect abstraction mech-
anisms that lead from very basic representations that only presuppose sensorimo-
tor abilities to more abstract concepts that get more independent of sensorimotor
grounding. Thus, both phylogenetic and ontogenetic development of conceptual
abilities is analyzable within frames in terms of diUerent abstraction mechanisms.
Of course, it remains an open question how many diUerent abstraction mecha-
nisms there are at work and how far up such mechanisms can get us in terms of
abstractness.
7 Conclusion
To sum up, we have laid out the foundations of our frame-theory and argued for
its advantages over other formats of representing concepts. The frames speciVed
here are capable of representing concepts and information of any desired grade
of detail. The frames are not restricted to sortal concepts but can easily repre-
sent relational concepts as well. Although it is in principle possible to express
the content of the frames in logical formulas, the representation in frames has
clear advantages over e. g. predicates of Vrst order logics: no Vxed arities have
to be stipulated for the predicates, as well as no order of the arguments have to
be stipulated, due to the non-linear structure of frames. These advantages con-
cern the formal aspects of frame-representation, so it is worth pointing to one
of the psychological incitements for adopting the frame theory: There clearly is
evidence that cognitive processes can be understood in terms of attribute-value
sets and relations, so the explanatory role of frames within cognitive science is
quite clear.
With the frame-theory as a foundation of cognitive representation and pro-
cessing of concepts, the idea of grounding concepts in action can thus be formu-
lated in a cognitively adequate way and be embedded in a formalizable model
of concept-representation. We have shown what it can mean for a concept to be
grounded in sensorimotor processes, i. e. to rely on sensorimotor values in frames
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at a very basal level. This notion of groundedness suits well the idea of high-level
and low-level processing, where sensorimotor processes are thought to be low-
level processes which are at play at a very early stage in concept development
but do not cease to be a part of higher-level concept processing. Frames reWect
this hierarchical understanding of concept development in an appropriate way,
as higher-level concepts come along with higher degrees of abstraction within
concepts. These degrees and the responsible mechanisms of abstraction can be
made visible via frame analysis. The capability of frames to highlight abstraction
combined with the possibility to implement modality within representations of
motor-based concepts marks frames as a perfect tool for analyzing action-related
concepts.
Some further questions remain: As already mentioned above, it is far from clear
how concepts exhibiting a very high degree of abstractness could be sensibly un-
derstood as grounded on sensorimotor processes. If one adopts our account of
analyzing concepts via frames, at least a promising strategy for detecting mecha-
nisms of abstraction is at hand, worth to be persecuted. Another question con-
cerns the scope of the idea of grounded concepts: do literally all concepts have to
be grounded in the above sense, or would it already be suXcient for the thesis of
grounded cognition that some concepts are straightforwardly grounded, allow-
ing for the possibility of non-grounded concepts? To answer these questions, a
lot more empirical and conceptual research on abstract concept grounding has to
be done. Our method of analyzing can thus be understood as just a starting point,
but a very promising one.
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Abstract
We applied Barsalou’s Frame Theory to analyze the structure of operational-
ized classiVcatory texts used in psychiatry, such as the International ClassiVca-
tion of Disorders, Chapter V (ICD-10), and the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual
(DSM-IV), which provide the basic terminology for today’s psychiatric classiV-
cation system. We studied the classiVcatory principles of “schizophrenia” and
“speciVc phobias” as examples of mental disorders. In addition, we studied Parkin-
son’s disease as an example of a disorder on the border between neurology and
psychiatry. Initial results suggest that although the texts of modern classiVcation
systems are highly operationalized and appear straightforward and simple, their
internal structure is highly complex with subframe structures of divergent types
emerging. Also, the comparison of both modern systems of classiVcation shows
that the diUerences are greater than just time-course diUerences or terminological
diUerences. We show that by applying Barsalou’s frame theory, internal struc-
tures of standard classiVcatory texts in psychiatry may become discernible, and
that focusing on well-deVned concepts of brain functions like the sense of agency
promises to yield useful insights into the pathophysiology, symptomatology and
classiVcations of major mental disorders.
1 Introduction
Barsalou developed a theory of frames as the general format of the representa-
tion of concepts in human cognition (Barsalou 1992a, 1992b). The theory was
further developed, and integrated into Barsalou’s theory of conceptual symbol
Thomas Gamerschlag, Doris Gerland, Rainer Osswald & Wiebke Petersen
(eds.). 2015. Meaning, Frames, and Conceptual Representation. Düsseldorf:
dup.
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systems (Barsalou 1999). Barsalou frames represent their referents by means of
a recursive structure in terms of attributes and the values they take. Following
the conventions developed in Petersen (2007/2015), Barsalou frames can be rep-
resented by directed graphs.1 In a frame for an arbitrary category of objects, a
central node represents the object itself; it is marked with a double line. The node
is “central” in that all arrows originate directly from it or from nodes connected
to it. Labeled arrows connect a node to other nodes. The arrows represent at-
tributes, the labels name them. The nodes to which the arrows lead represent the
values that the attributes take. The number of attributes is not limited, nor is the
depth of embedding.
ATTRIBUTE 1 ATTRIBUTE 1.1 
ATTRIBUTE 2 
object value value 
value 
Figure 1: General structure of a Barsalou frame
Crucially, the attributes are functional relations: for any object they assign ex-
actly one value and for any object the same attribute can only be applied once.
In frame graphs it is not permissible to have more than one arrow with the same
label originate from one and the same node. DiUerent nodes may, however, have
the same attribute. Think, for example, of a frame-format physical description of
a person. Possible attributes can include height, weight, and age.2 Any person,
at a given time, has the descriptive dimensions of height, weight or age only once
and each of these take just one value. For a simple notation for the fact that for
an object x the attribute a takes the value y, one can use the usual mathemati-
cal notation for a function taking a value for a given argument: “a(x)=y”. One
can write “height(Jones) = 1.76 m” for the fact that the attribute height for the
person Jones takes the value 1.76 m. A nonfunctional attribute would be a char-
acteristic such as a ‘disease’: namely, a person can have several, just one or no
1 Barsalou (1992a, 1992b) uses directed labeled graphs, too. However, his representations have a more
complex, although essentially equivalent, structure. See Petersen (2007/2015) for a discussion of the
alternative graph representations of frames.
2 We use small capitals for attribute terms.
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diseases at all. Consequently, the attribute “disease” would not necessarily take a
unique value. It would be inappropriate to notate the fact that Jones suUers from
diabetes as “disease(Jones) = diabetes”; if Jones suUered from a bronchitis at the
same time, one would have to put this as “disease(Jones) = bronchitis”. However,
if disease really were to be a function(al attribute), its value for a given person
at a given time cannot be both diabetes and bronchitis because these are diUer-
ent diseases. In constructing frames for the representation of concepts, attributes
have therefore to be chosen very carefully to use only attributes that are really
functions. Representing the fact that a person suUers from diabetes would require
a frame with attributes such as insulin production or insulin resistance.
Frame-format descriptions are thus descriptions in terms of functional attri-
butes and the values they take. Such descriptions are very frequently used in
practice in one form or the other. For example, a lab report with values for various
substances in the blood such as Fe, Mg, or cholesterol, represents a frame in terms
of concentrations of these substances in the blood sample analyzed. A reference
to a publication represents a frame-format description in terms of author(s), year
of publication, title, publisher, etc. Another instance of frame-format description
is passports; they contain a frame description of the bearer.
Barsalou frames may also contain various types of constraints that relate to the
values of attributes. For example, a constraint might delimit the range of possible
values for an attribute, or it might correlate the values of two attributes.
Frames for diseases or disorders would start from a frame for the person with
attributes added for those parts or functions of the organism which are aUected.
A disease can be described at diUerent levels. A description of diabetes at the
level of diagnostics would refer to attributes such as blood sugar level, while
a description at the organic level might relate to the function of the pancreas.
Capturing the causes of the disease would require attributes relating to lifestyle or
to the genetics of the person. The description of a disease would then essentially
involve the choice of relevant attributes and the values they take. Such a frame
may be restricted to a certain level of description or it may combine more than
one level. Including both the organic and the symptomatic level would enable
one to represent causal relations between elements of the frames, for example
between insulin production and blood sugar.
Using frames for the analysis of mental disorders is demanding, but oUers the
opportunity for a more precise and explicit conceptual analysis. The available
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descriptions of disorders do not come in terms of functional attributes (see Tables
1 and 2 below). To begin with, in most cases of particular mental disorders it is
not made explicit what the respective disorder is a disorder of. What exactly is
disturbed in schizophrenia? Is there a uniform disorder underlying all those cases
currently classiVed as a particular disorder? The usual descriptions of mental dis-
orders describe symptoms and diagnostics, such has “hearing voices” in the case
of schizophrenia. The description of a disorder may refer to behavioral character-
istics or to other levels such as bodily symptoms or genetics. It may be in terms of
phenomena or in terms of malfunctioning. It will include temporal characteris-
tics such as the frequency and duration of symptoms, the age of the patient, the
chronological progression of the disorder. It may also include causal components
such as lifestyle, social environment, infections, intoxication, etc. It must provide
for a weighting of symptoms, for exclusion criteria, and for provisions such that a
certain number out of all possible symptoms must be present. A frame approach
should Vrst make a decision about the level(s) of description which it aims at and
will then have to try to determine the appropriate set of attributes for capturing
the characteristics of the disorder. In this article, we will represent initial ex-
ploratory heuristic frame descriptions of three disorders: schizophrenia, speciVc
phobias, and Parkinson’s disease. The last section represents considerations to-
wards a more principled approach to the frame analysis of mental disorders in
terms of faculties of the mind.
2 ClassiVcation of mental disorders
Two major classiVcation systems for mental disorders have been developed and
are in use globally: the World Health Organization (WHO) publishes the “In-
ternational ClassiVcation of Disorders,” which is currently in its 10th revision
(hence “ICD-10”) (World Health Organization, 1990) and the American Psychi-
atric Association (APA) publishes the “Diagnostic and Statistical Manual,” which
is currently available in its fourth edition (hence “DSM-IV”) (American Psychi-
atric Association, 2000). Both systems are currently being revised by interna-
tional working groups with a view to publish the newly revised versions ICD-11
and DSM-V in 2013/2014. Both classiVcation systems share a number of features:
• They are operationalized: they explicitly specify rules on how to arrive at
a certain diagnosis
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• They are anosological: they do not make assumptions about the nosological
entities that may underlie a certain diagnosis. This implies that they do not
make assumptions about the pathophysiology of any of the mental disorders
classiVed in the respective diagnostic system.
Both systems have been tested for inter-rater reliability in the early 1990’s,
and one of their strengths and advantages is clearly that they have reduced the
ambiguities previously associated with psychiatric diagnostics. After appropriate
training, the inter-rater reliability is around 80%. These systems have become
widely accepted internationally. The majority of international psychiatric scien-
tiVc literature uses either ICD-10 or DSM-IV. A survey of the use of ICD or DSM
in psychiatric journals showed that some country-speciVc preferences are still
observable between both systems, i. e., US-psychiatrists prefer DSM-IV, whereas
German psychiatrists prefer ICD-10 (Lopez-Munoz et al., 2008).
As a rule, the constitutive features of mental disorder speciVed in these clas-
siVcations include i) a syndrome of clinical symptoms, ii) some disease course
characteristics and iii) the results of laboratory tests or neuroimaging methods.
The latter, however, are mainly used for detecting brain tumors, inWammatory or
metabolic disorders as causes of mental disorders.
In Germany, the use of the ICD-10 has been mandatory since 2000 for in- and
out-patient services. For example, reimbursement by health insurance companies
in the somatic disorders is based on diagnosis-related groups, which are founded
in ICD-10 diagnoses. The oXcial version is published by the German Institute
of Medical Documentation and Statistics (DIMDI), with annual updates of the
German modiVcation (ICD-10-GM), so that the actual 2010 version of the ICD-
10-GM features some minor diUerences compared to the original WHO ICD-10
version (www.dimdi.de). The German-language version issued by DIMDI is a
trinational version which is also valid in Austria and Switzerland.
ICD-10 contains all somatic and all mental disorders, the latter are listed in
Chapter F and contain the following major diagnostic groups (Table 1).
While the somatic disorders are only listed in ICD-10 and no speciVcation for
their diagnosis is given, the mental disorders are explicitly deVned considering
characteristic symptoms, time-course criteria, and exclusion criteria. In contrast
to ICD-10, DSM-IV only deals with mental disorders, but also contains explicit
rules for arriving at certain diagnoses similar to chapter F of ICD-10. A number
of diUerences still exist between the diagnostic rules for some – but not all –
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Table 1: Mental Disorders in ICD-10 (Chapter F) (WHO, 1992)
Chapter F class Designation
F0 Organic, including symptomatic mental disorders
F1 Mental and behavioral disorders due to psychoactive substance use
F2 Schizophrenia, schizotypal and delusional disorders
F3 Mood [affective] disorders
F4 Neurotic, stress-related and somatoform disorders
F5 Behavioral syndromes associated with physiological disturbances and phys-
ical factors
F6 Disorders of adult personality and behavior
F7 Mental retardation
F8 Disorders of psychological development
F9 Behavioral and emotional disorders with onset usually in childhood and
adolescence
mental disorders between both classiVcation systems, and those pertaining to the
mental disorders discussed in this chapter will be delineated in the ensuing text.
It should be mentioned at this point that there are also a number of regional vari-
ations of classiVcation systems still in use for mental disorders, e.g., in China or
Latin America, but in international research and for the purposes of international
scientiVc projects, such regional codes have not gained any importance.
Besides the advantages of providing highly reliable, standardized and inter-
nationally widely accepted rules for diagnosing mental disorders, these classi-
Vcation systems have also been criticized for the aforementioned diUerences in
operational details, for not including pathophysiological processes, and for ag-
glomerating a range of putatively diUerent nosological entities into single disease
groups. These issues are currently being debated intensively in the APA and
WHO workgroups in charge of revising DSM-IV and ICD-10. However, even
considering the tremendous progress in elucidating pathophysiological processes
involved in a range of mental disorders, it currently appears rather unlikely that
these advances have already been made far enough to warrant the inclusion of
pathophysiology criteria in DSM-V or ICD-11.
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3 Applying frame theory to texts of psychiatric
classiVcation
The main purpose of this initial stage of a joint research project between the
Department of Psychiatry and Psychotherapy and the Department of Linguis-
tics and Information Science of the Heinrich-Heine-University Düsseldorf was to
demonstrate the feasibility of using Barsalou’s Frame Theory to analyze texts of
psychiatric classiVcation with a view to systematically assessing the structure un-
derlying the classiVcation of mental disorders. The selection of mental disorders
to be studied in the Vrst phase of the research project was guided by the idea
that one of the more frequent mental disorders was to be included. It should be
diagnosed on the basis of clinical symptoms and it should provide some varia-
tions of time-course. We chose schizophrenia for this purpose, as it provides a
large number of cases and fulVlls these criteria. It has a range of time-course
variants, and it is characterized by a set of hierarchical clinical diagnostic crite-
ria. A second mental disorder was studied because in the course of analyzing
schizophrenia, we realized that the analysis was hampered by a lack of infor-
mation about the neurobiological foundations of schizophrenia, and the frame
structure turned out to indicate a high degree of complexity. We therefore chose
the group of speciVc phobias, since the neurobiology of fear disorders is com-
paratively better known, and the clinical courses and characteristics are not as
complicated as in schizophrenia. We decided to round up this initial set of inves-
tigations with a neurological disorder featuring a clearly deVned neurobiological
foundation and associated symptoms of a mental disorder: Parkinson’s disease is
characterized by the degeneration of a set of neurons in the midbrain and ensuing
degeneration of the Vber tracts that connect these speciVc areas of the midbrain
with other brain areas. This results in the typical shaking palsy of patients with
Parkinson’s disease. In addition, approximately 30 % of all patients with Parkin-
son’s disease also suUer from aUective or cognitive symptoms, which may lead
to mental disorders such as depression and dementia.
3.1 Frame analysis of schizophrenia
Both DSM-IV-TR (DSM-IV Text Revision) and ICD-10 feature a range of schizo-
phrenia-like symptoms of importance for diagnosing schizophrenia and schizo-
phrenia-related disorders like persistent delusional syndromes or schizoaUective
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disorder, which constitutes an overlap of both mood symptoms and schizophre-
nia-like symptoms. For the purpose of the initial analysis of these criteria, our
project focused on the major groups of “schizophrenia” (F20 in ICD-10; 295.10-
90 in DSM-IV). The diagnosis of schizophrenia according to DSM-IV or ICD-10
is a multi-step process. First, it is important for the clinician to ascertain that
a number of symptoms are present for a suXciently prolonged period of time.
While the types of symptoms are compatible – but not identical – between both
diagnostic systems, the time course criterion varies signiVcantly (four weeks in
ICD-10 and six months in DSM-IV). The symptoms comprise so-called “positive”
symptoms like hallucinations and delusions and “negative” symptoms like loss of
interest, lack of initiative and social withdrawal. Table 2 gives an overview of
the diagnostic criteria comparing DSM-IV (text revision edition of 2000, hence
“DSM-IV-TR”) and ICD-10:
It is important to realize that two partly divergent sets of diagnostic categories
exist. However, the principal components are comparable. We chose to use the
ICD-10 criteria for a Vrst analysis, since it is the type of criteria set relevant
for Germany, and since it is widely used in Europe as compared to the DSM-
IV criteria. Figure 2 shows some aspects that a frame for the ICD-10 deVnition
of schizophrenia may contain.
This frame shows that one of the major challenges will be to determine which
functions underlie the pathophysiology of the major symptoms like hallucina-
tions and delusions. We have added place holders, because much more work
is needed to demonstrate whether functional systems such as a “reality check”
system exist in the human brain, and whether they become dysfunctional in
schizophrenia. We are currently performing such investigations by deriving in-
formation from the scientiVc literature on the set of such systems as identiVed by
neuroimaging or other assessment techniques. It is likely that such systems, or
“modules” as they are called in systems analyses of the central nervous system,
are at the root of the pathophysiology of the functional impairments observed
in mental disorders (Zielasek & Gaebel, 2008; Seitz et al., 2011). Also, this initial
analysis shows that the structure of the schizophrenia frame will be very com-
plicated, probably leading to a substantial number of subframes. As there are
associations between the positive symptoms as a group of symptoms, this may
lead to a formal constraint (for example between the various types of delusions
diUerentiated in the ICD-10 criteria). In the course of developing DSM-V, the
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Table 2: Operationalized diagnostic criteria of schizophrenia compared between ICD-10 (WHO,
1992) and DSM-IV-TR (American Psychiatric Association, 2000).
ICD-10 DSM-IV-TR
Clinical criteria Criterion A
A) Thought echo, thought insertion or withdrawal, and
thought broadcasting
B) Delusions of control, influence of passivity; delusional
perception
1) Delusions
C) Hallucinatory voices giving running commentary on the
patient’s behavior, or discussing the patient among them-
selves, or other types of hallucinatory voices coming from
some part of the body
2) Hallucinations
3) Disorganized speech
D) Persistent delusions of other kinds that are culturally
inappropriate and completely impossible
E) Persistent hallucinations in any modality when accom-
panied either by fleeting of half-formed delusions without
clear aective content, or by persistent over-valued ideas,
or when occurring every day for weeks or months on end
F) Breaks or interpolations in the trains of thought, result-
ing in incoherence or irrelevant speech, or neologisms
G) Catatonic behavior 4) Grossly disorganized or catatonic behavior
H) Negative symptoms 5) Negative symptoms
A significant and consistent change in the overall quality
of some aspects of personal behavior
Evaluation criterion Evaluation criteria for criterion A:
Aminimum of one very clear symptom (and usually two or
more if less clear-cut) belonging to any one of the symp-
toms in groups (A) to (D) above, or symptoms from at least
two of the groups referred to as (E) to (H)
Two or more symptoms
Only one Criterion A required if delusions are bizarre or
hallucinations consist of a voice keeping up a running com-
mentary on the person’s behavior or thoughts, or two or
more voices conversing with each other
Criterion B
Social/occupational dysfunction
Time criterion Time criterion
Criterion C
One month or more Duration: continuous signs of the disturbance persist for
at least 6 months. This 6 month period must include at
least one month of symptoms that meet Criterion A
Exclusion criteria Exclusion criteria
Extensive depressive or manic symptoms unless it is clear
that schizophrenic symptoms antedated the aective dis-
turbance
Criterion D
Schizoaective and mood disorder exclusion
Criterion E
Presence of overt brain disease Substance/general medical condition exclusion
States of drug intoxication or withdrawal
Criterion F
Relationship to a pervasive developmental disorder
319
J. Zielasek, G. Vosgerau, W. Gaebel, K. Fauerbach, I. Girgin, S. Jungbluth, J. Weiland, S. Löbner
search for such “clusters” of symptoms became very important. Nevertheless,
the associations are merely statistical, since every positive symptom may occur
independently of others. The same holds for the association between symptoms
and course characteristics. Even the association between certain symptoms and
prognosis is not a strict association, but rather a statistical association. This leads
to the question as to how the diUerent course speciVers may be incorporated into
a frame analysis. Schizophrenia has diUerent course types which are speciVed in
DSM-IV as shown in Table 3.
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Thoughts 
Flattened 
Decreased 
Others? 
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Figure 2: Some aspects of a schizophrenia frame analysis
It will be a major issue to devise methods of representing such temporal aspects
of mental disorders in the usual notation of frames. This initial analysis is at best
very preliminary and subject to change as research into the pathophysiology ad-
vances. However, schizophrenia does not lend itself easily to frame analysis, and
may even indicate necessary extensions of frame theory once temporal and causal
aspects come into play. Another challenge arises when sets of criteria with not yet
clariVed relations to functional systems of the brain are used. Although the latter
is not necessary for establishing diagnostic categories with prognostic validity
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Table 3: Course specifiers of schizophrenia in DSM-IV-TR (American Psychiatric Association, 2000)
Description
1. Episodic with inter-episode residual symptoms
2. Episodic with no inter-episode residual symptoms
3. Continuous
4. Single episode in partial remission
5. Single episode in full remission
6. Other or unspecified pattern
and for indicating the necessity of therapy, it would become a necessity if func-
tional subsystems and their relationship to symptoms needed to be deVned for
frame analysis. With the current knowledge, frame analysis could still be useful
for analyzing historic shifts in the deVnition and understanding of “schizophre-
nia” as a diagnostic construct in psychiatry – not relying on the identiVcation
of the “true” modules disturbed in schizophrenia, but rather on terminological
descriptions. This will be the focus of the ongoing analysis besides the deVnition
of the dysfunctional modules. Central texts for such an analysis would be the
conception of “dementia praecox” by Kraepelin (1899), the initial deVnition of the
schizophrenias as a group of mental disorders by Bleuler (1911), and the introduc-
tion of a hierarchy of schizophrenia-deVning symptoms by Schneider (1971).
3.2 Frame analysis of speciVc phobias
While fear is a normal and physiological element of human existence serving
to protect an individual in dangerous situations, its diagnostic value relates to
inappropriate fears occurring in harmless situations, or with negative conse-
quences for the individual in excess of any useful warning function of fear. Both
ICD-10 and DSM-IV deVne a variety of fear disorders ranging from stimulus-
speciVc anxiety disorders like the so-called “speciVc phobias” (including fear of
narrow rooms, fear of spiders etc.) to generalized anxiety disorders. ICD-10
(http://www.who.int) deVnes speciVc phobias as “phobias restricted to highly spe-
ciVc situations such as proximity to particular animals, heights, thunder, dark-
ness, Wying, closed spaces, urinating or defecating in public toilets, eating cer-
tain foods, dentistry, or the sight of blood or injury.” For the purpose of frame
analysis, we chose speciVc phobias because in contrast to schizophrenia they are
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characterized by a rather narrow spectrum of symptoms, clearly deVned fear-
inducing stimuli, and a rather well-known neurocircuitry. Thus, it could be hoped
that frame analysis would lead to rather simple frame structures. However, neu-
roimaging frequently shows that phobic stimuli activate a range of neurocircuits
(Pull, 2008; Damsa et al., 2008) including the amygdala and other structures of
the brain like the anterior cingulate cortex and the insular cortex. Such “fear
circuitries” are necessary conditions for bringing about fear, but it is still not
completely known what exactly goes wrong with this circuitry in phobias. An
intriguing question also arises as to the role of variations in genes involved in the
metabolism of the neurotransmitter serotonin (Munafo et al., 2008), as these seem
to increase the likelihood of the development of fear disorders. Also, learning
experiences seem to play an important role. Thus, while it is quite well known
which brain regions are involved and which normal functions are usually served
by such regions, it is still a considerable step to fully explain the psychopathology,
i. e., the set of signs and symptoms so characteristic of speciVc phobias. There are
still missing links in the chain of events from genetic predisposition via learning
experiences and initial fear reactions to the full clinical picture of a speciVc pho-
bia. All of these steps would ideally be modeled in frame analyses of the future. A
peculiar challenge lies in the delineation from “healthy” fear reactions. Similar
to the dimensional assessment of hallucinations and delusions in schizophrenia,
there appears to be a substantial overlap between fear reactions in the healthy
control population and in those individuals who develop anxiety disorders. In ad-
dition, there is not only an emotional reaction to fear stimuli, but also a vegetative
reaction with a diverse range of somatic signs like sweating and increased heart
rates. Thus, a frame for speciVc phobias will need to include a range of functional
circuits. An initial proposal is made in Figure 3.
3.3 Frame analysis of Parkinson’s disease
Parkinson’s disease used to be characterized as a neurodegenerative disorder with
relatively speciVc degeneration of a set of neurons in the substantia nigra of
the midbrain. The neurotransmitter produced by these neurons is dopamine,
and consequently there is a loss of dopaminergic neurotransmission in the target
projection area of these neurons in the striate corpus of the basal ganglia. This
leads to the main symptoms of Parkinson’s disease, i. e., resting tremor, akinesia,
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Figure 3: Aspects of a frame analysis of specific phobias
and rigor (Lees et al., 2009). However, other neurotransmitter systems are also
involved in the neurodegenerative process. An intricate neurocircuitry of motor
control underlies these pathophysiological processes.
A simple Vrst approach towards a frame analysis of the impairment of the mo-
tor system in Parkinson’s disease would result in a frame as depicted in Figure 4.
This frame does not yet take into account the fact that a signiVcant proportion
of patients with Parkinson’s disease not only suUer from motor symptoms, but
also from aUective and cognitive impairments. It is not completely understood
how these are related to the primary nigrostriatal degenerative process, but may
involve a spread of the initially locally conVned neurodegenerative process to
serotonergic and noradrenergic brain systems in depressive symptoms (Storch et
al., 2008) and a more widespread involvement of cholinergic neurotransmission
and frontostriatal circuits in patients with cognitive symptoms (Zgaljardic et al.,
2004). A unifying hypothesis for the relationship between the loss of dopamin-
ergic neurons and the ensuing neurocircuitry alterations leading to aUective and
cognitive symptoms has been proposed by Calabresi and colleagues (2006). Thus,
similar to schizophrenia and speciVc phobias, the pathophysiology of mental dis-
orders even in the framework of well-deVned neurodegenerative processes in-
volves a large number of brain areas and neurocircuits, making frame analysis
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Figure 4: Frame of neuronal elements involved in motor symptoms in Parkinson’s disease
diXcult especially when higher brain functions involved in mood and cognition
are aUected.
4 Frame analysis of the pathophysiology of mental
disorders
In order to gain a foothold in this complex area, we began an analysis of the con-
cept of “agency,” which is central to understanding many core features of mental
disorders. We assume that the sense of agency is based on an integration process
(weighting) of diUerent agency cues which are provided by diUerent processes (or
“modules”), including motor control, perception, proprioception, thinking (back-
ground beliefs). Therefore, delusions of control cannot be explained by a break-
down in motor processes only – in contrast, we need a multifactorial account of
agency that integrates the diUerent agency cues mentioned above (Synofzik, Vos-
gerau & Newen 2008). This account can thus serve as an example of the analysis
of symptoms in terms of faculties of the mind.
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Figure 5: A multifactorial account of agency in frames. Different faculties of the mind are pre-
sented by shaded areas. Possible neural implementations are attached to the according
nodes as black rectangulars (SMA: supplementary motor area, PPC: posterior parietal
cortex, EBA: extrastriate body area).
In Figure 5, a frame is shown that (partly and exemplarily) describes the mul-
tifactorial account of agency. For example, a mismatch at the comparator com-
paring perceived state and goal state serves as one agency cue indicating that
I am not the agent of the action (this is the case, for instance, when someone
nudges your arm during an arm movement such that you do not reach your goal).
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However, in other situations such a mismatch might not lead you to think that
you are not the agent of the action: e.g., perceived state and goal state will not
match when you fail to hit the bull’s eye as planned when playing darts. Never-
theless, the situation of playing darts and your background knowledge that your
skills in darts are not perfect will function as another cue which is, in this situ-
ation, weighted more highly than the mismatch. This results in your ascribing
the agency to yourself.
DiUerent faculties of the mind (exemplarily) re presented by diUerently shaded
areas since the two-dimensional paper makes an adequate depiction of the diUer-
ent faculties as attributes of a central “person” node very inconvenient. The frame
analysis shows how diUerent faculties of the mind interrelate in the production
of speciVc phenomena (agency as an aspect of self-consciousness in this case).
Delusions of control can be described as disturbances in speciVc values in the
frame, for example by unusual values of the comparison outcomes due to deVcits
in the comparison process or by unusual values of agency ascriptions due to
deVcits in the weighting process of diUerent cues. At the same time, the frame is
able to display the complex eUects that disturbances in single nodes can have; e.g.,
a disturbed value of a COMPARISON node might lead to disturbed values in the
ASCRIPTION node in cases where it is not outweighed by other agency-nodes.
This example of analyzing speciVc phenomena and their pathological distur-
bances is, moreover, embedded into a general theory of self-consciousness (Vos-
gerau 2009), such that the general pattern of analysis can be fruitfully applied
to other phenomena (e.g., authorship of thoughts or ownership of body parts;
Synofzik, Vosgerau & Newen 2008).
Moreover, the frame makes it possible to integrate data concerning neural cir-
cuits. Just to give a few examples: some brain areas are attached to some nodes in
the frame; there is some evidence that renders these brain areas plausible can-
didates for being the neural correlate of the according values in the frame. The
motor cortex is likely to be involved in forming and issuing the motor command
(Beurze et al. 2010); there is considerable evidence that the supplementary motor
area (SMA) plays a crucial role in the generation of a copy of the motor command
(“eUerence copy”) that is further used in prediction (Haggard & Whitford 2004).
It has been suggested that the comparison process between predicted state and
perceived state may involve the cerebellum and the parietal cortex (Blakemore,
Wolpert & Frith 1999); in addition, it has also been suggested that the poste-
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rior parietal cortex (PPC) and the extrastriate body area (EBA) may participate
in the network of areas correlating with the sense of agency (Yomogida et al.
2010). These examples show how experimental data on the neural correlates of
the diUerent faculties of the mind can be straightforwardly integrated into the
frame analysis, such that a comprehensive picture of the complex interrelations
between diUerent faculties of the mind, diUerent disruptions of speciVc processes,
and diUerent brain regions involved in these processes emerges.
5 Discussion
Frame theory can be applied to modern operationalized diagnostic criteria of
mental disorders, but its use is limited in two ways: i) the mental processes un-
derlying the pathophysiology of mental disorders are not yet suXciently clariVed
and ii) frame theory cannot yet render temporal and causal dimensions of mental
disorders. Also, the diagnostic structure of some mental disorders is complicated,
since such disorders involve a number of functional brain modules, leading to
intricate frame structures. During our initial analyses, frequently the question
arose as to which functions of the human brain are impaired and how this re-
sults in a clinical symptom. As exempliVed even by the relatively simple case
of phobias, there is an intricate network of interacting brain modules and the
pathophysiology of the psychopathologic phenomena proves to be of a very in-
tricate nature. Identifying constraints between attributes in frames for mental
disorders will prove to be diXcult because in clinical reality there is hardly ever a
strict correlation, but rather a certain predisposition or statistical association. An-
other aspect which needs to be addressed is the question of a continuum between
symptoms of mental disorders and “diluted” or less intense similar symptoms in
healthy people. This has been analyzed for some major symptoms of mental dis-
orders like delusions and hallucinations, and could indicate that there may be no
absolute boundaries between “health” and “disease.” This issue is referred to as
the “dimensional” nature of mental disorders and one of the central topics of the
current revision process of DSM-IV (Brown & Barlow, 2005). It will be necessary
to include such aspects in the Frame Analysis of mental disorders.
With such limitations and challenges at hand, it seems attractive to postpone
any further frame analysis of mental disorders until the pathophysiology of the
mental disorders to be analyzed is known. However, as the example of Parkin-
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son’s disease shows, it seems unlikely that “simple” pathophysiologies will be
discovered. Thus, we decided to focus on core features of the pathophysiology
and symptomatology of psychotic disorders, in this case the disturbance of the
concept of self-agency, to limit the scope of phenomena to be explained by more
detailed frame analyses of mental disorders. Two features speak in favor of using
frame theory: i) it provides a systematic and well-deVned approach which pro-
vides general rules usable for all mental disorders as regards their pathophysiol-
ogy, symptomatology and classiVcation, and ii) it may also be useful for analyzing
the historic changes of diagnostic conceptions of mental disorders. Thus, the ap-
proach to progress in this area – as exempliVed by schizophrenia – needs to be
twofold: Vrstly, it is well worth the eUort to analyze historic texts of the early
times of the conceptualization of schizophrenia as an example, because these def-
initions were made without any knowledge about the pathophysiology of the
disorder and have developed over time. Secondly, it is necessary to analyze the
neurobiological underpinnings of core concepts of mental disorders using frame
analyses including time-variability and individual precipitating factors for their
disturbances in mental disorders.
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